The Politics of Eurocracy: Building a New European State?

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How can an executive with a staff of less than 25,000 regulate a modern polity with a population of 450 million? The answer is that it cannot. In the long term, the European Commission—with a staff the size of the administration of a typical midsized European city—cannot hope to implement and enforce the massive body of accumulated Community law (the *acquis communautaire*) across twenty-five countries comprising nearly half a billion people, to develop new policies and to shepherd them through the European Union’s (EU’s) legislative process. While some early Europhiles may have dreamt of erecting a massive Eurocracy in Brussels, and while many Eurosceptics still fear that this is occurring (Siedentop 2001), today this collective dream or nightmare can only be viewed as a flight of fancy. Quite simply, the member states would not permit it, and the European Parliament (EP) and Commission do not seek it.

But to say that the EU will never build a massive Weberian state bureaucracy in Brussels is not to say that it will not build a novel state-like organization. In his seminal study of American state building, Skowronek (1982: 8) describes the nineteenth-century American state as ‘a governmental order that failed to evoke the sense of a state.’ Skowronek points out that leading nineteenth century scholars including Tocqueville and Hegel did not consider America a ‘real state’ in that it lacked many of the formal institutional arrangements associated with the classical European state model. Yet, Skowronek emphasizes, the ‘peculiar genius’ of the early American state lay precisely in this ‘apparent, but ultimately illusory, statelessness.’ To say that the contemporary EU fails to evoke ‘a sense of state’ is a gross understatement. Yet despite this apparent statelessness, the EU is developing an increasingly powerful ‘governmental order.’ The EU’s regulatory capacity is expanding along two fronts: one judicial and one bureaucratic. First, because

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the EU cannot rely on a massive state bureaucracy, it is encouraging the judicialization of policy processes. As a growing literature on EU legal integration demonstrates, the EU actively enlists national courts and private litigants to act as decentralized enforcers of EU law (Mattli and Slaughter 1998; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998; Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2001; Alter 2001; Cichowski 2001; Kelemen 2003). Second, the EU has moved to expand its executive capacity through the establishment of specialized, decentralized European agencies outside the structure of the Commission.

This chapter focuses on this second dimension of the growth of the EU’s regulatory state. The construction of EU agencies has hardly grabbed the headlines. Yet, quietly the EU has established twenty-three such agencies with a combined budget of over €900 million and staff of approximately 2,500. A handful of other agencies are currently in the pipeline and the trend appears likely to accelerate.

The creation of European agencies is puzzling in important respects. The early rhetoric supporting the European agencies emphasized the benefits of delegating the technical aspects of regulation to these purportedly ‘independent’ bodies. It was far from clear, however, of which political actors these agencies were supposed to be independent (Kelemen 2002: 94). Independent of the member states? As we will see below, this was certainly not the case. Independent of the Commission? Perhaps, but at the time the Commission itself was viewed by many as an ‘independent’ regulator. Why then were new European agencies created when additional resources and authority could simply have been delegated to the Commission?

This chapter examines the politics behind the establishment of European agencies. Many accounts of the European agencies have emphasized the functional motivations behind their creation (Everson 1995; Everson et al. 1999; Kreher 1997; Majone 1997, 2000, 2002). The Commission’s stated rationale for agencies hinges on the need for technical expertise, independence and credibility in the regulatory process. As the Commission (2002: 5) explained in its Communication on agencies: ‘The main advantage of using the agencies is that their decisions are based on purely technical evaluations of very high quality and are not influenced by political or contingent considerations.’ Majone, the most prominent academic analyst of the EU agencies, echoes this functionalist approach to EU agencies. Majone’s approach to the EU agencies has been primarily normative. He argues that the agencies should be insulated from politics such that they can perform their tasks based on apolitical, technocratic judgments and can thus ensure the credibility of EU policymaking. In particular, he argues that, ‘the growing politicisation of the Commission…is possibly the strongest argument in favor of an increased recourse to nonmajoritarian institutions of regulatory policymaking at the European level’ (Everson et al. 1999: 21; Majone 2002: 330). Majone’s normative analysis seems to spill over into his positive analysis. His explanations of why agencies actually are established reflect the same functional arguments for why they should be established. However, this functional, efficiency based understanding ignores much of the actual political struggle over the creation of European agencies.

