

# Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset\*

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## Introduction

This document contains coding rules, codings of cases, justification for those codings and source material used in reaching the coding judgments. The data set consists of all changes in regime to or from democracy for the period 1980-2000 that are included in two data sets:

- José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited,” *Public Choice* 143(1-2): 67-101, hereafter cited as CGV. Dataset at <https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited>
- Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers. Polity™IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009. Center for Systemic Peace, 2010. Dataset at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

The CGV data set is an extension and update of Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 and José Antonio Cheibub and Jennifer Gandhi, “Classifying Political Regimes: A Six-fold Measure of Democracies and Dictatorships,” prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2004 available at <http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataloguide/set.html>.

The definition of democracy in the CGV dataset is a dichotomous one that rests on four coding rules (page references are to Przeworski et al. 1990):

- The chief executive is elected in popular elections (19, 28);
- The lower house of the legislature is popularly elected (19, 28);
- There is more than one party (20, 28);
- Countries are coded as authoritarian, however, if “the incumbents will have or already have held office continuously by virtue of elections for more than two terms or have held office without being elected for any duration of their current tenure in office, and until today or until the time when they were overthrown they had not lost an election.” (23, 28).

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This dataset records 65 democratic transitions and 19 reversions during the 1980-2000 period.

The Polity dataset treats regime type as a continuous variable that is composed of a democracy (DEMOC) and an autocracy (AUTOC) component. DEMOC is an additive eleven-point scale (0 to 10) derived from a weighted sum of the following: the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. Similarly, AUTOC is an additive eleven-point scale from (0 to 10) derived from the same variables as the DEMOC indicator with the addition of the regulation of participation. The standard Polity score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC from the DEMOC score, and ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Following convention, we code transitions to democracy as movements from below 6 to 6 or more on the so-called “dem-auth” scale; reversions are movements from 6 or above to below 6. These coding rules are from the Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual.

In addition to the standard scores, the Polity dataset also codes some country years with two dummy variables:

- -77 country years are defined as an “interregnum or anarchy” and converted into a score of 0. Two reversions—Lesotho in 1998 and the Solomon Islands in 2000—are coded as -77’s. In our judgment, the 0 coding for Lesotho in 1998 is not warranted and appears to be an anomaly of the coding rule; we have provided an analysis of the case but have removed it from the dataset for all summary purposes. The other case, the Solomon Islands, does experience a reversion in 2000. But the basis of the 0 coding also appears to be an anomaly of the coding rule, reflecting the fact that country was experiencing “anarchy” during the year rather than a judgment about the nature of its political institutions. We have thus excluded it from the dataset as well.
- -88 country years are “transitions” and converted into a pro-rated Polity score according to the following rule: “Cases of “transition” are prorated across the span of the transition. For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years...so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.” In all of the -88 or transition cases, the -88 years are coded as less than 6 and thus authoritarian. The one exception is South Africa in which the transition year itself—1992—is coded a 6 as a result of the Polity coding rule. All countries with a -88 coding are entered into the data set using their pro-rated scores.

**Table 1** summarizes the transition and reversion cases that had -77 or -88 codings that were subsequently converted (in parentheses). It identifies the country-year of the coding; the years leading up to or surrounding it; and the concordance with the CGV dataset.

Table 1: Polity Scores and Concordance with CGV Dataset

Country/Year	Transition Path	Concordance with CGV Dataset Transitions
<b>Transitions</b>		
Benin 1991	-7 in 1989, -88 (0) in 1990, 6 in 1991	Coincides with CGV transition
Croatia 2000	-5 in 1998, -88 (1) in 1999, 8 in 2000	Not a CGV transition
El Salvador 1984	-88 (0) in 1981, -88(2) in 1982, -88(4) in 1983, 6 in 1984	Coincides with CGV transition
Honduras 1982	-88(1) in 1980, -88(4) in 1981, 6 in 1982	Coincides with CGV transition
Hungary 1990	-88(4) in 1989, 10 in 1990	Coincides with CGV transition
Madagascar 1992	-6 in 1990, -88(2) in 1991, 9 in 1992	CGV transition in 1993
Mali 1992	-7 in 1990, -88(0) in 1991, 7 in 1992	Coincides with CGV transition
Niger 1992	-7 in 1990, -88(1) in 1991, 8 in 1992	CGV transition in 1993
Philippines 1987	-6 in 1985, -88(1) in 1986, 8 in 1987	CGV transition in 1986
South Africa 1992	5 in 1991, -88(6) in 1992, -88(8) in 1993	Not a CGV transition
South Korea 1986	-5 in 1986, -88(1) in 1987, 6 in 1988	Coincides with CGV transition
Sudan 1986	-7 in 1984, -88(0) in 1985, 7 in 1986	Coincides with CGV transition
<b>Reversions</b>		
Haiti 1999	7 in 1998, -88(2) in 1999, -2 in 2000	Not a CGV reversion
Lesotho 1998	8 in 1997, -77(0) in 1998, -88(2) in 1999, -88(4) in 2000	Not a CGV reversion; omitted from Haggard, Kaufman and Teo dataset
Solomon Islands	8 in 1999, -77(0) in 2000	Not a CGV reversion; omitted from Haggard, Kaufman and Teo dataset

Given the composite nature of the Polity score, there are multiple actions that might account for shifts in scores. In order to assure alignment of our coding with the Polity dataset, we have drawn on the descriptions provided in Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. Polity IV Country Reports 2008 and Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. Polity IV Country Reports 2010 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm>

This Polity dataset records 57 democratic transitions and 20 reversions during this period. 36 of these transitions and 9 of the reversions are either exactly the same as the CGV dataset or fall within a two year window on either side of the CGV dating of the transition. Nine of the transitions and none of the reversions code the same country but place the transition at a date outside the two year window.

The overlap between the two datasets is partial. Following are the cases that one dataset includes and the other omits.

- The CGV dataset includes 29 cases that Polity omits: Albania 1991, Bangladesh 1986, Burundi 1993, Central African Republic 1993, Comoros 1990, Congo 1992, Croatia 1991, Cyprus 1983, Fiji 1992, Ghana 1993, Grenada 1984, Guatemala 1986, Guinea-Bissau 2000, Kenya 1998, Mexico 2000, Nepal 1990, Nicaragua 1984, Niger 2000, Nigeria 1999, Paraguay 1989, Romania 1990, Sao Tome and Principe 1991, Sierra Leone 1996, 1998, Sri Lanka 1989, Suriname 1988, 1991, Taiwan 1996, and Uganda 1980.
- Polity includes 21 cases that CGV omits: Bangladesh 1991, Croatia 2000, Dominican Republic 1996, Fiji 1999, Guatemala 1996, Guyana 1992, Haiti 1990, 1994, Honduras 1989, Lesotho 1993, Mexico 1997, Moldova 1993, Nepal 1999, Nicaragua 1990, Paraguay 1992, Romania 1996, Russia 2000, South Africa 1992, Taiwan 1992, Ukraine 1994, and Zambia 1991.

Similarly, there are a number of reversions that one dataset includes and the other omits.

- CGV includes 10 cases that Polity omits: Bolivia 1980, Burundi 1996, Comoros 1995, Ecuador 2000, Guatemala 1982, Sierra Leone 1997, Suriname 1980, 1990, Thailand 1991 and Uganda 1985.
- Polity includes 11 cases that CGV omits: Armenia 1995, Belarus 1995, Dominican Republic 1994, Fiji 1987, the Gambia 1994, Haiti 1991, 1999, Honduras 1985, Sri Lanka 1982, Ukraine 1993, and Zambia 1996.

For each case in the dataset we indicate whether it is coded as a transition by the CGV dataset, the Polity dataset or both; cases coded as transitions by only one of the two datasets can be seen as contested. In cases where the difference in coding is one or two years, we have consolidated the qualitative analysis into a single case description but noting the possible reasons for the differences and whether it affects the coding of the case. If the transition falls outside of the two-year window, we treat it as a separate case.

We also compare the results of our qualitative coding to the quantitative results contained in Christian Houle’s “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization,” *World Politics* 61, 4 (2009): 589-622. For the 1980-2000 period, there were 42 transitions to democratic rule in the Houle data set. 17 countries undergoing democratic transitions in this period according to the CGV dataset were omitted from the Houle dataset because of lack of any data on the income distribution variable: Armenia 1991, Belarus 1991, Cape Verde 1990; Comoros 1990; Republic of the Congo 1992; Czechoslovakia 1989; Estonia 1991, Grenada 1984; Guinea-Bissau 2000; Lithuania 1991, Mali 1992; Mongolia 1992; Sao Tome and Principe 1991; Suriname 1988, 1991, Taiwan 1996, and Ukraine 1991. Cote d’Ivoire 2000 was included in the Houle dataset but subsequently excluded in the CGV update of Cheibub and Gandhi 2004 cited above.

Three cases—Croatia (transition in 1991), Latvia 1991, and Macedonia (transition in 1991)—are included in Houle’s data set, but after their transitions; they are thus coded as continuously democratic. A fourth case—Sierra Leone—is included in the data set through 1996, but undergoes a second democratic transition in 1998. As these four cases were not included as democratic transitions in the Houle data set they are omitted from our summary statistics of the Houle cases.

During the same period, there were 13 reversions in the Houle data set; five cases in the CGV dataset—Comoros 1995, Congo 1997, Fiji 2000, and Suriname 1980, 1990—were omitted. One other case—Sierra Leone 1997—is included in the data set through 1996 but reverted in 1998.

The following table includes all countries listed in the data set, the date of the transition according to the two underlying sources, and whether they are included in the Houle dataset.

Table 2: Democratic Transitions, 1980–2000

Country	CGV year	Polity year	Included in Houle dataset
Albania	1991		X
Argentina	1983	1983	X
Armenia	1991	1991	
Bangladesh	1986		X
Bangladesh	1991		
Belarus	1991	1991	
Benin	1991	1991	X
Bolivia	1982	1982	X
Brazil	1985	1985	
Bulgaria	1990	1990	X
Burundi	1993		X
Cape Verde	1990	1991	

¶ Under our two-year coding rule, we consolidate our discussion of cases for which the coding in the two datasets is separated by two years or less. We nonetheless provide an explanation of the reasons behind the coding differences.

Central African Republic	1993		X
Chile	1990	1989	X
Comoros	1990		
Congo	1992		
Croatia	1991		
Croatia		2000	
Cyprus	1983		
Czechoslovakia	1989	1990	
Dominican Republic		1996	
El Salvador	1984	1984	X
Estonia	1991	1991	
Fiji	1992		
Fiji		1999	
Ghana	1993		X
Grenada	1984		
Guatemala	1986		X
Guatemala		1996	
Guinea-Bissau	2000		
Guyana		1991	
Haiti		1990	
Haiti		1994	
Honduras	1982	1982	X
Honduras		1989	
Hungary	1990	1990	X
Indonesia	1999	1999	X
Kenya	1998		X
Latvia	1991	1991	
Lesotho		1993	
Lithuania	1991	1991	
Macedonia	1991	1991	
Madagascar	1993	1992	X
Malawi	1994	1994	X
Mali	1992	1992	
Mexico		1997	X
Mexico	2000		
Moldova		1993	X
Mongolia	1990	1992	
Nepal	1990		X
Nepal		1999	
Nicaragua	1984		X
Nicaragua		1990	
Niger	1993	1992	X
Niger	2000		X
Nigeria	1999		X
Pakistan	1988	1988	X
Panama	1989	1989	X
Paraguay	1989		
Paraguay		1992	

Peru	1980	1980	X
The Philippines	1986	1987	X
Poland	1989	1991	X
Romania	1990		X
Romania		1996	
Russia		2000	
Sao Tome and Principe	1991		
Senegal	2000	2000	X
Serbia	2000		
Sierra Leone	1996, 1998		X
South Africa		1992	X
South Korea	1988	1988	X
Sri Lanka	1989		X
Sudan	1986	1986	X
Suriname	1988		
Suriname	1991		
Taiwan		1992	
Taiwan	1996		
Thailand	1992	1992	X
Turkey	1983	1983	X
Uganda	1980		X
Ukraine	1991	1991	
Ukraine		1994	
Uruguay	1985	1985	X
Yugoslavia		2000	
Zambia		1991	X
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>42</b>

Table 3: Reversions from Democratic Rule, 1980—2000

Country	CGV year	Polity year	Included in Houle dataset
Armenia		1995	
Belarus		1995	
Bolivia	1980		X
Burundi	1996		X
Comoros	1995		
Congo	1997	1997	
Dominican Republic		1994	
Ecuador	2000		X
Fiji		1987	
Fiji	2000	2000	
The Gambia		1994	
Ghana	1981	1981	X
Guatemala	1982		X
Haiti		1991	
Haiti		1999	
Honduras		1985	
Niger	1996	1996	X
Nigeria	1983	1984	X
Pakistan	1999	1999	X
Peru	1990	1992	X
Sierra Leone	1997		
Sri Lanka		1982	
Sudan	1989	1989	X
Suriname	1980		
Suriname	1990		
Thailand	1991		X
Turkey	1980	1980	X
Uganda	1985		X
Ukraine		1993	
Zambia		1996	
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>

## Democratic Transitions

We use a dichotomous coding rule to divide the democratic transitions into “distributive conflict” transitions and “non-distributive conflict” transitions. In each case, we identify the specific decision or action on the part of incumbent elites that constitutes the transition point. We then consider the role of mass mobilization in that transition, provide a brief justification for the coding and references consulted in reaching the judgment. However, we also identify ambiguous cases in a way described below.

**Distributive conflict** transitions are ones in which:

1. The mobilization of redistributive grievances on the part of economically disadvantaged groups or representatives of such groups (parties, unions, NGOs) posed a threat to the incumbency of ruling elites; and
2. the rising costs of repressing these demands motivated elites to political compromise or exit in favor of democratic challengers, typically indicated by a clear temporal sequence (mass mobilization followed by authoritarian withdrawal).

Comments and clarifications on the coding rule:

- “Mass mobilization” can include both organized collective actions (protests, rallies, demonstrations, insurgencies) and spontaneous forms of collective action (riots, destruction of property, land seizures).
- Distributive conflicts need not follow any particular cleavage, and can include urban class conflicts (for example, strikes) rural mobilization (for example, land seizures), and the mobilization of ethnic, sectarian or regional conflicts, including secessionist movements, where those can be interpreted as reflecting distributive grievances.
- The economically disadvantaged or the organizations representing them need not be the only ones mobilized in opposition to the incumbent regime; oppositions can be cross-class in nature.
- Although grievances must partly reflect demands for redistribution—whether of assets, income or through increased government transfers or services—they can be motivated by other grievances as well.
- Mass mobilization need not be the only factor in the calculation of incumbent elites, but it must be a significant factor.

**Non-distributive conflict** transitions are cases in which:

1. Mass mobilization did not occur at all;
2. Mass mobilization was present but was not aimed at distributive grievances and/or did not appear to be a significant factor in the decision of authoritarian elites to withdraw.

Comments and clarifications on the coding rule:

Although we do not attempt to provide an alternative theory of the transition, we code cases as non-distributive conflict when the following factors appear significant in the transition, typically indicated by a clear temporal sequence (antecedent condition followed by incumbent withdrawal or concessions):

- Military intervention or political pressures from outside actors;
- Demands from aid donors;
- Elite defections from within the ruling coalition, for example, by politicians or the military, or challenges from elites or elite parties outside of the government;



- Decisions on the part of the incumbent elite to democratize that reflect a presumed ability to limit subsequent redistributive challenges. This might occur through transitions that include institutional features granting authoritarian incumbents veto powers or transitions designed to pass power to parties controlled by incumbents and their elite allies.

A summary of our codings of the cases is provided [below](#).

Table 4: Distributive and Non-Distributive Transitions, 1980–2000

	CGV Dataset		Polity Dataset	
	Cases	Share of all transitions	Cases	Share of all transitions
Distributive conflict transitions	Albania 1991		Argentina 1983	
	Argentina 1983		Armenia 1991	
	Armenia 1991		Bangladesh 1991	
	Benin 1991		Benin 1991	
	Bolivia 1982		Bolivia 1982	
	Brazil 1985		Brazil 1985	
	Bulgaria 1990		Bulgaria 1990	
	Burundi 1993		Dominican Republic 1996	
	Congo 1992		El Salvador 1984	
	El Salvador 1984		Estonia 1991	
	Estonia 1991		Guatemala 1996	
	Fiji 1992		Haiti 1990	
	Guatemala 1986		Indonesia 1999	
	Indonesia 1999		Latvia 1991	
	Kenya 1998	36/55.4%	Lesotho 1993	33/57.9%
	Latvia 1991		Lithuania 1991	
	Lithuania 1991		Madagascar 1992	
	Madagascar 1993		Malawi 1994	
	Malawi 1994		Mali 1992	
	Mali 1992		Mongolia 1992	
	Mongolia 1990		Nepal 1999	
	Nepal 1990		Niger 1992	
	Niger 1993		Peru 1980	
	Niger 2000		Philippines 1987	
	Nigeria 1999		Poland 1991	
	Peru 1980		South Africa 1992	
	Philippines 1986		South Korea 1988	
	Poland 1989		Sudan 1986	
	Romania 1990		Thailand 1992	
	South Korea 1988		Ukraine 1991	
	Sri Lanka 1989		Ukraine 1994	
	Sudan 1986		Uruguay 1985	
	Suriname 1988		Zambia 1991	
	Thailand 1992			
	Ukraine 1991			
	Uruguay 1985			

Non-distributive conflict transitions	Bangladesh 1986		Belarus 1991		
	Belarus 1991		Cape Verde 1991		
	Cape Verde 1990		Chile 1989		
	Central African Republic 1993		Croatia 2000		
	Chile 1990		Czechoslovakia 1990		
	Comoros 1990		Fiji 1999		
	Croatia 1991		Guyana 1992		
	Cyprus 1983		Haiti 1994		
	Czechoslovakia 1989		Honduras 1982		
	Ghana 1993		Honduras 1989		
	Grenada 1984		Hungary 1990		
	Guinea-Bissau 2000		Macedonia 1991		
	Honduras 1982		Mexico 1997		
	Hungary 1990		Moldova 1993		
	Macedonia 1991	29/44.6%	Nicaragua 1990	24/42.1%	
	Mexico 2000		Pakistan 1988		
	Nicaragua 1984		Panama 1989		
	Pakistan 1998		Paraguay 1992		
	Panama 1989		Romania 1996		
	Paraguay 1989		Russia 2000		
	Sao Tome and Principe 1991		Senegal 2000		
	Senegal 2000		Serbia 2000		
	Serbia 2000		Taiwan 1992		
	Sierra Leone 1996		Turkey 1983		
	Sierra Leone 1998				
	Suriname 1991				
	Taiwan 1996				
	Turkey 1983				
	Uganda 1980				
	<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>		<b>57</b>	

## Ambiguous Cases

Any given transition is driven by a variety of factors. The foregoing coding attempts to identify cases in which distributive conflict is an important cause and those in which it did not appear to play an important causal role or was absent altogether. We generally sought to give the theories in question the benefit of the doubt, and a number of cases did fall easily into these two categories. However, a number of cases were ambiguous, in the sense of being subject to alternative interpretations in which the significance of distributive conflict could be challenged. We identify three non-mutually exclusive sources of ambiguity: doubts about the class composition of mass mobilization; doubts about the significance of economic grievances; and doubts about the weight of economic factors. We mark these cases in the dataset with an asterisk (\*).

### *Doubts about the class composition of mass mobilization.*

We code cases as distributive conflict transitions even when the protest appears to be driven primarily by

middle-class or even upper middle-class groups without significant involvement of the poor. These distributive conflict cases do reflect protest on the part of sectors that are disadvantaged relative to economic elites favored by the regime. But the role of the lower classes—even as coalition partners—may not be decisive or even relevant at all. As a result, such cases could be reinterpreted in terms of more conventional narratives about the rise of a middle-class (for example Ansell and Samuels 2010) rather than in terms of two-class or even three-class models in which coalitions between the middle class and poor are deemed decisive.

*Doubts about the objectives of protest groups.*

The distributive conflict model assumes that actors are protesting against socio-economic inequalities sustained by the regime. A number of cases fit this model of overt economic protest, including those in which mass mobilization highlighted the corruption of incumbents. However, resentment against inequality is often implicit rather than explicit in the protests leading to democratic transitions. Although we coded most cases of mass protest as distributive conflict cases, there are cases in which socio-economic grievances did not appear to play a dominant role or in which they did not appear to conform with the class conflict model. Of particular interest in this regard are the protests that led to the overthrow of several Communist regimes. In some of these transitions, socio-economic grievances on the part of lower class groups were indeed significant. However in others it did not appear to play a central role. Moreover, inequality was comparatively low. To the extent that protests called for market-oriented economic reforms they arguably favored more not less inequality and greater mobility for relatively favored groups—such as the well-educated—in particular.

*Doubts about the importance of international pressures.*

In many transitions, mass mobilization against authoritarian regimes occurred in conjunction with strong economic and political pressure from economic donors and/or powerful states. As long as the former appeared to be one of the factors driving elite concessions, the case was coded as distributive conflict. However, alternative interpretations could plausibly place greater – even decisive – weight on these external pressures, ie., could argue that in the absence of international pressures, domestic mobilization would not have been of adequate scale or scope to force authoritarian withdrawal. Where such arguments could be made, we have coded the case as ambiguous.

Table 5 identifies the ambiguous cases by the source of ambiguity (class composition of protest; nature of grievances; significance of international pressures).

Table 5: Ambiguous Cases

CGV Dataset		Polity Dataset	
Country	Source of Ambiguity	Country	Source of Ambiguity
Armenia	Grievance	Armenia	Grievance
Benin	Class	Benin	Class
Bulgaria	Grievance	Bulgaria	Grievance
Congo	Class		
El Salvador	International	El Salvador	International
Estonia	Class/Grievance	Estonia	Class/Grievance
Fiji	International		
Kenya	International		
Latvia	Class/Grievance	Latvia	Class/Grievance
		Lesotho	Class/International
Lithuania	Class/Grievance	Lithuania	Class/Grievance
Malawi	Class/International	Malawi	Class/International
Mali	Class	Mali	Class
Mongolia	Class/Grievance	Mongolia	Class/Grievance
Niger	Class/Grievance	Niger	Class/Grievance
Sri Lanka	Grievance		
Suriname	International		
Ukraine	Class/Grievance	Ukraine	Class/Grievance
<b>Total</b>	17		13
<b>Percent of total transitions</b>	26.2%		22.8%

## Albania 1991 (CGV only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The Communist leadership acceded to multiparty elections in 1992 that resulted in the victory of an opposition coalition.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Reform communists under the leadership of Ramiz Alia pursued controlled liberalization after the death of Hoxha in 1985, including some measures of political liberalization in 1989. But economic collapse generated significant protest that was followed by further political concessions. In 1990, thousands of Albanians stormed embassies in an effort to leave the country; in the wake of this incident the first opposition party (Democratic Party) was formed and legalized. Protests, led initially by students, continued in late 1990 and early 1991 and pressed the government to hold the first multi-party elections in 1991. The victory of a coalition of Communist and socialist parties was greeted by further social upheaval that made it impossible to govern. A general strike in May 1991 by independent trade unions mobilized over 350,000 workers, demanding a 50 percent wage increase. In the countryside, peasants seized land and livestock. Although the demands of opposition political leaders centered on access to Europe, they capitalized on economic collapse and demands for relief as well. Communist rulers agreed to stage new elections in the wake of these protests in March 1992 which were won by the opposition Democratic Party.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Early phases of the transition were initiated from above, but subsequent protests over economic grievances on the part of low-income groups, including with respect to wages and access to land, appeared central to political concessions in 1990 and 1991.

*Source.*

Elez Biberaj, *Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

## Argentina 1983 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1983, the heads of the Navy and Air Force withdrew from the ruling military junta. The Army command appointed a caretaker government that organized elections in negotiation with an opposition coalition of Peronists, Radicals, and Peronist labor unions.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The union movement was initially divided over whether to negotiate or oppose the military government, but it converged on a strategy of massive opposition during the severe economic crisis of 1981. In 1982, a wave of mass mobilizations and general strikes forced the resignation of General Viola, and his replacement by General Galtieri, a hardliner. The Falkland War was launched to divert popular pressure and reduce growing tensions between military hard and soft liners. But protest resumed after a humiliating defeat by Great Britain. These mass protests led to the withdrawal of the Navy and Air Force from the junta and the decision on the part of the Army command to establish a caretaker military government that would negotiate the terms of elections with the opposition.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Argentina's powerful labor movement was pivotal in exacerbating divisions between hard and soft-line military rulers and eventually forcing the collapse of the government.

*Sources.*

Ruth Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 119-126.

James W. McGuire, "Interim Government and Democratic Consolidation: Argentina in Comparative Perspective," in Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, ed., *Between States: Interim Governments and Transitions in Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. 179-210.

Gerardo L. Munck, *Soldiers and Workers in Argentina, 1976-1983*. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1998.

## Armenia 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* The Armenian National Movement (ANM), headed by Levon Ter-Petrossian, defeated the Communist party in multiparty legislative elections held in the Soviet Republics in August 1990. The Armenian Soviet proceeded to select Ter-Petrossian as head of government. Following an overwhelming referendum in favor of full independence, the Armenian Soviet – now led by the ANM and Ter-Petrossian – voted to withdraw from the Soviet Union in September 1991. It held presidential elections on October 16, which Ter-Petrossian won with 83 percent of the vote.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Extensive, although directed only secondarily at the ruling Soviet elite and their local communist allies. Perestroika provided an opening for a nationalist Armenian movement, and public demonstrations became more common. But the focus of conflict was not Russian domination, but on the struggle for Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K), an Armenian ethnic enclave of Azerbaijan. In 1988, the parliament of N-K voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join with Armenia, and this triggered intense and increasingly violent ethnic conflict.

The Armenian nationalist movement, the ANM, was formed in 1989 in support of the annexation of N-K, and grew stronger as Soviet authorities vacillated about how to handle the conflict. In the unrest that followed a devastating earthquake in December 1988, the Soviets first tried to quell opposition by arresting the leaders of the Karabakh Committee, which championed the ethnic cause. But the arrests unleashed large nationalist protests. Gorbachev then proposed enhanced autonomy for N-K within Azerbaijan in 1989, but local communist governments in both Armenia and Azerbaijan opposed this initiative. In September of that year, Azerbaijan began to block the flow of vital oil supplies to Armenia, dealing a devastating economic blow to Armenia. In January 1990, Gorbachev sent troops to stop pogroms against Armenians in N-K, but his unwillingness to transfer jurisdiction of N-K to Armenia and his failure to end the Azerbaijani blockade discredited the local communist elite and alienated much of the population. The Armenian Communist party backed the demands of the N-K Armenians, but even so, they were overwhelmingly defeated by the ANM in the elections to the Armenian Supreme Soviet in August 1990. Now dominated by the ANM, the Armenian Soviet quickly declared sovereignty and the incorporation of N-K. The failed putsch against Gorbachev in August 1991 was the final step in the independence process, convincing the Armenian government that it was essential to break with the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. A referendum in September voted overwhelmingly for secession, and this was followed by the Armenian Soviet's declaration of full independence.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Violent ethnic conflict and an intense nationalist movement drove this transition, but Azerbaijan was the principal adversary. At the same time, however, the Soviet elite, which resisted the secession of N-K from Azerbaijan, was a secondary target and thus the conflict did contribute to regime change. Redistributive grievances did not appear to play any significant role in the broad ethno-nationalist movement, but in keeping with the expansive approach to the application of our coding rule, we classify this as a distributive transition.

*Sources of ambiguity.* Nature of grievances and class composition of protest? The mobilization of an ethno-nationalist majority against a Soviet elite is roughly consistent with the theory, but the primary target was ethnic rivals in neighboring Azerbaijan, and economic grievances did not appear to play a significant role.

*Sources.*

Jonathan Aves 1996. "Politics, Parties, and Presidents in Transcaucasia" in *Caucasian Regional Studies* 1:5-23. Also [www.poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0101-02.htm](http://www.poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0101-02.htm)

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<http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/random%20narratives.htm>  
Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Bangladesh 1986 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1986 the government of Hussain Muhammed Ershad, who had come to power in a military coup in 1982, removed the ban on political parties and held a general election. The categorization of the 1986 decision as a democratic transition is problematic. The Polity score for 1986 was -6, and this score did not rise above six until Ershad was pushed out of power 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Elections were stage-managed by the regime in order to “civilianize” Ershad’s rule.

After seizing power in 1982, Ershad had suspended the constitution, barred political activity, and assumed the presidency. Ershad nonetheless sought to return the country to parliamentary rule by undertaking elections, albeit on the military’s terms. From the onset of military rule, the main opposition parties (the 15-Party Alliance headed by the Awami League [AL] and the 7-Party Alliance led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party [BNP]) repeatedly refused to participate in any elections until martial law was lifted. Reversing an offer of parliamentary elections in 1985, Ershad staged a national referendum on his leadership that he won overwhelmingly. Pro-Ershad politicians also won overwhelmingly in local elections later in the year as a result of an opposition boycott.

In the wake of these victories, Ershad removed some restrictions on political party activities, including their right to hold large public rallies. With the lifting of the ban on political activities the opposition staged processions and mass rallies and threatened a general strike. In response, Ershad made some limited concessions and scheduled parliamentary elections. The opposition ultimately divided on the question of whether to participate in the elections, with the AL participating and the BNP continuing the boycott. Ershad’s Jatiya Party, a personal political vehicle, won a majority of the parliamentary seats. Citing fraud in the 1986 election, both the BNP and the Awami League decided to boycott the next general election in 1988.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Despite some mass mobilization by the political parties in early 1986, the decision to return the country to some form of controlled parliamentary rule had been taken before that time. Moreover, the elections of 1986 were clearly a stage-managed effort to perpetuate Ershad’s rule. In 1991, Ershad was pushed from power by major demonstrations by opposition parties and civil society groups (see the discussion of this case below). However, Ershad clearly controlled the limited transition in 1986.

### *Sources.*

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Syed Serajul Islam, “Bangladesh in 1986: Entering a New Phase,” *Asian Survey* 27, 2 (February 1987), 163-172

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Bangladesh,” Polity IV Country Reports 2010 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed December 15, 2011.

U.S. Department of State, “Bangladesh: Background Note,” May 24, 2010 at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm> accessed December 20, 2011.

