

FROM NATIONALISM TO  
REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM

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Two types of approaches to the study of the relationship between Islamic radicalism and politics can be ascertained. One such approach or framework might be referred to as the 'ideational' model. This approach views organisations such as the Moslem Brotherhood in terms of the development of Islamic thought. In this view, the origins of Islamic militancy in Egypt are to be found in the Islamic reform movement of the late nineteenth century whose leaders were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh. The primary purpose of this movement was to return to the fundamentals of Islam. By removing centuries of unnecessary exegesis, the basic principles of Islam would once again be visible and would provide the most effective weapon with which to confront Western imperialism. Under the tutelage of Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh, greater emphasis was placed upon the role of reason in religious interpretation. During the early part of the twentieth century, Rashid Rida and the *al-Salafiyya* movement, the disciples of al-Afghani and 'Abduh, redirected their attention away from the role of reason to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. It was this particular school of thought, the *al-Salafiyya* movement, which profoundly influenced the thought of the Moslem Brotherhood's founder, Hasan al-Banna.

This ideational approach to the relationship between Islam and politics was heavily influenced by the Orientalist tradition in Middle East studies and was most prominent in the writings of H. A. R. Gibb (Gibb, 1947). An implicit assumption was that tendencies towards Islamic radicalism were directly correlated with the penetration of Western values into the Moslem world. While not articulated as such, the ideational model posited a 'decay thesis' which juxtaposed a reified Islam to a dynamic system of Western values. Islam was seen as passing through various phases or stages. In its initial phase, Islam achieved its ascendancy through positing a rigid belief system which inspired its adherents to victory over infidel forces. In its second phase, under the Umayyid and Abbasid caliphates, Islam attained its Golden Age. Subsequent to the closing of the door of *ijtihad* and the decline of the Abbasid caliphate, Islam entered a long period of intellectual decline and stagnation. With the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt and the penetration of Western values, the process of decay was accelerated as a rigidified Islamic world-view made a futile attempt to cope with a dynamic and secular Western system of values, but in vain. It was this process of decay which al-Afghani, and particularly 'Abduh, hoped to end by stressing the role of reason in religious interpretation. Instead of producing a reformist Islam, the logic of this movement ultimately led it

## 7 Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt

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One of the most significant phenomena in the contemporary Middle East is the increased strength of Islam as a political force. Under the banner of Islam, militant religious movements have toppled the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran while threatening the stability of secular regimes in Syria, the Sudan and Iraq. In Egypt, Islamic militants were responsible for the assassination of the most prominent Arab leader, Anwar al-Sadat. Even the arch-defender of Islamic orthodoxy, the Saudi monarchy, has not been immune from attack. It has found itself challenged by tribally-based religious groups which claim that Islam is not being protected from the encroachment of secular westernisation. Given their increasing political influence, the paucity of information and the conceptual confusion surrounding them underline the need for a better understanding of Islamic radical movements.

By far the most powerful radical Islamic movement in the Middle East is the Moslem Brotherhood which was founded in Egypt in 1928 and subsequently spread throughout the Arab world. Although studied from an organisational and ideological viewpoint, there is still a relatively limited understanding of the continuing attraction that the Brotherhood and its militant offshoots holds for large segments of the Egyptian populace. To broaden our understanding of the relationship between Islam and politics in Egypt, this study focuses on three central questions. First, what social strata are attracted to Islamic radicalism and why? Second, why do these strata interpret Islam in the way that they do? Third, how do radical Islamic political organisations relate to the dominant groups in Egyptian society and what chances do they have of seizing power?

to the radical fundamentalism of *Ikhwan* ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna.

At one level, this model is very seductive since it offers a very integrated argument which is placed in an historical perspective. Nevertheless, it suffers many conceptual flaws. First and foremost of these is its emphasis on seeing change in the realm of ideas. This leads to a concentration on the thought of major Islamic thinkers and hence to an élitist bias. How this thought resonates with the needs of the society at large is largely left to the imagination. As regards Moslem Brotherhood and other Islamic radical groups, this means that we learn much about the ideologues of the movement but little about its mass following.

A second conceptual flaw is the tendency to view Islamic society (assuming for a moment that such a notion is of conceptual utility) in terms of decay, breakdown and social-pathology. Rather than seeing Islamic radicalism as an attempt to regenerate a corporate unity that repairs the breakdown of traditional institutions, such as the extended family, and to help its adherents cope with rapid social change, it is viewed as a pathological and xenophobic response to alien views with which it refuses to come to terms.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, this approach fails to stratify Islamic societies. Thus all Moslems are lumped together as one undifferentiated social unit. This prevents an understanding of why some Moslems and not others, are attracted to Islamic political movements. It is precisely this problem which the 'sociological' model attempts to confront.

The sociological model may be designated as such because it seeks to account for the social bases and recruitment patterns of Islamic radical groups. The early studies of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt said little or nothing about the social composition of the movement. In the most comprehensive analysis of the Moslem Brotherhood to date, Richard Mitchell (1969) offers a limited amount of data on members arrested during the late 1940s and after the purported assassination attempt on President Nasser in 1954. In a study completed in 1969, it was possible to expand on Mitchell's data and construct a sample of over 650 Moslem Brothers arrested between 1947 and 1954. Through the analysis of these data, an effort was made to interrelate such variables as occupation, education, place of birth, age, political activity and intensity of commitment to the Moslem Brotherhood (Davis, 1970).

Most recently, Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, conducted a similar type of study through interviews with imprisoned members of *al-Jama'at al-Muslimin (Jama'at al-takfir wa'l-hijra)*.<sup>2</sup> This research illuminated many fascinating aspects about the social backgrounds of those drawn to Islamic

radical movements, such as early socialisation, which are much less clear from statistical data gained from trial records (Ibrahim, 1980).

The sociological model proved to be of greater conceptual utility than the ideational approach in demonstrating that the Moslem Brotherhood and its offshoots in Egypt recruited from a particular stratum of society, and in offering hypotheses to explain this recruitment pattern. It also introduced, albeit implicitly, a notion of process or change. By arguing that Islamic militants were drawn from members of the urban lower class who were both horizontally and vertically mobile, and who were hostile to the religious establishment and Egypt's political class, these studies posed questions which could only be adequately answered by understanding the life-experiences of Islamic militants *over time*. In other words, if Islamic militants were predominantly recruited from recent migrants to urban areas, what caused these individuals to leave the countryside? What factors caused them to seek upward mobility and why were they so hostile to the *ulama* and to those who control the state? Unlike the ideational model which posited no more than a vaguely defined struggle between the values of occident and orient, the sociological model introduced the notion of conflict among social groups within Egypt and suggested that only through a more defined historical perspective, one that was not limited to a formalistic study of ideology, could the sources and ultimate outcome of this conflict be understood.