This chapter seeks to reinsert a dose of politics into these excessively functionalist accounts of agency creation. The chapter examines how political conflict and compromise between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers have influenced the design of European agencies. The chapter draws on the literature on the politics of agency design in the USA and identifies insights applicable to the European agencies. While the US literature does shed light on how principal-agent concerns influenced the design of EU agencies, the institutional terrain and the politics of agency design has differed in significant ways. As Skowronek (1982) demonstrated in his study of the expansion of federal administrative capacities in the USA, the builders of an administrative state must contend with the defenders of preexisting institutions. In the EU, where European level agencies have been established, they have in most cases been built on policy terrain already occupied by powerful national bodies. This, along with other systematic limits on EU resources, helps explain salient features of the European agencies, such as the ‘network model’ that underpins most of them.

The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 clarifies the precise definition of a European agency and surveys the landscape of existing agencies. Section 2 examines the politics of Eurocracy in general terms, highlighting the positions of key actors and the causal mechanisms behind the creation of European agencies. Section 3 details the development of the first wave of European agencies in the early 1990s. Section 4 discusses the second, ongoing wave of agency creation. Section 5 concludes.

1. What Is a European Agency?

Given the proliferation of institutions, bodies, authorities, centres, foundations, offices, and agencies in the EU and the variations in their functions and legal statuses, it is important to clarify precisely what we mean when we speak of a European agency. European agencies (regardless of the label attached to them) can be defined as EU level public authorities with a legal personality and a certain degree of organizational and financial autonomy that are created by acts of secondary legislation in order to perform clearly specified tasks (Commission 2002: 3, 1996). This definition distinguishes European...
agencies from other independent bodies established in the Treaties, such as the European Central Bank, the European Monetary Institute or Eutropol.

The agencies differ significantly in their structures, functions and resources. They perform a variety of tasks ranging from gathering information and providing scientific advice, to conducting compliance inspections, to making binding regulatory decisions, to coordinating networks of national administrators, to administering Community spending programs. Broadly, they can be divided into two categories, (a) executive agencies that perform managerial tasks on behalf of the Commission and (b) regulatory agencies that provide information and advice, make regulatory decisions and coordinate regulatory networks. Though the vast majority of these agencies have been established under the EU’s first pillar (the EC Treaty), more recently agencies have been established under the second and third pillars of the EU. Table 8.1 lists the name, location, year of founding, and primary functions of existing European agencies and those in final stages of the legislative process.

2. The Politics of Eurocracy

European agencies were created first as a political response to a set of functional pressures associated with the 1992 single market programme. As the Commission and analysts such as Majone suggest, the growing regulatory burden (in terms of data gathering, monitoring, rule-making, licensing) associated with the completion of the single market programme served as an important motivation behind the creation of European agencies. However, these functional pressures did not press inexorably for European agencies as a solution and certainly did not dictate the shape that agencies eventually took. Indeed, the most straightforward means by which to meet the regulatory demands associated with the single market programme would have been to expand the Commission’s staff and resources. Moreover, functional pressures alone cannot explain the ongoing disagreements between the Commission, Council and Parliament over the design of European agencies.

To explain the creation of European agencies we must understand how strategic interactions between the Council, the Commission and, in some cases, the EP shaped their design (Kelemen 2002: 95). The European agencies are bureaucratic agents of the EU’s political principals. Clearly the member states in the Council are powerful principals in the EU context (Pollack 1997; Franchino 2000). With its growing power in the 1990s, the EP also emerged

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3 The impact of the functional pressures associated with complex regulation on a pan-European scale parallels in important respects the causal mechanism Jabko and Parsons term ‘technical change’.