## Bangladesh 1991 (Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* General H.M. Ershad (1982-1990) resigned in December 1990, making way for an interim caretaker government headed by Acting President Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed; the interim government oversaw relatively free and fair elections.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Students initially led protests against the government, but following violence against them the major opposition parties (the BNP, a center-right party, and the center-left Awami League) issued statements calling for Ershad to resign. In addition to workers, NGOs, and students, professional groups, civil servants and businessmen also mobilized demonstrations. In the face of widespread mass protests in Dhaka, senior army officers withdrew support from Ershad in December 1990. Although political themes dominated the protests and subsequent campaigns, the major center-right and center-left parties faced pressure from other left parties and social movements to keep the democratic reform on track. The electoral campaigns of the competing parties emphasized a variety of economic grievances, including union disaffection with the Ershad government and rural indebtedness.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Although protests were initially led by students, urban and was cross-class in nature and emphasizing political issues, center-left political leaders also played a role in the protests and democracy movement.

*Sources.*

Ahmed Fakhruddin, *The Caretakers: A First Hand Account of the Interim Government of Bangladesh (1990-91)*. Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 1998. Pp. 1-13, 87-96.

Talukder Maniruzzaman, "The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian Rule in Bangladesh," *Pacific Affairs* 65, 2 (Summer, 1992). Pp. 203-224.

## Belarus 1991 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In August 1991 the Belarussian parliament, still dominated by the Communist party, declared independence from the Soviet Union. In December, Belarus joined with Russia and Ukraine in the Alma Ata Declaration which dissolved the Soviet Union entirely. After a prolonged struggle, the still-dominant former communist party agreed to a new constitution and multiparty elections in 1994.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. In 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear accident in neighboring Ukraine stirred some protest, as did the discovery of a mass grave of Stalin's victims in 1988. But the nationalist protest movement was very weak in comparison with those in the Baltic countries, Armenia, and Ukraine. The Belarussian People's Front, organized from exile, led the initial opposition to Soviet rule but it was unable to gain widespread support in the electorate or the streets.

Unlike these other countries, Belarus had become highly Russified during the Soviet era. The Belarussian communist party remained dominant in the legislature after multiparty elections were held within the Soviet Republics in 1990. In July 1990, following Yeltsin's lead in Russia, the parliament declared Belarus sovereign, but without breaking with the Soviet Union. In an all-Union referendum held in March 1991, 83 percent of Belarussian voters supported preserving the USSR. Full independence was driven by events in Moscow. In the anti-Gorbachev coup of August 1991, top Belarus officials appeared to side with the putsch, and were ousted by the communists in the legislature. The full declaration of independence several weeks later again followed the lead of Yeltsin in Russia.

*Coding.* Non-distributive transition. The "transition" in this case was very superficial; it was led primarily by the Communist party itself, which remained in control of most of the levers of power. The opposition, did attempt to mobilize both nationalist and democratic protest, had very little leverage.

*Sources.*

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## Benin 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* In 1990, incumbent General Kerekou convened a National Conference. The Conference declared sovereignty and appointed a transitional government. The transitional government organized a referendum on a new constitution (1990) and parliamentary and presidential elections (1991) that resulted in the defeat of Kerekou and the victory of opposition politician Nieephore Soglo, who had headed the transitional government.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Benin had been a Soviet client state under President Kerekou. Economic crisis—including a severe banking crisis in 1988—left it in a state of fiscal collapse, unable to pay public sector salaries, dispense patronage or maintain support of the military. The crisis led to protests by students, civil servants, and teachers as well as more spontaneous urban riots. The incumbent government called the National Conference for February 1990 in response to deepening social mobilization and the refusal of the armed forces to support further repression.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Popular protest was decisive in the decision to call the National Conference, which set the transition process in motion.

*Source of ambiguity.* Class composition of protest, which came primarily from civil servants, students and teachers.

*Sources.*

Samuel Decalo, “Benin: First of the New Democracies,” in John F. Clark and David Gardinier, eds. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 291-297.

Wuyi Omitoogun and Kenneth Orniogo-Itite 1996. “The National Conference as a Model for Democratic Consolidation: Benin and Nigeria,” *Africa Occasional Paper*, No. 6, Ibadan, Nigeria: French Institute for Research (IFRA). Pp 15.

## Bolivia 1982 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1982, incumbent Garcia Meza was ousted in a military coup. The coup leaders reinstated the legislature that had been deposed by Garcia Meza in 1980, and the legislature in turn named Hernan Siles Suazo to the presidency. The choice was ratified in a competitive presidential election held several months later.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The mineworkers union was one of the most militant in the region and frequently allied with peasant organizations. Between 1978 and 1982, they led the opposition to a series of military efforts to take control of the government. The first of these came in 1978, when General Hugo Banzer, who had seized power in a coup in 1971, attempted to use rigged elections to extend his time in power. The plan was derailed by a mass movement triggered by a hunger strike by four miners’ wives. In 1979, the military allowed presidential elections to proceed, but when this ended in a stalemate, it again seized control of the government. Again, however, blockades and strikes led by the miner’s union forced the military to accede to new elections in 1980. This time, although no candidate received the necessary plurality, the newly elected congress named Hernan Siles Suazo to the presidency, only to have its decision overturned by a still another coup led by General Garcia Meza. In 1982, mine workers were once more at the forefront of a broad opposition coalition that led to the downfall of the Garcia Meza dictatorship and the decision of the military to allow competitive elections to go forward.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. By 1982, Garcia Meza met strong opposition from business groups and the United States as well as unions. There is little doubt, however, that large, militant, well-organized unions, together with peasant movements, were decisive in the defeat of repeated military attempts to reassert control between 1978 and 1982.

*Sources.*

Ruth Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 143-149.

James Dunkerly, *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982*. London: Verso, 1994. Pp. 251-267.

## Brazil 1985 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* Following a scheduled vote of the electoral college, a soft-line military government reluctantly accepted the transfer of the presidency to a moderate civilian supported by the opposition party. This was followed by a competitive congressional election in 1986, swept by the political opposition.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Gradual political liberalization was initiated by a soft-line military president in 1974 and then pressed further by moderate leaders of the political opposition. However, massive popular protest substantially added to the pressure for full democracy. A wildcat strike movement, originating in the metallurgical industry, spread to millions of workers between 1978 and 1980, then resumed again in 1983 after a period of repression. The unions provided the core of a social movement involving a broader range of civil society groups in poor neighborhoods. In 1984-85, massive rallies in favor of direct elections prompted leading pro-government politicians to defect in the electoral college and to support the choice of a civilian successor from the opposition. In the face of protest and ruling party defections, the military allowed the electoral college vote to stand.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transitions. The labor movement was a core component of a broader opposition coalition that deprived the regime of control of the liberalization process.

*Sources.*

Ruth Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 134-138.

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## Bulgaria 1990 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* Long-time dictator, Zhikov, was deposed in a coup d'état by reform communists in November 1989. National Roundtable Talks held from January through March 1990 initiated a number of political reforms, including agreements on a new constitution and electoral rules. The incumbent reformed communist party—the Bulgarian Socialist Party—won competitive elections in June 1990.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Although there is some increase in civil society activity over the course of 1989, the decision to depose Zhivkov in November 1989 appears largely the result of calculations by the communists who also proposed Roundtable Talks. However, the departure of Zhivkov was followed by mass demonstrations, in which organized labor played an important role, and the formation of a broad anti-communist coalition. These demonstrations provided the context for the roundtable talks and the environment in which the communists ultimately made the decision to relinquish the communist party's monopoly of power and to hold elections. Although the reform communists won the transitional elections in June, evidence of an ongoing role for mass mobilization can be found in the fact that the reform communist government itself ultimately fell in November 1990 as a result of demonstrations and a general strike.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Although the deposing of Zhikov was the pivotal event in the transition, subsequent political decisions took place in the shadow of the mass anti-communist protests of late 1989 and early 1990. Although political issues dominated these protests, demonstrations included a highly mobilized union movement.

*Sources of ambiguity.* Class composition of popular protest and nature of grievances. Although labor did play a role, the demonstrations were very much broader and focused largely on political issues.

*Sources.*

Venelin I. Ganey, *Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria After 1989*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Nassya Kravlevska-Owens, *Communism Versus Democracy: Bulgaria 1944 to 1997*. Sofia: American Research Center in Sofia, 2010.

Albert Melone, *Creating Parliamentary Government: The Transition to Democracy in Bulgaria*. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1998, pp. 30-41.

## Burundi 1993 (CGV only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1988, authoritarian incumbent President Buyoya set up a national commission to study “national unity” made up of equal Hutu and Tutsi representation. The commission produced a report, which was followed by the drafting of a “Charter on National Unity” that was approved by referendum in 1991. A Constitutional Commission then drafted a new constitution that was approved in 1992 by referendum setting the stage for national elections in 1993.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The 1987 coup maintained Tutsi hegemony of the political system despite their minority status vis-à-vis the majority Hutu (approximately 85-15). The remnants of an extremist Hutu organization (Umugambwe w’Abakozi b’Uburundi or Burundi Workers’ Party (UBU)) appear to have been responsible for the deaths of a number of Tutsi peasants in the northern communes of Ntega and Marangara in August 1988. In response, the Tutsi-dominated army unleashed a wave of violence against Hutus in the North in which as many as 20,000 were killed and 60,000 displaced. In the wake of this violence, the government came under strong external as well as internal pressure to reach some intra-ethnic accommodation and responded with the ‘National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity’ and the inclusion of increasing numbers of Hutu into the government. These processes explicitly addressed a number of distributional issues, including Hutu access to education and the civil service. The negotiation of the constitution took place under the shadow of ongoing Tutsi control of the state and military (with coup attempts in February 1989 and March 1992) and contained strong power-sharing elements. The 1993 elections resulted in a lopsided victory for Hutu parties. Following two unsuccessful coup attempts, the president, his family and leaders of the (Hutu) FRODEBU were assassinated in a successful coup. Although the coup leaders did not seize power and were even allowed to escape, a “creeping coup” effectively restored Tutsi control over the state.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The incumbent’s decision to gradually cede power was triggered by ethnic violence. Even though the perpetrators of this violence were not pushing for democratization, concerns about the difficulty of continuing to repress Hutu demands appeared to motivate the transition process. Given the history of exclusion, these demands implicitly had a strong distributive component. However, incumbent state and military elites were willing to brutally suppress ethnic challenges, effectively controlled the constitution-writing process and wielded a veto over the new government. The country is coded as reverting to authoritarian rule in CGV dataset in 1996.

*Sources.*

Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2005. Pp. 30-38.

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Filip Reyntjens, "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: The June 1993 Elections in Burundi," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, 4 (December 1993): 563-583.

## Cape Verde 1990-91 (CGV dates the transition in 1990; Polity in 1991): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In February 1990, the National Council of the ruling Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) officially supported a transition to multiparty rule. In September, the government adopted the constitutional revision that ended one-party rule and established a multi-party semi-presidential system. Competitive elections were held in February 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* None. The Catholic Church had criticized the ruling party in the past, and some overseas migrants had formed an opposition party. But there was no organized opposition within the country and what did emerge followed rather than led the transition. When the ruling party introduced subnational elections in 1989, opposition groups started to form in response and these groups shifted their focus to the national level after, rather than before, the political shift on the part of the PAICV. Following the announcement of the intention to change the constitution, the PAICV engaged in a dialogue with the emergent opposition forces in parliament about the new framework; the transition has been called a "pacted" one (Meyns 2002, 150). Rather, the ruling party undertook the changes in response to international changes and the desire to appeal to donors; and in the belief that they would win the founding elections. This expectation proved wrong; the Movement for Democracy won both the presidency and a majority in the parliamentary elections.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition.

*Sources.*

B. Ames, L. Renno, L. And F. Rodrigues, Reform and Social Peace in Cape Verde. Afrobarometer Paper No. 25 (2000).

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P. Meyns, "Cape Verde: An African Exception," *Journal of Democracy* 13, 3 (2000): 153-166.

*Consulted.* Professor Bruce Baker, Professor of African Security and Director of African Studies Centre, Coventry University.

## Central African Republic 1993 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* General Kolingba agreed to hold elections in October 1992 but nullified the election results. Elections were held again in August 1993. Again, Kolingba sought to make changes in the electoral code and the makeup of the Supreme Court to avoid a runoff election but reluctantly allowed the elections to stand leading to a runoff and transition of power.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. After 1990, a small pro-democracy movement called for the convocation of a National Conference but Kolingba refused and detained several opponents. Pressure from the United States, France, and from a group of locally represented countries and agencies called GIBAFOR (France, USA, Germany, Japan, EU, World Bank and UN) finally led Kolingba to agree, in principle, to hold free elections in October 1992. After using the excuse of alleged irregularities to suspend the results of the

elections, Kolingba again came under intense pressure from GIBAFOR to make political concessions. He established a Provisional National Political Council (Conseil National Politique Provisoire de la République” or CNPPR) and a Mixed Electoral Commission, which included representatives from all political parties. The new bodies drafted the new electoral code. Following a riot and two coup attempts, Kolingba finally agreed to the August 1993 elections. However, given his willingness to repress opponents in the past, pressure from France appears to have been decisive in assuring the final acquiescence to the election results.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. There is some limited mobilization following Kolingba’s attempts to steal elections, but he had successfully repressed it. External actors played a crucial role in forcing elite negotiations and holding Kolingba to the election schedule and results.

*Sources.*

“Central African Republic Votes to Ring Out Old,” *Africa Report* 38, 6 (November/December 1993). Pp 5-6.

John F. Clark, “Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate,” in John F. Clark and David Gardinier, eds. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

U.S. Department of State, “Central African Republic Human Rights Practices 1993,” January 31, 1994 at [http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993\\_hrp\\_report/93hrp\\_report\\_africa/](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/)

## Chile 1989-90 (Polity dates the transition in 1989; CGV in 1990): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* Augusto Pinochet ceded the presidency after a center-left coalition (the Concertacion) won a competitive election over a right wing candidate in 1989 and took office in 1990.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Not significant at the time of the transition. During the economic crisis of 1982-1983, massive demonstrations led by labor unions and opposition parties opened space for the re-constitution of center-left opposition parties after a decade underground or in exile. But the protests petered out after 1986. Opposition leadership turned to registering voters for a constitutionally mandated referendum on Pinochet’s rule in 1988 and for competitive elections held a year later. The opposition triumphed in the 1988 referendum on Pinochet’s continuation in power, and its leaders entered into negotiations with the government over constitutional reforms. Intensive negotiations between the old regime and opposition party leaders led to an agreement in 1989 on a new constitution that preserved a wide variety of prerogatives for the military and right-wing parties. Agreements on the constitution opened the way to the 1989 presidential elections and the transfer of government to the center-left coalition in 1990.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Massive protest in 1983 helped open space for the reemergence of opposition parties onto the political scene. But these protests met severe repression and ended in 1986, and had no direct impact on the elite negotiations that established the constitutional terms for the transfer of power.

*Sources.*

Ruth Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 150-155.

Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 93-94, 257-262.

## Comoros 1990 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* In 1989, military ruler Ahmed Abdallah was assassinated by six military officers, allegedly led by French mercenary Colonel Bob Denard. Denard was forced from the country by France and South Africa and an interim government headed by Chief of the Supreme Court Mohammed Djohar organized competitive elections in March 1990.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. The Comoros island group has a long history of conflict between the three main islands (Anjouan, Grande Comore and Mohéli), punctuated by secessionist bids; these conflicts clearly have a distributive component. Nonetheless, elite struggles and external actors were the main drivers of regime change.

The country has a long history of coups and coup attempts, over 20 since independence. Ahmed Abdallah, the country's first president and prime minister, was deposed by Ali Soilih after only one month in office. The autocratic Soilih, who sought to "Comorianize" the country, was ousted and killed by a group of 50 French mercenaries under the command of Colonel Bob Denard, who restored Abdallah to power. Abdallah tilted back towards France, ruled through a one-party state, and in the constitution of 1982 concentrated power at the center and made the island governors nominees of the Union president. Political centralization generated significant inter-island conflict.

Abdallah was formally limited by the constitution to two presidential terms. Toward the end of his second term in 1985, Abdallah engineered a constitutional amendment that would have allowed him to continue in office, antagonizing a number of presidential hopefuls within his own party. A referendum in early November registered 92.5 percent in favor of the amendment and provoked some protest. But palace intrigue and the involvement of external actors were the main forces behind the subsequent murder of Abdallah by members of his own presidential guard. The leader of the coup was Bob Denard, the French head of a mercenary force that had been contracted to protect the president and intimidate opposition figures and had been involved in corruption. But at the urging of both the French and the South African government, Abdallah had planned to expel Denard by the end of 1989. Denard acted to seize power before the plan could be carried out. However, the South African government withdrew funding from the mercenaries and the French began a military build-up on the dissident island of Mahore. Denard surrendered to French forces and was returned to France.

The deposition of Bernard opened the way for the organization of an interim government, headed by the head of the Supreme Court, Said Mohammed Djohar, who was the constitutionally-proscribed successor to Abdallah. The Djohar government held elections in 1990, which Djohar won about 55 percent of the vote. As before, however, the system continued to be plagued by repeated coup attempts and chronic cabinet instability; see the discussion of the 1995 reversion below.

*Coding* Non-distributive conflict transition. Despite inter-island conflicts, regime changes were driven primarily by military conspiracies, including the activities of French citizen Colonel Bob Denard and a group of French mercenaries. French and South African influence was significant throughout. In the turmoil following the direct elections of 1990, French troops played a direct role in supporting Djohar and establishing a government of national reconciliation.

*Sources.*

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## Republic of the Congo 1992 (CGV only): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* President Sassou and the ruling PCT concede to the convening of a national conference, which declares itself sovereign and appoints an interim government. The interim government schedules presidential and legislative elections.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. In the wake of substantial economic shocks, the PCT announced it was abandoning Marxism-Leninism and its monopoly on power in mid-1990. The PCT also announced that it would be open to those of different ideological persuasions and that it would make constitutional changes at an extraordinary PCT congress scheduled for 1991. These concessions were met by a convergence of church and union pressures on the government and demands for a constitutional convention

not controlled by the PCT. The crucial event in the transition appears to be a general strike by the dominant trade union in September 1990 that called for autonomy from the government and an independent constitutional convention as well as material demands for higher wages. The government ceded to the demands of the CTU and allowed the formation of opposition parties with immediate effect. In early December a number of prominent PCT politicians defected from the party. Substantial conflict ensued concerning the structure and process of the national conference that convened in February and then again in March. But once convened, it was broadly representative and took the decision early to declare itself “sovereign.” Sassou accepted this decision, and the conference proceeded to elect a slate of leaders that completely excluded the PCT. At the end of the conference, it chose an interim government for one year, appointed a technocratic leader, and the interim government schedule presidential and legislative elections for March and June 1992. The interim government had to contend with several crises involving the military and charges of election fraud, but weathered these challenges to hold the elections.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The precipitating events leading to the authoritarian withdrawal involved urban protest spearheaded by labor unions, the Church and opposition politicians critical of the corruption of the government.

*Source of ambiguity.* Class composition of protest. As in other low-income African countries, distributive demands emanated primarily from urban labor unions.

*Source.*

John F. Clark, “Elections, Leadership and Democracy in Congo,” *Africa Today* 41, 3 (3rd quarter 1994), special issue on “Electoral Successes: Harbingers of Hope?,” pp. 41-60.

## Croatia 1991 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding for 2000 below): Non-distributive conflict transition

*Note.* The Houle data set includes Croatia for 1995-2000 and it is thus considered as continuously democratic, although it appears as a democratic transition in 1991 in the CGV dataset.

*The transition.* The regional governments of the federal Yugoslav republic held multiparty elections in 1990. Franco Tudjman, founder of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), was elected as head of the Croatia region of Yugoslavia in 1990 and declared independence in 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* After Tito’s death in 1980 the Yugoslav communist party adopted a collective leadership model, with the occupant of the top position rotating annually; and it strengthened the federal structure that gave more authority to Yugoslavia’s constituent republics. During the 1980s, however, attempts to implement IMF-sponsored adjustments to economic decline exacerbated tensions between liberal elites within the federal government and the regional elites, and among the regional elites themselves. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Slovenian government began to withhold tax contributions to the federal government and to resist federal efforts to increase its control over the monetary system. These tensions opened the way for similar responses in Croatia.

Tensions within the federal system escalated further because of ethnic conflicts within Serbia between Serbs and Albanians. Slobodan Milošević, the president of the Communist League of Serbia, exploited the intra-Serbia conflicts with Serbian nationalist appeals that further alarmed elites in the other regions. The growing rift among the regional branches of the Communist Party led to the effective dissolution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia at its 14th Congress held in January 1990 into different parties for each republic.

The dissolution of the federal party opened the way for reform communists within the regions to hold multiparty elections in 1990. In Croatia, Tudjman, a dissident nationalist, had begun to build support among diaspora Croatians, and in the runup to the 1990 regional elections, founded the HDZ in 1989. His party won only 42 percent of the vote; but as a result of the winner-take-all electoral rules established earlier by the reform communists, he captured 58 percent of the parliamentary seats and declared independence in 1991.

His campaign of ethnic cleansing, intended to quell the protest of Serbian minorities, set off the civil war with Serbia.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition The breakup of Yugoslavia and the decision to hold regional elections was largely the product of an inter-elite game aimed at expanding the autonomy of the regions within the federal system. Although Croatia and Slovenia objected to Milosevic's nationalism, the violent ethnic hostilities that fueled the civil war of the 1990s was a consequence, rather than an underlying cause, of these efforts. Regional divisions among Communist party elites made multiparty elections possible, opening the way to the election of Tudman and the declaration of independence.

*Source.*

Susan L. Woodward, *The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995. Pp. 82-146.

### Croatia 2000 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* When Tudjman became ill in November 1999, the Supreme Court appointed an interim president to preside over the government until multiparty elections could be held in February 2000; Tudman died in December. Parliamentary elections led to the defeat of Tudman's HDZ and the formation of a government under the leader of the Social Democratic Party (former League of Communist of Croatia), Ivica Racan. Presidential elections completed in February also resulted in the victory of opposition leader, Stjepan Mesic.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Some protest in 1998, but limited impact in the 2000 transition. After the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia in 1995, there was some expectation that Croatia might have an opportunity to move toward more democratic rule. This did not prove to be the case, as demonstrated by the ongoing "Zagreb crisis" of the second half of the 1990s in which Tudman repeatedly refused to recognize the victory of opposition parties in the city, including the success of the Social Democratic Party in blue-collar neighborhoods. Protest against the government included a mass rally in 1998 called by the unions that combined opposition to Tudman's authoritarian tendencies with bread-and-butter issues. Yet despite a sharp shift to the right within the HDZ in 1998 and the resignation of moderates from the government, the transition itself does not appear to be substantially affected by these events but occurred as a result of constitutional processes (the Supreme Court's appointment of an interim government and the holding of elections).

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition.

*Sources.*

International Crisis Group, "Change in the Offing:: the Shifting Political Scene in Croatia," Europe Report No. 50 (December 14, 1998) at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/croatia/050-change-in-the-offing-the-shifting-political-scene-in-croatia.aspx>

Marina Ottaway and Gideon Maltz, "Croatia's Second Transition and the International Community," *Current History* 100, 649 (2001) 375-81.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Croatia," Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

### Cyprus 1983 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* On November 15, 1983, Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot National Unity Party (UPB), declared statehood for the Turkish region of Cyprus. Formal independence paved the way for the promulgation of a new democratic constitution in 1985.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Decision to declare statehood or subsequent promulgation of constitution was driven by elite strategies and external patrons. From its independence in 1960, Cyprus has been riven by communal conflict. The independence constitution included complex power-sharing arrangements between the dominant Greek and minority Turkish communities, guaranteed by Britain, Greece and



Turkey. These arrangements proved incapable of stopping overt conflict, most notably in the outbreak of violence in 1963. In 1974, the Greek military dictatorship invaded Cyprus in response to Archbishop Makarios's declaration of independence from Greece. Turkey responded with an armed intervention of its own that led to effective partition and the declaration of a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) followed by an exchange of populations under UN oversight. Negotiations between the two sides ensued but continually deadlocked over competing visions of federalism, with the Greek Cypriots seeking a more centralized system than their Turkish counterparts.

On 15 November 1983, the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish area passed a resolution proclaiming the formation and independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Legislative Assembly created a Constituent Assembly which in turn delegated the responsibility of drafting a fundamental law to a constitutional commission. The Constituent Assembly approved the constitution in March 1985 and it was ratified in a referendum in May by a 70-30 margin.

*Coding.* Cyprus has been characterized by ongoing distributive conflicts between the Greek majority and Turkish minority, including periodic mass mobilization and violence. However the declaration of independence was the result of effective partition of the country as a result of actions taken by Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the case is anomalous in many respects. The Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized; its approach to the European Union in 1981 was one precipitating cause of the declaration of independence by Northern Cyprus. Protected by 35,000 Turkish troops, however, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognized by any country except Turkey; the international community considers Northern Cyprus occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

*Sources.*

International Crisis Group, "The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?" Europe Report N°171, March 2006 at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/cyprus.aspx>

James Wolfe, "Cyprus: Federation under International Safeguards," *Publius* 18, 2 (Spring, 1988), 75-89.

## Czechoslovakia 1989-90 (CGV codes the transition as occurring in 1989, Polity codes the transition in 1990): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* After mass demonstrations in late 1989, the conservative leadership of the Czech Communist Party abdicated, leaving a rump group to negotiate the transfer of power. The first "government of national understanding" was dominated by leaders of the two main opposition movements: the Civic Forum that had emerged in the Czech lands and its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence. Following the general election of June 1990, most of the top positions in the national government were held by leaders of the Civic Forum, while in the Slovak regions, Public Against Violence predominated. These divisions ultimately led to the separation into two countries.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant mass mobilization, but not on the basis of economic grievances nor reflecting decisive leadership or participation by groups reflecting the interests of lower-class constituencies. The leadership of the opposition was Charter 77, which was formed in 1977 by several hundred intellectuals and human rights activists. Its objectives focused exclusively on human rights, and particularly the obligations of the Czech regime to implement provisions of international human rights charters that it had signed. In November 1989, after over a decade of repression, mass protests provided the opportunity for the leaders of Charter 77 to emerge as the main challengers to the communist regime. These protests were triggered on November 17 by a police crackdown on student demonstrators demanding a pullout of Soviet forces and an end to Communist rule. The manifest opposition to the regime led directly to the resignation of the Communist leadership a few weeks later. By the end of December, Vaclav Havel, the leader of Charter 77, had taken over as president.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Large-scale mass protest was the immediate catalyst that

prompted the sudden resignation of the communist leadership. But in contrast to other transitions from Communist rule, including Albania and Romania, the representation of lower-class groups was not decisive or significant and socio-economic grievances were not salient.

*Sources.*

Paul Blokker, "Dissidence, Republicanism and Democratic Change," *Eastern European Politics and Society* 25, 2 (May 2011): 219-243.

Valerie Bunce, "The National Idea: Imperial Legacies and Post-Communist Pathways in Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Society* 19, 3 (Summer 2005): 219-243.

Anna Grzymala-Busse, *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Michael Kraus, "The Czech Republic's First Decade," *Journal of Democracy* 14, 2 (April 2003): 50-64.

Alan Renwick, "The Role of Dissident Values in Institutional Choice: 1989 in Comparative Perspective," *East European Politics and Society* 25, 2 (May 2011): 296-317.

## Dominican Republic 1996 (Polity only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* Aging caudillo Joaquin Balaguer fulfilled a commitment to allow an election in which he would not be a candidate. The election contest pitted Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, a populist opposition leader, against more moderate leftist Leonel Fernandez. Support from Balaguer's party played a role in Fernandez's victory, but the election was widely viewed as free and fair.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Balaguer had dominated political life in the Dominican Republic since 1966, and resorted extensively to fraud and intimidation to win elections, and coopt or intimidate opponents. Nevertheless, under strong pressure from the U.S. Carter administration, he agreed to relatively free elections in 1978 and to the victory of opposition candidates. Politics became much more competitive from this point onward, and the Dominican Republic crossed the 6 point Polity threshold. In the 1986 elections, Balaguer regained the presidency in the midst of a severe economic crisis, capitalizing on wide-spread opposition to a government IMF program and on anti-Haitian nationalist appeals. Continuing to resist IMF adjustments, he won again in relatively free elections in 1990.

In 1994, however, with support slipping, Balaguer again resorted to extensive fraud in an attempt to continue in office. The fraud was widely condemned by international observers and led to extensive opposition protests. Facing strong backlash from civil society groups, Balaguer negotiated a pact with the opposition in August 1994 in which he agreed to cut his term to only two years and to hold elections in 1996 in which he would not run. The ensuing two years were characterized by official corruption and police violence, but also by continuing popular protest over both civil liberties and economic conditions thus sustaining pressure to fulfill the terms of the 1994 agreement. The elections went forward as scheduled in 1996, with the moderate leftist Leonel Fernandez emerging as the victor.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The agreement with the opposition to hold new elections took place in the context of civil society protest. Opposition politicians were able to capitalize on an increasingly militant civil society, strike activity and popular protest which made it increasingly costly for Balaguer to renege on the 1994 agreement and continue in office. Dominican politics had long been characterized by a mixture of political pluralism, corruption, and intermittent repression, and this shift in Polity ranking is a marginal one (from 5 to 6). Nonetheless, the withdrawal of Balaguer from office was an important step in the direction of democracy.

*Sources.*

Jonathan Hartlyn, *The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Civil War Narratives: The Dominican Republic," Working Draft, June 27, 2006 at

<http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf>

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Dominican Republic," at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed January 5, 2012.

## Estonia 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* In August 1991, a compromise agreement between radical and moderate factions of the independence movement provided for the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly and full independence for Estonia from the Soviet Union.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Protests began in 1987 over ecological issues, and steadily gathered steam around the independence movement in 1988. That same year, the Estonian Communist party responded by replacing pro-Soviet Communist chief, Karl Vaino, by the more reform-minded Vaino Valjas. The Supreme Soviet of Estonia adopted a declaration of sovereignty that gave Estonian laws precedence over all-union ones. However, mass demonstrations grew in size and militancy in the following years. In 1989, these culminated in the formation of a 600-kilometer human chain of over a million people demanding independence for the Baltic republics.

In 1990, radical factions of the movement (the Estonian National Independence Party, ENIP), organized an election for a new Congress of Estonia, which convened in March. In the meantime, the Communist party disintegrated, and a moderate independence faction that advocated a gradual transition to independence (the Popular Front) gained control of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. Relations between these two wings of the independence movement were extremely strained throughout the transition, but the August coup that temporarily ousted Gorbachev spurred them to form a united front in defense of independence. The Chairmen of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Estonia issued a joint appeal to the Estonian people, and leaders of the two assemblies reached a compromise agreement calling for the formation of a Constituent Assembly. In September 1991, with Gorbachev temporarily restored to power, the Soviet Union recognized Estonian independence.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The massive Estonian independence movement, like those of the other Baltic countries, was motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization at the hands of the Soviets. Mass mobilization aimed at a fundamental redistribution of political and economic power away from the Russian minority and toward the Estonian majority.