Despite its advance over the ideational approach, the sociological model suffers its own analytic shortcomings. If the ideational approach to Islamic radicalism tells us little about the social bases of its adherents, then the sociological approach is anaemic in its ability to explain ideology. Ideology is either viewed in terms of a crude materialism or in terms of psycho-social needs. In one instance, it is a reflection of class interests – a response to thwarted ambitions for upward mobility – and in another, a reflection of the social strains caused by the difficulties facing urban migrants steeped in tradition who are trying to adapt to the pressures of city life. This means that the internal structure of Islamic radical thought, causes underlying its changes over time, its emotive power, and the political constraints and advantages it bestows on its adherents are never fully discussed.

A second criticism of the sociological model is its failure to provide an historical context within which to situate the growth and development of Islamic radicalism. Even though the hypotheses offered by this model suggest an historical perspective, it remains implicit and is never clearly articulated. The inadequacy of the sociological model becomes manifest

when one asks the following question: why is it that Islamic radical thought is anti-imperialist and largely concerned with socio-economic issues during the 1940s and 1950s while during the 1960s and 1970s, such thought places primary emphasis on symbols such as corruption, family socialisation, sexual mores and cultural authenticity – symbols which are primarily cultural rather than economic in nature?

In order to confront the criticisms of the aforementioned models, and to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of Islamic radicalism in Egypt, we propose a structural model centred on the concepts of accumulation, legitimisation and authenticity. At this point, it is only possible to sketch the rudiments of such a model. Its advantage over prior conceptualisations of Islamic radicalism is that first, it integrates the study of ideology and social structure; second, it studies these phenomena over time; and third, it situates the study of Islamic militancy in a global or world-market perspective. Islamic radical movements cannot be adequately studied as a phenomenon disembodied from its larger social setting. Unless one focuses on these movements in relationship to the accumulation process, and to the Egyptian class structure and the competing ideologies articulated by groups within that structure, only partial conceptualisations of Islamic radicalism will be obtained.

In seeking to integrate ideology and social class, and to place the study of Islamic radicalism within a larger historical and global perspective, our model emphasises three broad hypotheses. The first of these hypotheses centres on the problem of differential accumulation. The central dilemma facing Egyptian society during the nineteenth and especially the twentieth century has been the inability of social resources to keep pace with an ever-increasing population. In contrast to the general impoverishment of the populace, a rural notable stratum of 'umad and *mashayikh* was able to capitalise upon the rapid expansion of long-stable cotton cultivation and was transformed into an agrarian bourgeoisie by the late 1800s. The process of differential accumulation abated somewhat following the over-throw of the monarchy in 1952 and the implementation of Nasserite 'socialism'. However, the process began again in earnest following the onset of the 'open door' policy (*al-infitah*) of the 1970s. The widening gap between rich and poor needs to be seen as a key element in providing a fertile climate for the growth of militant Islamic political groups.

The problem or crisis of legitimisation is directly related to that of differential accumulation. It can be argued that the impact of the global economy was the central element in the process of differential accumu-

lation by providing the market demand for long-staple cotton. It can also be argued that world market forces, aided by the inherent difficulties of capital formation and by both colonial and neo-colonial pressures, prevented either capitalist or 'socialist' (state capitalist) policies from effectively confronting Egypt's development problems. In contributing to the de-legitimisation of both capitalist and socialist development models, world market-forces contributed to the crisis of authenticity by creating an ideological vacuum which a militant political interpretation of Islam could fill.<sup>3</sup> Both the liberal model of development of the pre-1952 era and the state capitalism of the Nasser period failed adequately to confront Egypt's development problems or the contradiction of the greater accumulation of wealth in relatively fewer hands and the concomitant increasing pauperisation of the bulk of society. With the deepening of underdevelopment, the political class found it more difficult to legitimate its rule as it had been unable to solve the pressing problems of the politically conscious elements outside the dominant power structure.

It is our contention that the increasing contradiction between differential accumulation and decreasing legitimacy produces a crisis of authenticity. The failure of liberalism and state capitalism (which was referred to by the Nasser regime as Arab socialism), both of which are perceived as imported development models, stimulated an introspection among the politically-conscious strata of Egyptian society that were only marginally benefiting from the accumulation process. Whether or not the attempt to characterise liberalism and secular socialism as 'imported' value systems (that is, intrinsically alien to Egyptian society) is a valid one is not the main concern here. Rather we are interested in the effort of a disaffected stratum to substitute its own ideology and development model for what Islamic militants perceive as the bankrupt ideologies of Western liberalism and secular socialism (that is, state capitalism).

Within this context, a much more comprehensive view of ideology can be articulated than is possible through either the ideational or sociological approaches. We would argue that ideology is a reflection of class interests in that Islamic radicals, as shall be seen, do come from a particular social class and do seek to acquire a greater share of society's material resources. Ideology can also be understood in terms of social strains as Islamic militants do seek refuge in Islam to sooth the alienation stemming from the status deprivation which they have experienced. The transference of their hostility on to scapegoats such as liberals, imperialists, communists and Jews, and their conviction that,

by seeking refuge in 'true Islam', they will ultimately triumph over their infidel enemies is a classic syndrome associated with coping with social strains (Geertz, 1964).<sup>4</sup> Beyond this, however, ideology plays an important cognitive role for Islamic radicals. It does not merely offer a call to action and a palliative for their alienation. As a rich and complex cultural system which has developed over many centuries, Islam offers a vast symbolic network and thus a medium through which to interpret reality and to provide meaning for the believer. It offers a mechanism through which to re-establish a sense of community and corporate identity that will replace the fragmentation of traditional institutions, especially the extended family. In performing this cognitive function, Islam should not be viewed in the abstract. Islamic radicalism appeals to those who have suffered real or perceived deprivation. Its call to action differs sharply from the quietism of the establishment *'ulama*.