4 In 2003, the Council agreed to extend the mandate of the Centre and transform it into a Fundamental Rights Agency. The Commission plans to propose a regulation for the new agency in 2005.
Table 8.1. (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMSA—European Maritime Safety Agency</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Regulation/Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASA—European Aviation Safety Agency</td>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Inspection/Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENISA: European Network and Information Security Agency</td>
<td>Heraklion</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Information/Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA: European Railway Agency</td>
<td>Lille/Valenciennes</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Information/Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control</td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Defense Agency</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Pillar III/Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders</td>
<td>Brussels (temporary location)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Pillar II/Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Fisheries Control Agency (proposed)</td>
<td>Vigo</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Monitoring/Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Chemicals Agency (proposed)</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Monitoring/Coordination</td>
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As discussed below, the need to accommodate existing national regulators helps explain the emergence of a ‘network model’ for European agencies. Second, institutional legacies in the form of legal requirements concerning the EU’s ‘institutional balance’ limited the scope of delegation to agencies.

Efforts to address the EU’s purported democratic deficit and the widespread recognition among European elites of the need to enhance the transparency and accountability of the EU’s policy processes have also influenced the politics of agency design. First, pressure to democratize the EU undermined the legitimacy of the opaque, unaccountable comitology system that long underpinned the Commission’s regulatory policymaking. European agencies were designed as a more democratically palatable alternative. In contrast to their comitology forbears, European agencies were designed to be more visible, subject to greater transparency requirements and parliamentary and judicial scrutiny.

Building on the principal-agent framework and recognizing the import of the causal mechanisms described above, one can summarize the politics of agency design as follows: Given the Council’s (and to a lesser extent the Parliament’s) opposition to expanding the Commission, the Commission proposed the establishment of ‘autonomous’ European agencies as an alternative means by which to expand the EU’s regulatory capacity. Though the delegation of routine technical duties to agencies led to a loss of bureaucratic ‘turf’ for the Commission in some cases, this delegation benefited the Commission insofar as it allowed the Commission to concentrate its resources on its core tasks—policy initiation and policy enforcement (Kelemen 2002; Wilson 1989: 182–83). In its approach to European agencies, the Council of Ministers sought to defend the prerogatives of national regulatory bodies and to limit both growth and potential political or bureaucratic ‘drift’ (McCubbins et al. 1999) of supranational regulatory bodies. Also, the Council recognized that its existing mechanisms for oversight of EU regulatory processes—the notoriously opaque and unaccountable comitology committees—could not withstand the democratic deficit critique in the long term. These preferences led the Council to support the creation of European level regulatory agencies subject to the requirements that (a) they be controlled by management boards dominated by member state representatives, and (b) they be designed along a hub and spoke model that integrated national regulatory authorities into their operations. Finally, since the EP became an active player in the politics of agency design in the mid-1990s, it has taken a different approach to bureaucratic oversight than the Council, demanding the establishment of bureaucratic structures and administrative procedures that enhance the transparency and facilitate ‘fire-alarm’ oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Pollack 1997; Franchino 2000: 76; Kelemen 2002: 97). Unlike the resource-rich member states that could oversee the agencies

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5 The Constitutional Treaty (Art. III-274(1) calls for transformation of Eurojust into European Public Prosecutors Office charged with investigating and prosecuting cross-border crime.
directly through their positions on agency management boards and scientific advisory panels. The Parliament preferred to conduct oversight by enhancing ('fire-alarm') opportunities for actors in civil society to detect and challenge agency malfeasance. These conflicting demands from the EU’s political principals have shaped the design of European agencies in terms of the resources they are granted, the administrative procedures they must follow, the judicial scrutiny to which they are subject and the limitations placed on their authority.