*Sources.*

Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 47-103.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Estonia," Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## El Salvador 1984 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* Incumbent military and economic elites accede to the election of a constituent assembly in 1982, which was dominated by a newly formed right wing party, ARENA. However, negotiations among the major parties resulted in an agreement (Pact of Apaneca) that created a Political Commission that subsequently drafted a new constitution in 1983. The new constitution provided for elections in 1984. These were relatively free and were won by Jose Napoleon Duarte, a moderate Christian Democrat.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Substantial. The transition occurred in the context of bloody civil war between oligarchs and right-wing military factions on one side and a coalition of leftist groups, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), on the other. Reformist military officers and civilians attempted to respond to social grievances in a coup launched in October 1979, but their efforts were undermined by

death squads and conservative military officers who pushed the reformers out of the ruling junta. In January 1981, the FMLN launched its own military operations, posing a severe threat to ruling economic as well as political elites. Demands for redistribution of land and income were at the heart of peaceful protests of the late 1970s and the revolutionary uprising of the early 1980s. During those years, moreover, the uprising might well have succeeded in ousting the old regime, had it not been US economic and military counter-insurgency efforts. The convening of the Constituent Assembly, the negotiations among the major parties and the constitutional agreements leading to the 1984 elections were pressed strongly by the United States as part of a classic counter-insurgency program to politically isolate revolutionary forces by bringing moderates and even center-left leaders back into the system.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Political reforms were aimed at responding directly to the grievances that spurred the revolution. The transition coded in 1984 was at best a limited one, and peace initiatives undertaken by the Duarte government subsequently failed and war continued. Nonetheless, the political changes opened new space for unions and civil society groups.

Source of ambiguity. Weight of international factors. Pressure from the United States to adopt a “hearts and minds” strategy was a key factor in the military’s and oligarchy’s decision to accept constitutional reform.

*Sources.*

Tommie Sue Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Tommie Sue Montgomery and Christine J. Wade, “Civil War to Uncivil Peace,” in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds. *Latin American Politics and Development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. Pp. 501-528.

Elizabeth Jean Wood, “An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests, and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador,” *Comparative Political Studies* 8, 34 (2001). Pp. 862-888, especially 872-873.

## Fiji 1992 (CGV only): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* After the first 1987 coup, the issue of constitutional revision became paramount and was the precipitating event driving the second coup in the same year that established Fiji as a republic (see discussion of Fiji 1987 reversion below). Following the coup, however, pressures on the government to transition toward democratic rule and revise the constitution continued. A new constitution was drafted in 1990 and elections were held under it in 1992.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The 1987 general elections resulted in a Labour Party-National Federation Party Coalition victory, ending the post-independence monopoly of the Alliance party. A coup in the same year severed the relationship to the Crown by declaring Fiji a republic and installing a Military Administration; we code this reversion as an elite reversion involving distributive conflict (see below). The coup also had wide-ranging significance for Fiji’s international relations. Protests by the Government of India led to Fiji’s expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations and official non-recognition of the Rabuka regime from foreign governments, including Australia and New Zealand.

The coup was followed by violence against the Indian community. However, the authoritarian tendencies of the government upset labor, which threatened strike actions in the early 1990s, as well as a newly-formed rural union movement that reflected intra-Fijian rivalries and distributive conflicts as well. Western Fijians objected to the corruption and favoritism of the government and had formed their own tribal confederacy and political parties as a result; it was an alliance between the Labor Party and the Indian-based Federation Party that led to the opposition victory in 1987 and sparked the coup.

Partly in response to these pressures, the Rabuka government orchestrated a new constitution in 1990 that served as the basis for the 1992 elections, in which the opposition reluctantly decided to participate. The source of that reluctance was ongoing bias in the nature of the new constitution, which calls its democratic

nature into question. The Constitution mandated affirmative action in favor of Fijians, elevated the status of Fijian customary law, barred access to the ordinary courts in cases involving Fijian customary land law, and provided for human rights provisions to be superseded by a two-thirds majority of both houses in a wide range of circumstances. Moreover, the electoral rules were clearly biased against the Indian community. National constituencies elected by universal suffrage and comprising approximately half of the House of Representatives under the 1970 constitution were abolished and all members of the House of Representatives were elected from communal constituencies on closed electoral rolls for registered members of a particular ethnic group. 37 seats were allocated to ethnic Fijians and only 27 to Indo-Fijians, despite the near-equality of their numbers in the population. These electoral rules permitted Rabuka to retain office.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Both Indian and intra-Fijian pressures played at least some role in the transition to a new constitution.

Source of ambiguity. Weight of international factors. The Rabuka government was widely condemned abroad for the 1987 coup, with parallels drawn to apartheid. This had wide-ranging economic effects, as tourism receipts in particular plummeted. The constitution was in part a response to these pressures, and in any case appeared to enshrine continuing political dominance of the incumbent; Polity codes a shift only to a 5 in 1990, thus not crossing the standard democratic threshold. The constitution also continued to be a source of contention (see discussion of Fiji transition 1999).

*Sources.*

Brij V. Lal. 2006. *Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji*. Canberra: ANU E Press, chs. 4-7.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Fiji," Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

Ralph Premdas, "General Rabuka and the Fiji Elections of 1992," *Asian Survey* 33, 10 (October 1993): 997-1009

## Fiji 1999 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* In 1997, a new constitution increased Indian representation in the legislature and permitted a non-Melanesian Fijian to become Prime Minister. The legislative elections of May 1999 were the first to be held under the new constitution. Rabuka's Fijian Political Party (SVT) lost power to a coalition of parties led by the ethnic Indian-dominated Fiji Labour Party (FLP), whose Mahendra Chaudhry became Fiji's first ethnic-Indian Prime Minister. This government was overthrown in a coup only one year later, however.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Ethnic conflicts between indigenous Fijians and the Indian community—the two dominant ethnic groups—have roots in tenancy disputes that date to the colonial period, a power-sharing independence constitution that encouraged ethnic political identifications, and affirmative action policies in education and civil service appointments. The dominance of the Fijian Alliance Party—nominally multiracial but with declining Indo-Fijian support over time—ended with the creation of an Indian-dominated but more populist government in 1987. This government was overthrown in a coup in 1987 led by Sitiveni Rabuka who sought to ensure the country was ruled by indigenous leaders; the coup was followed by violence against the Indian community. Fijian dominance was enshrined in new constitution introduced in 1990.

The authoritarian tendencies of the government upset labor, which threatened strike actions in the early 1990s, as well as a newly-formed rural union movement. From the outset, the Indian community, including parties and NGOs, also objected to the constitution and sought to overhaul the political structures that favored indigenous Fijians; the issue of constitutional revision was key to the elections of both 1992 and 1994. But the indigenous Fijian parties needed coalition partners to govern and reached an agreement with Labour that included a variety of concessions on issues of interest to the Indian community. The Indian community also split over tactics for opposing the constitution, with more moderate leaders favoring a dialogue and negotiated constitutional review. Moreover, the Constitution itself included a review process; Article 161 required that the Constitution be reviewed by 1997. Rabuka's appointment of an electoral reform commission did not

appear to result from manifest social mobilization but rather from promises made to Labor in order to form a government and by a willingness to negotiate on the part of more moderate Indian leaders led by Jai Ram Reddy.

The review commission produced a draft constitution that reserved the presidency for a Fijian but lowered the proportion of seats reserved by ethnic groups and opened the position of prime minister to all races. Rabuka supported the proposal although nationalist indigenous Fijian parties opposed it; this split allowed the new constitution to be approved setting the stage for the elections of 1999 and victory for a coalition of opposition parties led by Labour.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Despite the obvious distributional implications of the 1990 constitution and the opposition to it within the Indian community and among labor, the initiation of the review committee does not appear to stem from mass mobilization but rather from the politics of coalition formation and negotiations with the opposition.

*Sources.*

Brij V. Lal. 2006. *Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji*. Canberra: ANU E Press, chs. 4-7.

Brij V. Lal. 2010. *In the Eye of the Storm: Jai Ram Reddy and the Politics of Postcolonial Fiji*. Canberra: ANU E Press, ch. 7.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Fiji," Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Ghana 1993 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The authoritarian PNDC government under Jerry Rawlings appointed a Constitutional Advisory Committee in 1991 to draft proposals for a new constitution. Following further amendment in a Consultative Assembly, the Constitution was approved by popular referendum in April 1992 followed by presidential and parliamentary elections in November and December. The elections were won by Rawlings and his National Democratic Congress (NDC), which took office in January 1993.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited impact on reforms of Rawlings government. The democratic opposition in Ghana consisted of a variety of political forces that would appear to signal a distributive conflict transition, including: the unions, which adopted a pro-democracy stance in 1988; and left and progressive movements which had initially allied with the PNDC but became disillusioned with its economic policies. Human rights protests, including from the Bar Association, and student organizations also played a role. In August 1990, the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) was created as a forum for these organizations to co-ordinate. But mass protests played little role in the transition, which appeared motivated by concerns about donor disaffection with authoritarian rule and Rawlings' belief that he could control the transition process. The PNDC pre-empted the democratic opposition, controlled the appointments to the Consultative Assembly, which provided very little basis for consultation with or concessions to the opposition. Although decreed "free and fair" by Commonwealth monitors, the elections of 1992 were in fact widely viewed as fraudulent.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Although the Rawlings government was subsequently constrained by new democratic institutions, including rulings by the Supreme Court, mass mobilization did not appear to challenge the regime.

*Source.*

E. Gyimah-Boadi. 'Ghana's Uncertain Political Opening,' *Journal of Democracy* 5, 2 (1994).

## Grenada 1984 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* On October 25, 1983, United States forces invaded Grenada, deposed the heads of the ruling party and established an interim government under Nicholas Braithwaite. The interim government reinsti-

tuted the constitution that had been in effect prior to the 1979 revolution, and on December 1984, it held democratic elections, the first since 1976.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. In March 1979, Grenada's New Jewel Movement (NJM) party overthrew the corrupt and repressive government of Sir Eric Gairy, a move widely popular amongst Grenadians, and established the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) led by Maurice Bishop. Though Bishop embraced a Marxist ideology and maintained close relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, he maintained an officially neutral foreign policy stance; US policy was initially cautious. Severe economic difficulties generated conflicts within the ruling party over the course of 1983. In October, Bishop was ousted in an internal power struggle by a competing hardline faction within the party led by Bernard Coard. Bishop was first arrested, then freed, but subsequently captured and executed when he attempted to retake power.

The Reagan administration's decision to invade was a reaction to the coup. Of particular concern to Reagan was the presence of Cuban workers and military personnel building a large airstrip that could potentially be used for military purposes. The construction had begun under the deposed Bishop regime, but with the hardliners in charge, Reagan feared that it would be used to transport weapons to Central American insurgents. The US also had concerns about a small group of stranded US students. The invasion was officially undertaken at the request of the Governor-General, Barbados, and other Eastern Caribbean states.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Although there were some street demonstrations when the relatively moderate Bishop was overthrown, the United States invasion was decisive in deposing the Marxist regime that succeeded him.

*Sources.*

Michael Rubner, "The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada." *Political Science Quarterly* 100, 4 (1985-1986): 627-47.

Gary Williams, "Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 29, 1 (February 1997): 131-69.

U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Grenada" at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2335.htm> Accessed December 20, 2011.

## Guatemala 1986 (CGV only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1984, the military government announced elections for an 88-member Constituent Assembly, charged with drafting a new constitution and electoral law. The constitution was formally introduced in June of 1985, and elections were held in November.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Substantial. The reforms were undertaken in an effort to quell an insurgency rooted in Guatemala's large indigenous majority. In 1982, key-armed groups unified to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The uprising, in turn, was met with violent repression under General Efraín Ríos Montt, who had seized power in a coup in March 1982. Ríos Montt combined a merciless anti-insurgency campaign bordering on genocide, with some populist redistributive measures (*frijoles y fusiles*) and a promise to reform the political system. The reforms were briefly interrupted when General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores replaced Ríos Montt in a violent palace coup in 1983, but nonetheless were continued. Both the U.S. government and moderate factions of the ruling military viewed elections as a way to combat the insurgency. In fact, human rights abuses continued well after the transition, and the insurgency did not end until the internationally brokered peace agreements of 1996. Nevertheless, the transition did open the way to successive elections and a turnover among elite parties.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Conservative politicians continued to dominate the electoral process after 1985, but the threat posed by the mass-based insurgency contributed significantly to the military's decision to accept an electoral process and allow civilians to become heads of government.

*Source.*

Dwight Wilson, "Guatemala: Democracy by Default" in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds. *Latin American Politics and Development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. Pp. 528-543.

### Guatemala 1996 (Polity only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* President Alvaro Arzu, elected in 1995, signed a peace accord with the URNG (the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union), the umbrella organization for insurgent guerilla groups. As a result, the URNG was granted status as a legal political party.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The peace agreements marked the end of a 36 year civil war. The agreements followed a ten-year process of political liberalization that opened the way to a revival of civil society. In 1993, wide-spread popular protests helped to roll back a "self-coup" initiated by the incumbent president Jorge Serrano, opening the way to a series of constitutional reforms and partial accords over the next several years. From 1993 to 1995, a caretaker president elected by Congress (Ramiro de Leon Carpio) successfully initiated a package of constitutional reforms and accelerated peace negotiations with the URNG. Separate agreements, brokered by the United Nations, were signed in 1994 (human rights), resettlement of displaced persons (1994), and indigenous rights (1995). In elections in 1995, a centrist candidate, Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen, won a narrow victory over a hard-right candidate, setting the stage for the conclusion of the peace agreements and the integration of the URNG into the party system.

Coding: Distributive conflict transition. Civil society protests played an important role in keeping political liberalization on track from 1993 to 1996. The conclusion of the peace agreements with the URNG marked the end of a violent, redistributive insurgency rooted in Guatemala's large indigenous majority.

*Sources.*

John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, Thomas W. Walker. 2010. *Understanding Central America : Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger, "Polity IV Country Reports 2008: Guatemala" at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

### Guyana 1992 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In October 1992, following several years of political and economic liberalization, the leaders of the ruling party held competitive elections. The elections resulted in the defeat of the People's National Congress (the PNC), which had held power for twenty-eight years, and a victory for the Progressive People's Party (the PPP), which was based in the East Indian (Indo-Guyanese) majority.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited, despite significant inter-racial tensions. Afro-Guyanese constituted about one-third of the population, and provided core support for the ruling party, the PNC. Following independence from Great Britain in the 1960s, Forbes Burnham, the head of the PNC, ruled in increasingly autocratic fashion, providing only limited space for small opposition parties. Indo-Guyanese – largely rural labor and small farmers – constituted about half the population. The PPP, headed by Marxist firebrand Cheddi Jagan, drew primarily on this sector of the population, but the party had been thoroughly marginalized under PNC rule.

More salient to the transition was the fact that Guyana was a small open economy heavily dependent on external economic assistance, remittances from the expatriate population, and trade. Since the 1960s, the United States had been a major donor, preferring the neutral Burnham regime to the more left-oriented Jagan and the PPP. The loss of international support and pressure from international donors played a significant role in the eventual withdrawal of the PNC from power.

In 1985, Burnham's death opened the way to a period of economic and political liberalization. "Soft-liners," lead by Hugh Desmond Hoyte gained control of the ruling party. By this point, Guyana faced major



international challenges. Economically, it was constrained by crippling external debt and arrears to international creditors. At the same time, as the Cold War wound down, it had lost the patronage of the United States government. In this context, the softliners moved – grudgingly at first – toward market adjustments and political reforms that would bring them into line with the demands of the international community. In 1987, the PNC renounced its claim to a political monopoly and opened greater space for opposition parties. In 1989, it initiated an ambitious structural adjustment program financed by the World Bank. From 1990 to the election of 1992, Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center played a major role in pushing the government toward further political opening. Key steps included the establishment of a more independent electoral commission, the reform of voter lists, and reform of ballot-counting procedures. International observers – again lead by the Carter Center – played a crucial role in validating the results of the 1992 elections.

Opposition to the regime was organized by a coalition of parties led by the revived PPP. In the event, the PPP won about 55 percent of the vote to 40 percent for the PNC. Race relations polarized, moreover, after the PPP took office. However, in the years leading up to the election, the opposition demonstrated almost no capacity to mobilize grass-roots opposition to the regime. Repression and cooptation had virtually destroyed the PPP's organizational infrastructure, and both the party and other opposition forces depended heavily on external support. To gain this support, Jagan and his allies lobbied Western governments intensely, renouncing Marxism and embracing democratic capitalism.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Deep racial cleavages have been important features of Guyanese society, but they were not mobilized in the run-up to the 1992 election and did not appear to play a major role in the incremental steps toward democratization underway since 1985. These were driven primarily by PNC soft-line elites, acting in conditions of economic crisis and under severe pressure from the United States and other international donors.

*Sources.*

Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Political Change, Democracy, and Human Rights in Guyana." *Third World Quarterly* 18, 2: (June 1997): pp. 267-285.

David Hinds, "Problems of Democratic Transition in Guyana: Mistakes and Miscalculations in 1992" *Social and Economic Studies* 54, 1 (2005): pp. 67-82.

Tyrone Ferguson, *Structural Reform and Good Governance: The Case of Guyana*. Georgetown, Guyana: Public Affairs Consulting Enterprise. 1995.

## Guinea-Bissau 2000 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* A military uprising in June 1998 against the incumbent government of long-time ruler Joao Bernardo Vieira was followed by substantial violence in the capital city, sometimes referred to as a civil war. A peace agreement was signed in November 1998 but the unity government did not hold and in May 1999, the insurgent military forces under the command of Brigadier Asumane Mane succeeded in ousting Vieira. Mane then transferred authority to an interim government headed by the Speaker of the Parliament, which held free elections in November 1999.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. The civil war left hundreds dead, but it was primarily a struggle within the military rather than between representatives of political-economic elites and groups representing disadvantaged social or ethnic groups. The incumbent ruler, Vieira, had originally seized power in 1980; the regime itself faced coup attempts in 1983, 1985, and 1993. Vieira governed through a single party system but began to liberalize politics in 1991 and won office in relatively open multi-party elections in 1994. Nonetheless, the system remained only semi-competitive at best with power concentrated in the hands of the president.

The civil war erupted in June 1998, when Vieira dismissed Brigadier Asumane Mane and placed him under house arrest on charges that he had been involved in smuggling weapons to insurgents in the neighboring Senegalese province of Cosamance. The Vieira government had sought closer relations with Senegal and Francophone Africa more generally and arms trafficking became a major diplomatic issue. Military rebels

loyal Mane launched a coup, which became the precipitating event in nearly a year of intense violence in the capital between military factions loyal to the Vieira and Mane.

International actors subsequently played a significant but ultimately ineffective role in seeking to settle the conflict. Senegal and Guinea, encouraged by France, dispatched troops to defend the Vieira regime. In November 1998, peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) provided the framework of an accord, including the gradual withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean forces and the establishment of a West African peacekeeping force. Hostilities flared again in January 1999 followed in February by a new accord between Mane and Vieira around a government of national unity, the disarmament of the rival forces, and the immediate withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops. The unity government did not resolve core issues of military prerogatives, however, and in early May 1999 fighting again erupted. Vieira announced that he would hold legislative and presidential elections later in the year, but Mane's forces stormed the presidential palace and forced Vieira's surrender. A transitional government held presidential and parliamentary elections in November 1999 that were won by the opposition Social Renewal Party of Kumba Ialá.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. The violence in the country was largely the result of inter-elite conflicts over military prerogatives rather than by distributive mass-elite dynamics. The military was riven with factionalism, and the country had a long history of coups and coup attempts. Ethnic separatists in Casamance province of Senegal did have sympathizers among co-ethnics in the north of Guinea-Bissau, and accusations of weapons smuggling triggered the internal military conflicts and the Senegalese intervention. But both sides in the civil war were eventually implicated in gun-running, and most of the top military brass were members of the dominant Balante tribe, which comprised only about 30 percent of the population. Moreover, the eventual winner of the 2000 elections was Kumba Ialá, was himself accused of favoritism toward the Balante, calling into question that the conflicts reflected broader cleavages.

*Sources.*

Patricia Magalhaes Ferreira, "Guinea-Bissau: Between Conflict and Democracy," *African Security Review* 13, 4 (2004):45-56.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Guinea-Bissau," Polity IV Country Reports 2010 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed December 15, 2011.

Gilles Olakounlé Yabi, *The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau* (Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010).

U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Guinea-Bissau" at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5454.htm> Accessed December 16, 2011.

## Haiti 1990 (Polity only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In March 1990, military ruler, Prosper Avril, left the country and a provisional civilian government organized elections held in December 1990. In the election, populist leader Jean-Claude Aristide won in the first round with 67 percent of the vote and assumed office in February 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Substantial, but also major influence of external actors. From 1957 to 1986, Haiti had been ruled by a brutal personalist dictatorship, first headed by Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier and then after his death in 1971, by his son, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier. The Army and the terrorist militia force, the Tonton Macoute, were the main pillars of control, although for substantial periods, the regime also had support from the Haitian elite and the United States government. In 1986, in the midst of severe economic collapse and wide-spread rioting, military support for the regime collapsed and Duvalier fled the country. Over the next five years, there followed a series of short-lived military and civil-military governments, state terrorism by the Tonton Macoute, and severe political unrest.

In 1988, Colonel Prosper Avril seized power promising to lead a transition to democracy, but in early 1990, he cancelled scheduled elections and declared a state of siege. The population reacted with wide-spread riots and street demonstrations, and at the urging of the United States Ambassador, Avril fled the country leaving a civilian provisional government to schedule elections. The elections, backed by international monitors and strong diplomatic support, came off as scheduled; and as noted, Aristide won an overwhelming popular victory. But a brief military uprising in January 1991 came close to preventing him from taking office. The uprising failed in the face of popular violence, including the “necklacing” of suspected supporters of the old regime, and strong diplomatic pressure. However, as discussed in the “reversions” section below, Aristide continued to face severe opposition from the military and elite and was ousted only seven months later in September 1991.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Divisions within the repressive apparatus and declining external support from the United States contributed to the withdrawal of the Duvalier regime and the political turmoil that followed after 1986. International pressure from the OAS and the United States was also a very important in preventing the reconsolidation of authoritarian rule between 1986 and 1991. Nevertheless, popular opposition led by Aristide was clearly instrumental in preventing the reconsolidation of authoritarian rule and forcing the elections that brought Aristide to power.

*Sources.*

Source: Robert Fatton, Jr. 2002. *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy* Lynne Rienner:CO.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Haiti,” Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, “Civil War Narratives: Haiti” Working draft, May 8, 2006, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/HaitiRN1.2.pdf>

## Haiti 1994 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* With a United States-led multinational military force of 21,000 troops preparing to enter the country, General Raoul Cedras agreed to be escorted out of Haiti and to transfer power to a transitional civilian authority. In October 1994, Jean-Claude Aristide, who had been elected in December 1990 and then deposed in September 1991, was restored to power along with other elected officials of the governing party.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. As discussed in our coding of the 1990 transition above, popular protest and political violence had been a consistent feature of Haitian politics since the deposition of dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, and played an important role in the reforms that first brought Aristide to the presidency in 1991. However, Raoul Cedras, the military dictator who deposed him in September 1991 appeared to be consolidating power. Between 1991 and 1994, he appeared to have gained control over the highly fractious military and had launched a systematic campaign of terror directed at pro-Aristide politicians and civil society groups. At the popular level, the most visible response to the dictatorship was a massive wave of emigration, which increasingly worried the Clinton administration in the United States.

Although the potential for popular pressure remained, it was thus international leverage and the threat of a military occupation that brought Cedras's regime to an end. The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council strongly condemned the Cedras coup and issued a series of resolutions that ultimately authorized the deployment of a multinational military force led by the United States. As noted, the U.S. government of Bill Clinton was motivated primarily by growing concern about the mass exodus of Haitians that followed the 1991 coup. With the military force preparing to enter the country, the Clinton government authorized Jimmy Carter to negotiate Cedras's exit from Haiti. Once Cedras agreed to withdraw from power in 1994, a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) consisting of about 600 troops and 300 police played a crucial peace-keeping role, particularly in deterring new efforts to depose the Aristide government.

*Coding.* Non-distributive transition. Popular protest, along with intra-elite conflicts, had played a role in forcing previous military rulers from power. Nevertheless, the threat of this protest did not appear to deter the Cedras regime from doubling down with a ruthless campaign against the opposition. Aristide himself remained in exile. It was the prospect of an overwhelming external occupation that eventually drove Cedras from power and permitted the return of Aristide.

*Sources.* Robert Fatton, Jr. 2002. *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy*. Lynne Rienner:CO.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Haiti," Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, "Civil War Narratives: Haiti" Working draft, May 8, 2006, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/HaitiRN1.2.pdf>

## Honduras 1982 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The military regime permitted the election of a constituent assembly in April 1980 and general elections were held in November 1981. A new constitution was approved in 1982 and the PLH government of Roberto Suazo assumed power.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Unlike in Guatemala, the military regime and Honduran economic elite faced only limited internal threats to their rule. Although some civil society activity was tolerated and the government ignored some land invasions, there were no significant pressures from below. The transition was largely a response by the military, the economic elite, and the United States to the prospect of "contagion" from other countries in Central America. Despite allowing the election of a civilian, the military, which had controlled the government since 1963, remained the dominant political actor. Suazo remained subordinated to right-wing military leaders who engaged in severe repression of trade unions, student organizations, and peasant groups; the formal transition even brought about a narrowing rather than a broadening of the scope for popular participation.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Although the political reforms responded to threats of contagion from conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador, the government did not in fact face significant threats from below. The transition was sponsored by the military establishment, the United States, and elite civilian politicians who continued to control the political process.

*Source.*

J. Mark Ruhl, "Honduras: Democracy in Distress," in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds. *Latin American Politics and Development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. Pp. 543-558.

## Honduras 1989 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* This slight change in Polity score (from 5 to 6) was the result of the victory of Nationalist Rafael Callejas in regularly-scheduled presidential elections in 1989 (taking office in 1990). This was the first transfer of power to a civilian opposition candidate since 1932.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. As in 1982, this transition was an elite affair, with no involvement from civil society. Callejas won with 52.3 percent of the vote but despite accusations of fraud, he assumed power with the backing of the military.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition.

*Sources.*

John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, Thomas W. Walker. 2010. *Understanding Central America : Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.

J. Mark Ruhl, "Honduras: Democracy in Distress" in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, *Latin America: Politics and Development*. Westview Press 2011, pp. 543-557.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Honduras." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Hungary 1990 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In roundtable negotiations in 1989, the government and moderate opposition leaders agreed to hold elections, which took place in January 1990 and were won by the center-right Hungarian Democratic Form.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Reformist factions in the communist party initiated the political transition as Soviet oversight ebbed and economic difficulties increased. It began with the replacement of Janos Kadar as head of the party in 1988, renunciation of the Party's claim to a monopoly of authority, and the liberalization of controls over the press and assembly. The government followed these steps with the invitation to opposition notables with limited mass support to negotiate over the timing of the elections and the form of the new constitutional regime. The agreement on a parliamentary, rather than presidential, system and on the elections of 1990 marked the culmination of this process. The country did witness subsequent mass mobilization of a more distributive nature in a large taxi strike in the fall of 1990. But these followed the basic political changes rather than leading them.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Despite Hungary's reform socialist path, civil society remained very weak. The principal opposition to the regime was a loose collection of notables with a conservative, nationalist orientation, and the coalition disintegrated rapidly after winning the 1990 parliamentary elections. Initiative for the change came primarily from within the Communist party itself and was negotiated with the opposition in the absence of mass mobilization.

*Sources.*

David Bartlett. *The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform and Democratization in Hungary*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp. 141-164.

Rudolf L. Tokes, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

## Indonesia 1999 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In May 1998, Soeharto resigned and passed power to his vice-president Habibie. Habibie initiated liberalization, but did not initially signal his intention to step down. A consultative assembly dominated by authoritarian incumbents made further liberalizing moves and electoral laws were finalized in early 1999 leading to free and fair parliamentary elections in June 1999. In October 1999, President Habibie's "accountability speech" was rejected by the legislature, ending his political career, and Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president by the legislature in November, completing the transition.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. In the second half of 1997, Indonesia became the country hardest hit by the Asian economic crisis. As the financial crisis unfolded, opposition leaders became more vocal in their criticism of Suharto, but the precipitating event in his resignation was widespread riots following a crackdown on student protests in May 1998. These riots involved a variety of ethnic and economic grievances against ethnic Chinese and between Muslims and Christians. Demonstrations also played a role in the liberalizing concessions made by the constitutional assembly in 1998 and threats of mass mobilization led to the passage of relatively liberal electoral laws in early 1999. The demands of party leaders included religious claims; nearly 40% of the vote in the founding election was for religious parties. But both religious and secular parties advanced economic claims in the wake of the crisis.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Economic grievances and distributional conflicts, including those targeted at Chinese, played a significant role in setting the transition in train. Subsequent protest, even though not dominated by distributive demands, also played a role.

*Sources.*

Greg Barton, "Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia," in Tun-jen Cheng and Deborah Brown, eds., *Religious Organizations and Democratization* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), pp.221-241.

Judith Bird, "Indonesia in 1998: The Pot Boils Over," *Asian Survey* 39, 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1999). Pp. 27-37.

R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored," *Asian Survey* 40, 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2000). Pp. 32-42.

Eric Thompson, "Indonesia in Transition: The 1999 Presidential Elections," *National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Report* #9, December 1999.

## Kenya 1998 (CGV only; Polity codes the transition as occurring in 2002, after the time frame of this dataset): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* Incumbent President Moi makes some concessions to electoral reform in advance of the 1997 elections, which he wins by a plurality.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant, but with ambiguous results. Kenya's authoritarian system had electoral elements as a result of constitutional changes undertaken in 1991 prior to the 1992 elections that permitted multipartism. Demonstrations in 1991 were important in the concessions that led to the opening of a multiparty system, but the electoral system and a divided opposition permitted Moi to retain office and a majority in the legislature with relatively small pluralities of the vote. In mid-1997, a coalition of civic organizations, church groups and reformist opposition politicians formed a National Convention Executive Council to press for political reform, including constitutional changes. Given the unwillingness of the Moi government to enter into negotiation, mass demonstrations were an important tool of the group under the theme of 'no reforms, no elections.' Demonstrations in July and August resulted in a large number of deaths (by Kenyan standards; 25-30 and 40 respectively). External donors responded to the violence by withholding aid. Although continuing to reject direct negotiations with the NCEC or the holding of a national convention, Moi agreed to hold negotiations between the KANU and opposition MPs in parliament, where KANU enjoyed a majority. These negotiations were held through the so-called Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group. In October and November 1997, the IPPG negotiated a variety of changes to the constitution and election-related legislation that represented a compromise between hardliners in KANU, who opposed all concessions, and the opposition in parliament. However the negotiations served to divide the opposition and the agreements reached weakened donor resolve with respect to withholding aid. The agreements would not be implemented until following the 1997 elections. In November, Moi suspended parliament and the elections went forward, with Moi retaining the presidency and a legislative majority.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Mass mobilization and violence was the trigger to the reforms and they were clearly rooted not only in corruption but wider economic grievances.