As interpreted and practised by the Moslem Brotherhood and its derivative organisations, Islamic radicalism should not be understood in terms of the concept of revival or resurgence but rather as the *'politicisation* of Islam. It is not as if Egyptians have suddenly 'rediscovered' Islam. Rather the power of the appeal of radical interpretations of Islam throughout the twentieth century, and especially after the Second World War, is a response to a conjuncture of processes: the increasing gap in income between rich and poor, the declining legitimacy of the political system, the rising consciousness of the urban middle class, the breakdown of traditional institutions and the need for orienting concepts that will allow disaffected sectors of Egyptian society to cope effectively with conditions of rapid social change.

#### MEMBERSHIP AND RECRUITMENT

Most studies of Islamic radical movements in Egypt have told us very little about the social composition of their membership. Ideology has proved to be a poor predictor of the social bases of such movements. Given the often crude and simplistic interpretations of Islam in writings of Islamic radicals, the tendency was frequently to assume that the membership of organisations such as the Moslem Brotherhood was drawn from such traditional groups as petty religious functionaries, small merchants and artisans, or from the urban lumpenproletariat. Data obtained from trial records, newspapers, interviews and literary sources indicate that such a perception is misplaced. While it is possible

to locate members of these groups in Islamic radical movements, they comprise only a small percentage of the overall membership.

Who then is the typical Moslem Brother or member of an Islamic radical organisation? A surprisingly consistent pattern that persists over almost a fifty year period is that radical groups appeal to, and recruit members from, the urban professional middle class, especially, in more recent times, engineers. Contrary to what might be expected, members seem to be those whom modernisation predicted would be secular in their world view given their high level of education, as Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 indicate.

This occupational pattern requires important qualifications. Although the overwhelming portion of Islamic radicals are drawn from professional and white collar occupations, most are recent immigrants to urban areas.<sup>5</sup> Thus their occupations and educational backgrounds belie a traditional socialisation in the countryside. Another important consideration is that while radicals in urban areas tend to be professionals or part of a white collar salariat, those in the countryside tend to contain a heavy proportion of secondary school teachers.<sup>6</sup>

The high representation of teachers among rural members of the Moslem Brotherhood hints at the relationship between the seemingly secular occupations of urban radicals and rural social structure. Data indicate that urban members of Islamic radical groups are both horizontally and vertically mobile. In other words, these individuals are both migrants from rural areas and aspirants to higher social status as evidenced by their choice of professional education. Although the data are not conclusive, they point to a number of patterns. First, urban radicals frequently were former teachers themselves. Second, urban militants maintain links with their families in the countryside and thus with family members who continue in the teaching profession.<sup>7</sup> Secondary school teacher-training entails considerable religious education which is an indicator of the traditional origins of religious radicals.<sup>8</sup> Data also indicate that urban and rural radicals come from a very conservative and tradition-oriented rural social stratum that is comprised of sub-groups of small merchant-artisans, religious functionaries and small landowners. Often the extended family contains elements of each sub-group in addition to providing members of the teaching profession.

From the emphasis on social pathology in much of the literature on 'Islamic revivalism', one would anticipate a considerable amount of disruption of family life among members of Islamic radical organisations. Indeed this is the impression that the Egyptian government

TABLE 7.1 Occupations of members of the Guidance Council of the Moslem Brotherhood, 1934 and 1953

Occupation	1934	1953
Higher Civil Servants (inspectors/directors)	0	4
Lawyers	0	2
Men of religion	5*	2
University professors	0	2
Urban notables	2	0
White collar employees	3	0
Secondary schoolteachers	1	0
Pharmacists	0	1
TOTAL	11	11

\* Three Members of this category, including Hasan al-Banna, were teachers in religious institutes.

SOURCE Bayumi (1979) p. 87; Mitchell (1969) p. 329.

attempted to promote in the extensive press coverage which was given to the family life of Ahmad Shukri Mustafa, the leader (*al-amir*) of *Jama'at al-takfir wa'l-hijra*. While this is certainly true for some radicals, on the whole they seem to come from relatively stable family environments (Ibrahim, 1980, p. 440). The fact that those drawn to Islamic groups

TABLE 7.2 Distribution by occupation of Moslem Brothers arrested in 1954

Occupation	Percentage of sample
Professionals	6.7 (40)
Businessmen	5.0 (30)
Government employees	13.1 (76)
Politicians	0.4 (2)
Military men	6.8 (41)
Teachers	12.3 (74)
Men of religion	0.5 (3)
Students	24.1 (145)
Artisans/Small business/Petty functionary	9.8 (59)
Workers	15.8 (95)
Farmers	3.0 (18)
Other	2.5 (18)
TOTAL	100.0 (601)

SOURCE Newspapers: *al-Jumhuriya*, *al-Akhhbar al-Yawm*, *al-Qahira*; Magazines: *al-Musawwar*, *Akhhir Sa'a*, issues for December 1954 through February 1955.

TABLE 7.3 Distribution by occupational group of Moslem Brothers arrested in 1954

Occupational group	Percentage of sample
Professional	11.0 (66)
White collar	55.3 (331)
Artisan/Small business/Petty functionary	13.8 (83)
Skilled worker	9.3 (56)
Unskilled worker	10.7 (65)
TOTAL	100.0 (601)

SOURCE Same as Table 7.2.

have received a traditional socialisation, have learned basic educational skills, have a knowledge of the basic tenets of Islam and an aspiration for upward mobility suggests a cohesive family structure. What does seem to be the case is that the rural *petite-bourgeoisie* from which Islamic radicals are drawn is increasingly pressurised and marginalised by Egypt's deteriorating economic conditions.

TABLE 7.4 Occupations of Moslem Brothers brought to trial in 1965

Occupation	Number	Percentage
Professionals	32	(31)
Secondary school teachers	16	(16)
Clerks/low level bureaucrats	14	(14)
Students (science)	9	(9)
Small factory owners/shopkeepers/contractors/merchants	5	(5)
High level bureaucrats/factory directors	4	(4)
Men (and women) of religion	3	(3)
Peasants	3	(3)
Students (other)	2	(2)
Skilled workers	2	(2)
Worker	1	(1)
Army officer	1	(1)
Housewife	1	(1)
Unknown	8	(8)
TOTAL	100	(100)

SOURCE *al-Ahram*, *al-Jumhuriya*: issues from December-February, 1965 (NB: This sample is only preliminary since over 700 Moslem Brothers were arrested during 1965.)