The 1992 single market programme presented the Commission with a regulatory conundrum. Commission President Delors and other Commission leaders recognized that with its small staff and budget, the Commission was ill equipped to handle the dramatic increase in regulatory tasks associated with the single market initiative. However, the most obvious route to enhancing the EU’s regulatory capacity, expanding the Commission, was foreclosed by politics. There was widespread political opposition across the member states to any major expansion of the Commission bureaucracy, and even the EP was apprehensive about significant personnel growth. With attacks on the emerging superstate in Brussels a staple of Euro-sceptic rhetoric, the Commission itself was reluctant to be seen as a burgeoning bureaucracy. In this context, the Commission sought novel avenues through which to expand the EU’s regulatory capacity and turned to the idea of ‘independent’ European agencies. The popularity of independent regulatory agencies was growing across EU member states in the late 1980s, and the Commission suggested adopting the agency model at the EU level.6

Commission President Delors set the ball rolling in January 1989 by proposing the establishment of a European Environment Agency (EEA). After the success of the EEA proposal, proposals for a variety of agencies emerged from the Commission bureaucracy, and the Commission Secretariat General quickly stepped in to coordinate the process of agency design (Kelemen 2002: 102). Six new European agencies were established between 1990 and 1994.

This 'first wave' resulted from a political compromise between the Commission and the member states in the Council. The first agencies were designed under decision-making procedures that limited the role of the EP to consultation. The Parliament generally supported the Commission’s pref-

6 The idiosyncratic European agencies had been established in 1975 (see Table 8.1), but these did not provide the model for the new wave of agency creation.

7 See the discussion of the Meroni doctrine below.
European agencies could use their position at the hub of these networks to gradually pressure national administrations to conform to common European norms and practices. As a result, national administrations would not see European agencies as a threat to their existence and in some cases might even see their like-minded European counterparts as allies in domestic struggles.

Finally, the 'decentralization' of EU agencies to locations across the EU member states also served to make the agencies more palatable to member state governments. Not only would the agencies coordinate networks of existing national authorities, they would do so from locations outside Brussels. For the member states, such decentralization presented attractive opportunities for pork barrel politics. Indeed, at the Laeken summit in 2001, heads of state have battled over the locations of a series of new agencies. While such decentralization created some logistical problems for the Commission, this was a small price to pay for the significant expansion of EU regulatory capacities that the agencies could deliver.

The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) was among the most significant agencies established in the early 1990s. The EMEA was designed to accelerate the process of assessment and authorization of pharmaceutical products and thus to facilitate the completion of the internal market in pharmaceuticals (Kelemen 2004: 144–9). The Commission overcame the concerns of national drug testing authorities by proposing a network structure that preserved an integral role for these national authorities. Essentially, the EMEA would coordinate a regulatory network in which national authorities would take turns assessing and authorizing pharmaceuticals for the European market, following central guidelines. Finally, the Commission dealt with the legal limitations imposed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ's) Meroni doctrine and the institutional balance principle by retaining ultimate responsibility for any drug authorizations. The outcome of the entire EMEA drug assessment process would not be a legally binding approval, but rather a recommendation to the Commission, which would then take responsibility for the legally binding authorization.

4. The Second Wave of European Agencies: 2001—present

European agencies, which first appeared as ad hoc experiments in institutional design, are becoming central elements in the EU's model of governance. The 2001 White Paper on European Governance (Commission 2001) acknowledged the development of European agencies and suggested that the creation and greater empowerment of more such agencies might be a way to improve EU regulation. The White Paper also called for the establishment of a formal framework for the creation, operation and supervision of such agencies. In 2003, the Council adopted a framework (Council of Ministers (EC) No 58/2003) for the creation of the relatively uncontroversial category of 'executive agencies' that perform managerial tasks on behalf of the Commission. As for the more controversial 'regulatory agencies,' in a 2002 Communication (Commission 2002) the Commission proposed a set of guidelines for such a framework and the Commission proposed a draft interinstitutional agreement in 2005 on the basis of this Communication (European Commission, December 2005). Meanwhile, the creation of new agencies has continued apace, with eleven new agencies being created since 2001. The agency model has extended to the EU's second and third pillars with agencies being established in areas such as defence procurement (European Defence Agency) and border control (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders).

The politics of agency design has changed in significant respects in recent years. The central conflicts still concern what the agencies should do, and who should control them. However, the EP has become an increasingly significant player in agency design and oversight. With the growing involvement of the Parliament and heightened profile of existing agencies, questions concerning the transparency and accountability of European agencies have become ever more prominent.