*Source of ambiguity.* Weight of international factors. The Moi regime was under intense pressure from donors to reach a political accommodation. The regime did not hesitate to repress the opposition, however, and the concessions wrought did not affect the outcome of the 1997 elections. To the contrary, the concessions served to forestall further social and international pressure on the regime for political accommodation.

*Sources.*

Joel D. Barkan, "Toward A New Constitutional Framework in Kenya," *Africa Today* 45, 2, (Apr. - Jun., 1998). Pp. 213-226.

Stephen Brown, "Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in Power," *Third World Quarterly* 22, 5 (2001). Pp. 725-739.

Stephen Ndegwa, "The Incomplete Transition: the Constitutional and Electoral Context in Kenya," *Africa Today* 45, 2 (April-June 1998). Pp. 193-212.

## Latvia 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In March 1990, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic resulted in the victory of a coalition of independence forces, the Popular Front of Latvia. In May 1990, the Latvian Soviet declared independence from the Soviet Union. After a tense and violent standoff with pro-Soviet forces, the Soviet Union recognized Latvia's independence in September 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost initiative opened the way to massive ethno-nationalist demonstrations throughout the Soviet Union. Protests within Latvia as well as the other Baltic states led the way. In 1987, dissidents called for a ceremony to mark Stalin's mass exile of Latvians in 1941 and attracted a gathering of over 5000 participants. In 1987 and 1988, this experience triggered coordinated mass demonstrations throughout the Baltics, as well as further demonstrations elsewhere in the Soviet Union and growing divisions within the Politburo about how to respond (Beissinger 63). In 1988, Popular Front organizations were formed throughout the Baltics, and protest escalated even further in 1989. The Latvian independence movement, like most others in the Soviet Union, was motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands (Beissinger 75-79). Nevertheless, Latvian nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the dominant Russians.

In 1989 and 1990, Soviet authorities responded to the protest by allowing semi-competitive elections to provincial Soviets, and in Latvia, the way was opened to the victory of the nationalist Popular Front in the multiparty elections to republic's Supreme Soviet, and to the declaration of succession in May 1990. Tense negotiations with the Soviet government ensued. A turning point came in January 1991, when Latvian demonstrators repelled efforts by special Soviet military forces to seize government buildings and restore the control of the Soviet regime. More negotiations followed, but Gorbachev's hand was severely weakened by supportive nationalist movements throughout the Soviet Union, as well as by the continuing resistance of the Latvian population. In August 1991, Soviet hardliners failed in an attempt to depose Gorbachev, but the coup accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union. On September 6, 1991, the Soviet government – now in its last stages – recognized Latvia's independence.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. As noted, the massive Latvian independence movement was motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, Latvian nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the dominant Russians. Mass mobilization aimed at a fundamental redistribution of political and economic power away from the Russian minority and toward the Latvian majority.

*Source.*

Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 47-103.

## Lesotho 1993 (Polity only): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* Following the completion of the work of a Constituent Assembly convened by the military, elections were held in 1993.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. A coup in 1986 created a mixed system of government: a military regime with the king as its chief executive. Over time, tensions mounted within the government culminating in a coup in 1990 that effectively deposed the king and sent him into exile. This decision by the military was driven by growing public disaffection with the regime and a campaign that included the Church, press, and academics. On seizing power, the military then convened a handpicked Constituent Assembly that was given the task of drafting a constitution. The military set the parameters of the constitutional debate and excluded a number of important party figures. But corruption within the regime and wider economic grievances resulted in the mobilization of unions and civil society groups against the government. Repression of these strikes proved an embarrassment for external donors, who added their voice to the pressure for a transition.

Yet another coup followed in April 1991, but the new government promised to abide by the findings of the Constituent Assembly. Unfolding events in South Africa toward the dismantling of apartheid and ongoing civil society pressures appeared to play a role in holding the military to elections. The elections were placed in the hands of foreign (Commonwealth) advisors and appear to have been largely free and fair excepting some technical/administrative limitations.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The military exercised quite substantial control over the Constituent Assembly and subsequent transition, but military decisions were taken against the backdrop of at least some union and civil society mobilization.

*Sources of ambiguity.* Weight of international pressures and scope of protest. Strong external pressures from donors played a critical role and raise doubt about the relative importance of the mass mobilization, which was also limited in scope.

*Sources.*

Khabele Matlosa, "The 1993 Elections in Lesotho and The Nature of the BCP Victory," *African Journal of Political Science* 2, 1 (1997). Pp. 140-151.

Khabele Matlosa and Neville W. Pule, "The Military in Lesotho," *African Security Review* 10, 2 (2001).

Roger Southall, and Tsoeu Petlane, eds., *Democratization and Demilitarization in Lesotho: The General Election of 1993 and its Aftermath*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1995.

## Lithuania 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* In March 1990, elections to the Supreme Soviet produced a victory for the independence movement (Sajudis) and a declaration of independence. After a brief attempt to depose the government in January 1991, the Soviet Union recognized Lithuania as an independent republic in August 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. As in Latvia, Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost initiative opened the way to the organization of a reform movement (Sajudis) and to ethnonationalist demonstrations. Although these began in Latvia, they soon broadened into coordinated protest activities throughout the Baltics, led by Popular Front Organizations. The Lithuanian independence movement, like most others in the Soviet Union, was motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, Lithuanian nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the dominant Russians.

In 1989 and 1990, Soviet authorities responded to the protest by allowing semi-competitive elections for provincial legislatures (Soviets). In Lithuania, the way was opened to the victory of the nationalist Popular Front in the multiparty elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet, followed by the declaration of succession and independence in March 1990 and the legalization of multi-party competition. Tense negotiations with the Soviet government ensued. A turning point came in January 1991, when Soviet forces occupied the central TV station. Despite a number of civilian deaths, however, the government remained in power, and in August 1991, the Soviet government recognized Lithuanian independence after the failed conservative coup of August 1991.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. As noted, the massive Lithuanian independence movement was motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization. Mass mobilization aimed at a fundamental redistribution of political and economic power away from the Russian minority and toward the Lithuanian majority.

*Sources.*

Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 47-103.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Lithuania." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.



## Macedonia 1991 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conflict transition

*Note.* The Houle data set has continuous data for Macedonia from 1992-2000 and it is thus treated as continuously democratic. It appears in the Przeworski et al. and Cheibub and Gandhi datasets as having a transition in 1991.

*The transition.* After Tito's death in 1980 the Yugoslav communist party adopted a collective leadership model, with the occupant of the top position rotating annually, and strengthened the federal structure that gave more authority to Yugoslavia's constituent republics. During the 1980s, however, attempts to implement IMF-sponsored adjustments to economic decline exacerbated tensions between liberal elites within the federal government and the regional elites, and among the regional elites themselves. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Slovenian government began to withhold tax contributions to the federal government and to resist federal efforts to increase its control over the monetary system. These tensions opened the way for similar responses in Croatia.

Tensions within the federal system escalated further because of ethnic conflicts within Serbia between Serbs and Albanians. Slobodan Milošević, the president of the Communist League of Serbia, exploited the intra-Serbia conflicts with Serbian nationalist appeals that further alarmed elites in the other regions. The growing rift among the regional branches of the Communist Party led to the effective dissolution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia at its 14th Congress held in January 1990 into different parties for each republic.

The dissolution of the federal party opened the way for reform communists within the regions to hold multiparty elections in 1990. In Macedonia, although the nationalist party won a plurality, the ex communist party (SDSM) led by Kiro Gligorov forged a majority coalition in the parliament. In 1991, he was elected president and following the lead of Slovenia and Croatia, led the government to a declaration of "sovereignty" later that year.

The role of mass mobilization. As in Croatia, nationalist sentiment was strong, but mass mobilization was not a decisive element in the breakup of the Yugoslav regime and the decision to hold regional elections. In part thanks to UN peacekeepers, Macedonia did not become deeply involved in the Balkan wars.

*Coding.* Non-redistributive conflict transition.

*Source.*

Susan L. Woodward. *The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995, pp. 82-146.

## Madagascar 1992-93 (Polity codes the transition as occurring in 1992; CGV code the transition as 1993): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* President Ratsikara agreed to the formation of a Constitutional Convention in 1992, which organized presidential elections in 1992 and parliamentary elections in 1993 (thus accounting for the difference in the dating of the transitions). The leader of the Vital Forces, Albert Zafy, emerged from the elections as the new head of government.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Substantial. Madagascar, one of the poorest and aid-dependent states in the world, experienced a major economic crisis after the decline of Soviet aid in the 1980s. In 1989, the ruler, Didier Ratsikara, sought to extend his mandate in a rigged presidential election. In response, the Christian Council of Churches organized a broad opposition coalition (the Vital Force) in 1990-91 that mobilized hundreds of thousands of people in general strikes and protests and seized government buildings. Though Ratsikara had been in power since 1975, the military was too divided to suppress the emergence of armed groups (Kung Fu societies) or autonomous civil society organizations, which subsequently provided the impetus to the anti-regime protests.

*Coding:* Distributive conflict transition. Economic grievances rooted in the crisis of the 1980s spurred the general strikes and demonstrations. The Vital Force crumbled quickly, leaving Zafy isolated. This allowed

Ratsikikara to make a comeback, regaining the presidency in the elections of 1996.

*Sources.*

Philip M. Allen, *Madagascar: Conflicts of Authority in the Great Island*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Pp. 105-107.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 276-278.

## Malawi 1994 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* In 1992, President for Life Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda agreed to hold a referendum on whether to continue single-party rule or to hold multi-party elections. The referendum was held in 1993, and new presidential and national assembly elections transferred power to the opposition in 1994.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Prior to 1992, there were no opposition parties and the reach of two pro-democracy NGOs was extremely limited. In March 1992, Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter condemning human rights abuses, in effect an elite defection. The letter set off a wave of student protests and strikes, although they were effectively repressed. At the same time, a group of anti-regime exiles met in Lusaka, Zambia, and prominent trade unionist Chakufwa Chihana chose to return to Malawi to lead a domestic campaign for democracy and human rights, leading to the formation of the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD). His arrest resulted in a shift in donor sentiment toward the country—including the rejection of a major aid appeal—and increased external support for the pro-democracy opposition. Donors also played a crucial role in guaranteeing the integrity of the referendum and subsequent elections.

There is evidence that Banda initially sought to control the referendum process to his advantage (for example, by appointing the Referendum Committee without opposition representation). The transition was pushed along in part by the disintegration of the patronage networks that had sustained the ruling Malawi Congress Party and the loss of control over the coercive apparatus. In 1993, the Army revolted against an attempt by Banda to transfer power to his lieutenant, John Tembo. Former insiders were the main challengers in the 1994 election, and the winner was Bakili Mazuli, who had broken from the ruling party only the year before.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The pastoral letter was followed by some protests, the coalescing of an opposition in exile, and the formation of so-called “pressure groups” that played off the regime’s weak economic performance.

*Sources of ambiguity.* Class composition of protest and weight of international factors. This is a marginal case, in which elite defections and external actors appear to play a highly significant role and in which the transition itself is dubious. Banda’s political concessions were purely tactical, designed to appease foreign donors; there is evidence he believed that he could fully control the referendum and transition process. A cutoff of aid and outside intervention in the electoral process played an important role as well.

*Sources.*

Stephen Brown, “Born-Again Politicians Hijacked Our Revolution!” Reassessing Malawi’s Transition to Democracy,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 38, 3 (2004). Pp. 705-722.

Dzimhiri, Lewis B. “The Malawi Referendum of June 1993,” *Electoral Studies* 13, 3 (1994): 229-234.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 282-284.

Denis Venter, “Malawi: The Transition to Multiparty Politics.” In John A. Wiseman, ed. *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London: Routledge, 1995.

## Mali 1992 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* In March 1991, Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Toure led a coup ousting long-standing dictator Moussa Traore. The new military government appointed a transition committee, which drafted a new constitution that was subsequently reviewed by a National Conference and submitted to a referendum. Elections in 1992, which were won by Alpha Oumar Konare and The Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Adema).

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The origins of resistance to the regime were economic, and began with urban protests against structural adjustment measures instituted in the late 1980s that cut against the interests of civil servants in particular. The ruling UDPM resisted calls for multiparty democracy, and three distinct opposition groups formed, coalescing into a Coordinating Committee of Democratic Associations and Organizations (CCAOD), which mobilized demonstrations in December 1990 to put pressure on the ruling party. The main union organization linked to the government party, the UNTM, also initiated strikes in January. These challenges started to divide the military between conservatives and dissenters, including Traore. Violent clashes in January and March led to over a hundred deaths and were clearly the precipitating cause of the coup. The coup leaders formed a national reconciliation council and announced that elections at all levels would be held within a year. These measures reversed popular perceptions of the military and led to a virtual collapse of the ruling party.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Despite the fact that the military was able to play an important role in the transition process, mass mobilization was clearly significant.

*Source of ambiguity.* Class composition of protest. As in other low-income African cases, urban unions and state sector workers played a dominant role in the protests.

*Source.*

Leonardo Villalon and Abdourahmane Idrissa, "The Tribulations of a Successful Transition: Institutional Dynamics and Elite Rivalry in Mali," in Leonardo A. Villalon and Peter VonDoepp, eds. *The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions*. South Bend: Indiana University Press, 2005.

## Mexico 1997 (Polity only; see discussion of CGV coding of 2000 below): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The dominant party, the PRI, lost its absolute congressional majority in the 1997 congressional elections following several decades of gradual political liberalization and institutional reform. From 1990 to 1996, the PRI had gradually transferred control over the electoral machinery to an independent Federal Election Institute (IFE), which guaranteed a more free and fair election in 1997 than in the past.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Protests over electoral fraud were a source of leverage against the ruling party, but focused primarily on the legitimacy of the political regime. Localized land seizures in the 1970s and the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas did contribute to the pressures for gradual political liberalization. The PRI's capacity to maintain electoral credibility was also eroded by decline of patronage resources and the expansion of middle-class and informal sector voters not fully integrated into the corporatist system. But major labor unions remained tightly linked to the ruling party, and the episodes of rural unrest did not pose serious threats to its dominance or directly affect the transition. Much more serious challenges came from generalized discontent among business groups and the middle class over recurrent economic crises and painful adjustments, as well as from internal rifts within the ruling party over control of patronage. Protests about fraud, especially blatant corruption of the 1988 presidential election, led to the establishment of an independent electoral commission in 1990 and subsequently, to incremental increases in its autonomy. But the strongest opposition party in the negotiation of these reforms was the PAN, a center-right party backed by business elites and sectors of the middle class. The PAN was the principal winner in the 1997 congressional elections, and its candidate gained the presidency in 2000.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Although there were repeated protests against electoral fraud across the political spectrum, the government negotiated the reforms primarily with leaders of the center-right opposition.

*Sources.*

Alonso Lujambio, *El poder compartido: un ensay sobre la democratizacion Mexicana*. Mexico, D.F. Oceano. 2000.

Andreas Schedler, "The Democratic Revelation," *Journal of Democracy* 11, 4 (October 2000): 5-18.

David A. Shirk, "Vicente Fox and the Rise of the PAN," *Journal of Democracy* 11 4 (October 2000): 25-32.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Mexico." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Mexico 2000 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* An opposition candidate won the 2000 presidential election, following several decades of gradual political liberalization and institutional reform. From 1990 to 1996, the PRI had gradually transferred control over the electoral machinery to an independent Federal Election Institute (IFE). This in turn contributed to the turnover in the 1997 congressional elections and the loss of the presidency in 2000.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Localized land seizures in the 1970s and the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas did contribute to the pressures for gradual political liberalization. The PRI's capacity to maintain electoral credibility was also eroded by decline of patronage resources and the expansion of middle-class and informal sector voters not fully integrated into the corporatist system. But major labor unions remained tightly linked to the ruling party, and the episodes of rural unrest did not pose serious threats to its dominance or directly affect the transition. Much more serious challenges came from generalized discontent over recurrent economic crises and painful adjustments, as well as from internal rifts within the ruling party over control of patronage. Protests about fraud, especially blatant corruption of the 1988 presidential election, led to the establishment of an independent electoral commission in 1990 and subsequently, to incremental increases in its autonomy. But the strongest opposition party in the negotiation of these reforms was the PAN, a center-right party backed by business elites and sectors of the middle class. The PAN was the principal winner in the 1997 congressional elections, and its candidate gained the presidency in 2000.

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David A. Shirk, "Vicente Fox and the Rise of the PAN," *Journal of Democracy* 11, 4 (October 2000): 25-32.

## Moldova 1993 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In October 1993, the Supreme Soviet of Moldova, elected in 1990, agreed to hold early parliamentary elections. These elections were held in 1994. More than 20 parties and political movements were registered during 1993, and the election was the first since independence was declared in 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited by 1993, and of little direct relevance to democratization. There were major demonstrations over Romanian language rights in the late Soviet period. In 1989, nationalist protests over Romanian language rights evolved into a nationalist Popular Front movement, which captured

the leadership of the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990. Mircea Snegur, a former Communist official, was first elected president by the Parliament in 1990 and then ran unopposed in 1991. Violent confrontations in the early 1990s between Romanian ethnic nationalists and Slavic-speaking regions backed by Russia. But although ethnic and – to a lesser extent – economic grievances continued to spur protests through the mid-1990s, the violence had largely subsided by 1992. Following the 1991 elections, the Popular Front began to splinter into moderate factions advocating independence and more radical factions advocating union with Romania. The temporary ascendancy of the radicals spurred violent minority protests and a Soviet-backed secession in the provinces of Gagauz and Transnistria.

But in 1993, centrist factions gained control of the Supreme Soviet and formed a government that offered a more moderate road to national independence and some representation to minorities. With defections and realignment, the representation of the pro-Romanian faction fell to only 25 seats, and the ethnic violence subsided. Parliamentary stalemates continued, however, over economic issues, and as the economy worsened, the government agreed to hold early parliamentary elections. The more moderate coalition led by communist reformers and moderate factions of the Popular Front won overwhelmingly.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Mass ethnic protest between 1990 and 1992 constituted an important part of the political landscape, but these protests focused on relations with the Soviet Union and Romania and had been brought under control by moderate politicians, overwhelmingly supported by the Moldovan population. The spur to competitive elections in 1994 came primarily because the moderate leadership was stalemated over issues of economic reform.

*Sources.*

Helen Fedor, ed. *Moldova: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C. GPO, The Library of Congress

Charles King. *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Moldova." *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Mongolia 1990-1992 (coded 1990 in CGV and 1992 in Polity): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* There is disagreement between the two datasets in the coding of this transition, and it is arguably significant. In March 1990, Jambyn Batmonh, head of the Communist party, resigned in the face of street protests and popular demands for faster reform. In May, the new head of the party (Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat) renounced its constitutional role as the guiding force in the country, and legalized opposition parties. In July 1990, the government held Mongolia's first multi-party elections for a parliament. Communists won this election decisively and the parliament elected Pusalmaagiyn Ochirbat, the head of the reformed Communist party, to the presidency. Some opposition figures were incorporated into the cabinet. A new constitution was subsequently negotiated with the opposition in 1991 and came into effect in January 1992. Communists won again in the first multiparty election of the post-Soviet era in 1992. The 1992 elections appear to be the basis for the Polity coding.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Initially important, but insignificant by 1992. Street demonstrations in 1990 intensified internal divisions within the ruling party about whether to repress or reform, and led to the replacement of the leadership in the March 1990 Party Congress. Although the demonstrations were catalytic, however, reformist pressures had been building within the party since 1988, strengthened as a consequence of Perestroika and events in Eastern Europe. Opposition forces, moreover, were based primarily in academic institutions and the intelligensia and concentrated almost exclusively within Ulan Bator. The opposition lacked a base among the herd people of the countryside. The ruling party retained control over state finances, media, and patronage, and it won an overwhelming victory in the multiparty elections of 1990, with 85 percent of

the vote.

Subsequent initiatives for constitutional revision emerged in response to economic difficulties, but came from within the reformed communists as well as the opposition and did not in any way reflect a response to protests. The new constitution, including its electoral components, was negotiated peacefully within the legislature.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The protests of 1990 played at least some role in moving the party toward reform.

*Sources of ambiguity.* Class composition of protest and nature of grievances. Despite the temporary outbreak of protest in 1990, the transitional constitution and elections were largely the result of intra-elite bargaining. Grievances appeared overwhelmingly political, and did not focus on socio-economic inequalities. Protest played no role in the 1991 constitutional negotiations and subsequent elections.

*Sources.*

Steven M. Fish, "Mongolia: Democracy without Prerequisites," *Journal of Democracy* 9, 3 (July 1998). Pp. 127-141, especially 130-131, 135.

Tom Ginsburg, "Political Reform in Mongolia: Between Russia and China," *Asian Survey* 35 (May 1995). Pp. 459-471, especially 462-468.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Mongolia," *Polity IV Country Reports 2010* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm>

## Nepal 1990 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding of 1999 below): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* King Birendra lifts the ban on political parties in 1990 and allows for an interim government headed by a coalition of opposition leaders. A Constitution Recommendation Commission (CRC) drafts a new basic law, setting the stage for parliamentary elections in May 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. In late 1989, the Nepali Congress party leadership sought to initiate a mass movement to restore democracy, motivated in part by economic grievances following the monarchy's mismanagement of relations with India. Left and communist parties, which had previously eschewed the pursuit of democratic reforms, joined the democratic movement; four communist parties plus three other groups formed a United Left Front (ULF) to lend "moral support" to the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Demonstrations around the country were met with liberalizing concessions, but the opposition movement viewed these as inadequate. Protests in April were met by the military with violence, but in the wake of these demonstrations the king made more fundamental concessions. The parties making up the ULF chose to run separately, but the Communist Party of the Nepal was the second largest vote-getter. Land reform was advocated by all parties.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Significant political concessions by the king followed immediately in the wake of violent protests.

*Sources.*

Fred Gaige and John Scholz, "The 1991 Parliamentary Elections in Nepal: Political Freedom and Stability," *Asian Survey* 31:11 (November 1991). Pp. 1040-1060, especially 1041-1042.

Michael Hutt, "Drafting the Nepal Constitution, 1990" *Asian Survey* 31:11 (November 1991): 1020-1039, especially 1021.

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Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Nepal." *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Nicaragua 1984 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding for 1990 below): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* Elections were held at the initiative of the incumbent authoritarian Sandinista government in 1984. The principal opposition leader, Arturo Cruz, decided not to run in the election citing restrictions imposed by the regime. Nevertheless, most outside observers declared the election free and fair.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. The transition from Samoza to the Sandinistas in 1979 resulted from a revolutionary process in which mass grievances played a central role. However, the democratic transition in question did not occur at that point in time, but after the Sandinistas had established their political dominance. Although the regime placed a high priority on political participation and mobilization and had promised a transition to more pluralistic politics, it did not face mass pressures to hold elections in 1984. The government's principal objectives were to bolster international support in the face of the determined counter-revolutionary opposition backed by the United States and to reduce opposition from private-sector groups remaining in Nicaragua.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Indirectly, the elections were arguably made possible by a mass-based revolutionary struggle against the Samoza dictatorship. But the initiative to hold the elections came from the Sandinista leadership, primarily under international pressure.

*Sources.*

David Close, *Nicaragua: Politics, Economics, and Society*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1998.

William Leogrande, "Political Parties and Postrevolutionary Politics in Nicaragua," in Louis W. Goodman, William M. Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, eds. *Political Parties and Democracy in Central America*. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1992.

Richard L. Millett, "Nicaragua: The Politics of Frustration," in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. *Latin American Politics and Development*. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2007.

## Nicaragua 1990 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The government of the dominant Sandinista Party held presidential elections in 1990, with intense international monitoring. The election was won by an opposition coalition led by Violeta Chomorro.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. By 1990, the Nicaraguan economy had been severely crippled by the war with the US-backed “contras,” an economic embargo, and the prospective loss of aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Sandinista’s decision to hold a relatively free election under international supervision was based in part on the hope that a credible election would help to end the US embargo and attract assistance from Western Europe, and partly on the expectation that it had enough public support to win. Although the opposition received substantial external assistance, its organized backing at home came primarily from business sectors and the Catholic Church, whereas the ruling party had extensive links to domestic civil society organizations. The opposition was able to capitalize on widespread public fatigue with the war with the “contras” and the hope that a vote for the opposition would bring peace and American assistance. *Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. The contra insurgency posed an ongoing threat to the Sandinista government, but its support came primarily from the United States government and conservative groups outside and inside Nicaragua. It does not fit the profile of a mass, redistributive uprising on the part of the dispossessed against an entrenched elite. The primary impetus for the 1990 elections came from strong external pressures, not threats “from below.”

*Sources.*

John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, Thomas W. Walker. 2010. *Understanding Central America : Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.

David Close, *Nicaragua: Politics, Economics, and Society*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1998.

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## Niger 1992-3 (Polity codes the transition as occurring in 1992; CGV code it as occurring in 1993): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* General Saibou permitted the convening of a National Conference in July 1990. The Conference assumed the de facto power of a transitional government, drafted a new constitution and held generally free elections in March 1993. The victor was Mahamane Ousmane at the head of a coalition led by the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS).

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Seyni Kountché, in power since 1974, died in 1987, and was succeeded by General Ali Saibou. The main unions had been subjugated by the Kountche regime, but became substantially more militant and independent after the mid-1980s. They also maintained clandestine alliances with Marxist associations appealing to the Hausa (about half the population), and to the underdeveloped northern region. In 1990, these forces backed strikes and protests against IMF austerity programs and supported the formation of left-oriented opposition parties. It was in response to these pressures that General Saibou and the military announced that the constitution would be revised, that a multi-party system would be permitted and finally that a National Conference would be convened, following the model in other Francophone states. The National Conference subsequently dissolved the Saibou government and the national assembly and drove the transition process.



*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Key concessions followed in the immediate aftermath of mass urban mobilization, with economic grievances playing an important role.

*Source of ambiguity.* class composition of protest. Unions and student organizations represented only a miniscule portion of the population.

*Sources.*

Robert Charlick, "Labor Unions and 'Democratic Forces' in Niger," in Jon Kraus, ed. *Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 83-123.

John Uniack Davis and Aboubacar B. Kossomi, "Niger Gets Back on Track," *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 12, No. 3, July 2001. Pp. 80-87.

Myriam Gervais, "Niger: Regime Change, Economic Crisis and the Perpetuation of Privilege," in John F. Clark and David Gardinier, eds. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

## Niger 2000 (CGV only; Polity codes a second transition in 2004, outside of the time frame of this dataset): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1999, authoritarian ruler Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Bare was killed by his own presidential guard. Following the coup within the army, Major Daouda Mallam Wanke declares a 9-month transition plan to take place under a military Council of National Reconciliation. Following extensive debate over the nature of institutional arrangements—both within appointed Technical and Consultative Committees and in the press—the military imposes a solution, which is validated in a referendum in 1999. Presidential and legislative elections were held in October and November 1999 and the new government took office as the Fifth Republic in 2000.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. In 1996, the military under the leadership of Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Bare overthrew the relatively new democratic government and dissolved the institutions of the Third Republic. The military stated its commitment to return the country to democratic rule, and appointed a new national conference, the National Forum for Democratic Revival, to seek constitutional changes that were approved in referendum. The military clearly intended to control the process of both constitutional revision and the elections in the now-presidential system; when opposition forces appeared poised to challenge the military candidate in the elections, vote counting was stopped and Bare declared himself the winner. In the legislative elections scheduled for later in the year, the opposition coalesced around a program of annulling the presidential elections. A period of constant opposition mobilization followed, including protests and strikes involving students and the labor movement. The military sought to appease mounting protests by partial concessions, such as appointment of new governments and finally the holding of new elections in February 1999. The results were widely viewed as fraudulent, including by the international community. When Bare was assassinated by his own presidential guard, the head of the guard Major Daouda Mallam Wanke was pronounced head of state and announced the military's intention to transition to a new democratic system.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. This transition is but one in a cycle of regime and government changes over the 1990s in which the military played a central role. Yet the introduction of political changes under both Bare and Wanke occurred against the backdrop of ongoing mobilization by opposition and civil society groups, including unions. In contrast to the 1992-3 case, the protests appear wider in scope including opposition parties challenging the corruption of the regime; we therefore do not code it as ambiguous.

*Sources.*

Robert Charlick, "Labor Unions and 'Democratic Forces' in Niger," in Jon Kraus, ed. *Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 83-123.

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## Nigeria 1999 (CGV only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* Following the death of incumbent president General Sani Abacha in 1998, the military selected Abukar Abdulsalam as his successor and backed a phased transition to democratic rule over a two-year period. The transition proceeded first with political liberalization and consultations with the opposition, then with a sequence of local, parliamentary, and finally presidential elections backed by the creation of new electoral institutions and foreign monitoring.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. In 1993, extensive strikes and protests forced General Babangida (1985-1993) to resign after he had attempted to extend his power by annulling the presidential elections of 1993. The transition began only five years later, after another long interval of military dictatorship under General Sani Abacha. During the Abacha presidency, the regime faced sporadic outbreaks of protest and violence, and used a combination of repression and co-optation to maintain power, for example, through the creation of new states that divided the opposition. The Abacha regime put in place a transition program, but it excluded important opposition figures and parties and ultimately was stage-managed to continue to Abacha's own rule.

Abacha died under mysterious circumstances in 1998 and was succeeded by a moderate general, Abukar Abdulsalam. By the time of Abacha's death, continued military rule had come under strong pressure from the international community and from the military itself. Abubakar quickly moved to liberalize the political system including through the freeing of political prisoners and consultations with the opposition. He also announced that he would stick to the Abacha pledge to transfer power by October 1, a pledge that Abacha had appeared to be backing away from.

The death of the main opposition leader, Chief Abiola, gave rise to widespread protests and rioting in July 1998. Despite Abubakar's liberalizing moves, the precise nature of the transition remained unclear. Abubakar faced opposition from hardliners associated with Abacha, and some of the elements of Abacha's plan for a rigged transition that would perpetuate his power (including his electoral tribunal and the five pro-Abacha political parties that had been vetted) remained in place. Although the process of releasing political prisoners had begun, Abiola – the most prominent – had yet to be freed pending negotiations over whether he would claim power based on his victory in the 1993 elections.