Even though the rural families from which Islamic radicals are drawn seem still to be cohesive, they do not seem to be able to provide material and psychological protection for their members who seek upward mobility. It is instructive to contrast this type of family with the rural notable family from which Egypt's dominant political élite recruits its members. Despite land reform, the rural notable family still possesses significant tracts of land. From its strong rural base, it has been able to situate its members in the armed forces, the state apparatus, the dominant party and parliamentary institutions, the security network and in the public sector (Binder, 1979). By contrast, the rural petty bourgeois family cannot provide the same level of protection or influence (*al-wasita*). Thus the upwardly mobile member of the family finds himself very vulnerable to the vicissitudes of Egyptian life, especially in large urban areas such as Cairo and Alexandria. Attempting to cope with urban life becomes particularly problematic if a rural migrant has received a university degree and is unable to find satisfactory employment. Even if employment is located, considerable status inconsistency can result since white collar employment often does not allow the individual to maintain a decent standard of living commensurate with his social status.

In this regard, it is not coincidental that the Moslem Brotherhood and other Islamic radical groups have chosen to refer to their primary organisational unit as 'the family' (*al-usra*). In forming cells in major urban centres and in provincial capitals, Islamic groups seek to reconstruct the corporate unity of traditional rural life. The 'Islamic family' thus provides a sense of identity and protection within what is perceived to be a hostile and capricious environment.

Despite a strong concern with socio-economic issues, much discussion among Moslem Brothers within the 'family' or cell dealt with trying to cope with the changing mores and values of Egyptian society, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. The deep concern among male radicals with finding a 'pure' woman who would be suitable as a wife, and with trying to deal with their sexuality as a result of increased sexual stimuli, point once again to the impact of traditional socialisation. Given the very conservative and closed nature of rural petty bourgeois society, the cosmopolitan and materially oriented character of urban life which allowed for more contact with members of the opposite sex, especially in the university, posed very threatening temptations not found in the village. The cell provided the opportunity to assert one's complete elevation to purity and hence a refuge from the corrupt outside world.<sup>9</sup>

In recruiting members, Islamic radical movements form an extensive

institutional infrastructure and symbolic nexus which is not available to competing political groups. First, over one hundred Islamic fraternal and charitable organisations are officially registered in Egypt. Second, the mosque provides an additional source of recruitment, especially since this provides an opportunity to observe who are the most devout among those saying their prayers. Since the mosque is not merely a place of prayer but also a social institution, it is frequently used by Islamic militants to organise religious study circles which is frequently done after the Friday prayer.<sup>10</sup> It further provides an opportunity to raise money since donations can be collected for the purchase of religious texts. Third, radicals frequently invoke the obligation of the *zakat* or tax on personal wealth for the sake of charity as an additional source of funds.<sup>11</sup> Of course, recruitment to groups such as the Moslem Brotherhood is often based upon family networks or social ties established at the university. Nevertheless, the ability to manipulate Islam confers an organisational advantage on radical organisations over competing political groups, especially those on the left such as the Nasserites and communists.

## IDEOLOGY

Islam in radical or fundamentalist thinking reflects the social experiences and class character of its adherents but should not be reduced to these categories. Radical Islamic ideology provides a source of strengths and constraints for organisations such as the Moslem Brotherhood and the *jama'at al-takfir wa'l-hijra*. Ideology is an important determinant of these organisations' ability to mobilise support, provide an alternative to the ideological dominance of the ruling class, and ultimately their ability to seize political power.

It is important to distinguish between ideologues and activists when discussing radical interpretations of Islam. Clearly, most activists are aware of the basic tenets of Islam but are unfamiliar with the sophisticated doctrinal disputes that have characterised the discourse among prominent *'ulama* and religious thinkers over the centuries. By radical Islamic ideology, I mean the writings of prominent Moslem Brothers such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and 'Umar al-Tilimsani and leaders of more radical Islamic groups such as Ahmad Shukri Mustafa and Salih al-Sirriya, the former head of the Islamic Liberation Party (*Hi:zib al-tahrir al-islami*).

Perhaps the most striking feature of radical Islamic ideology is its



unitary or holistic character. At the social level, the tenacious emphasis on the integrated nature of Islam and the assertion that its doctrines encompass all aspects of man's existence reflect the desire to utilise Islam as a means to resist the increasing fragmentation of social life. Islam becomes a way of reasserting the corporate unity of Egyptian society which Islamic radicals perceived to exist from the vantage point of their early socialisation in the countryside.

This emphasis on a unitary, holistic Islam is very compatible with the overall world-view of the rural *petite-bourgeoisie*. It has been argued that there is no contradiction between the fact that such a large percentage of Islamic militants have been educated in the natural sciences and still subscribe to radical interpretations of Islam. Since the natural sciences stress an absolute approach to knowledge (either something is right or it is wrong), it is erroneous to assume that a 'modern' education will necessarily erode a traditional consciousness which likewise emphasises absolute categories of thought.

If there is a 'fit' between the traditional world view of the rural *petite-bourgeoisie* and the manner in which Islamic radicalism is articulated in urban centres, then such a statement still fails to explain the way in which such thought mediates reality for its followers and the advantages and shortcomings of such mediation. In emphasising the total character of Islam, radical Islamic ideology provides not only for the psychological needs of its adherents but also provides a comprehensive explanation of a complex and changing social reality. Moreover, it does this using symbols which possess strong emotive power since they are ones with which members of the lower middle class have been acquainted since early childhood and they evoke memories of a romanticised past in which life was integrated and devoid of conflict.

The strength of such symbols becomes even more apparent when juxtaposed to those of the major competing ideologies: liberalism, Arab socialism and Marxism. All three ideologies come under major attack in the writings of Islamic radicals. Liberalism is associated with capitalism, while socialist ideologies are seen as part of a conspiracy to turn Egypt into a communist society which would be beholden to the Soviet Union. Both liberal-capitalist and communist concepts are seen as belonging to imported ideologies that seek to encourage the social disintegration of Egyptian society. Capitalism fosters social decay through unprincipled competition and exploitation of the middle and working classes while communism encourages internal conflict through its doctrine of the inherent conflict between the owners of capital and the producing classes.