A central bone of contention between the Commission, Parliament and Council remains the design of management boards that oversee the agencies. No uniform model for the composition of these management boards has emerged. Indeed, in a recent report on regulatory agencies, the European Parliament (2004) identified at least ten variants in the structure of boards of existing agencies. The Commission continues to push for structures that would insulate the agencies from traditional intergovernmental politics. In its communication on agencies, the Commission (2002: 9) emphasized that the administrative boards of existing agencies 'fail to take sufficient account of the Community dimension,' which is Eurospeak for saying that the boards serve as fora in which national representatives pursue national interests. Instead the Commission proposed a model where management boards would have fifteen members, with six appointed by the Commission, six by the council and three nonvoting members representing stakeholders. The Parliament acknowledged this as an acceptable model, but expressed a preference for a model in which the Commission would draw up a list of candidates to be submitted to the Parliament for scrutiny and to the Council for final approval (European Parliament 2004). Also, the Parliament has backed away from its earlier demands for direct representation on agency management boards, now preferring to clearly separate itself from agency operations and maintain an outside oversight role. The Council has yet to
take a unified stance on the appropriate model for agency management boards (Council 2004). While member state governments agree that member state representatives should constitute the overwhelming majority of board members, the notion that the member states might have to give up on the principle of each state being represented is gaining ground in the Council (Interview, European Commission, December 2004).

Along with the growth of its legislative power, the EP has sought to exert itself as a watchdog of the EU executive, including European agencies. Since the mid-1990s the EP has used its budgetary powers in order to impose accountability requirements on European agencies. Agency budgets fall under the 'non-compulsory' part of EC budget, which enables the EP to hold agency budgets on reserve and discharge funds on a partial, ongoing basis. The use, or even the threat, of this reserve procedure, has enabled the Parliament to impose a variety of accountability requirements on European agencies (Dehouss 1997; Kelemen 2002: 105; Flinders 2004: 536).

The Parliament has also demanded that the agencies adopt formal, transparent and judicially enforceable administrative procedures. Such procedures create opportunities for the Parliament's interest group allies to challenge agency actions and thus to engage in the sort of 'fire-alarm' oversight favored by Congress in the US context (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). The Parliament first succeeded in pressing such transparency demands in the case of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the founding regulation of which required EFSA to hold public meetings and to specify and publish its internal procedures (Regulation 178/2002, Art. 38).

The founding regulations for the recently established European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the proposed European Railway Agency (ERA) also reflect such transparency and accountability requirements. EASA has been given the authority to issue airworthiness codes and to issue (or suspend or revoke) individual airworthiness and environmental certifications for aircraft products. These decisions are legally binding and clearly have significant impacts on the producers and users of such products. The regulation (Reg. 1592/2002) establishing the EASA requires the agency to establish 'transparent procedures' for issuing certification specifications and demands that the agency 'consults widely' with interested parties according to a fixed timetable and that it 'make a written response to the consultation process' (Art. 43). Similarly, in taking individual decisions on aircraft parts the agency shall ensure that the party concerned and any other party with a direct and individual concern be granted a hearing and that the decision state the agency's reasons (Art. 44). Such requirements effectively establish a 'giving reasons requirement' (Shapiro 2002; 2001) and provide the legal basis for interested parties to challenge agency decisions on both substantive and procedural grounds.

Similarly, the founding directive of the proposed European Railway Agency (ERA) requires the agency to consult with prescribed representatives of 'the social partners' (Art. 4) and of organizations representing customers and passengers (Art. 5). The regulation requires the Agency to take 'due account' of these consultations. As in the case of the EASA, it seems likely that the question of whether or not an agency has given such consultations 'due account' may eventually be subject to judicial scrutiny.

Indeed, the founding regulations of European agencies increasingly foresee the likelihood of such legal challenges and make provisions for it. Where early agencies sometimes contained no explicit provisions concerning judicial scrutiny, recently established agencies, such as the EASA, establish rigorous systems of judicial oversight. Private parties that want to challenge EASA decisions will bring cases, in the first instance, to EASA's internal Board of Appeal, whose decisions can then be appealed at to the ECJ.