Following the rioting after Abiola's death, vital details of the transition were clarified and the pace accelerated. Abubakar almost immediately dismissed the cabinet appointed under Abacha, established a more independent National Election Council, and disbanded the five official parties, clearing the way for the organization of new, more independent parties. The timetable for the transfer, finally, was moved up from October to May 1999.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. It appears that Abubakar intended to liberalize the political system, in part due to international pressures and the political challenges the military faced as a result of declining economic performance. But he was only in office a month before Abiola was killed and his capacity to carry out the transition plan in the face of hardliner opposition had not been tested. The riots seemed to strengthen the hand of the military reformers vis-à-vis the hardliners..

*Sources.*

Peter Lewis, "An End to the Permanent Transition?" *Journal of Democracy* 10, 1 (1999). Pp. 141-156.

Abubakar Momoh and Paul-Sewa Thovoethin, "An overview of the 1998-1999 Democratization Process in Nigeria." <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN009286.pdf> Accessed April 2, 2010.

### Pakistan 1988 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In May 1988, authoritarian leader General Muhammed Zia al-Haq dissolved the national parliament and provincial assemblies, calling new elections for November. But shortly thereafter (August) he died in a mysterious plane crash. Elections were announced by the acting President, Ghulam Ishaque Khan, and the unconstitutionality of the suspension of the elections was upheld by the Supreme Court. Parliamentary elections were held in November 1988, bringing Benazir Bhutto and the PPP coalition to power.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. The hanging of Bhutto in 1979 had generated mass protest in the Sindh region of the country and in 1981, a populist Movement to Restore Democracy (MRD) grouped together eight opposition parties; this group included leftist leaders who mobilized peasants in some sections of the country. But the movement was aggressively repressed and unable to bring adequate pressure to bear on the regime for electoral changes. Zia permitted non-party elections to be held in 1985. Subsequent pressure for a normalization of politics came largely from Prime Minister Mohammed Khen Junejo, who sought to gain leverage vis-à-vis Zia by reaching out to opposition parties. However, the cancellation of the November elections by Zia demonstrated his belief that he could control any transition process. The military decision to acquiesce in the calling of elections by the interim government did not appear to stem from mass mobilization. Rather, the decapitation of the military leadership in the 1988 plane crash provided an opportunity for the opposition to exploit the transfer of power to the Chairman of the Senate and the decision of the Supreme Court to annul the suspension of elections. *Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. No mass mobilization at the time of the transition; driven by intra-elite conflicts and temporary weakening of the military.

*Sources.*

Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics," *Asian Survey* 29, 2 (February 1989): 199-206, esp. 199-202.

Yunus Samad, "The Military and Democracy in Pakistan," *Contemporary South Asia* 3, 3 (November 1994).

### Panama 1989 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In December 1989, an invasion by the United States deposed and imprisoned military strongman Manuel Noriega and disbanded the base of his power, the Panama Defense Force. Guillermo Endara, the apparent victor in a presidential election held in May 1989 that Noriega had nullified, was subsequently sworn into office.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Although Panama maintained a façade of civilian government, Manuel Noriega was the de facto military ruler of Panama between 1983 and 1989. In a scheduled presidential election in May 1989, a coalition of opposition parties led by Guillermo Endara appeared to have overwhelmingly defeated Noriega's candidate, Carlos Duque. Rather than accept this result, Noriega annulled the election results and demonstrated his willingness to repress the opposition by tolerating a brutal physical attack on Endara himself. Despite unrest within some sectors of the military (there was a failed coup attempt in October), popular protest was limited. The invasion was spurred by growing antagonism between Noriega and the Reagan and Bush administrations over issues extraneous to democracy. Although Noriega had been on the CIA payroll, his links to drug trafficking became an increasing source of embarrassment to the U.S. government. The US used the pretext of actions against American troops and civilians to justify the invasion, which occurred in December. Within Panama, there may have been passive support for the U.S. invasion but the most notable overt reaction was looting and property damage, which lasted for a period of several weeks following the invasion. Given that one of the stated intentions of the intervention was to restore democratic rule, there

is no reason to link this violence to the democratization process, which simply confirmed the results of the May elections.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. The cause of the transition was a foreign invasion, which does not appear to be motivated in any way by distributive conflicts in Panama.

*Sources.*

John Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*. New York: Random House 1991.

John T. Fishel, "The Institutional Reconfiguration of the Panamanian Defense Force," in Orlando Perez, Jr., ed. *Post-Invasion Panama: The Challenges of Democratization in the New World Order*. London, MD: Lexington Books 2000, pp. 11-29.

Orlando J. Perez, "Introduction: US-Panamanian Relations in Historical Perspective," in Orlando Perez, Jr., ed. *Post-Invasion Panama: The Challenges of Democratization in the New World Order*. London, MD: Lexington Books 2000, pp. 3-8.

**Paraguay 1989 (CGV only): Non-distributive transition (Note that Polity dates the transition from 1992, which is outside the two year window and thus is treated as a separate case).**

*The transition.* In 1989, General Andres Rodriguez, backed by a coalition of military officers and a "traditionalist" faction of the ruling party, ousted aging dictator Alfredo Stroessner in a military coup. The coup marked the onset of a gradual regime transition: the election of a National Constituent Assembly in 1991, the promulgation of a new constitution in 1992, and a competitive presidential election in 1993.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Stroessner was overthrown in a palace coup. In 1988, he had been reelected for the eighth time, having ruled Paraguay since seizing power in 1954. By that time, serious concern had arisen within both the military and the ruling Colorado party about succession from the 76 year-old dictator's rule. Against Stroessner's supporters, a "traditionalist" wing of the Colorados pressed for a nonpersonalist transition to ensure the continuation of Colorado dominance. This movement gained the backing of rebels within the military led by General Andres Rodriguez, Stroessner's second in command. Civil society had become somewhat more active in the 1980s, but the regime was not threatened by mass protest against the dictatorship; the elite remained thoroughly in control. Although international factors appeared to play only a secondary role to the palace intrigue, after 1985, Paraguayan elites had come under increasing diplomatic pressure from the Reagan administration to join the democratic wave. By 1988, there was growing concern within the military and party elite about international isolation.

Three months after the coup, Rodriguez held a snap election which he won by over 70 percent of the vote. A new constitution promulgated in 1992 limited the presidency to a single five year term, an effort to limit the continuismo practiced under Stroessner. But this step reflected the preferences of the "traditionalist" wing of the Colorados. In the election of 1993, General Rodriguez backed the nomination and election of Juan Carlos Wasmosy of the Colorado party. Moreover, although the election was generally considered to be free and fair, it was tainted by military threats to stage a coup if the Colorados were voted out of office. The newly-elected government, moreover, maintained continuity by appointing many Stroessner supporters to high government positions.

*Coding:* Non-distributive conflict transition. The transition was driven by intra-elite concerns within the military and ruling party about the succession from the Stroessner era and there was substantial continuity with the old regime. The international community also played a secondary role.

*Sources.*

Paul Sondvol, "Paraguay: A Semi-Authoritarian Regime?" *Armed Forces and Society* 34:1 (2007): 46-66.

Frank O. Mora, "From Dictatorship to Democracy: The United States and Regime Change in Paraguay, 1954-1994" *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 17:1 (1998):59-79.

Peter Lambert, "A Decade of Electoral Democracy: Continuity, Change, and Crisis in Paraguay," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 19:3 (July 2000): 379-396.

Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson, eds., *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*. New York: St. Martin's Press 1997.

## Paraguay 1992 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1992, a National Constitutional Assembly (elected in 1991) adopted a new constitution that limited the presidency to a single five-year term and established the basis for a competitive presidential election in 1993.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. In 1989, long-time dictator Alfredo Stroessner was ousted in a military coup led by Andres Rodriguez, with the backing of the conservative Catholic Church and the United States. The issue of succession to the aging dictator was the primary motive for the coup. Rodriguez ended the state of emergency imposed by Stroessner over thirty years earlier, and held a presidential election in which he ran as a candidate of the ruling Colorado party and won with over 70 percent of the vote. In December 1991, the Rodriguez government held an election for a broadly representative National Constitutional Assembly that promulgated a new constitution in 1992. It limited the presidency to a single five-year term. Rodriguez signed the constitution into law on June 22, 1992, and elections went forward in 1993.

It should be noted that the transition exhibited a number of continuities with the transitional military regime. Rodriguez and the military backed the nomination and election of his Colorado Party successor, Juan Carlos Wasmosy. Although the election was generally considered to be free and fair, the election was tainted by military threats to stage a coup if the Colorado party was voted out of office. The new government did not continue the political liberalization initiated by Rodriguez and appointed a number of Stroessner supporters to high government positions.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. The transition was driven by intra-elite concerns within the military and ruling party about the succession from the Stroessner era and there was substantial continuity with the old regime. The international community also played a role.

*Source.*

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Paraguay." *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Peru 1980 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The military leadership agreed to elections for a Constituent Assembly, held in June 1978. The Assembly, dominated by the APRA party and other opposition forces, organized free presidential elections in May 1980. Fernando Belaunde Terry, an opposition candidate from the Christian Democratic party, emerged as the winner.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The nationalist and populist military dictatorship established under General Juan Alvarado Velasco (1968-1973) sponsored the massive organization of new, corporatist labor organizations intended to counter-balance the strong union base the APRA party, its historical adversary. However, the government was unable to gain full control over the organizations it had created, and as the economy began to deteriorate in 1973, it faced increasing opposition from both the old, APRA-based unions and its own new organizations. Labor opposition intensified divisions within the military itself, and in 1973, Velasco was replaced by more conservative government headed by General Francisco Morales Bermudez. The new government, however, adopted more orthodox economic policies that further inflamed labor opposition and led to serious strikes in 1975 and 1976. Labor opposition reached a peak in July 1977 with a huge general strike, the largest in Peru's history (Collier, 118). The strike forced the government to establish a firm date for a constitutional convention and set into motion a retreat to the barracks. The APRA party received the largest

representation in the Assembly, which was chaired by its long-time leader, Haya de la Torre. The “new left,” now independent of the military, also gained 33 percent of the votes. Strikes and other pressures from below continued through 1978 and 1979, but the momentum had shifted decisively toward a return to civilian rule.

*Coding.* Distributive Conflict. Strong labor protest against the business-oriented policies of the Morales Bermudez government was a decisive element in the transition.

*Sources.*

Ruth Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 115-119

Henry Dietz, “Elites in an Unconsolidated Democracy: Peru during the 1980s” in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. 237-281.

Cynthia McClintock, “Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian and Democratic,” in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989. Pp. 335-385.

## The Philippines 1986-87 (CGV code the transition as 1986; Polity codes the transition as occurring in 1987) Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* President Marcos resigned in February 1986 in the wake of massive protests against fraudulent election results.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 and the onset of the debt crisis served to solidify the opposition. Strikes increased in 1984-85, although the union movement was split. The left also failed to reach an accommodation with the more moderate opposition that finally coalesced around Cory Aquino and therefore played a limited role in the transition as a result. Nonetheless, mass mobilization was clearly significant. After calling snap elections in November 1985, Marcos counted on his ability to use fraud and military loyalty to ride out any opposition. Following open efforts to steal the election by shifting the vote count to the controlled legislature, segments of the military defected and received support from a massive “people power” movement, with support from the Church, opposition parties and civil society groups.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Although the left did not play a significant role in the transition and the Aquino government was moderate, it did stand for economic and social reform that would address the material grievances arising during the authoritarian period. The opposition movement was a cross-class one, including social forces representing the poor.

*Sources.*

Jennifer Conroy Franco, *Elections and Democratization in the Philippines*. Routledge, 2001. Pp. 165-180.

Mark M. Turner, ed. *Regime Change in the Philippines: The Legitimization of the Aquino Government*. Canberra: Dept. of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1987.

David Wurfel, “Democratic Transition in the Philippines 1978-1988”, in Dianne Ethier, ed., *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia*. London: Macmillan, 1990.

## Poland 1989-91 (CGV code the transition as occurring in 1989; Polity codes it as 1991): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* Roundtable negotiations between the martial law government of Wojciech Jaruzelski and the opposition Solidarity movement in 1989 produced a transitional agreement that reserved two-thirds of the

parliamentary seats for the Communists and their allies. Competitive elections for the remaining one-third of seats produced a smashing victory for Solidarity. In June 1989, the parliament, although still dominated by the Communists, selected Solidarity leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the first non-communist to head an Eastern European government since the late 1940s. Full parliamentary elections were held in January 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The industrial working class was the social base of the Solidarity movement, which emerged out of wildcat strikes of the late 1970s. Following a campaign of mass protest in 1979 and 1980, the regime imposed martial law and drove the movement underground. But the social networks forged during the protests remained intact, and the risk of a renewed social explosion remained a serious impediment to the government's efforts to undertake economic adjustments. The Solidarity movement resurfaced in 1988 and 1989, as economic conditions deteriorated. The movement rallied around nationalist and religious symbols as well as economic interests, but material grievances and outrage at the privileges of the communist elite were important motivating factors. Reform communists promoted the roundtable negotiations during a period of growing economic crisis, in the hope that Solidarity leaders could be induced to share responsibility for new economic reform initiatives if they were granted electoral representation. After the sweeping victory of Solidarity candidates in the 1989 elections, the parliament – still dominated by incumbent communists – ceded power to a new Solidarity government. The Solidarity government in turn presided over the establishment of an independent electoral commission and the first full parliamentary elections in 1991.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Although reformist communist factions played an important role in relaxing repression, the overt mobilization and electoral strength of the Solidarity movement was central to the transition.

*Sources.*

Jasiewicz. Krzysztof, "Polish Politics on the Eve of the 1993 Elections: Toward Fragmentation or Pluralism?" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 26:4 (December 1993): 387-425, especially 388-390.

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 261-276.

Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. Chapters 3-5.

## Romania 1990 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding of 1996 below): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In December 1989, long-time dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was driven from office by violent riots, worker protests, and defections from within the party, military and police and subsequently executed. Power was seized by the National Salvation Front, a group dominated by former Communists, who held elections in May 1990.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Protests initially broke out in Timisoara in December 1989 over ethnic issues involving the Hungarian minority, but were joined by students and became a broader anti-regime protest. Ceausescu sought to rally support through a public appearance in Bucharest in Revolution Square, but he was booed and heckled. Despite violent repression the protests grew in Bucharest and spread throughout the country ultimately forcing the Ceausescus to flee the capital. They were eventually apprehended, turned over to the army, sentenced to death by a military court and executed. Political power was initially seized by an interim government of Communist reformers around Ion Iliescu called the National Salvation Front (FSN). The FSN called for multi-party elections and lifted the ban against parties, but protests continued against the FSN monopoly of power and the media. Demonstrations against the FSN and continuing communist influence in government were countered by the FSN's mobilization of miners who entered the city at a number of critical junctures in 1990 both before and after the elections.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Ceausescu was deposed through a "palace coup," and possibly by

elite orchestration of protest activity. Moreover, the transition to democracy was limited by continuing control of the government by former communists. But the fall of the Ceausescus was driven by an extraordinarily popular upheaval with obvious roots in economic grievances; Romania was the only Eastern Bloc country to overthrow its government by force and to execute its leaders.

*Sources.*

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 344-365.

Peter Siani-Davies, *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

## Romania 1996 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The government of Ion Iliescu, a successor to the Communist party, was defeated in a regularly-scheduled election by Emil Constantinescu of the liberal Democratic Convention. The 1996 election was the first relatively clean election, and the first time the post-Communist successor party had been forced to yield power.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. As detailed above, mass mobilization played a central and direct role in the fall of the Ceausescus but these did not play a role in the subsequent transition from the Iliescu regime. Rather, external pressure from the European Union was a pivotal factor in inducing Iliescu to relax political controls in the early 1990s and to hold a clean election in 1996. Faced with a suspension of Western assistance in 1990 and 1991, and in the midst of a very deep economic recession, the government eased controls on the media and began to back away from the use of the Security Service and private thugs in managing the opposition. In 1993, an accession agreement with the European Union strengthened incentives to liberalize the political system, and the opposition received technical and financial support from Western foundations and NGOs. But the transfer occurred within the context of established constitutional rules of the game.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Romania faced severe economic difficulties in the early and mid-1990s and was therefore deeply dependent on assistance from the European Union and the broader international community. Economic difficulties spurred domestic opposition to the incumbent government, but this occurred within a previously-established constitutional framework.

*Sources.*

William Crowther, "The European Union and Romania: The Politics of Constrained Transition." In Paul Kubicek, ed. *The European Union and Democratization*. London: Routledge 2003.

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 344-365.

Steven D. Roper, "Romania," in Julie Smith and Elizabeth Teague, eds. *Democracy in the New Europe: Politics of Post-Communism*. London: The Greycoat Press. 1999

Peter Siani-Davies, *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Romania." *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Russian Federation 2000 (Polity only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*Note.* The Houle data set codes Russia as continuously democratic from 1991.

*The transition.* The election to the presidency of Vladimir Putin. The first transfer of power from one elected president to another.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Putin had gained credibility as a tough Prime Minister under the stumbling Yeltsin government. During that period, Russia had begun to recover significantly from the 1998 financial collapse. Moreover, Putin won support for exercising a "strong hand" against Chechen rebels.



The transition reflected “normal” electoral politics, rather than mass pressure from below. *Coding*. Non-Distributive conflict transition

*Sources*.

Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 385-443.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Russia.” *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Sao Tome and Principe 1991 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition*. The Central Committee of the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP), which had ruled as a single party since independence in 1975, introduced a democratic constitution that was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum in August 1990. In October 1990, Manuel Pinto da Costa was replaced as Secretary General of the party and democratic elections were held in January 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict*. Limited. Sao Tome and Principe gained independence in 1975 after the overthrow of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. President Manuel Pinto da Costa, head of the MLSTP, established a Soviet-style one-party state, with strong foreign policy ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and a highly statist economic policy. Sao Tome and Principe was a mini-state with a population of only several hundred thousand; and the regime was heavily dependent on this international support. After attempted invasions from exile groups in 1978 and 1988, Angola stationed troops on the islands, at the request of the government, and remained until 1991. It also supplied the islands with subsidized oil.

Changes in the regime were closely related to the decline in support from these external Communist patrons as well as secular economic decline within the islands themselves associated with the regime’s statist development strategy. By the late 1980s, Pinto da Costa began to co-opt opposition elements into the ruling party and made tentative steps toward market reforms with support from the international financial institutions and new donors. In late 1989, the party committed to a transition to full multiparty democracy, and in 1990, it submitted a constitution in which it relinquished its claim to a monopoly of power and opened the way to multi-party competition. Severe internal rivalries also contributed to the transition. In 1986, Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada was accused of stirring unrest against the government and forced into exile; but internal dissension continued and in 1991, Trovoada returned to lead the opposition party.

*Coding*: Non-distributive. Reform from above led by reformist faction within the ruling party as sources of external support weakened.

*Sources*.

David Kuranga, *The Power of Interdependence: Lessons from Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2012, pp. 54-60.

Gerhard Seibert, *Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism, and Democracy in Sao Tome and Principe*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Caroline Shaw, *Sao Tome and Principe*. Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio Press, World Bibliographical Series #172, 1974.

## Senegal 2000 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition*. Abdoulaye Wade defeated incumbent Abdou Diouf in a regularly scheduled election in 2000, the first time that elections in Senegal had resulted in the defeat of the incumbent Socialist Party.

*The role of distributive conflict*. Limited. Diouf’s defeat was a product of economic decline, the erosion of patronage resources and the defection of rural voters in the context of a political system that had been gradually liberalized over the 1980s and 1990s. The political system was opened to limited electoral opposition in 1976. Widespread popular protest after a fraud-ridden election in 1988 prompted important electoral reforms that

increased the leverage of the opposition and encouraged the incorporation of some of its leaders into coalitions led by the incumbent Parti Socialist (PS). Despite these liberalizing changes, the 1993 elections still resulted in victory for Diouf. After the elections, however, economic reforms diluted the capacity of the Socialist Party to maintain its complex patronage networks, including with religious leaders who delivered the rural vote. The electoral outcome of 2000 resulted from the defection of several Socialist Party leaders, who left the party to contest the first round of the elections thus denying Diouf a first round victory. The rural constituencies, which voted for Diouf in 1988 and 1993, and against him in 2000, were decisive in producing the PS defeat. The opposition candidate, Wade, won in the second-round run-off.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Although distributive issues played a role in the elections of 2000, the electoral changes that permitted this result had occurred over a decade before. There is no evidence that mass mobilization played a role in the decision on the part of Diouf to allow the election results to stand.

*Sources.*

Dennis Galvan, "Political Turnover and Social Change in Senegal," *Journal of Democracy* 12, 3 July 2001.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 273-275.

Richard Vengroff and Michael Magala, "Democratic Reform, Transition and Consolidation: Evidence from Senegal's 2000 Presidential Election," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, 1 (2001):129-162.

## Serbia 2000 (CGV; coded as Yugoslavia in the Polity IV dataset): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*Note.* The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia effectively dissolved over the course of 1991-92 as a result of declarations of independence by Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed by Serbia and Montenegro in April 1992 and maintained that name until 2003, when it became the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. See the discussion of Yugoslavia below.

## Sierra Leone 1996 and 1998 (CGV codes transitions in both years): Non-distributive conflict transition

*Note.* Although discussed together because of the proximity of the two transitions, the two cases are treated as separate observations for all summary and statistical purposes. However, only the 1996 case is included in our summary analysis of the cases in the Houle data set, since the country is included in the dataset only through 1996.

The transitions. Transfers of power in 1996 and 1998 were related episodes in the context of a complex civil war that began in 1991. In 1996, Brigadier Maada Bio launched a coup against the incumbent military regime (the National Provisional Ruling Council, NPRC) under the leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser. Following this coup, he opened negotiations with rebel forces (the Revolutionary United Front or RUF) and held elections in February 1996 that were won by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The army subsequently overthrew the Kabbah government in May 1997 (see discussion of 1997 reversion case below). The new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under Major Johnny Paul Koroma forged a new authoritarian government that included civilians disaffected with the Kabbah government and representation of the RUF. The AFRC/RUF regime was deposed by foreign intervention in 1998 and the Kabbah government re-instated.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant, but does not correspond with distributive conflict models and has contradictory effects on democratization. The civil war began in 1991 with the invasion of the RUF from

Liberia. The RUF was a populist, even millenarian movement backed by Libya that sought to appeal to a wide spectrum of disenfranchised elements in Sierra Leone society. However, it subsequently evolved into a classic rent-seeking insurgent grouping, exploiting its access to gold and diamonds and the use of terror. The proximate cause of the 1992 coup was the failure of the incumbent dominant-party regime under the All People's Congress to deal with either the RUF or the country's catastrophic economic decline. In 1995, the military junta enlisted the aid first of British and then of South African forces to push back the RUF, with some success. With pressure for the South African mercenaries to depart, civilians in the east and south organized a people's militia (kamajoi) to supplement the efforts of the army. Pressure mounted for the military to step aside altogether but not for obvious redistributive reasons but rather in protest of the military's ineffectiveness in dealing with economic issues and the insurgency.

The new democratic government explicitly rejected a number of the redistributive demands of the RUF as unrealistic, even though trying to accommodate them through peace negotiations and ultimately with a peace agreement (on which the RUF reneged). The coup of 1997 was undertaken by a coalition of the military, elites who were alienated from the Kabbah government, and was supported by the RUF, which was then invited to share power. The period of AFRC/RUF rule saw an intensification of civil conflict, atrocities on the part of the regime, and a further breakdown of the social order as civilians fled the fighting. The restoration of the Kabbah government clearly responded to internal distributive conflicts and fighting, but was largely the result of external decision-making processes. West African foreign ministers agreed in June 1997 on a three-pronged strategy to overturn the coup: dialogue, sanctions (endorsed by the UN) and the ultimate use of force by regional forces, primarily Nigerian. Following the failure of the AFRC/RUF government to honor the peace agreement, ECOMOG forces intervened and ousted it from power.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transitions (1996 and 1998). The lines of conflict in Sierra Leone were intense, but they were extremely complex and did not map in a straightforward way onto a distributive conflict story in which democratization occurs as a result of elite concessions to mass mobilization. Although the RUF claimed to rest on a lower-class base it is not clear that it did; there was widespread support for its suppression. Regional-cum-ethnic conflicts also played some role, but they do not map clearly onto demands for democratic rule in a way that is consistent with the theory, namely, that elite concessions were a response to such pressures. Moreover, foreign intervention played a pivotal role in the second democratic transition.

*Sources.*

Yusuf Bangura, "Strategic Policy Failure and Governance in Sierra Leone," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38, 4 (December 2000). Pp. 551-577.

Caspar Fithen and Paul Richards, "Making War, Crafting Peace: Militia Solidarities and Demobilization in Sierra Leone," in Paul Richards, ed. *No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*. Ohio University Press, James Currey, Oxford, 2005.

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Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, Ralph Hazleton, *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security*. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000.

Alfred B. Zack-Williams, "Sierra Leone: the Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98," *Third World Quarterly* 20, 1 (1999: 143-162).

## South Africa 1992 (Polity only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1990, the National Party government lifted the ban on the African National Congress and other political organizations. F.W. de Klerk ordered the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, and began negotiations for a political transition. The government repealed apartheid legislation, and agreed to hold free elections in 1994, leading to an overwhelming victory for the ANC.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. The African National Congress and its allies within the union movement spearheaded a highly organized struggle against apartheid that included the full range of contentious politics, from demonstrations and strikes to armed struggle. By the 1980s, South Africa's racial policies also began to encounter opposition from business elites and from Western political movements that pressed for an economic boycott against the regime. Nevertheless, protest from the black majority was a pivotal factor in forcing the white elites to accept a negotiated transition. The decision to hold elections in 1994 reflected the view of DeKlerk and much of the white elite that South Africa's economic and political isolation could be eased only through an accommodation with the ANC.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Foreign pressure played some role in the transition, but there is little doubt that organized opposition from the ANC was crucial in the transition.

*Source.*

Elizabeth Jean Wood, "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests, and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador," *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (34): 862-888, especially 872-873.

## South Korea 1988 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In June 1987, incumbent Vice President Roh Tae Woo announced a political reform that included direct election of the president. Subsequent negotiations between the regime and the opposition hammered out a constitutional compromise. Presidential elections were held in December 1987 and legislative elections the following April.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Although the movement for democracy was cross-class, including significant middle-class elements, it also included radical student groups, unions and civil society groups with a populist agenda. These groups played an increasing role in the democracy movement beginning in 1985 through large-scale protests against the death by torture of a student in early 1987. After the Chun Doo Hwan regime suspended debate about direct election of the president (April 1987) and effectively nominated his successor Roh Tae Woo (June), it faced massive protests in Seoul organized by a broad coalition of democratic groups. The government faced three weeks of large-scale protests in Seoul and elsewhere across the country, cresting in the Great Peaceful March of the People on June 26 involving millions. Following the initial concessions by the authoritarian regime, labor mobilization increased dramatically and also influenced some elements of the constitutional settlement.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The protests of June 1987 were the most decisive in generating concessions from the regime, and these were effective because they were cross-class in nature and included middle class and professional participants. Nonetheless, the democratic movement included unions and populist civil society groups and labor protests provided a backdrop to the elite negotiations over the constitution.

*Sources.*

Sunhyuk Kim, *The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000.

Hagen Koo, *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

## Sri Lanka 1989 (CGV only. Polity codes a reversion in 1982 and a transition occurring in 2001, but it is after the timeframe of this dataset): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* President Jayawardene's terms was scheduled to end in February 1989, and according to the constitution elections had to be held between December 4 1988 and January 3 1989. Jayawardene had extended

his rule through irregular means in the past, and there was some uncertainty about whether he would do so again. In September 1988, he announced that he would not run again; presidential elections were held as scheduled. In one of his final acts as president, Jayawardene dissolved parliament and set February 15, 1989 for general elections.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Following the overwhelming victory of the United National Party in the 1977 general election, the new government used its two-thirds majority in Parliament to create a new constitution. The Constitution added the position of Executive President, and extended the term of elected Presidents and Parliament to 6 years from the date of the election. In 1978 Jayawardene named himself President of Sri Lanka. The first direct vote to elect a President was held in 1982, with President Jayawardene obtaining 52% of votes cast. Claiming that sections of the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party were conspiring to take power in a coup, Jayawardene imposed a state of emergency. Due to the non-concurrence of elections, the term of the parliament was due to expire in August 1983 and Jayawardene faced the possibility of his ruling United National Party losing its supermajority in parliament. He therefore proposed a referendum to extend the life of parliament an additional six years. The referendum took place on December 22, 1982 and Jayawardene won. The sitting parliament was therefore extended for six further years beginning in August 1983, and served out its mandate until the 1989 general elections, which is coded as the return to democratic rule.

The Jayawardene government is coded as authoritarian because of the declaration of the state of emergency and the questionable legality of extending the sitting parliament, even if by referendum. The question is therefore whether mass mobilization played any role in the decision to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections as scheduled in 1988 and 1989. At the time of the transition, the country was deeply riven by the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, which had been exacerbated rather than resolved by the Indian intervention in 1987. Elections for provincial councils had been introduced in 1987 as a result of devolution measures undertaken in connection with the India-Sri Lanka accord; these elections were certainly motivated by ethnic conflict. The government also faced pressures from Sinhalese extremists and armed leftist groups in the South.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Foreign intervention by India plays some role in this case, but the earlier elections for provincial councils suggest at least some link between the ethnic violence and political accommodation.

Source of ambiguity. Nature of grievances. It remains unclear, however, whether Jayawardene's decision to hold elections came in response to ethnic conflict.

*Sources.*

Bruce Mathews, "Sri Lanka in 1988: Seeds of the Accord," *Asian Survey* 29, 2, (February 1989). Pp. 229-235.