The symbols of liberalism do little to mediate reality for the Moslem Brother or member of more radical Islamic groups whose contacts with Western culture are minimal at best. The atomism and individualism of liberal thought offers little to the aspirant of upward mobility who finds his path to success blocked or only partially achieved. Indeed, if liberal symbols were to be taken seriously, they would suggest that failure to achieve success and the accompanying psychological trauma are the responsibility of the individual not the society at large. Politically, Egypt's experiment with liberalism since the turn of the century produced great differentials of wealth, collaboration with British imperialism, the loss of Palestine to Zionism and increasing secularisation and hence in the view of Islamic radicals, moral corruption of society.

Marxist symbols are equally inadequate in performing a cognitive function for the lower middle classes. Marxist symbols are most appropriate for those who have lost all ties with existing society and who have nothing to lose and everything to gain through the revolutionary transformation of society. Future-oriented rather than past-oriented symbols provide a prism through which to understand reality for the urban factory worker or agrarian wage labourer. They offer little to the political activist of rural *petite-bourgeoisie* origin who is trying to achieve social mobility but who is still tied and committed to traditional structures.

The symbols of Arab or Nasserite socialism are even less resonant with social reality than those of bourgeois liberalism and Marxism since they are much more *ad hoc*, have a shorter history and are treated with such cynicism by their own proponents. That neither freedom, socialism nor unity were ever on the verge of being implemented in Egypt or the Arab world under President Nasser was not lost on those who were attracted to the Moslem Brotherhood and its derivative organisations. The repression of the political Right and Left, the loss of two wars to Israel, the deteriorating economic situation and the corruption within the state apparatus and public sector created utter contempt among the lower middle class for Arab socialist ideology. Worse yet, Arab socialism was seen as facilitating the infiltration of more radical communist ideas and hence the ultimate takeover of Egypt by Marxist forces.<sup>12</sup>

Radical Islamic ideology in Egypt thus serves to interpret reality in such a way as to fulfill the material and psychological needs of its adherents. Its symbols posit the fundamental unity and integrity of society as found in the Holy Qur'an and in the application of Islamic law



(*al-shari'at al-islamiya*). Radical Islamic thought informs its followers that society is experiencing difficulties because its leaders and members of the community have strayed from the path of Islam. Greed, corruption and atheism all threaten to fragment society and prevent it from effectively confronting its external enemies. Through such argumentation, the Islamic radical is given categories which both help to explain the social decay around him and his own thwarted ambitions for upward mobility. These categories provide a sense of community or group solidarity which juxtaposes the community of the faithful to the community of unbelievers. Used in this way, Islamic symbols place the militant at a higher moral level than other members of society and thus place him in the position of serving a divine mission as he seeks to restore God's will on earth. Not only does such ideology mediate reality in a very effective manner but it also holds out the prospect that time is on the side of the believer.

Although radical Islamic thought is unitary in scope, it should not be seen as a static ideology. Here the inadequacies of viewing such thought in terms of social pathology become apparent. For if Ikhwān ideology is to be seen as an irrational aberration of Islam that is meant to offer solace to its adherents, how is one to explain the organisational sophistication of radical Islamic groups which hope to seize power? Far from being totally irrational, Islamic ideology in Egypt is structured and teleological. It proffers a political programme and hence, a vision, however impractical, of a future Egyptian society under its hegemony. Radical Islamic thought stresses the unity of Islam not just to serve the psychological needs of its followers, and to help explain reality to them, but also to counterpose itself to the dominant ideologies – both in the religious and political spheres.

The notion of a rigidified Islam which refuses to confront social change, which many Orientalists see inherent in radical or fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, seems much more characteristic of the positivism of establishment Islam. Certainly relations between the Azharite *'ulama* and the Moslem Brotherhood have always been conflictual. In the case of the *takfir wa'l-hijra* group, relations became so acrimonious that they led the group to kidnap and assassinate a former minister of religious endowments and Azhar affairs. Indeed, since the rise of the Moslem Brotherhood during the 1930s the *'ulama* have come under continual attack for their ineffectiveness in confronting Western imperialism and, during the Nasser era, in rebuffing Soviet attempts to gain more influence in Egyptian society. More recently the *'ulama* have been seen as acquiescing to the renewed influence of Western capitalism

over Egypt's economic and social life and its rapprochement with Israel. The struggle between the unitary view of Islam in its radical variants and the positivist orientation of the establishment *'ulama* is perhaps best illustrated in the dispute between Shaykh Muhammad Husayn al-Dhahabi, an Azharite scholar and former minister of religious endowments and Azhar affairs, and the *Jama'at al-takfir wa'l-hijra* which kidnapped and assassinated him in 1977. While the causes for al-Dhahabi's killing are still not entirely clear, the main reason seems to be his attack on radical Islamic groups entitled, *Deviant Tendencies in Interpreting the Holy Qur'an: Their Motives and their Repudiation (al-ittijahat al-munharifa fi tafsir al-qur'an al-karim: dawafi'uha wa daf'uha)* (1976). The sources of this dispute will be discussed in greater detail below. What concerns us here is a chapter entitled, 'The deviant tendency in explanation according to those who claim that the Qur'an contains all the universal sciences in general and in detail'.

In this chapter, it is clear that al-Dhahabi seeks to dispute the notion that 'engineering, medicine and philosophy' and all sciences can be located in the Qur'an. The Qur'an is a means towards the betterment of mankind and not a comprehensive source of knowledge. The view of the Qur'an as a comprehensive source of knowledge, al-Dhahabi argues, impedes scientific and technological studies which are crucial for the betterment of humanity (al-Dhahabi, 1976, pp. 81–8).

It is clear from al-Dhahabi's arguments and those of other establishment *'ulama* that they seek to disaggregate the very categories which radical Islamic thought views in unitary terms. Thus religion, science and politics are discrete and self-contained spheres of thought and action which do not possess any necessary interrelationship. This positivist and essentially secular view of reality serves the interests of the ruling class in Egypt in two fundamental ways. First, it separates religion and politics in an attempt to prevent oppositional groups from using Islam to challenge the ruling class's ideological dominance. Second, it precludes any attempt to place constraints on the accumulation process through invoking edicts derived from Islam. If, for example, it could be argued that Qur'an did contain all necessary scientific knowledge, or even the broad outlines of such knowledge, this would place serious restrictions on economic development since such an assertion could be used to delegitimize technological and scientific innovations borrowed from non-Islamic societies. When considered in conjunction with the political dimensions of radical Islamic ideology, it is easy to visualise how such arguments could have a significant impact on the process of accumulation in Egyptian society and the control over this process by

the ruling class. In seeking to protect its class rule, the dominant forces in Egyptian society seek to promote an individualistic and apolitical concept of Islam – the direct antithesis of the world view offered in radical Islamic thought.

### ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND STATE POWER

Given the critique of existing conceptualisations of radical Islamic political organisations in Egypt and the discussion of recruitment patterns and ideology which characterise such movements, it is now possible to examine Islamic radicalism within the context of the structural approach mentioned earlier in the paper. Recruitment data point to a class base of Islamic movements in Egypt which, while unable to seize power on their own, can continue to pose a serious challenge to the political stability of the current regime. What the lower middle class possesses in members and ideological appeal is offset by its lack of influence in formal political and social institutions (e.g., among the *ulama*, in the parliament and in the judiciary) and its lack of control over economic resources. Nevertheless, radical Islamic political organisations might pose the threat of seizing power were they to enter into coalition with other rightist groups. This is particularly true with regard to attempts by other Arab regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Libya, both in the past and in the present, to use radical Islamic groups to destabilise Egypt.

While the Moslem Brotherhood first began to make foreign contacts through its participation in the Arab Revolt in Palestine between 1936 and 1939, it did not begin to have extensive contacts outside Egypt until fighting in the 1948 Arab–Israeli war (al-Sharif, n.d.) Thus, after the suppression of the Moslem Brotherhood in 1954, several of its prominent members such as Sa'id Ramadan, Salih al-Ashmawi and Mustafa al-'Alim fled to Jerusalem where they became associated with the Higher Islamic Council. With the deterioration of Egyptian–Saudi relations during the 1960s, especially after Egyptian troops came to the support of Republican forces in Yemen, the exiled Moslem Brothers transferred their operations to Saudi Arabia where they enjoyed the largesse of the Saudi royal family. It was from Saudi Arabia that the attempted *coup d'état* against the Nasser regime in 1965 was coordinated and financed.

While the sample of Moslem Brothers arrested in 1954 consisted almost entirely of native Egyptians, the sample of Brothers arrested in

1965 contained nationals from other Arab countries, particularly Palestinians, Libyans, and Sudanese. Contacts with Moslem Brotherhood organisations extended as far away as Kuwait and Bahrain.<sup>13</sup> While the Moslem Brotherhood was founded in other Arab countries (e.g. in Syria in 1934),<sup>14</sup> the contact of Moslem Brothers in different Arab countries was enhanced by the spread of Arab nationalism and the internationalisation of capital in the Middle East following the Second World War. The spread of Arab nationalism which led the states of the Arab League to intervene in Palestine in 1948 was one factor which expanded contact between Islamic political organisations in different Arab countries. The attempt of President Nasser to spread Egyptian influence under the banner of Arab socialism led to offers to students from all Arab countries to complete their university education in Egypt. Given the strong influence of the Moslem Brotherhood and other radical Islamic groups in Egyptian universities, many of these Arab students were recruited to them.

The internationalisation of capital likewise had a significant impact on the interaction of Egyptian Islamic radicals with those in other Arab countries. The rise in the price of petroleum products after 1970 created a demand for skilled labour in many of the Arab oil-producing states, especially in Saudi Arabia, Libya and the Persian Gulf states, all of which have small populations. This process of cross-national migration affected Egypt more than other Arab states because of its heavy surplus population and its own limited sources of petroleum.

The organisational and financial support bestowed upon the Moslem Brotherhood and its derivative organisations by states such as Saudi Arabia, and more recently by Libya, was offset, however, by developments within the Islamic movement itself. Here the importance of a structural or systemic understanding of radical Islamic movements becomes particularly apparent. Until the assassination of the founder of the Moslem Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, in 1949, there were no significant cleavages in the movement. Certainly, much of this unity can be attributed to the dynamic leadership of al-Banna who was a skilled orator and highly effective in political organisation. However, with the rapid growth in the ranks of the Moslem Brotherhood after 1946, it became possible to discern splits in the organisation even before al-Banna's assassination. This was particularly true once a large number of students and young professionals joined the organisation.

By the late 1940s the Moslem Brotherhood was already witnessing signs of a fissure which was only to become fully manifest during the 1970s. This split resulted in the creation of two separate organisations:

the Guidance Council (*maktab al-irshad*), on the one hand, and the Secret Organisation (*al-jihaz al-sirri*), on the other. It was the latter organisation which, under the control of Yusuf Tala't, was behind the attempt to assassinate President Nasser in 1954.

This split brings us once again to the distinction between ideologues and activists. The attempt of the Palace to co-opt the Moslem Brotherhood after al-Banna's death by encouraging the appointment of Hasan al-Hudaybi, who was considered loyal to the Egyptian monarchy, as Supreme Guide, was deeply resented by the younger and more activist members. Since the Palace was already suspected of complicity in al-Banna's death, al-Hudaybi's attempt to play down the Brotherhood's involvement in domestic politics and in the anti-imperialist struggle against the British was perceived as betraying the goals of the organisation.

The situation which existed between 1949 and 1954 bears many similarities to the situation which arose in Egypt after Anwar al-Sadat came to power in 1970. Eager to establish a power-base of his own and fearful that the most effective opposition to his rule would come from the left, Sadat began to release members of the Moslem Brotherhood who had been arrested and imprisoned in 1965. Exiled Moslem Brothers in Europe and Saudi Arabia were allowed to return to the country and in 1976 the Brotherhood was formally allowed to function once again and to publish its periodicals, *al-Da'wa* and *al-I'tisam* (Grzeskowiak, 1980, p. 678; Ramadan, 1977, pp. 10-11). Sadat used the Brotherhood very effectively as a counterweight to the left which he had neutralised by the time of his visit to Israel in November, 1977.

Perhaps in no other area did Islamic radicalism regain as much strength during the 1970s as in the universities. Leftists lost almost all influence in student organisations.<sup>15</sup> The Islamic radical groups which gained influence in the universities and among Egyptian youth were not part of the traditional Moslem Brotherhood which they saw as too conservative and too closely allied with the Sadat regime.