The second wave of agency creation shows no signs of abating. The mismatch between the Commission's extensive regulatory responsibilities and its inadequate resources remains. Indeed, with the expansion of the EU's policy mandate and the continued political resistance to any substantial growth in the size of the Commission, this mismatch has grown. The growing politicisation of the Commission is likely to encourage even more delegation to European agencies. The Parliamentary censure of the Santer Commission and most recently the forced reshuffle of the proposed Barroso Commission under pressure from the Parliament seem to herald a new era in EU politics. The days when the Commission could be viewed as an independent, technocratic 'supergency' dedicated to the completion of the common market are gone (Majone 2002: 330). The growing politicization of the Commission lends weight to supporters of European agencies, such as Majone, that the independence and credibility of Community regulation can no longer be assured in the context of the Commission. Moreover, the Commission's enforcement of Community law is subject to ever closer Parliamentary scrutiny, and the Commission's monopoly of initiative on new EU policies has been undermined to an extent by the advent of the co-decision procedure. As a result, the Commission leadership has great incentives to focus its limited resources on these core competences and thus is likely to prove more willing to delegate day-to-day regulatory tasks to agencies.

One long-standing legal obstacle to greater delegation is showing signs of giving way. Article 4 of the Rome Treaty as interpreted by the ECJ in Meroni establishes a strict nondelegation principle. Scholars of Community
law and the Commission Legal Service itself have long held that Meroni limits the delegation of broad, discretionary powers to bodies not foreseen in the treaties. Such delegation threatens to upset the ‘institutional balance’ between the EU’s three primary institutions, and thus can only be allowed through treaty revision. Majone (2002) points out that while the Commission Legal Service continues to adhere to this strict interpretation of Meroni, a growing faction within the Commission advocates a looser interpretation of Meroni that would allow a broader delegation of discretionary powers to agencies. Strikingly, despite the voluminous academic literature on the Meroni doctrine and the great emphasis observers place on it, the ECJ has never relied on Meroni to settle subsequent disputes of delegation of powers (Bergström and Rotkirch 2003: 27). In any event, it is difficult to imagine the ECJ severely limiting the remit of an agency that had won the support of the Commission, Council and Parliament (Kelemen 2002: 99). Arguably, Meroni has served as a convenient legal justification that helped the Commission retain all rule-making powers while delegating only the more mundane coordination and information gathering tasks to agencies. As the Commission’s political willingness to delegate rule-making powers increases, its emphasis on Meroni is likely to decrease. Indeed, we already see signs of this in the mandate of the recently established EASA, whose rule-making powers make it the most powerful European agency to date (also see Commission 2002:8).

5. Conclusions: Building a New European State?

The growth of European agencies has been one of the most significant developments in the EU’s institutional development over the past decade. The European agencies, and the networks of national officials that they coordinate, are emerging as a vital element of the EU’s governmental order. The agencies have made virtue of political necessity: they are reliant on national administrations, but they are using their tight coupling with networks of national regulators as a means through which to spread common administrative practices. It is tempting to view the empowerment of European agencies as a diminution of the Commission’s control over the EU executive. And indeed, some information gathering, monitoring and decision-making functions that might otherwise have been performed by the Commission were delegated to European agencies. However, for the most part, the resources and responsibilities granted to European agencies were not taken away from the Commission in any sense. Rather, many of the tasks delegated to agencies would otherwise have been performed by obscure comitology committees (Dehoux 1997: 258; Krapohl 2004). In many respects, the first wave of European agencies represented a dramatic upgrading and formalization of the committee system that had long underpinned EU regulatory policymaking.

More recently, with the advent of second and third pillar agencies and the establishment of regulatory agencies with greater rule-making powers, it seems that European agencies have entered a new phase. European agencies have become an accepted part of the EU’s institutional architecture. While delegation to agencies raises serious concerns over accountability, a variety of oversight structures and judicial safeguards have been put in place and the EU’s primary institutions—the Commission, Parliament and Council—seem willing to grant the agencies even greater responsibilities. With the growing transformation of the Commission from independent regulator to political executive, European agencies may one day be viewed as the true Eurocracy.

References