K. T. Rajasingham, Sri Lanka: the Untold Story, Chapters 34 ("The Accord and its Ramifications"), 35 ("Accord Turns to Discord"), 36 ("Indians Rule the Roost") and 37, Asia Times Online at <http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/AsiaTimes.htm>

## Sudan 1986 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* Following a coup in April 1985 that deposed President Numeiri, the military formed a Transitional Military Council, appointed a largely non-partisan civilian cabinet, promulgated a revised constitution and oversaw elections for a Constituent Assembly, which were held as scheduled in April 1986.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The Sudan case is complicated because of the multiple axes of resistance to the Numeiri regime and the civil war in the South, which did not seek democratization but succession. Efforts by the regime to introduce sharia and a more authoritarian constitution in 1983-4 met resistance from a variety of civil society forces, from professionals and some unions to secular parties and regional politicians from the South; Numeiri's repressive tactics served to renew the fighting in the South. Following the execution of a prominent cleric, Mahmud Muhammad Taha, a National Alliance for National Salvation was formed in 1985,

representing professional and trade unions and seeking to remove Numeiri from power by civil disobedience. Deteriorating economic conditions contributed to major public protests in March and April 1985 calling for “bread and liberty.” The military split on how to respond to the protests, and immediately following them the armed forces deposed Numairi, his party and dissolved the national assembly.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The sources of opposition to the Numeiri regime were wide-ranging, and included general economic performance, religious grievances and secessionist pressures. However, mass mobilization in Khartoum and the resurgence of fighting in the South and elsewhere—with strong distributive implications—were clearly precipitating factors in the military’s decision to overthrow Numeiri and initiate a transition process.

*Sources.*

Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*. Indiana University Press, 1998. Pp. 45-75.

Kamal Osman Salih, “The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, 2 (Jun 1990). Pp. 199-224.

### Suriname 1988 (CGV only): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* In 1988, the military agreed to legislative elections, which led to a landslide victory for civilian opponents and the establishment of a civilian government.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant, but international pressure also very important. After a violent military crackdown in 1982, led by Desi Bouterse, the Netherlands and the United States suspended all external aid, dealing a crippling blow to the small, aid-dependent Suriname economy. Initially, the Bouterse dictatorship had attracted support from unions, but as economic conditions deteriorated, labor moved into the opposition and engaged in widespread strikes. Additional pressure on the regime came from an insurgency of the descendents of runaway slaves (Maroons) in the sparsely-populated interior of the country over resettlement policies. Faced with both external economic sanctions and popular opposition, Bouterse agreed in 1985 to the appointment of a National Assembly, with representatives from business and labor, and to the legalization of political parties. In 1987, the government completed work on a new constitution that was approved by referendum in September of that year. Legislative elections were held in November 1987 and a new civilian government led by the traditional political parties took office in 1988. The Netherlands and the United States resumed economic aid. However, Bouterse remained the head of a new Military Council established under the new constitution, and continued to dominate politics.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The withdrawal of external assistance was a major factor in this transition, but mass mobilization along class and economic lines propelled the transition forward. Suriname was deeply divided along ethnic lines—descendents of East Indians (Hindustanis) constitute about 38 percent of the population; Creoles about 31 percent; Javanese Muslims, 15 percent, and the descendents of slaves about 10 percent—and the latter put pressure on the government. But much of the opposition came from labor groups that had initially been part of the ruling coalition and defected as the economy turned sour.

*Source of ambiguity.* weight of international factors. External sanctions appear to play a powerful role in the case.

*Sources.*

*Europa World Year Book 2, Year 2* Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge. “Suriname: Introductory Survey,” 3982-3994.

US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. “Background Note: Suriname 2009.” at [www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm)

## Suriname 1991 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* The military government that had seized power in December 1990 agreed to hold new elections in May 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. In December 1990, Desi Bouterse and his allies ousted the civilian government elected in 1987 and handpicked replacements that were ratified by the National Assembly a few days later. But the coup provoked a strong international reaction, especially from the Netherlands, the key external supporter of the Suriname economy. The military backtracked very quickly, appointing a caretaker government to organize new elections. These were held in May 1991, five months after the coup. Victory went to a broad-based coalition of the major ethnic parties and the labor-based Surinamese Workers Party, but mass demonstrations and threats were relatively limited and did not appear to play an discernible role in the decision of Bouterse to reverse course.

*Coding.* Non-redistributive transition. External pressure, which was also important in the 1988 transition, seemed decisive in the quick rollback of the 1990 coup d'état.

*Sources.*

*Europa World Year Book 2, Year 2.* Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge. "Suriname: Introductory Survey."

US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. "Background Note: Suriname 2009." at [www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm)

## Taiwan 1992 (Polity; see discussion of CGV coding of 1996 below): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1991 the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritarian measures that dated to the time of the KMT's reversion to Taiwan, opening the way for legislative elections. Political parties were legalized in advance of the elections, which the KMT won in December 1991.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. The process of political reform began in 1986 when then-president Chiang Ching-Kuo made the decision to undertake political reform and the opposition, dominated by Taiwanese, took the risk of establishing a political party (the Democratic People's Party, DPP). The DPP did subsequently play a role in pressuring the regime, but the transition was tightly controlled by the KMT as its gradual nature attests. In 1987 the KMT abolished martial law and subsequently enacted a set of new laws guaranteeing freedom of speech, association and public assembly. The KMT chaired a National Affairs Conference in 1990 that sought to forge a consensus on the main elements of political reform, including a gradual retirement of legislators that had been elected to nominally represent mainland districts and a transition to direct election of the president. In 1991 the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritarian measures that dated to the time of the KMT's reversion to Taiwan, and shortly thereafter President Lee declared an end to the state of emergency.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Implicit in the political opening was greater representation for the Taiwanese majority, and thus implicitly a fundamental reallocation of political power and potentially of economic resources as well. But the KMT exercised tremendous influence over the course of the transition, was responding to a variety of factors including the country's international isolation and political competition with the mainland as well as pressures from below. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the KMT thought it could be competitive in a post transition environment.

*Sources.*

Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds. *Political Change in Taiwan*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1992.

Shelley Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy*. London: Routledge, 1999. Pp. 103-177.

Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, "Crafting Democratic Institutions in Taiwan," *The China Journal* 37 (January 1997): 1-27.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Taiwan." *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Taiwan 1996 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The CGV coding of the transition in Taiwan appears to be associated with the first direct elections for President.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. The direct elections for the president in 1996 were the culmination of a process of political reform that began in 1986 when then-president Chiang Ching-Kuo made the decision to undertake political reform and the opposition, dominated by Taiwanese, took the risk of establishing a political party (the Democratic People's Party, DPP). The DPP did subsequently play a role in pressuring the regime, but the transition was tightly controlled by the KMT as its gradual nature attests. In 1987 the KMT abolished martial law and subsequently enacted a set of new laws guaranteeing freedom of speech, association and public assembly. The KMT chaired a National Affairs Conference in 1990 that sought to forge a consensus on the main elements of political reform, including a gradual retirement of legislators that had been elected to nominally represent mainland districts and a transition to direct election of the president. In 1991 the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritarian measures that dated to the time of the KMT's reversion to Taiwan, and shortly thereafter President Lee declared an end to the state of emergency. KMT victory in the December 1991 National Assembly election actually facilitated the transition, since it allowed President Lee Teng-hui and the KMT to pursue constitutional reforms that placated interests within his own party. By 1994 the framework of a constitutional democracy was essentially in place, with the direct election of the president the final step.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Implicit in the political opening was greater representation for the Taiwanese majority, and thus implicitly a fundamental reallocation of political power and potentially of economic resources as well. But the KMT exercised tremendous influence over the course of the transition, was responding to a variety of factors including the country's international isolation and political competition with the mainland as well as pressures from below. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the KMT thought it could be competitive in a post transition environment.

*Sources.*

Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds. *Political Change in Taiwan*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1992.

Shelley Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy*. London: Routledge, 1999. Pp. 103-177.

Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, "Crafting Democratic Institutions in Taiwan," *The China Journal* 37 (January 1997): 1-27.

## Thailand 1992 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* Following the coup in 1991, the military sought to draft a new constitution with "provisional clauses" guaranteeing military influence over Parliament for another four years. The provisional clauses sparked widespread demonstrations against the government. The king intervened to restrain the military, Suchinda resigned and Parliament rescinded the provisional clauses. An interim government oversaw elections in September 1992.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Immediately following the announcement of the provisional clauses, a Campaign for Popular Democracy was formed to coordinate a variety of sources of opposition, including students but also civil society groups and those representing the poor. Political parties also ran in the March 1992 elections on anti-military platforms. This movement expanded into major demonstrations in April and May, which the military sought to repress, including through shooting into the demonstrators.



*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. The intervention of the king and the opposition of the private sector played a role, and the pivotal protests were led by students. But the anti-authoritarian movement was broad and included slum organizations and NGOs representing the poor and religious and other organizations protesting corruption and money politics. The intervention of the king followed directly from mass demonstrations.

*Sources.*

Michael Connors, *Democracy and National Identity in Thailand*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, *Thailand: Economy and Politics*, 2nd edition. Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 373-80, 385-414.

## Turkey 1983 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* At the time of the coup in 1980, the military stated that its intervention would be of limited duration. In 1981, the junta appointed a Consultative Assembly charged with devising a new constitution. In 1982, this document was submitted to a referendum. The Consultative Assembly also wrote an electoral law that established new political parties. In October 1983, the military transferred power to the new government despite the defeat of its favored candidate.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Violent conflict between left and right had been a feature of Turkish politics in the late-1970s. But in the aftermath of the coup, the military government undertook a wide-ranging purge of government—arresting all major political leaders—brutally repressed unions and extremist groups and suspended all societal organizations. As the military gradually reopened the political space in early 1983, new parties formed around established politicians but most were vetoed by the military. Although the military government was clearly surprised by the electoral victory of the one opposition party it had allowed to function—the Motherland Party—there is no indication that threats of mass mobilization influenced the decision to let the election results stand. Moreover, despite the surprising victory of the opposition the military retained veto power over the new government in a number of respects. Those prerogatives were subsequently weakened in the face of social challenges, but such challenges did not influence the timing of the transition itself.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. The military withdrew on a pre-announced schedule, and at least in the short-run shaped the constitution, the party and electoral system and military prerogatives to conform with its interests.

*Sources.*

Henri J. Barkey, “Why Military Regimes Fail: the Perils of Transition,” *Armed Forces and Society* 16 (1990). Pp. 169-92.

Clement H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*. Beverley, United Kingdom: Eothen Press, 2nd revised edition 1990.

Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.

## Uganda 1980 (CGV only): Non-distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* The transition occurred in the wake of the Tanzania-Uganda war and the deposing of Idi Amin by victorious Tanzanian and Ugandan forces. Following a period of internecine conflict within the Uganda military forces that participated in the conflict, a transitional structure oversaw bitterly contested elections in December 1980 that were won by Milton Obote’s Uganda Peoples Congress.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. By 1978, Amin’s base of support began to shrink significantly as a result of his own erratic behavior toward supporters and the general decline of the economy after years of neglect and abuse. In 1978, Amin faced a mutiny from within the military and when he sought to put it down

some of the mutineers fled across the Tanzanian border. Amin then claimed that Tanzanian President Nyerere had been behind the coup and Amin invaded Tanzanian territory and formally annexed a section across the Kagera River boundary in November. Nyerere launched a counterattack, joined by Ugandan exiles united as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). Despite support from Libya Tanzania and the UNLA took Kampala in April 1979. Amin fled the country.

The period following the ousting of Amin was characterized by intense competition and fighting for power among contending military and political factions. Before the liberation of Kampala, Tanzania assisted in forging a transitional government by convening a Unity Conference of twenty-two Ugandan civilian and military groups. The Conference established the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) as political representative of the UNLA military forces and named Dr. Yusuf Lule, former principal of Makerere University, as head of the UNLF executive committee. Lule subsequently became president, advised by a temporary parliament, the National Consultative Council (NCC) but was seen as too conservative by some factions. In June 1979, the NCC replaced Lule with Godfrey Binaisa who expanded the NCC but was nonetheless also removed in May 1980 by the Military Commission of the UNLF in what amounted to a military coup. Binaisa had run afoul of military factions within the UNLF who had started to build private armies, which in turn were harassing and intimidating opponents. He was overthrown in a military coup on May 10, 1980. The coup was engineered by supporters of Milton Obote, who returned to Uganda and effectively took control of the transition process. Because the Military Commission, as the acting government, was dominated by Obote supporters, the opposition faced formidable obstacles. The elections were won by Obote and his Uganda Peoples Congress, but despite an endorsement by the Commonwealth Commission were widely viewed as fraudulent.

*Coding.* Non-distributive transition. Despite widespread disaffection with Amin and some mass mobilization, the transition was effectively engineered by military elites.

*Source.*

Rita M. Byrnes, ed. *Uganda: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990 at <http://countrystudies.us/uganda/>

## Ukraine 1991 (Polity and CVG): Distributive conflict transition\*

*The transition.* This case represents one of six cases in which former Soviet Republics were coded as democracies from the time of their independence. The Ukraine's declaration of independence occurred on August 24, 1991 and came in direct response to the August 19th coup attempt in Moscow, when conservative Communist leaders sought to restore central Communist party control over the USSR. The declaration was followed by a proposal for a national referendum issued jointly from majority leader Oleksandr Moroz and opposition leader Ihor Yukhnovsky. The referendum won overwhelmingly, securing 90% of the vote.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant, but with ambiguity concerning objectives. Reform communism in the Ukraine got a late start, with the formation of a pro-Gorbachev group (Rukh) only in 1989; hardliners in the party even sought to nip this effort in the bud. The focus of the reformers and other opposition forces that joined together into a Democratic Bloc, was initially political reform. The Supreme Soviet elections of March 1990 became a focal point; the bloc won 108 of 450 seats. It openly argued for a multiparty system, but was bitterly denounced by the Communist majority and Gorbachev. Protests and mass events accompanied these political developments, including a human chain, large music festivals, demonstrations and strikes by miners issuing both economic and political demands. In October of 1990, open demonstrations began in the form of a tent city and large-scale marches in Kiev, joined in one of the larger demonstrations by workers from one of Kiev's largest factories and forcing the resignation of some key hardliners.

But the substantive emphasis of these protests was mixed, and changed rapidly over time. While the initial interests of Rukh were political, and limited largely to groups of intellectuals, the movement rapidly transformed into a nationalist movement, supported if not led by the ruling elite itself and having a very broad, cross-class appeal. Kravchuk, former ideology chief of the party and to become the first president,

quickly took hold of the nationalist issue over the course of 1990. In July 1990, the Ukrainian legislature voted for sovereignty, following Yeltsin's lead. In a March 1991 referendum, the electorate sent mixed signals—simultaneously voting both for a renewed union with the Soviets and for sovereignty—and severely dividing the dominant communist bloc. But the vote was not deeply politicized along ethnic lines: only very weak relationships can be found between share of Ukrainian and Russian voters and the vote on both questions. The Crimea—with a strong Russian majority—did pursue autonomy within the Ukraine and mobilized fears of “Ukrainization.” But in the referendum for independence, even a majority in the Crimea voted for independence.

By the summer of 1991, support for sovereignty was overwhelming and when the coup occurred in Moscow in August 1991, the former communists were able to lead the movement toward independence in alliance with the minority opposition.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. It is not entirely clear on what grounds the Ukraine is coded as a democracy in 1991, but it is plausible that pressures from below kept the Communist majority from cracking down harder on the opposition and closing down the political system altogether.

*Sources of ambiguity.* Nature of the grievances. The nationalist goals of the emerging movement raise doubts about the significance of distributive aspirations.

*Sources.*

Bohdan Harasymiw. 2002. *Post-Communist Ukraine*. Alberta and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Robert Kravchuk, *Ukrainian Political Economy: the First Ten Years*. Palgrave MacMillan, 2002.

Paul Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and the Ukraine,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 27, 4 (1994): 423-441.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2010. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Ukraine,” *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed January 5, 2012. .

Zenovia Sochor, 1996. “August 1991 in Comparative Perspective: Moscow and Kieve, in Jane Shapiro Zacek, Ilpyong J. Kim eds. *Legacy of the Soviet Bloc*. University of Florida Press.

## Ukraine 1994 (Polity only): Distributive conflict transition.

*The transition.* This case represents two subtle changes in Polity rankings in two years: a reversion in 1993 (from 6 to 5; see the discussion of the reversion below) and a transition in 1994 (from 5 to 7). The 1993 reversion takes the form of presidential assumption of extraconstitutional powers and ongoing conflict between the president and parliament over their respective powers. However, in the same year an agreement was reached to hold early elections in 1994, leading to a victory for former minister Leonid Kuchma over president Leonid Kravchuk; these elections appear to constitute the basis for the transition coding in 1994 even though the agreement to hold the elections is reached earlier.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Transitional elections in 1991 elected Leonid M. Kravchuk, former chairman of the Ukrainian Rada and ideology secretary of the Communist Party, to a 5-year term as Ukraine's first president. At the same time, a referendum on independence from the Soviet Union was approved by more than 90% of the voters. Despite the fact that communists managed to maintain power, Polity codes the 1991 transition as a 6 (prior to that time, Ukraine was coded by Polity as part of the Soviet Union).

In 1992, Kravchuk undertook a number of reforms designed to establish Ukrainian sovereignty from Russia; the economy went into a steep decline. In late 1992, Kravchuk dismissed his first prime minister and appointed Leonid Kuchma in his place, a move that was ratified by the Rada. Kuchma sought emergency powers for six months in November (through May 1993) in order to push through a more aggressive reform program. He was granted these powers overwhelmingly by the Rada, which permitted him to suspend elements of the constitution and issue decrees with respect to the economy culminating in a major reform program in early

1993. These actions appear to be legal because they were ratified by the parliament and therefore should not constitute the source of the reversion.

When Kuchma's powers expired in May 1993, he asked that they be extended; he was concerned that his reform efforts were being undermined by parliamentary control over the central bank and the State Property Fund. This time, the Rada overwhelmingly rejected the extension of further decree powers. Kuchma threatened to resign and Kravchuk responded with a decree on June 16 establishing a temporary "Extraordinary Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers" to deal with economic matters; it is this action and subsequent actions by Kravchuk vis-à-vis the parliament in late 1993 that appear to constitute the source of the slight shift in coding.

The issuing of the decree coincided with a massive strike by coal miners in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, and was followed by complex political maneuvering between the president and parliament. The demands of the striking miners included not only increased wages and mine safety but a call for a national referendum of confidence in the president and parliament. In response to the demands of the strikers, Kravchuk removed Kuchma and replaced him with an official sympathetic with the miners and agreed to early parliamentary and presidential elections to be held in 1994. Parliament initially rejected Kuchma's resignation and the conflict between the two branches over policy negotiations lasted for several months. But it was finally resolved when the Rada voted a movement of no confidence in Kravchuk's Cabinet of Ministers and accepted Kuchma's removal. This set in train a period when reforms were reversed in the run up to the elections, which Kuchma won.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition/elite reaction reversion This is an anomalous case, because the reversion and transition seem to overlap almost exactly in time; the conflict between the branches of government and the decision to hold the elections are compressed. The case has important elements of an intra-elite conflict because the Rada was dominated by communists. Nonetheless, the decision to hold elections in 1994 appears to be driven by pressure from the miners in the context of a deep economic crisis. Notwithstanding the importance of intra-elite maneuvers, it is this pressure which leads us to code this as a distributive conflict transition. We note also the deep regional conflicts between the Russophile east and south, where the reconstituted communist party drew its strength, and the Ukrainian nationalists in the west. However, although these differences were of major importance in the later "color revolution," they did not appear to play the same role in the conflicts described above.

*Sources.*

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2010. "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Ukraine," *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed January 5, 2012. .

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Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, 7 (Nov., 1997), pp. 1293-1316.

## Uruguay 1985 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In 1984, the military entered into formal negotiations with a coalition of center and left parties, resulting in an agreement to hold competitive elections and return power to civilian government.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Unions and other civil society groups derailed prolonged military efforts to transfer office to civilian elites that it could continue to control. Initial efforts to impose a new constitution were rejected in a referendum held in 1980; and in 1982, primary voters again rejected an attempt to place allies at the head of the traditional political parties. Despite these setbacks, however, the

military continued to seek control over a transition in negotiations with the traditional parties. At this point, their efforts were disrupted by the explosion of popular protests and strikes, led by the union movement. A massive general strike in January 1984 was especially important in strengthening the bargaining power of the opposition. The military responded by permitting the inclusion of left parties and unions into the opposition coalition and agreed to abide by the results of relatively free and competitive elections.

*Coding:* Class Conflict. Military defeats in the 1980 constitutional referendum and the 1982 party primaries opened the way to labor protest. But labor protest played a pivotal role in blocking continuing military efforts to maintain control over the election of a civilian government.

*Sources.*

Ruth Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 138-143.

Charles Guy Gillespie, *Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 135.

## Yugoslavia 2000 (Polity; coded as Serbia in the CGV dataset): Non-distributive conflict transition.

*Note.* The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia effectively dissolved over the course of 1991-92 as a result of declarations of independence by Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed by Serbia and Montenegro in April 1992 and maintained that name until 2003, when it became the Union of Serbia and Montenegro.

*The transition.* Mass demonstrations in Belgrade forced Slobodan Milosevic from power, after he refused to accept his defeat in the 2000 presidential elections.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant, but the demonstrations were directed overwhelmingly at Milosevic and the issue of electoral fraud. Despite disastrous economic conditions, Milosevic had managed to retain power throughout the Balkan Wars through a combination of ethnic-nationalist appeals and harassment of the opposition. In 1996 and 1997, he was able to face down massive student protests against fraud in local elections. With the outbreak of the Kosovo war in 1998, however, Yugoslavia faced Western trade sanctions and then NATO airstrikes on Serbian targets. Initially, this led to an upsurge in nationalist support for Milosevic, but this eroded quickly as external pressure took a severe economic toll and forced a Western-backed settlement. In the 2000 presidential election, Milosevic lost to opposition candidate Vojislav Koštunica, but refused to relinquish power. Milosevic's unwillingness to leave office triggered a general strike, a broad popular uprising in Belgrade, attacks on the parliament building, and the occupation of the main TV station. Security forces and Army commanders defected in the face of popular opposition, and Milosevic negotiated a transfer of power to Kostunica.

*Coding.* Non-distributive conflict transition. Despite the significance of the popular uprising, and the context of a wartime economic crisis, the protests were rooted in the student movement and the liberal, middle-class and were focused overwhelmingly on abuses of civil rights and the electoral process. The case therefore does not conform with the stipulated causal mechanisms in the theory.

*Sources.*

Leonard J. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2001.

Mark R. Tohmppson and Philip Kuntz, "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October," *Journal of Democracy* 15, 4 (2004): 159-72.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Slovenia." *Polity IV Country Reports 2009* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Zambia 1991 (Polity only): Distributive conflict transition

*The transition.* In July 1990, members of the Kaunda cabinet defected from the regime and entered into a coalition with opposition leader Frederick Chiluba, head of the copper workers union. Kaunda agreed to call multiparty elections in 1991—thinking he would win—and lost overwhelmingly to Chiluba.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. As in a number of cases in Africa, fiscal crisis eroded the patronage resources of the state and pushed the Zambian government toward highly unpopular structural adjustment policies. In 1989, the regime was shaken by a decline of copper prices, deep recession, and increasing dependence on external aid. Its effort to implement a structural adjustment program led to strikes by copper workers unions, students, and postal workers, as well as to urban rioting. Protest developed into a democracy movement and civil society groups, led by the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, called for multiparty elections.

*Coding.* Distributive conflict transition. Although the transition had support from both business groups and external donors, and was triggered by elite defections, those defections were in turn the result of pressures from unions and the inability of the military to quell spontaneous violence.

*Sources.*

Michael Bratton, “Zambia Starts Over,” *Journal of Democracy* 3, 2 (April 1992). Pp. 81-94

Julius O. Ihonvbere, *Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: The Case of Zambia*. Africa World Press, Trenton NJ and Asmara, Eritrea 1996.

## Reversions from Democratic Rule

We identify four types of reversion from democratic rule: “elite reactions,” which conform most clearly with the distributive conflict theory; “populist reversions”; “cross-class reversions”; and “intra-elite” reversions.

We code two types of cases as **elite reactions**:

1. Cases in which elites conspire to oust incumbent governments that rely on the political support of lower class or excluded groups and are actively committed to the redistribution of assets and income.
2. Cases in which elites—including political incumbents—institute various restraints on political and electoral competition or political liberties in a pre-emptive way: in order to prevent coalitions with explicitly redistributive aims from taking office or to limit lower-class mobilization.

*Notes on the coding rule.*

In both of these cases, there must be both:

- Clear evidence of redistributive actions on the part of the government or pressures from outside it;
- And elite disaffection with the policies of the incumbent government and/or with threats to elite interests from parties, organized social forces or collective action, including violence that is aimed at greater redistribution of income and assets.
- It is important to note that elite reaction reversions can occur without a change in officeholders if incumbents restrict electoral competition or place limits on political and civil liberties.

**Populist** reversions are cases in which the incumbent government is overthrown not by elites seeking to limit redistribution but by populist leaders promising more extensive redistribution.

*Notes on the coding rule.*

- Like elite reversions, populist reversions are characterized by evidence of distributive conflicts prior to the reversion, either between the government and opposition within the government or between the government and parties, organized social forces or collective violence outside of it;
- Although populist reversions are identified by promises of more extensive redistribution and appeal to lower class groups, they need not be followed by populist policies.

In **cross-class** reversions, authoritarian challengers exploit wide disaffection with the performance of democratic incumbents and invoke broad grievances that cut across class interests, such as institutional stalemate and government ineffectiveness, economic performance, corruption, political scandals or other grievances that have wide cross-class appeal.

*Notes on the coding rule.*

- Cross-class reversions may be accompanied by signs of distributive conflicts, but can be distinguished by the nature of the appeals that authoritarian challengers make and primarily by the target of the intervention. In particular, cross-class reversions are not directed at the redistributive actions of the government or distributive conflicts, but rather at general government performance.
- Moreover, cross-class reversions must involve support or “active acquiescence” on the part of significant parties and organizations representing the poor and economically excluded. In the absence of such support or in the face of active resistance on the part of lower-income groups and their representatives, we assume that the reversion is likely to be “elite reaction” in form.

**Intra-elite** reversions are those in which broad distributive conflicts are either absent altogether or appear to play a minimal role in the decision to overthrow democratic rule.

*Notes on the coding rule.*

Intra-elite reversion would include cases in which:

- The military—or factions within it—stages a coup against incumbent democratic office-holders because of loss of budget, prerogatives or career concerns;
- Competing economic elites mobilize military, militia or other armed forces against democratic rule because of intra-elite rather than distributive challenges, such as the elimination of prerogatives or rents.
- Challengers in intra-elite reversions do not mobilize either elite-mass cleavages or cross-class disaffection but act primarily in defense of narrow elite interests. Such reversions are more likely to occur in political settings in which organized political forces—parties, unions, social movements, NGOs—are relatively weak to begin with.

Below is a summary of our cases.

Table 6: Distributive and Non-Distributive Reversions, 1980–2000

	CGV Dataset		Polity Dataset	
	Cases	Share of all reversions in dataset	Cases	Share of all reversions in dataset
<b>Elite reactions (distributive conflict reversions conforming with theory)</b>	Bolivia 1980 Burundi 1996 Fiji 2000 Turkey 2000	4/21.2%	Armenia 1995 Dominican Republic 1994 Fiji 1987 Fiji 2000 Haiti 1991 Turkey 1980 Ukraine 1993 Zambia 1996	8/40.0%
<b>Populist reversions</b> Ghana 1981	Ecuador 2000 Ghana 1981 Suriname 1980	3/15.8%	Ghana 1981 Haiti 1999	2/10.0%
<b>Cross-class reversions</b>	Congo 1997 Niger 1996 Peru 1990 Sierra Leone 1997 Sudan 1989	5/26.3%	Congo 1997 The Gambia 1994 Niger 1996 Peru 1992 Sudan 1989	5/25.0%
<b>Intra-elite reversions</b>	Comoros 1995 Guatemala 1982 Nigeria 1993 Pakistan 1999 Suriname 1990 Thailand 1991	7/36.8%	Belarus 1995 Honduras 1985 Nigeria 1994 Pakistan 1999 Sri Lanka 1982 Uganda 1985	5/25.0%
<b>N</b>	19	100%	20	100%



## Armenia 1995 (Polity only): Elite reaction reversion

*The reversion.* The reversion is associated with creeping authoritarianism on the part of the incumbent president in the form of attacks on the opposition, the drafting and passage of a Constitution that concentrated his power, and elections of dubious integrity held in 1996.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The population of Armenia voted overwhelmingly for independence in a September 1991 referendum, followed by a presidential election in October 1991 that gave 83% of the vote to Levon Ter-Petrossian. Ter-Petrossian subsequently revealed a more repressive face, including accusations about the integrity of the opposition (and its ties to the Soviets in particular), a series of political assassinations and ultimately a broad sweep against the opposition in the run-up to parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring 1995. From 1994, the government faced mass mobilization in the form of rallies and demonstrations around political issues; these were compounded in 1995 as the country slid into a severe economic crisis. In July 1995 a strongly contested constitutional referendum pushed through a major revision that gave the president vast powers, including the capacity to declare emergency powers and wide ranging control over the judiciary. Concurrent parliamentary elections for the National Assembly were characterized by international observers as “free, but unfair” but Polity notes that the subsequent 1996 presidential elections were characterized by election observers for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as suffering from severe irregularities.

Coding: Elite reaction reversion. The case differs from other elite reaction reversions because the undermining of democracy came not from forces outside of the government but from the incumbent himself. Protests centered initially and largely on political issues, but came to encompass economic issues and corruption as the economy deteriorated in 1995. However, we believe it falls generally within the parameters of distributive conflict models because of the presence of widespread economic distress and demands on the government that it could not manage—or chose not to manage—through standard democratic processes.

### *Sources.*

James Fearon and David Laitin, 2006. “Armenia,” at Random Narratives at <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/random%20narratives.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

Jennifer Widner, 2005. “Armenia 1995,” Constitution Writing & Conflict Resolution: Data & Summaries, first posted August 2005 and accessed at <http://www.princeton.edu/pwcr/reports/armenia1995.html> on March 31, 2011.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger, “Country Report 2008: Armenia,” at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Belarus 1995 (Polity only): Intra-elite reversion

*The reversion.* According to Polity, “Alyksandr Lukashenko was originally elected president of Belarus in competitive multiparty elections in 1994. Since that time Lukashenko has carried out a rolling coup.” The basis of this judgment is significant constraints placed on electoral politics and efforts to overrule both the legislature and the constitutional court through the issuing of executive decrees.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Minimal. Belarus’ declaration of independence in 1991 was reluctant; unlike other post-Soviet states the nationalist movement was weak and the bulk of the population favored continuity with the Soviet era and even incorporation with Russia. The liberal and nationalist opposition subsequently had difficulty wresting power from the government of Prime Minister Kyebich, which was made up largely of former communist functionaries. The Supreme Soviet repeatedly beat back calls for a referendum on its dissolution, but did agree to shorten its term to hold parliamentary elections in 1994. The elections, held under a constitution drafted by the incumbent government, generated a surprise result when Kyebich was soundly beaten by populist Alexander Lukashenko, who ran as a youthful anti-corruption crusader.