Groups such as *Jama'at al-takfir wa'l-hijra*, *Hi'zb al-tahrir al-islami*, *Jund Allah* (God's Soldiers), *Jama'at al-jihad* (The Holy War Association), *Jama'at al-Muslimin li'l-takfir* (The Society of Moslems which Charges Society with Unbelief), and *Ansar Khumayni* (The Followers of Khomeini) were uncovered throughout the country by the state security apparatus (Grzeskowiak, 1980, p. 675; Altman, 1979, pp. 98-101; *al-Dustur*, 1 and 8, October, 1979). While some members of these groups had formerly belonged to the Moslem Brotherhood, their organisations had no formal ties to their spiritual mentors. By the 1970s, then, an

important generational split had emerged in the Islamic radical movement in Egypt.

The problem with much current writing on Islamic political movements in Egypt during the 1970s is its attempt to situate the rise of groups espousing radical interpretations of Islam within the context of the defeat of Egypt by Israel in 1967. In most studies of Islamic political movements, radical or populist Islam was suppressed in 1954 only to appear again (hence the use of the notion of revival or resurgence) during the 1970s. The problem with such a conceptualisation is that it totally neglects the events of the 1960s. It is clear that almost immediately after the end of the trials of the Moslem Brotherhood in 1955 and the release of many of its younger members, attempts were begun to resurrect the organisation.<sup>16</sup> Groups of former Brothers were formed in Cairo, Alexandria, and the provinces which were apparently unaware of each other's existence. Meanwhile, inside the various prisons to which they had been assigned, Brothers formed study circles which allowed new social networks to be formed. By the time they began to be released during the early 1960s, new cells were formed and ties with those already released were established and re-established. Gradually, a new leadership group began to take shape which took responsibility for co-ordinating the activities of the various cells and for re-establishing links with exiled members of the organisation in Europe and in Saudi Arabia.<sup>17</sup>

The most prominent Moslem Brother in prison during the 1960s was Sayyid Qutb. Released by the government in 1964 for health reasons, he was soon approached by the newly constituted leadership of the Brotherhood to become the titular head of the organisation. Although Qutb had maintained ties with Brothers while still in prison through Zaynab al-Ghazzali and his sister, Hamida Qutb, he was never in actual control of the reconstituted movement. Sayyid Qutb played the role of an ideologue whose nominal leadership lent prestige and legitimacy to the Moslem Brotherhood. The important point is that the young leadership of the 1960s demonstrated little interest in and knowledge of formal Islam. When brought to trial, and questioned by the court, they showed the same ignorance of the intricacies of religious doctrine that members of the *al-jihaz al-sirri* had shown during the trials of 1954-5. Thus the 1960s represented a continuation of the process whereby formal Islamic ideology and political activism became increasingly bifurcated until, by the 1970s, they had become almost thoroughly divorced. Once legalised by the Sadat regime, the Moslem Brotherhood relegated itself primarily to the role of criticising government domestic

and foreign policies while activist splinter groups, such as those mentioned above, concentrated on illegitimate and often violent political activities (Grzeskowiak, 1980, pp. 677-9; Altman, 1979, p. 104; and *al-Ahram*, 4 July 1977 *et passim*). Groups of Islamic radicals continue to be arrested. Following the Sadat assassination, large numbers of militants were arrested in Asyut after engaging in armed conflict with the Egyptian army. In November 1982, 280 members of *Jama'at al-jihad* were brought to trial for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government of President Husni Mubarak.

The increasing hiatus between ideologies and activists can be explained in part by the policies of the Moslem Brotherhood itself and along generational lines. Just as the Brotherhood was used to break strikes led by the Wafd and the leftist worker-student alliance during the late 1940s and early 1950s so it was used by the Sadat regime to attack leftist intellectuals, students and Nasserites during the 1970s. In both instances, this close association alienated the younger and more radical elements of the movement. Clearly, generational factors were also crucial in explaining the bifurcation of ideologues and activists. The older Brothers in the Guidance Council were less prone to become involved in opposing the state outside legally prescribed channels. Indeed, during the 1960s, many older Moslem Brothers rejected the appeals of younger members to rejoin the organisation.

To understand fully the fissures that came to characterise the Islamic radical movement in Egypt, it is necessary to study the changes in its ideology. The fact that the ideology changed between the 1940s and the 1970s from an emphasis on socio-economic variables to those emphasising cultural issues relates in large measure to Egypt's relationship to the world market and its domestic class structure. Whereas members of the urban middle class saw the causes of Egypt's ills as stemming from British imperialism during the 1940s and 1950s, the expulsion of the British from the Suez Canal in 1956 signified the end of formal colonial control over Egypt. Increasingly, during the 1960s and 1970s, Islamic radicals came to see Egypt's problem as stemming from domestic rather than foreign sources. Some writers were very much aware that neo-colonial influences still persisted in Egypt. Nevertheless, Islamic radicals increasingly saw Egypt's problems as caused by betrayal from within rather than control from without. No longer was it possible to argue that foreign capitalists exploited the middle and lower classes through ownership of domestic industry since, by the mid-1960s, almost all the means of production were owned by the state public sector.<sup>19</sup>

This shift in perception was reflected at the ideological level in the

increasing prominence of the concept of withdrawal. In this sense, the period of the 1960s is a crucial, albeit unstudied, era when this concept first began to be clearly articulated. Sayyid Qutb's emphasis on the distinction between the 'community of the faithful' (*al-umma al-mu'mina*) as opposed to the 'community of unbelievers' (*al-umma al-jahiliyya*) reflected the increasing alienation of Islamic radicals from their own society.<sup>20</sup> This hostility to the state and society at large replaced the former hostility to imperial control. By the 1970s, this alienation had reached the point in the *Jama'at al-takfir wal-hijra* and other radical groups where its members had completely withdrawn from society. In the case of the *takfir* group, this meant refusing to take employment in the state bureaucracy or serve in the armed forces since this, it was argued, would only strengthen the infidel forces.<sup>21</sup> Neighbours of *takfir* communes, which were dispersed throughout middle-class quarters of Cairo and Alexandria, reported that their members prayed separately in the mosque and even refused to speak to anyone outside the group.<sup>22</sup>

The Sadat regime utilised the withdrawal phenomenon to discredit the more radical of the Islamic political groups. Shaykh al-Dhahabi's book (which, given its size, was definitely meant for popular consumption) attacked groups espousing a '*Kharijite*' mentality (Dhahabi, 1976, pp. 63-9; *al-Ahram*, 8 July 1977). Of course, the tendency among youth to disengage themselves from society and, as many members of the *takfir* group had done, become peddlars and beggars, was very alarming to certain intellectuals and members of Egypt's ruling class.

These observations on the development of Islamic radicalism in Egypt during the 1970s suggest that the deepening of underdevelopment is exacerbating the contradiction between differential accumulation and legitimacy. While this contradiction bodes ill for political and economic stability in Egypt, it does not imply a zero-sum game whereby the decrease in the ruling class's legitimacy automatically represents a gain in the political power of Islamic radical movements. The ranks of these movements have clearly swelled during the 1970s but this increase in numbers has not translated itself into effective political power because of the reasons just discussed. Even the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat and the subsequent struggle between armed Islamic radicals and government troops in Asyut in Upper Egypt did not pose a serious threat to the Egyptian regime.

Beyond the urban middle class, it is difficult to see Islamic radicalism extending to the industrial working-class and peasantry which has traditionally ignored its appeals.<sup>23</sup> This is especially true given the shift

in symbols from a socio-economic to a cultural emphasis which means that until now, Islamic political groups have offered little of substance to the lower classes. Given the presupposition of reading and writing skills which are required for even the most basic religious tracts, illiterate or semi-literate peasants and workers are unable to relate to radical Islamic writings and the study circles in which these writings are discussed. Furthermore, peasants and workers have not been socialised into a petty bourgeois consciousness which would make the symbols of Islamic radicalism relevant to their lives.

In conclusion, the chances of Islamic radical groups seizing power in Egypt seem remote in light of their own internal cleavages and their inability to form a powerful coalition with the upper middle class or to mobilise the masses behind their cause. At best, these groups seem destined to play a supporting role on the historical stage. Their power, then, ultimately seems to be determined in large measure by the extent to which they are manipulated by the dominant class which currently controls Egyptian society. This class, whose interests and destiny seem increasingly to be tied to foreign capital through the 'open door' policy, will probably only find it useful to mobilise support from Islamic radical movements if there is a strong challenge from the left. At the same time, radical Islamic groups may refuse to support the regime given their increasing alienation from it because of widespread corruption and the refusal of the state to reconstitute society according to their own interpretations of Islam. The result will most likely be a fragmented Egyptian polity pitting the 'neo-liberal' coalition of Anwar al-Sadat's successors against an increasingly vocal Islamic radical movement and a Nasserite and Marxist left.

## NOTES

1. Examples of this type of approach to the relationship between Islam and politics can be found in Saifan, 1961; and Halpern, 1963: esp. the chapter on 'Neo-Islamic Totalitarianism', pp. 134-55. For a critique and attempt to transcend it, cf. Binder, 1965, p. 396, and more recently Gilsenan, 1980.
2. This organisation refers to itself as the *al-Jama'at al-Muslimin*. However, the name which the Egyptian government has attached to it—*Jama'at al-takfir wa'l-hijra* (the association which accuses society of disbelief and advocates withdrawal from it)—has come to be the one by which it is commonly known.
3. A comparative example which highlights the importance of world market forces in fostering the growth of Islamic radical movements in Egypt can be found in the emergence of the *Gush Emunim* and other militant Jewish groups in Israel. As in Egypt, a bureaucratically top heavy 'socialist' model

- of development proved unable to provide adequate capital and technological modernisation for significant economic growth. The result was the turn to a much more *laissez-faire* model of development, similar to Egypt's *infitah*, and the undermining of the legitimacy of leftist ideologies in general. The attempt by groups such as the *Gush Emunim* to recapture the 'pioneering spirit' of the early *yishuv* and to define Israeli society in more Jewish and nationalist terms suggests a crisis of authenticity which is similar to that being experienced in Egypt. These arguments are developed in greater detail in my forthcoming book-length study which compares the Moslem Brotherhood and the *Gush Emunim* and their radical offshoots.
4. For an example from the American experience, cf. Lipset, 1964, pp. 358-71.
  5. All available data support this hypothesis (Davis, 1970, pp. 15, 27-31; Ibrahim, 1980, pp. 438-9; Kira, 1955, vol. 1, pp. 143 ff. *Al-Ahram*, 27 February; 7 March; 18, 19, 29 April; 1, 4, 5 May; 13, 14, 15 July 1966).
  6. *Al-Ahram*, 10, 14 February 1966; 4 May 1966; 13, 14, 15, 17, 18 July 1966.
  7. *Al-Ahram*, 13, 14 July 1966.
  8. cf. note Table 1, p. 11.
  9. Interview with a former Moslem Brother from Damanhur, December, 1978; *al-Ahram*, 19 April 1906, where a young Brother met Sayyid Qutb in Ra's al-Bar to help him find a '*Zawja salihah*'.
  10. *al-Ahram*, 28 April, 4, 5 May 1966; 11 July 1977; the pilgrimage also provides organisational opportunities for Islamic radical groups in bringing together large numbers of the faithful in al-Makka, *al-Ahram*, 17 May 1966.
  11. *al-Ahram*, 16 February; 13, 14 July 1966.
  12. *al-Ahram*, 19 April; 2, 4 May 1966; 8 July 1977.
  13. *al-Ahram*, 5, 9 February; 2, 7 May 1966.
  14. *al-Ahram*, *al-Ahzaab al-siyasiya fi suriya* (Damascus: Dar al-Ruwwad, 1954) p. 11.
  15. A similar phenomenon occurred in the Sudan during the 1970s as Moslem radicals were able to oust leftists from all student organisations and take control of them. Personal communication from a Sudanese professor from the University of Juba, 17 October 1981.
  16. *al-Jumhuriya*, 7 March 1977.
  17. *al-Ahram*, 2, 11 May; 17 July 1966.
  18. *al-Ahram*, 17, 18 July 1966.
  19. Compare, for example, Sayyid Qutb's earlier writings such as *Ma'rakat al-islam wa'l-ra'smaliya* (1952), with *Ma'alim fi-t-tariq* (1964).
  20. *al-Ahram*, 1 May 1966.
  21. *al-Ahram*, 7, 8 July 1977.
  22. *al-Ahram*, 8, 9, 10, 11 July 1977; it is also interesting that all marriages within the group were arranged by its leader, Ahmad Shukri Mustafa.
  23. For example, 'Organisationally the brotherhood made a concerted attempt to recruit the workers of the mill [at al-Mahalla al-Kubra] . . . But the Brotherhood only succeeded in acquiring a following among the managerial employees' (Carson, 1957, p. 369).