Once in office, however, Lukashenko moved swiftly to consolidate power at the expense of both the opposition and the legislature. The legislative elections held in May 1995 were characterized by a number of irregularities. By early 1995, Lukashenko had established control over the entire state administration, the economy, and the media and imposed an "information blockade" on the activities of the opposition. He also imposed restrictions on campaign spending and coverage of the elections in the media. Lukashenko further undermined the opposition by combining the May 1995 parliamentary balloting with his first referendum, which included proposals for making Russian an official language and for replacing postindependence national symbols with Soviet-era ones—issues that mobilized voters who felt nostalgic about communist rule. The referendum proposals passed easily, and not a single liberal opposition candidate (BPF) won a seat in parliament. The majority of seats went to the communist and agrarian parties, with two smaller opposition factions—liberals and social democrats—gaining control of one-fifth of the seats.

The communists and the agrarians eventually joined the democrats in opposing Lukashenko, in part over constitutional prerogatives. The second likely source of the change in Polity coding has to do with Lukashenko's formal usurpation of powers. The Constitution stipulated that the authority of the old parliament would formally expire when a new parliament holds its first session. But since the new parliament could not be formally convened because turnout had fallen short of constitutionally-stipulated thresholds, the old parliament reconstituted itself. Lukashenko denied these parliamentary deputies access to government funds, triggering a constitutional crisis. In October, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the reconvened parliament, which then passed new electoral laws to regularize the outcome of the election *ex post* by lowering turnout requirements; the Court deemed these moves legal as well. President Lukashenko ignored this ruling, refused to recognize the parliament, and began to rule by decree. During its first year, the Constitutional Court reviewed 14 presidential decrees and ruled 11 of them illegal. The president not only ignored these rulings, but issued an edict compelling the government and local authorities to disregard the Court's rulings and adhere to his decrees.

Although subsequent events fall outside the coding year, they are germane in understanding the nature of the new order. In 1996, Lushenko sought to regularize presidential rule through a new referendum that amended the constitution to extend his first term in office from four to seven years, concentrate power in the hands of the presidency, replace the unicameral Supreme Council with a much weaker bicameral legislature, and give presidential decrees the status of law, meaning that they would supersede acts adopted by the legislature. The prerogative of appointing members of the Constitutional Court and the Central Election Commission (CEC) was also transferred from parliament to the presidency. The 1996 referendum passed with wide support but was deemed fraudulent by outside observers. *Coding.* Intra-elite reversion. Lukashenko was initially elected on a populist platform, suggesting that his subsequent actions might be undertaken for redistributive reasons. However, there is no evidence of overt distributive conflict and Lukashenko's subsequent actions seem more like a pure power grab vis-à-vis the legislature rather than actions undertaken with redistributive policy intent.

*Sources.*

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David R. Marples. "National awakening and national consciousness in Belarus, *Nationalities Papers* 27:4 (1999), 565-578

Vitali Silitski, "Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus," *Journal of Democracy* 16, 4 (2005): 83-97

## Bolivia 1980 (CGV only): Elite reaction reversion

*The reversion.* A right-wing military faction led by General Luis Garcia Meza deposed acting President Lidia Gueiler in July 17, 1980, in the wake of the victory of leftist Hernan Siles in an election held earlier that year.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The resignation of long-time dictator Hugo Banzer in 1978 opened the way to a turbulent period of elections, labor conflicts and military conspiracies. Elections in 1979 produced a political stalemate; all candidates fell short of 50 percent of the vote required to win outright, and none could gain the backing of a legislative majority necessary to win the presidency. After a rapid succession of military and civilian governments, the Congress appointed Lidia Guiler, the head of the chamber of deputies, as interim president. In 1980, a new election led to the congressional victory of a left-of-center coalition, and the new legislature chose Hernan Siles as president. Siles was backed by the radical miners' union and by left parties, and had run for office as a strong critic of IMF adjustment programs. Before he could take office, however, a military faction linked to the right-wing dictatorship of Hugo Banzer deposed Guiler and installed a military dictatorship headed by Garcia Meza.

*Coding.* Elite reaction reversion. Bolivian society was deeply divided between the left and right. Siles, as noted, had the backing of working class unions and left-wing parties; Garcia Meza was linked to the right. Other factors were also important: the Garcia Meza regime was also deeply implicated in cocaine traffic and other forms of corruption. Nevertheless, this was clearly a right-wing coup.

*Source.*

Ruth Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 143-149.

## Burundi 1996 (CGV only): Elite reaction reversion

*The reversion.* After a massacre of over three hundred Tutsis by radical Hutu rebels in 1996, the third Hutu president went into hiding in advance of a military takeover. The new military government was headed by a Tutsi, Pierre Beyoya, who had previously held power from 1987 to 1992.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The deposed democratic government was led by moderate Hutu politicians but was extremely fragile. Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratic president in our sample period, died in an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1994 and his successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed in a suspicious plane crash in the same year.

*Coding.* Elite reaction reversion. The violence—although not attributable to or endorsed by the government—provided the excuse for a return of the Tutsi minority to power.

*Source.*

Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Cambridge ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 1996.

## Comoros 1995 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion

*The reversion.* In September 1995 Said Mohammed Djohar was overthrown in a coup led by a foreign mercenary, Bob Denard. Within a week of the coup, however, French troops had restored Djohar to power and established a government of national reconciliation. Under internationally-monitored elections held in March 1996, Mohamed Taki was elected president.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Since independence in 1975, the Comoros has been characterized by chronic political instability, with more than 20 coup attempts. An important figure in this history of this instability was the French mercenary Bob Denard. Denard headed the first president's presidential guard and had a variety of business interests in the country; he was also believed to have had close relations with French authorities, who acquiesced in his activities for a variety of strategic reasons ranging from support for his

mercenary operations in Mozambique and Angola to the utility of the Comoros as a base for circumventing the embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa. The broader context of the coup arguably involved a core distributive conflict in the archipelago over federalism and central control. Formal political power was centralized under President Ahmed Abdallah's second presidency (1978-1989). When Abdallah was assassinated (by Denard), his successor Said Mohammed Djohar sought to undertake modest democratizing reforms including the re-introduction of a multi-party system, restoring the office of prime minister, restricting the presidency to two terms only. The federal orientation of the state was also revived, but the government nonetheless faced inter-island conflict, political mobilization against the regime and a series of coup attempts. The French government ultimately withdrew its support and generated an additional crisis by requiring visas for Comorian citizens seeking to enter the island of Mayotte, an island in the archipelago that had voted at independence to remain a French dependency.

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion. The political backdrop for the coup included ongoing inter-island tensions that could be given a distributive spin; the election of Djohar marked a diminution of Anjouan dominance of politics in favor of greater federalism. However, although Denard was ultimately arrested for the coup attempt and the French intervened to broker the return of multiparty rule, the driving factors in the coup however appear to rest largely with external actors rather than with the redistributive policies of the government or mass mobilization against it.

*Sources.*

Chrysantus Ayangafac, "Situation Critical: the Anjouan Political Crisis," *Institute for Security Studies (Addis Ababa) Situation Report*, March 5, 2008.

Hamdy A. Hassan, "The Comoros and the crisis of building a national state," *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 2: 2 (2009): 229-239

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Comoros." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Congo 1997 (CGV and Polity): Cross-class reversion

*The reversion.* In early October 1997, after months of armed confrontations between rival political forces, president Pascal Lissouba was overthrown by invading Angolan troops backing former dictator Sassou Nguesso.

*The role of distributive conflict.* From its election in 1992, Lissouba's democratic government had been plagued by deep ethno-regional tensions that erupted into near-civil war in 1994 and 1995 and burst out again in the middle of 1997. The main protagonists were three ethnically-based parties: The National Alliance for Democracy (URD) led by Bernard Kolelas and drawing its support primarily from Bankongo and Lari ethnic groups; the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (AND), led by Pascal Lissouba and based mainly in the southern regions of Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou; and the former ruling party, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) headed by Sassou Nguesso, the dictator deposed in 1992 with a base mainly in the north of the country. (Clark, 72). An alliance between the AND and the PCT – both vaguely left-of-center parties – allowed Lissouba to win the presidency in a runoff election in 1992. However, the two groups quarreled over the allocation of cabinet seats. The PCT withdrew from the government and formed an opposition coalition with Kolelas's URD, its former adversary. A tense standoff ensued, in which Kolelas declared the legislature dissolved and the AND-PCT opposition declared his move illegal. The crisis was temporarily averted by an agreement, mediated by the military, to form a unity government that would oversee new elections in 1993. In that election, however, charges of fraud led to the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict in Brazzaville and the formation of rival militias in different sections of the city. In 1994, mediation by France, the OAU, and Gabon, produced a truce between Lissouba and Kolelas, but Sassou remained in opposition and continued to arm his followers throughout the rest of 1994 and 1995. Presidential elections scheduled for 1997 increased the tensions among and within the contending groups. In June 1997, President Lissouba's forces surrounded Sassou's compound in Brazzaville, and Sassou ordered his militia to resist. A bloody, four month conflict

ensued, leading to the invasion of Angolan troops and the restoration of Sassou to power.

*Coding.* Cross-class reversion. The complex conflicts among the parties appear to be rooted in the distributional consequences of regional and ethnic representation in the government; the reversion does not map easily onto any of the models we have described. But the reversion marks a return to the status quo ante in which Sassou's coalition—which had been elected—is restored at the expense of new entrants; this restoration is the basis for our coding. However, it is worth noting that as in Sierra Leone and Burundi, the “democratic regime” that was overthrown was exceedingly weak.

*Source.*

John F. Clark, “Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate,” in John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier, *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Pp. 62-86.

## Dominican Republic 1994 (Polity Only): Elite Reaction Reversion

*The reversion.* After 16 years of relatively open multiparty elections, Joaquin Balaguer resorted to electoral fraud in 1994 to maintain himself in office and to block the victory of populist figure Jose Francisco Pena Gomez.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Balaguer had dominated political life in the Dominican Republic since 1966, and resorted extensively to fraud and intimidation to win elections, and coopt or intimidate opponents. Nevertheless, under strong pressure from the Carter administration, he agreed to relatively free elections in 1978 and to the victory of opposition candidates. Politics became more competitive from this point onward, and the Dominican Republic crossed the 6- point Polity threshold. In the 1986 elections, Balaguer regained the presidency in the midst of a severe economic crisis, capitalizing on wide-spread opposition to a government IMF program and on anti-Haitian nationalist appeals. Taking a populist stance and continuing to resist IMF adjustments, he won again in relatively free elections in 1990.

Civil society opposition to Balaguer's corrupt regime grew in the early 1990s, however. The use of fraud in the 1994 elections elicited protest from most quarters of Dominican society, but much of the protest was led by Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, a black Dominican who directed his attacks against the lighter-skinned elites of Dominican society. As noted in the preceding section on transitions, Balaguer was constrained in August 1994 to agree to hold new elections in 1996 in which he would not run. Nevertheless, until he finally yielded office, his government continued to undermine civil liberties and dissent through fraud and strong-arm tactics.

*Coding.* Elite reaction reversion. As noted in our discussion of the 1996 transition, although cronyism, patronage, and corruption were enduring features of Dominican politics, elections had been relatively free since 1978 and there were expanding opportunities for political dissent. Balaguer's attempt to fix the 1994 election was a step backward in that regard. Although Balaguer himself had earlier resorted to anti-IMF forms of economic populism, we code this as an “elite reaction” reversion because his opposition in 1994 came primarily from the left.

*Sources.*

Jonathan Hartlyn, *The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Civil War Narratives: The Dominican Republic,” Working Draft, June 27, 2006 at

<http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf>

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Dominican Republic,” at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed January 5, 2012.

## Ecuador 2000 (CGV only): Populist reversion

*The reversion.* In the wake of street protests by CONAIE, the main organization representing indigenous peoples in Ecuador, and opposition from junior military officers, President Jamil Mahaud flees the country. CONAIE and military rebels form a short-lived “junta of national salvation,” but within a day had given way to the transfer of presidential power to the vice-president, Gustavo Nabo, in accordance with constitutional requirements.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant, but with populist outcome. The late 1990s had been characterized by severe economic difficulties and street protests that led Congress to oust three presidents from office before they had completed their term. (“Oust” is not a good choice of term, because it suggests something extra constitutional) Jamil Mahaud came to office in 1998 with the support of rightist and center-right parties. In response to sharply declining oil prices and a severe financial crisis, Mahaud temporarily banned withdrawals on bank accounts and in 1999 adopted the United States dollar as the country’s official currency. The dollarization decree triggered strong street protests and the storming of the Congress building, led by CONAIE, the country’s largest indigenous organization. The protest was joined by a group of junior military officers, led by Lucio Gutierrez. In coalition with CONAIE leaders, they formed a short-lived junta of “national salvation.” Under pressure from the United States, the junta collapsed in less than 24 hours, but Mahaud was forced to flee the country and was replaced by his vice-president, Gustavo Nabo.

*Coding.* Populist reversion. Strong evidence of distributive conflict and ouster of right-wing government by political forces on or sympathetic to the left.

*Source.*

Catherine M. Conaghan, “Ecuador: From Crisis to Left Turn,” in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds., *Latin American Politics and Development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. Pp. 363-383, especially 372-373.

## Fiji 1987 (Polity only): Elite reaction reversion

*The reversion.* The 1987 general elections resulted in a Labour Party-National Federation Party Coalition victory, ending the post-independence monopoly of the Alliance party. The new Bavadra government was toppled by a first military coup in May that tried to reinstall the defeated Mara government and introduce a variety of constitutional changes that would strengthen the political power of native Fijians. When these ambitions were thwarted by both domestic and international opposition, Major-General Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka launched a second coup in September that severed the relationship to the Crown by declaring Fiji a republic and installing a Military Administration.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Although centrist politicians in both major political blocs had sought to maintain multi-racial appeal, the major parties became more ethnically polarized, pulled in part by the emergence of more stridently nationalist indigenous Fijian parties (including dissenting factions of the National Federation Party and the Western United Front in particular). Ethnic conflict was overlaid with class conflict over the Alliance’s treatment of labor; the trade union-backed Labour party, which sought to advance a class-based multicultural platform, was launched in July 1985 in response to policies seen as adverse to the interest of both public and private sector workers. In addition to labor issues, the Labour party took a populist stance on other economic issues, including public ownership of key industries and greater Fijian involvement in sectors dominated by foreigners, such as tourism. The NFP did not stand for Indo-Fijian ascendance, but they did seek to limit political-constitutional arrangements and other policies that unduly favored one group or the other. Further evidence of the distributive nature of the conflict came in the immediate aftermath of the election when a militant indigenous force, the ‘Taukei Movement’, launched a carefully-orchestrated campaign to break the newly elected government. Within a week of the election, Fiji was rocked by a violent campaign of arson, sabotage, roadblocks and protest marches, which was the partial pretext for the military-led overthrow

of the Bavadra government in May.

*Coding.* Elite reaction reversion. As with other ethno-nationalist cases, we take a permissive view of the nature of distributive conflict. In this case, a government with a significant Indo-Fijian participation was clearly seen by elements of the indigenous community as posing a redistributive challenge to existing prerogatives.

*Sources.* Brij V. Lal. 2006. *Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji*. Canberra: ANU E Press, ch. 3.

S. Lawson. 1992. *The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

B. Macdonald. 1990. 'The literature of the Fiji coups: a review article', *The Contemporary Pacific: A Journal of Island Affairs*, 2:197–207.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Fiji." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

### Fiji 2000 (CGV and Polity): Elite reaction reversion

*The reversion.* On the anniversary of the formation of a new democratic government in 1999, the Prime Minister and a number of other members of parliament were taken hostage by ethnic Fijian nationalist George Speight and a small handful of gunmen. A political standoff ensued for nearly two months, during which the sitting government was dismissed by the President. The Fijian military ultimately seized power and brokered an end to the coup. The military and Great Council of Chiefs named an interim government, followed by the restoration of the constitution in early 2001 and new elections.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Speight by no means enjoyed unconditional backing among the Fijian community, which was deeply divided in the wake of the coup. But his intervention did reflect a coalition of Fijian interests—both elite and mass—that rejected the Chaudhry government and sought to re-establish institutionalized political and economic preferences for indigenous Fijians. Speight's backers included politicians who had lost their seats in the 1999 elections as well as a new generation of business interests but it also unleashed broader resentments by segments of the Fijian popular sector; the coup was followed by looting and violence on the streets of Suva, flight of Indo-Fijians, and the destruction of schools and places of worship. *Coding.* Elite reaction reversion. The case does not conform with the stylized model of an elite reaction. However we code it is an elite reaction because the coup drew on and magnified inter-communal tensions that had a distributive component.

*Sources.*

Brij V. Lal. 2006. *Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji*. Canberra: ANU E Press, ch. 8.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Fiji." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

### The Gambia 1994 (Polity only): Cross-class reversion

*The reversion.* On July 22, 1994 the government of President Dawada Kairaba Jawara and his People's Progressive Party (PPP) was overthrown in a bloodless coup by junior military officers led by then-lieutenant Yahya Jammeh and his Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). Two years later, Jammeh staged controlled elections in which he and his newly-formed party, the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction, won.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Minimal. At the time of the coup, the government of Dawada Jawara was the longest surviving multi-party democracy in Africa. This success was rooted in cooptation of opposition politicians and an elaborate system of patronage and corruption that limited the traction that alternative parties could gain. From 1992, however, the government was embroiled in a series of embarrassing corruption allegations that unfolded against declining economic performance. These allegations included the weak performance of a government asset management company set up to recover losses from the failure of the Gambia

Commercial and Development Bank, in which a number of rich Gambians were implicated, a scandal at the Gambia Cooperative Union that implicated Dawada Jawara's favored successor within the PPP and Dawada Jawara's lavish personal expenses on overseas trips. These problems were compounded by grievances within the small military force over pay.

Jammeh appears to have fashioned himself to some extent after Jerry Rawlings in Ghana. However, his central justification for the coup centered less on populist or redistributive claims than on the corruption of the incumbent government; perhaps the central plank in the new government's platform was the formation of a number of investigative panels. In contrast to the early populist phase of the Rawlings government, Jammeh continued to delegate substantial power to the technocrats and undertook a number of public goods initiatives, including school and road building. Although incumbent politicians and certain professional groups, such as the lawyers' guild, strongly opposed the coup, opposition parties and youth provided the new regime with a base of support. Nonetheless, the combination of sanctions from major donors, growing domestic opposition from civil society groups and two coup attempts within the army itself led the regime to set up a National Consultative Committee (NCC). In February 1995, Jammeh accepted the NCC recommendation for a more rapid transition back to democratic rule, setting the stage for the managed constitutional referendum and elections of 1996 through which Jammeh extended his power.

*Coding.* Cross-class reversion. This case corresponds closely to this type of authoritarian reversion. The military did not tap classic distributional grievances but rather the overall performance of the regime, and its corruption in particular. Although the coup was not popular among many civil society groups, particularly political and professional ones, it did enjoy some support among opposition parties and youth.

*Sources.*

Arnold Hughes, "'Democratisation' under the military in The Gambia: 1994-2000," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 38, 3 (2000) 35-52.

Abdoulaye S.M. Saine, "The Coup d'Etat in The Gambia, 1994: The End of the First Republic," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, 1 (Fall 1996): 97-111.

David Perfect, "The Gambia under Yahya Jammeh: An Assessment," *The Round Table*, 99, no. 406 (2010): 53-63.

John Wiseman, "Gambia: from Coup to Elections," *Journal of Democracy* 9, 2 (1998) 64-75.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Gambia." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Ghana 1981 (CGV and Polity): Populist reversion

*The reversion.* Military coup led by Jerry Rawlings overthrows the government of Hilla Limann.

*The role of distributive conflict.* At the time of the democratic transition that transferred power to Limann in 1979, Rawlings had signaled his willingness to re-enter politics if the new democratic government failed to perform. By the time of the coup, the economy had deteriorated badly, and the Limann government faced strikes and confrontations with workers over back pay and a painful austerity program. However, Rawlings took power with the backing of militant student organizations, unions, and left social movements. Upon seizing power, Rawlings actively solicited the support of these forces by placing representatives of radical left organizations on the military's Provisional National Defense Council and creating a raft of populist consultative organizations (Jeffries 1992). Rawlings' populism only aggravated Ghana's economic problems, and the military regime ultimately reversed course entirely and vigorously embraced the "Washington consensus." But the initial overthrow of the democratic regime clearly appealed to, and mobilized support from, left, populist and lower class groups.

*Coding.* Populist reversion.

*Sources.*



Yao Graham, "The Politics of Crisis in Ghana: Class Struggle and Organization, 1981-84," *Review of African Political Economy*, 34 (December 1985). Pp. 54-68

Mike Oquaye, *Politics in Ghana, 1982-1992: Rawlings, Revolution and Populist Democracy*. New Delhi: Thomson Press (India) Ltd, 2004.

Jon Kraus, "Trade Unions, Democratization, and Economic Crisis in Ghana," in Jon Kraus, ed. *Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 83-121.

## Guatemala 1982 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion

*The reversion.* In March 1982, General Efraín Ríos Montt deposed incumbent General Romeo Lucas García in a CIA-backed coup d'état, effectively negating the victory of Ángel Aníbal Guevara, the official party candidate in the presidential elections held earlier in the month.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Romeo Lucas had been freely elected in 1978, but his government had engaged in political repression and the assassinations of major progressive opposition figures. Despite worsening human rights conditions, his government received millions of dollars of US military and economic aid, and public backing from the Reagan administration. In 1981, he presided over the onset of a repressive campaign against the Mayan population. The coup d'état led by Ríos Montt was initially welcomed by the general population and even sought to appeal to the peasant population, albeit in order to prevent their defection to insurgents. However, Montt's military junta soon inaugurated a "beans and guns" campaign of terror and intimidation against the guerilla movement as well as a genocidal attack on the Mayan population.

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion. The deposing of the existing government came in the context of fears of the ineffectiveness of the incumbent government to manage distributive conflicts involving the large indigenous population. However, the coup did not reflect an elite reaction against a government that was itself engaged in redistributive politics; to the contrary, the Romeo Lucas García regime had already moved in a hardline and anti-democratic direction. Although the Ríos Montt government initially enjoyed some broad support, its initial appeals appear to be largely tactical as the government moved quickly in an extreme right-wing direction aimed at extirpating insurgent opposition.

*Sources.* Source: John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, Thomas W. Walker, *Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change*. Boulder CO: Westview Press 2010.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Guatemala." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Haiti 1991 (Polity Only): Elite reaction reversion.

*Note.* This was an episode in an ongoing domestic and international struggle over the role of the Jean-Claude Aristide (see Haiti transitions in 1990 and 1994 above).

*The reversion.* In September 1991, Colonel Raoul Cédras led a military coup against Jean-Claude Aristide, who had been in office since February of that year.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Aristide was a populist leader who had led opposition to a succession of military rulers and had been elected in December 1990 with very wide popular support. His charismatic appeal to the popular sectors was a source of extreme anxiety to Haitian civilian elites, who viewed him as a dangerous demagogue. Military officials saw him as a serious threat to their access to rents, and an attempted coup in January 1991 sought to block his inauguration as president. The enmity between the military and the president deepened further when he attempted to restructure the high command and to eliminate local agents of extortion and control within the Army and police. This direct attack on military privilege precipitated the coup of September 30.

*Coding.* Elite reaction reversion. Although Aristide's populism raised serious questions about his commitment to democracy, his wide mass appeal posed a clear threat to military and civilian elites, and this motivated

his ouster from office.

*Sources.* Robert Fatton, Jr. *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy*, Lynne Rienner.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Haiti." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, "Civil War Narratives: Haiti" Working draft, May 8, 2006. at <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/HaitiRN1.2.pdf>

## Haiti 1999 (Polity only): Populist reversion.

*The reversion.* In January 1999, President Rene Preval dismissed the Chamber of Deputies and all but nine members of the Senate and ruled by decree for the remainder of his term.

*The role of distributive conflict.* In 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected by a wide margin of the popular vote, but was overthrown only seven months later by elite groups and the military. In 1994, he was restored to the presidency with broad popular support and with the military backing of the United States and the international community. His government, however, also relied heavily on intimidation and harassment of his opponents. The governing party, the Lavales Political Organization (OLP) gradually split between a moderate and more radical faction. Aristide left the party to form the Lavales Family (FL), leaving the OLP in opposition and the parliament stalemated.

After winning a highly tainted election in 1995, Aristide's handpicked successor, Rene Preval, assumed the presidency, but Aristide remained a power behind the throne. Preval continued the campaign of intimidation against the opposition, but was increasingly hamstrung by legislative opposition from the former governing party, the OLP. From June 1997 until its dismissal, the legislature refused to confirm a series of nominees for prime minister, and the government was paralyzed. Preval exploited disaffection to dismiss the government. After dismissing the legislature, Preval appointed a cabinet dominated entirely by his and Aristide's Lavales Family (FL).

In the run-up to the election of 2000, Preval appointed an electoral council comprised of FL partisans. Legislative elections held in May 2000 were won overwhelmingly by the FL, but were marked by blatant fraud and condemned by the OAS.

*Coding.* Populist reversion. By 1999, intimidation and terror were significant instruments of political control. But much of the opposition to Aristide's erratic slide into authoritarianism came from the elite and international actors, and he retained a considerable reservoir of support within the popular sectors of Haitian society. Preval's seizure of power in 1999 was a "populist-authoritarian" initiative that exploited the stalemate of the government and paved the way for Aristide's return to the presidency in 2000.

*Sources.*

Robert Fatton, Jr. *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy*, Lynne Rienner.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Haiti." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

## Honduras 1985 (Polity only): Intra-elite reversion.

*The reversion.* In a regularly-scheduled election, opposition candidate Rafael Leonardo Callejas of the National Party captured 42 percent of the vote to 27 percent for of the ruling Liberal Party candidate Jose Azcona Hoyo. Nonetheless, Callejas was allowed by the government and the military to claim the presidency.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The victory resulted from a dispute over the election law. The ruling Liberal party was unable to agree on a single candidate, and instead ran four separate nominees. Although the opposition National Party won a plurality, the Liberals interpreted the law as allowing them to aggregate

the votes of all of their candidates and claimed victory. With the backing of the military, Azcono Hoyo assumed the presidency.

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion. Like the earlier transition in 1982 and the later one in 1989, this was the product of an elite game, mediated by the military establishment. Unable to coordinate *ex ante*, the political and military elite were able to coordinate *ex post* and enforce their preferred outcome. Broader civil society had only limited involvement.

*Sources.*

John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, Thomas W. Walker, *Understanding Central America : Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change*. Boulder CO: Westview Press 2010.

J. Mark Ruhl, "Honduras: Democracy in Distress" in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, *Latin America: Politics and Development*. Westview Press 2011, pp. 543-557.

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. "Polity IV Country Report 2008: Honduras." Polity IV Country Reports 2009 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed March 31, 2011.

### Lesotho 1998 (Polity only). Omitted from the dataset.

*The reversion.* Lesotho shows a change in Polity score from 8 in 1997 to 0 in 1998. The 0 coding for Lesotho in 1998 is an artifact of the Polity coding scheme. The country has an original coding of "-77" for 1998, one of two transition years in the Polity data set that have this coding. -77 codings are defined as "interregnum or anarchy," and are mechanically converted into a neutral 0 so that the country year could be used for statistical purposes. However, it is not clear from the Polity description of the case that a "0" coding is warranted and we have therefore removed the case from the data set. An explanation based on the Polity description of the case follows.

*The reversion coding.* In the 1993 elections the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) won all of the seats in the National Assembly and Dr. Ntsu Mokhele became prime minister; see the discussion of the 1993 transition above. While these elections were viewed by most independent observers as being "free and fair," the Basotho National Party (BNP), which was supported by members of the former military regime, protested the outcome of the polls. In 1994 a coalition of forces involving factions within the military, supporters of ex-King Moshoeshoe II and the BNP pressured King Letsie III to dismiss the BCP-led government, dissolve the National Assembly, and return the throne to his father. Violent protests by BCP supporters led to the political intervention of troops from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Under intense pressure from these states to resolve this political crisis, the Mokhehle government was reinstated. In January 1995, King Letsie abdicated his throne in favor of his father.

In 1997 Prime Minister Mokhehle broke from the BCP and established a new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy Party (LCD), taking a majority of BCP parliamentarians with him. As a result, the BCP became the minority opposition in the National Assembly. Refusing to accept its opposition status, remaining members of the BCP refused to attend Assembly sessions and organized opposition to LCD rule. Despite this opposition, the LCD—now under the leadership of Pakalitha Mosisili—won an overwhelming victory in regularly-scheduled National Assembly elections in 1998 capturing almost all seats.

Claiming that the elections were rigged, opposition parties engaged in violent street protests to destabilize the government, resulting in the death of over a hundred citizens. As during the crisis in 1993-94 opposition party members also appealed to disgruntled army factions and sought to persuade King Letsie to dissolve the National Assembly and install a government of national unity. Yet despite the claims of the opposition, independent observers could not confirm that the voting was rigged. Rather the problem was the first-past-the-post electoral system; with 60 percent of the popular vote the LCD won seventy-eight out of eighty parliamentary seats.

The political violence of 1998 was ultimately stopped by the intervention of troops from Botswana and South Africa. The LCD government agreed to hold new elections within 18 months, establishing an Interim

Political Authority (IPA) in December 1998 consisting of two members from each of the country's twelve main political parties. After a prolonged period of foot-dragging by the LCD government, national elections were finally held in May 2002 under a new electoral system designed to give smaller parties a greater voice in parliament.

*Comment.* The 1998 elections were regularly scheduled and outside observers were not able to determine that they were fraudulent. The transition during this year was to an Interim Political Authority that represented all parties, and that transition was driven by a combination of mass mobilization and violence and outside intervention. But it is not clear that the year should be coded as a 0. There is no reversion in the sense of either an incumbent executive, military or outside political force taking control of a democratic government and subverting it. For this reason, we have chosen to omit the case from the dataset.

*Source.*

Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2010. "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Lesotho," Polity IV Country Reports 2010 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> Accessed January 5, 2012.

## Niger 1996 (CGV and Polity): Cross-class reversion

*The reversion.* In January 1996, the army, led by Ibrihim Bare Mainassara overthrew incumbent president Mahamane Ousmane, who had been elected in 1993. Mainassara subsequently claimed victory in a rigged election that barred all of the main opposition candidates from competing and he held power until his assassination in 1999.

*The role of distributive conflict.* From 1993 to 1996, the government was headed by president Mahamane Ousmane of the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS). Following the elections, Ousmane appointed Mahamadou Issoufou as prime minister; Issoufou had been backed by the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS), a party that had campaigned on a left-of-center platform and had been a leading actor in the deposing of the one-party government of Ali Saibou. Nevertheless, the new democratic government faced the same economic and political constraints as its authoritarian predecessor, including dependence on conditional IMF support and escalating conflicts with the unions and students (Charlick, p. 71). In 1994, confrontations with the main union confederation escalated with the devaluation of the French franc, leading to threats of a general strike. The government responded with a crackdown that severely weakened the union movement. (Charlick, 72). The crisis forced Issoufou to resign as Prime Minister. The PNDS withdrew from the governing coalition and aligned with Saissou's National Movement for the Development of Societ (MNSD), the old ruling party.

Faced with the collapse of the governing coalition, Ousmane called a new election in 1995. In alliance with its former adversary, the PNDS, the old ruling party, the MNSD emerged as the victor. The government was paralyzed by the division between President Ousmane and the new parliamentary majority led by Prime Minister Hama Amadou. The economic situation continued to deteriorate, while the government itself remained stalemated and unable to act. The military intervened in January 1996 in the context of attempts to impose a tax reform sponsored by the World Bank and labor calls for a general strike. Bare cited the constitutional crisis and political stalemate as the reason for the coup, and there is evidence that this was also the perception of much of the population. "By the time the coup took place the legitimacy and credibility of the democratic process and of its principal players was so thoroughly undermined that it was greeted in many circles, at least initially, with relief... Even among (labor and student) associations that had played so key a role in ending the previous military regime, there were no calls for mass demonstrations." (Charlick, 73) and some student and labor groups even rallied in favor of the coup.

*Coding.* Cross-class reversion. Although the government did face some protest from unions and students, these groups did not represent the interests of marginalized groups; to the contrary. The student organization represented mainly university students (about 0.7 percent of the total university age population), and the unions, about 39,000 civil servants. The grievances of these groups centered in part on programs proposed by

the international financial institutions that would have reallocated spending to the rural sector and primary schools. Gervais, p. 102. The central motivation from the coup does not appear to be the need to dampen distributive conflicts but rather the institutional stalemate of a deeply divided government. The existence of some support for the coup provides further justification for this coding.

*Sources.*

Myriam Gervais, "Niger: Regime Change, Economic Crisis, and the Perpetuation of Privilege," in John F. Clark and David E. Gardiner, eds., *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Pp. 86-109.

Robert Charlick, "Labor Unions and 'Democratic Forces' in Niger," in Jon Kraus, ed., *Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa*. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. Pp. 61-83.

## Nigeria 1993-94 (CGV codes the reversion in 1993; Polity in 1994): Intra-elite reversion

*The reversion.* The civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was overthrown by a military coup led by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The coup occurred in the context of severe economic deterioration driven by the decline of petroleum prices and a widespread loss of confidence in the willingness or capacity of a highly corrupt government to cope with it. But there are no indications that the takeover was motivated by class or ethnic demands on the state, nor by significant involvement of civil society one way or the other. The most consequential divisions were within the elites, most notably, the military, clientelistic politicians, and the business class that had formed the core of the ruling class during the oil boom of the 1970s. When oil revenues collapsed, the ruling coalition fragmented under the competing claims for patronage. The inability of the hegemonic party to reconcile these conflicting interests, argues Augustine Udo (1985: 337), came to a head in a blatantly corrupt election in 1983, which exposed "unprecedented corruption, intimidation, and flagrant abuse of electoral privilege by all parties..." The leader of the coup, Major General Muhaamadu Buhari, was—like his predecessors—tied closely to the Muslim north and had held a high position within the deposed government, although he came from a different, minority ethnic group. There is little evidence that factional rivalries within the military were connected with broader conflicts that could be modeled in elite-mass terms, whether engaging class, ethnic or regional interests.

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion.

*Sources.*

Egosa Osaghae, *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Udo, Augustine. 1985. *Class, Party Politics and the 1983 Coup in Nigeria*. *Africa Spectrum* 20(3): 327–338.

## Pakistan 1999 (CGV and Polity): Intra-elite reversion

*The reversion.* A military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf deposes the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Poverty, regionalism, and ethnic divisions provided the backdrop for the overthrow of the democratic regime, but were not directly implicated in its demise. The overthrow of Pakistan's elected government primarily reflected deepening civil-military tensions following unsuccessful Pakistani incursions into Indian-controlled regions of Kashmir in 1999. An Indian counter-attack had forced a humiliating withdrawal, followed by sharp mutual recriminations between Sharif and Musharaff, the head of the military. Sharif sought to dismiss Musharraf while he was traveling on official business and attempted to block the emergency landing of his plane on its return. The plane landed anyway, and Musharaff was able to rally adequate support within the military to prevent his dismissal and seize power.

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion.

*Source.*

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan in 1999: Back to Square One," *Asian Survey* 40, 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2000), pp. 208-218.

## Peru 1990-2 (CGV codes the reversion in 1990; Polity in 1992): Cross-class reversion

*Note.* The CGV coding of this case is in error; the coup d'état that overturned the democratic regime occurred in 1992.

*The reversion.* In 1992, incumbent President Alberto Fujimori dissolved Congress, gave the Executive Branch all legislative powers, suspended the Constitution, and gave the president the power to enact various reforms. Fujimori subsequently called elections of a new congress in 1993. Fujimori received a majority in this new congress, which drafted a new constitution.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The "self-coup" engineered by Fujimori and the military was motivated in part by the desire for a freer hand in pursuing neoliberal reforms and in repressing the left-wing terrorist insurgency of the Shining Path insurgency. Nevertheless, this does not meet the criteria for an elite reversion. Fujimori initially faced opposition from United States and international lending organizations, as well as business sectors that feared international isolation (Mauceri 1995: 29-30). It was partially in response to these pressures that Fujimori moved to institute at least a façade of constitutional government. Moreover, although the unions and the political left opposed the coup, their organizations had been decimated by the hyperinflation and economic collapse of the late 1980s and they themselves enjoyed little popular support. On the contrary, the large majority of the Peruvian poor were attracted by a leader who promised to deal with the economic crisis and the insurgency with a strong hand. In 1992, one survey showed that almost 76 percent of low-income people supported Fujimori plan for constitutional reform (Rubio 1992, 7, cited in Weyland 1996, fn. 16.). Fujimori subsequently gained an overwhelming victory in 1993 elections to the constituent assembly. Although undertaking economic reforms, Fujimori also strengthened his electoral base through the expansion of clientelistic anti-poverty programs as the economy revived.

*Coding.* Cross-class reversion. Fujimori drew support from a wide cross-section of Peruvian society.

*Sources.*

Catherine M. Conaghan, *Fujimori's Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 2005.

Philip Mauceri, "State Reform, Coalitions, and the Neoliberal Autogolpe in Peru," *Latin American Research Review* 30, No. 1, 1995, pp. 7-37.

Kenneth M. Roberts, "Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 38, 2, 2006, pp. 127-148.

Kurt Weyland, "Neoliberalism and Neopopulism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31, 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 3-31

## Sierra Leone 1997 (CGV only): Cross-class reversion

*The reversion.* The military under the leadership of Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew the Kabbah government and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that sought to share power with the insurgent RUF.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The externally supervised power-sharing agreement that underpinned multiparty elections in 1996 was fragile and the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, leader of the Sierra Leone Peoples' Party (SLPP) never really gained control of the country. The new democratic government explicitly rejected a number of the redistributive demands of the RUF as unrealistic, even though trying

to accommodate them through peace negotiations and ultimately with a peace agreement (on which the RUF reneged). The overthrow of the government largely reflected internecine rivalries within coercive apparatus. During the run-up to the 1996 election, the military had been increasingly plagued by desertions, low morale, and cooperation with the rebel forces engaged in the illegal diamond trade. With the loyalty of the national military in doubt, the Kabbah government increasingly relied for protection on civil militias that had formed in response to the growing violence and announced plans to substantially reduce the size of the armed forces. The coup of May 1997 that brought Major Johnny Paul Koroma to power largely reflected these inter-elite conflicts.

*Coding.* Cross-class reversion. The new government had the support of at least some segments of the rebel force (the RUF), which was quickly invited to share power with the new junta. But the RUF relied heavily on terror, conscription, and diamonds rather than popular support and it was both feared and resisted in the areas in which it operated. Thus, the cleavages in Sierra Leone by no means map easily onto an elite-mass model of distributive conflict.

*Sources.*

Yusuf Bangura, "Strategic Policy Failure and Governance in Sierra Leone," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38, 4 (December 2000). Pp. 551-577.

Caspar Fithen and Paul Richards, "Making War, Crafting Peace: Militia Solidarities and Demobilization in Sierra Leone," in Paul Richards, ed. *No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*. Ohio University Press, James Currey, Oxford, 2005.

Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone*, The International African Institute in association with James Currey, Oxford and Heinemann, Portsmouth (N.H.), 1996.

Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, Ralph Hazleton, *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security*. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000.

Alfred B. Zack-Williams, "Sierra Leone: the Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98," *Third World Quarterly* 20, 1 (1999): 143-162.

## Solomon Islands 2000 (Polity only). Omitted from the dataset.

*The reversion.* Like Lesotho, the Solomon Islands shows a change in Polity score from 8 (in 1999) to 0 in 2000. The 0 coding for the Solomon Islands is partly an artifact of the Polity coding scheme. The country has an original coding of "-77" for 2000, one of two transition years in the Polity data set that have this coding. -77 codings are defined as "interregnum or anarchy," and are mechanically converted into a neutral 0 so that the country year could be used for statistical purposes. However, while there is evidence of a reversion it is not clear from the Polity description of the case that a "0" coding was given to the case as a result of the nature of the political changes in that year. We have therefore chosen to omit the case from the dataset.

*The reversion coding.* As in other island countries in the dataset, particularly the Comoros, there have been long-standing distributive conflicts in the Solomon Islands between the different islands in the chain. Most salient in this regard are conflicts between Isatabu (Guadalcanal) islanders and those from Malaita. Since being brought in by US forces to help drive out remnants of the Japanese army from Guadalcanal in 1942, Malaita Islanders remained politically and economically active on Isatabu, both in the capital city Honiara and in the palm plantations and gold mines.

Native Isatabu Islanders mobilized their resentment to the Malaita islander presence in the 1990s and demanded special compensation from the central government for hosting the capital. When that was denied, local militias (the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army, later renamed the Isatabu Freedom Fighters) were formed to intimidate and drive Malaitans out of the island. Many Malaitans fled from the countryside to Honiara and a militant group formed to protect them: the Malaita Eagles Force (MEF).

Since its first post-independence election in 1980, the Solomon Islands has been coded as democratic by Polity. The national election of August 1997 resulted in Bartholomew Ulufa'alu's election as Prime Minister,

heading a coalition government, which christened itself the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change. Clashes between the militias escalated in 1998-9 when Isatabu militants began attacking homesteads and workplaces of Malaita islanders. To deal with this crisis, the Parliament enacted a 4-month state of emergency on in June 1999, which extended the arrest and search powers of the police.

In June 2000, the MEF seized the capital and forced the resignation of Prime Minister Ulufa'alu. Manasseh Sogavare, leader of the opposition People's Progressive Party was subsequently voted Prime Minister. But six Members of Parliament had been prevented from attending the parliamentary session at which the Prime Minister was elected, allegedly due to intimidation by the MEF. The Australian-brokered Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) brought militant groups together to agree a ceasefire on 3 August 2000. But Isatabu militants retaliated and sought to drive Malaitan settlers from the island, resulting in the closure of a large oil-palm estate and gold mine which were vital to exports but whose workforce was largely Malaitan. According to Polity, "anarchy ensued," apparently the basis for the coding.

New elections were held in December 2001—outside the scope of this dataset—bringing Sir Allan Kemekeza into the Prime Minister's chair with the support of a coalition of parties. Kemekeza attempted to address the deteriorating law and order situation in the country, but widespread lawlessness and violence prompted a formal request for outside assistance, which was unanimously approved by parliament in 2001. In July 2003, the Australian Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) deployed to the island.

Comment. In contrast to Lesotho, there is some justification for coding the Solomon Islands as reverting from democratic rule in 2000. The opposition exploited the seizure of the capital by the MEF and elected a government of dubious constitutional legitimacy. Moreover, there is some more limited justification for treating it as a distributive conflict case, although the differences between the competing island factions do not appear to have a vertical or class structure. However the coding of 2000 as a 0 is given by the initial "-77" coding of the case as "anarchy" and not by the political developments of that year. We therefore have omitted the case from the dataset.

*Sources.*

U.S. State Department. "Solomon Islands: Background Note," at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm>

Commonwealth Secretariat, "Solomon Islands General Election, 5 April 2006: Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group," Commonwealth Secretariat, n.d.

## Sri Lanka 1982 (Polity Only): Intra-elite reversion.

*The reversion.* President Jayawardene declares a state of emergency and exploits his parliamentary supermajority to extend the life of the sitting parliament without elections.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Limited. Following the overwhelming victory of the United National Party (UNP) in the 1977 general election, the new government used its two-thirds majority in Parliament to create a new constitution. The Constitution added the position of Executive President, and extended the term of elected Presidents and Parliament to 6 years from the date of the election. In 1978 Jayawardene named himself President of Sri Lanka.

The UNP enjoyed a supermajority in parliament. Due to the non-concurrence of elections, the term of the parliament was due to expire in August 1983. Jayawardene was fearful, however, that elections could result in the UNP losing that supermajority; this subsequently became apparent when he only managed to garner 52% of the vote in the first direct presidential election in October 1982. In order to maintain the parliamentary supermajority of the UNP, Jayawardene decided to use a constitutional amendment to extend the life of parliament without holding direct elections. The Supreme Court ruled (4-3) that parliament could be extended if the bill was both passed by a supermajority and submitted to referendum. After the presidential elections in October, however, Jayawardene declared a state of emergency claiming that sections of the opposition Sri



Lanka Freedom Party were conspiring to take power in a coup despite the fact that no evidence was ever turned up suggesting this was the case. The referendum took place on December 22, 1982 and Jayawardene won. The sitting parliament was therefore extended for six further years beginning in August 1983, and served out its mandate until the 1989 general elections (which is coded as a return to democratic rule in the CGV dataset but note the Polity dataset).

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion. The Jayawardene government experienced some of the first serious violence surrounding the Tamil issue in 1981 following the introduction of direct elections to District Development Councils in 1981. More violence was to follow in 1983 as the country started its descent into civil war. But there is no evidence that the ethnic violence was the spur to the declaration of a state of emergency, or that emergency powers were introduced for the purpose of managing distributive ethnic or other conflicts. The declaration seems a self-interested measure on the part of the incumbent president and his parliamentary backers to retain power.

*Sources.*

Bruce Matthews, "District Development Councils in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey* 22, 11 (November 1982):1117-1134.

S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, "Sri Lanka in 1982: A Year of Elections." *Asian Survey* 23, 2 (February 1982):158-164.

## Sudan 1989 (CGV and Polity): Cross-class reversion

*The reversion.* In June 1989, the military undertook a coup that replaced Sadiq al- Mahdi's all-party coalition with the Revolution Command Council (R.C.C.) under the leadership of General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. The R.C.C. suspended the 1986 transitional constitution, dissolved the Constituent Assembly, dissolved all political parties, trade unions and professional organizations, and took possession of their assets.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Substantial, but in context of widespread grievances against the performance of the democratic government. Immediately following the elections of 1986, it became clear that the new democratic government had inherited an economy in a state of virtual collapse. External creditors initially refused to provide additional support, and both before and after an agreement with the IMF was reached in 1987 the country witnessed widespread protests related to rising prices and austerity measures. The question of whether the new government would retain the 1983 sharia laws also created substantial polarization between Muslim supporters and regional parties, including particularly from the South, and secular parties and civil society groups. And despite the expectation that the new regime would result in a resolution of the insurgency in the South, the most significant actor in that conflict—the Sudan People's Liberation Army—signaled that it viewed the new government as little better than its authoritarian predecessor and escalated conflicts, in turn generating a hardline response in return. The conflict in Darfur also began, including not only the rebellion but, demonstrations in Khartoum itself.

However, the disaffection with the government can also be seen as general. The new democratic government rested on extremely complex and fragile electoral coalitions, broke up twice in within three months in 1987, after which the Sudan was technically without a government for almost a year. The rapid deterioration of the security environment including both the conflicts in Darfur and the South as well as terrorist attacks by foreign forces all contributed to a general sense of insecurity. The appeals of the new military leaders suggested an attempt to appeal to general grievances and did not necessarily aim at a simple repression of distributive conflicts; for example, the military promised to re-open negotiations with the rebel forces in the South. The R.C.C. described its takeover as a 'revolution of the people, who had suffered years of 'verbal rule which is devoid of action and beset by economic deterioration, the high cost of living and bad security conditions'. It claimed that the previous regime had failed to deal with the economy, corruption, political instability, and disorder in Darfur and the South, and Sadiq al-Mahdi was blamed for the Sudan's increasing regional diplomatic isolation. The R.C.C. declared: 'This is a revolution with a pan-Arab orientation, neither to the left nor

to the right. It is non-partisan, non-factional, non-tribalist, and non-racial.

*Coding.* Cross-class reversion. Despite multiple axes of distributive conflict, the reversion was based on cross-class appeals.

*Sources.*

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Kamal Osman Salih, "The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, 2 (Jun., 1990). Pp. 199-224.

## Suriname 1980 (CGV only): Populist reversion

*The reversion.* In February 1980, 16 noncommissioned officers led by Desi Bouterse overthrew the elected government of Prime Minister Henk Arron.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Shortly after Suriname gained full independence from the Netherlands, Henk Arron was elected Prime Minister in a coalition of parties representing the Creoles (about 31 percent of the population), and the Javanese Muslims (about 15 percent). Independence had led to a massive emigration of Hindustanis (about 38 percent of the population), but the coup appeared to be motivated as much by a quest for power and spoils as by ethnic conflict. Bouterse had to defeat a Hindustani-backed coup led by Wilfred Hawker in 1981, and he became deeply implicated in drug trafficking over the course of his political career. The coup set into motion a decade of political turbulence. But Bouterse's government espoused a vaguely leftist orientation. Initially, it gained support from representatives of students and the labor movement, who joined a military-led National Revolutionary Front, although these had moved into opposition by 1984.

*Coding.* Populist authoritarian reversion. Greed and gangsterism were major elements in Bouterse's political activity. But despite international opposition, he remained a powerful presence on the political scene for decades (see description of 1988 and 1991 transitions and the 1990 reversion). In 2010, he won the election for the presidency. In the mid-1980s, his regime was opposed by broad sectors of civil society as well as external powers. But his leftist orientation and the initial support he received from labor warrants a coding of "populist authoritarian."

*Sources.*

"Suriname: Introductory Survey." *Europa World Year Book 2, Year 2*. Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge 2004, pp. 3982-3994

US Department of State: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Background note: Suriname. 2009. [www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm)

## Suriname 1990 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion.

*The reversion.* In December 1990, military officers forced the resignation of the civilian government elected in 1987, appointing replacements loyal to the military establishment.

*The role of distributive conflict.* This was a short-lived—and ultimately unsuccessful—grab for power on the part of Desi Bouterse (see the description of the 1991 transition above). After the election of a civilian government in 1987, Bouterse remained head of the Military Council and a major influence behind the scenes. As the plot unfolded, Bouterse resigned suddenly from his position on the pretext that the government had failed to protest the Dutch government's refusal to allow Bouterse to enter the Netherlands. Within days of Bouterse's resignation, his allies on the Military Council ousted the incumbent government and restored Bouterse as head of the military. As discussed in the description of the 1991 transition, the Dutch, the OAS, and other external donors reacted quickly with strong economic sanctions, and the military was forced to hold new elections in 1991.

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion. There is little evidence that the coup had support beyond the military establishment itself.

*Sources.*

Europa World Year Book 2, Year 2. Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge. "Suriname: Introductory Survey."

US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. "Background Note: Suriname 2009." at [www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm)

## Thailand 1991 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion

*The reversion.* General Suchinda Kraprayoon orders the arrest of prime minister and Chatchai on charges of corruption and incompetence, and assumes the position himself.

*The role of distributive conflict.* The 1991 coup in Thailand was undertaken by a military faction that bridled under both the existing military leadership and the efforts of the elected Assembly to exercise greater control over military spending and prerogatives. Elected officials were concerned, among other things, with channeling patronage resources to disadvantaged parts of the country, but they were linked closely to elite business interests. Although the distribution of income had deteriorated in Thailand during the economic reforms of the 1980s, left parties remained confined to the fringes of political life and a long-standing rural insurgency had petered out.

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion. The coup had the effect of galvanizing mass opposition, which subsequently played a role in the transition back to democratic rule. But there is no evidence that the coup was a response to popular pressures for redistribution.

*Sources.*

Michael Connors, *Democracy and National Identity in Thailand*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, *Thailand: Economy and Politics*, 2nd edition. Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 373-80, 385-414.

## Turkey 1980 (CGV and Polity): Elite reaction reversion

*The reversion.* The elected government of Suleiman Demirel was overthrown in September by a military coup. The armed forces established a five-member National Security Council (NSC), appointed a civilian cabinet and extended martial law to the entire country.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Turkey in the late-1970s was a classic case of both political and social polarization playing out against rapidly deteriorating economic circumstances. Parliament was increasingly stalemated by conflicts between Demirel's ruling conservative Justice party (AP) and the more left-wing Republican People's party (CHP) led by Bülent Ecevit. However, both parties seemed to excuse increasingly violent actions undertaken by parties and groups on the extremes of the system, including the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation party led by Necmettin Erbakan and the extreme right-wing National Action party (MHP) of former General Alparslan Türkeş. Martial law had already been imposed on a number of provinces because of the Kurdish insurgency, and in January 1980 the military issued a list of demands, including the formation of a broad-based coalition government and passage of anti-terrorism laws that would expand military discretion. Although Demirel appeared to accept these demands, he was unable to push them through the legislature. The precipitating events leading up to the coup included Erbakan's attendance at a mass public rally of Islamic fundamentalists at which he called for the restoration of the Shariah and a speech by Ecevit to a trade union gathering in which he appeared to condone mass mobilization and even violence.

*Coding.* Elite reaction reversion. Although there was arguably broad-based support for military intervention, the military was clearly responding in part to distributive conflicts that included labor, religious groups and a festering insurgency in the Kurdish areas.

*Sources.*

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George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.

Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics, and the Third Military Intervention," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 2, 1 (Spring-Summer 1981), 1-43.

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## Uganda 1985 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion

*The reversion.* President Milton Obote was overthrown in a coup lead by Acholi commander, Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Basilio Olara Okello.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant ethnic conflicts, but not implicated in the reversion in the way predicted by distributive conflict theories. Obote came to power in 1980 in an election that was orchestrated by the military (Kasozi et al, pp. 136-142). Obote's main ethnic base of support was the Langi. He himself came from that tribe, as did most of the military elite. He also drew support from the Acholi (about 4 percent of the population), who constituted much of the military rank-and-file. He proceeded to rule through severe repression of opposition, leading to the breakout in 1981 of a violent civil war that had a strong ethnic base. The main challenge to Obote came from a guerilla movement, the National Resistance Movement (NRA). This drew much of its leadership from an educated elite, but had an ethnic base among the Baganda people and Tutsi refugees, as well. The guerilla army relied primarily on hit-and-run tactics and initially gained only limited territory. In addition to the Baganda (the largest single ethnic group, about 16 percent of the population), groups that had been favored by Idi Amin (especially people of the West Nile) and the Banyarwanda were also severely victimized. (Kasozi et al 176-186). Deaths from Obote's military campaign against the insurgents and these groups are estimated at between 100,000 and 300,000 people.

As military casualties mounted, ethnic rivalries between the Langi and the Acholi increased. The latter claimed they had born the brunt of the fighting and alleged that the government had favored the Langi in its promotions. The rivalries within the military came to a head after the death of Oyite Ojok the Langi commander of the military force. Obote appointed another Langi, and attempted to counter Acholi opposition by building up a paramilitary Special Forces Unit, dominated by Langi. After Obote ordered the arrest of Lieutenant General Basilio Olara Okello, the latter mobilized troops and entered Kampala on July 27, 1985, forcing Obote to flee the country.

*Coding.* Intra-elite reversion. Although the backdrop for the reversion was severe intra-ethnic conflict and civil war, the coup was not the result of either the triumph of the insurgency or elites disaffected with the distributive policies of the government. Rather, the perpetrators of the coup were disaffected members of the ruling coalition, with splits within the military as the decisive factor. In addition, it is hard to see this as a reversion of a democracy, given the corrupt and brutal character of Obote's government.

*Source.*

A.B.K. Kasozi, Nakkanuyiki Muzisi, and James Mukooza Sejjengo. 1994. *Social Origins of Violence in Uganda*. McGill-Queen's University Press.

## Ukraine 1993 (Polity only): Elite reaction reversion

*Note.* See discussion of 1994 transition.

*The reversion.* This case represents two subtle changes in Polity rankings in two years: a reversion in 1993 (from 6 to 5) and a transition in 1994 (from 5 to 7; see the discussion above). The 1993 reversion takes the form of presidential assumption of extraconstitutional powers and ongoing conflict between the president and parliament over their respective powers, particularly over the conduct of economic policy. However,

in the same year an agreement was reached to hold early elections in 1994, leading to a victory for former minister Leonid Kuchma over president Leonid Kravchuk; these elections appear to constitute the basis for the transition coding in 1994 even though the agreement to hold the elections is reached earlier.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Significant. Transitional elections in 1991 elected Leonid M. Kravchuk, former chairman of the Ukrainian Rada and ideology secretary of the Communist Party, to a 5-year term as Ukraine's first president. At the same time, a referendum on independence from the Soviet Union was approved by more than 90% of the voters. Despite the fact that communists managed to maintain power, Polity codes the 1991 transition as a 6 (prior to that time, Ukraine was coded by Polity as part of the Soviet Union).

In 1992, Kravchuk undertook a number of reforms designed to establish Ukrainian sovereignty from Russia; the economy went into a steep decline. In late 1992, Kravchuk dismissed his first prime minister and appointed Leonid Kuchma in his place, a move that was ratified by the Rada. Kuchma sought emergency powers for six months in November (through May 1993) in order to push through a more aggressive reform program. He was granted these powers overwhelmingly by the Rada, which permitted him to suspend elements of the constitution and issue decrees with respect to the economy culminating in a major reform program in early 1993. These actions appear to be legal because they were ratified by the parliament and therefore should not constitute the source of the reversion.

When Kuchma's powers expired in May 1993, he asked that they be extended; he was concerned that his reform efforts were being undermined by parliamentary control over the central bank and the State Property Fund. This time, the Rada overwhelmingly rejected the extension of further decree powers. Kuchma threatened to resign and Kravchuk responded with a decree on June 16 establishing a temporary "Extraordinary Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers" to deal with economic matters; it is this action and subsequent actions by Kravchuk vis-à-vis the parliament in late 1993 that appear to constitute the source of the reversion coding.

The issuing of the decree coincided with a massive strike by coal miners in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, and was followed by complex political maneuvering between the president and parliament. The demands of the striking miners included not only increased wages and mine safety but a call for a national referendum of confidence in the president and parliament. In response to the demands of the strikers, Kravchuk removed Kuchma and replaced him with an official sympathetic with the miners and agreed to early parliamentary and presidential elections to be held in 1994. Parliament initially rejected Kuchma's resignation and the conflict between the two branches over policy negotiations lasted for several months. But it was finally resolved when the Rada voted a movement of no confidence in Kravchuk's Cabinet of Ministers and accepted Kuchma's removal. This set in train a period when reforms were reversed in the run up to the elections, which Kuchma won.

*Coding.* Elite reaction (distributive conflict) reversion. As noted above, this is an anomalous case, because the reversion and transition seem to overlap almost exactly in time; the conflict between the branches and the decision to hold the elections are compressed. The case has important elements of an intra-elite conflict because the Rada was dominated by communists. Moreover, the case is ambiguous because Kravchuk appeared less reformist than Kuchma, raising the issue of whether his accretion of powers was not for populist ends: to slow—rather than accelerate—the reform process. Nonetheless, we interpret his decree of mid-1993 as an effort to assume powers needed to undertake economic reforms that were unpopular and thus code it as an elite reaction reversion.

*Sources.*

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*Institution-Building in Ukraine*, edited by Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, Paul J. D'Anieri. Palgrave MacMillan 1999.

Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, 7 (Nov 1997), pp. 1293-1316.

## Zambia 1996 (Polity only): Elite Reaction Reversion

*The reversion.* Relying on an overwhelming legislative majority, President Chiluba pushed through a series of constitutional amendments in May 1996 that made former president Kenneth Kaunda ineligible to run for office. In November 1996 elections President Chiluba easily defeated a weakened and fractured opposition.

*The role of distributive conflict.* Ambiguous. In October 1991, in the first multiparty election in more than twenty years, Kaunda lost the presidency to Frederick Chiluba, leader of the newly formed Movement for Multiparty Democracy Party (MMD). Chiluba came to power in part by exploiting disaffection with structural adjustment policies that Kaunda—his predecessor—had pursued since the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, on coming to office the Chiluba government initiated one of the more aggressive structural adjustment programs on the continent, including lifting of exchange controls, major cuts in public expenditure, and the privatization of more than 250 parastatals. These measures split the union movement—some unions had allied with the MMD—and provided a natural focal point for the opposition; liberalizing measures generated opposition, including localized mobilizations, throughout the first half of the 1990s.

In 1996, Chiluba proposed constitutional changes that were clearly designed to limit the prospects that Kaunda would run again. The changes required a presidential candidate to be born to two Zambian citizens by birth or descent, and National Assembly candidates to give up their chieftancy: Kaunda's parents were Malawian and the vice president of his party was a chief. In legislative elections held simultaneously with presidential balloting the MMD secured an overwhelming victory, winning 131 of 150 National Assembly seats. While there was no evidence of substantial or widespread vote rigging or fraud, and it is doubtful that Kaunda would have won, the overt manipulation of the country's constitution for political ends seriously eroded the democratic character of executive recruitment in Zambia. Moreover, the new government also took a number of restrictive actions with respect to civil society groups.

*Coding.* Elite reaction reversion. The main motive of the constitutional changes appears to be political: to exploit the advantages of incumbency in order to maintain power, a pattern seen in a number of weak African democracies. Nonetheless, we code the case as an elite reaction reversion because of the existence of mobilized resistance to the policy course of the regime, even if relatively ineffective.

### *Sources.*

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## Changelog

*Version 1.1, September 12, 2012*

1. Updated links
2. Fixed minor formatting errors

*Version 1.0, May 26, 2012*

1. First release