

NOTICE

This material may be protected by
Copyright Law (Title 17 U.S. code)

Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions, and the Long Peace

Jack S. Levy

The half-century period since World War II has been violent in many respects. It has witnessed numerous military conflicts involving small and medium-size states, including interstate wars, wars of national liberation, civil wars and revolutions, other forms of internal violence, and transnational terrorism. It has also witnessed several superpower military interventions in weaker states and a few rather serious international crises between the superpowers (see Singer, and Brecher and Wilkenfeld in this book). But this period has not witnessed a major war between the superpowers. It is the longest period of relative peace among the great powers in the last five centuries of the modern system, and is now often referred to as "the long peace" (Gaddis, 1987). If the record of the past is projected into the postwar period, we certainly would have expected a war between the leading states in the system by now. One calculation suggests that the probability of no war occurring between the handful of leading states in the system (the great powers) during a forty-four-year period (e.g., 1945-1989), given the experience of the past five centuries, is about .005 (Levy, 1989d).¹ Thus the long peace is truly an historical aberration, and this has led to a lively scholarly debate on how we might explain it.

The most common explanations for the long postwar peace refer to the role of nuclear weapons (Mandelbaum, 1981; Waltz, 1981; Gaddis, 1987b and in this book; Nye, 1987; Jervis, 1989); the bipolar structure of the postwar world (Waltz, 1979; Gaddis, 1987b and in this book); the increasing economic interdependence among the advanced industrial states (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Rosecrance, 1986; Rosenau, in this book); the emergence of a U.S.-Soviet security regime, norms of cooperation, and crisis management procedures (George, et al., 1988; George, 1984; Johnson, in this book); changing attitudes toward war and the declining legitimacy of war in the Western world (Knorr, 1966; Mueller, 1989; Ray, 1989; Weart, 1988); and long cycles of hegemonic stability and decline (Keohane, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Modelski and Morgan, 1985; Thompson, 1988; Goldstein, 1988).²

It is this last set of theories that is of interest here. My task is to analyze the extent to which theories of long cycles and of hegemonic stability and decline can explain the long peace between the superpowers, and provide plausible forecasts of the likelihood of a major war in the future. I will not assess the role of other causal factors, for those are analyzed elsewhere in this volume, and for this reason I will not attempt to offer a comprehensive explanation for the long postwar peace. A full explanation requires a more complex analysis involving numerous variables and cast within a larger theory of the causes of peace and war, which goes far beyond the purpose of this study. My aim is to isolate one hypothesized explanation for the long peace and to assess its plausibility.

Explanations of the long peace from a long cycle/hegemonic stability perspective are based on extrapolations from earlier eras for which the theory is presumed to be true, and for this reason part of this study will necessarily involve an analysis of the historical validity of hegemonic and cyclical theories. Because these theories are concerned with the presence or absence of a great-power or hegemonic war involving the leading states in the system, I use the term "long peace" in this sense, while acknowledging that in other respects the postwar era has been far from peaceful.

Before we begin, it is useful to note that there are two particularly important versions of the realist theory of international politics. One is balance-of-power theory, which emphasizes the importance of the anarchic structure of the international system, the security dilemma, the destabilizing effects of dangerous concentrations of military power, and the effectiveness of balancing behavior in preventing hegemony. The central proposition of balance-of-power theory is that if one state grows so strong that it threatens to gain a position of dominance over the international system, other great powers will form a blocking coalition to prevent the expansion of the threatening state, and a hegemonic war will follow. "Hegemonic theories," on the other hand, emphasize hierarchies of power and informal systems of norms and order in a nominally anarchic system. The concentration of power in the hands of a single hegemonic power is stabilizing for the system because the leading state uses its power to manage the system to maintain order. Whereas balance-of-power theory hypothesizes that the threat of hegemony is a sufficient condition for a counter-coalition of other great powers and therefore for a general war, hegemonic theory hypothesizes that hegemony is a sufficient and perhaps necessary condition for the absence of a major war (Levy, 1989b).³ We will examine several versions of hegemonic theory in this paper.

HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY

There are several forms of hegemonic theory, but the one receiving the most attention in the international relations literature as a whole is hegemonic stability theory. The theory, often associated with Gilpin

(1975), Krasner (1976), Keohane and Nye (1989), and Keohane (1980, 1984), attempts to explain stability in one particular kind of international political economy — a liberal one characterized by the free play of international market forces in trade, investment, and finance. A necessary condition for stability is the existence of a single dominant state which is both willing and able to use its power to create and maintain a set of political and economic structures and informal "regimes" that maintain order in the system. This requires that the "hegemon" be the most powerful state politically and the most efficient state economically, that it be committed to a liberal order and have a domestic structure conducive to it, and that other leading economic states share similar interests in a liberal order (Ruggie, 1982:382-84; Gilpin 1981:129-31, 1987:72-73). In the absence of a hegemon to help provide collective goods and manage the system, the system will be conflictual and unstable. Hegemonic stability theorists view the United States as a declining hegemon and fear that with declining American leadership the international political economy will become increasingly unstable. Much of the literature on international regimes is concerned with the question of how to create international institutions and norms which facilitate stability and peaceful change in an era of declining hegemony (Keohane, 1984).⁴

Although it might appear that hegemonic stability theory provides a straightforward explanation for the long peace, that conclusion is misleading. Most versions of hegemonic stability theory define hegemony in terms of dominance in economic production, finance, and/or trade, while the role of military power is generally ignored or deemphasized (Krasner, 1976; Keohane, 1980, 1984).⁵ The theory attempts to explain the degree of stability in a liberal political economy rather than the incidence or seriousness of military conflict and war, and for this reason hegemonic stability theory is not a theory of peace and war and cannot explain the long peace.⁶

Hegemonic stability theory implicitly assumes that a stable liberal economy contributes to international peace and that its absence makes war more likely. This was originally proposed by Manchester liberals (Silberner, 1946) and is illustrated by the argument that the decline of economic liberalism resulting from the great depression of 1929-1939 contributed to the origins of World War II (Kindleberger, 1973). But the precise causal linkages between economic stability and international war have not been theoretically specified or historically confirmed. Liberal economic systems have some destabilizing as well as stabilizing features with respect to international security issues (Buzan, 1984), and there has been little empirical work to demonstrate which of these features dominates and under what conditions. Most analysts have concluded that economic structure is less important than military and political factors for decisions regarding war and peace between the great powers (Buzan, 1984; Levy, 1989b), though admittedly much more work needs to be done on both the theoretical and empirical levels.

Thus, although hegemonic stability theory might be able to explain the international economic stability of the first quarter-century of the postwar system and the increasing instability in that system since the early 1970s, the question of the long peace falls outside of the scope of the theory. For an explanation of the long peace we must turn to other versions of hegemonic theory.

ORGANSKI'S POWER TRANSITION THEORY

A. F. K. Organski's (1968: Chapter 14) power transition theory incorporates two ideas that have become central in later theories of hegemonic change and war: (1) the destabilizing effects of changing distributions of military power and potential in the international system, which arise from industrialization and other sources of differential rates of growth, and (2) the stabilizing effects of concentrations of military power in the hands of a single dominant state. Organski views the international system as characterized by one dominant power on top and a handful of weaker great powers below, along with other medium and smaller states and dependencies. Whereas balance-of-power theory focuses on static distributions of military capabilities as a key independent variable, Organski emphasizes the interaction effects between the distribution of capabilities and changes in relative capabilities: a major war is most likely when the military power of a dissatisfied challenger begins to approach that of the leading state in the system. The challenger will usually initiate a war in order to accelerate the power transition and to assure for itself the benefits, privileges, and influence commensurate with its newly acquired military power, though it is conceivable (but rare) that the declining leader will initiate a "preventive war."⁷ Organski (1968:376) acknowledges that it is possible in principle for power transitions to be accomplished peacefully, but argues that this rarely happens. He emphasizes instead that "the major wars of recent history have all been wars involving the dominant nation and its allies against a challenger who has recently risen in power thanks to industrialization."

Although Organski does not discuss the implications of his analysis for explaining the long peace or projecting into the future,⁸ the implications of his power transition theory are fairly clear. Peace for the first quarter-century of the post-1945 era is explained by American dominance. After that, given the gradual but continued American decline and the rise of the Soviet Union and other states, conditions became increasingly ripe for a hegemonic war. The key question for the purposes of prediction and explanation concerns the definition and measurement of power (and the aggregation of its many dimensions). Were we to accept the conventional wisdom that the Soviet Union began to approach the United States in overall military power (though not in economic power or political influence) somewhere in the 1970s, power transition theory

presumably would have predicted that conditions have been ripe for a hegemonic war during the last two decades.⁹

Although some of the concepts and hypotheses in Organski's power transition theory have been very influential, and although his contribution should be more widely acknowledged, subsequent theories of hegemonic transitions and war are more fully developed and give more attention to the implications for the contemporary era and for the future.¹⁰ Let us turn now to some of these more recent theories of hegemonic change and war.

GILPIN'S THEORY OF HEGEMONIC TRANSITION AND WAR

Robert Gilpin (1981) attempts to integrate some notions of hegemonic stability theory into a broader theory of hegemonic expansion, decline, transition, and war. Like Organski, Gilpin incorporates military, political, and economic dimensions into his conception of power. He also recognizes that the hegemonic state is not necessarily liberal in character, and extends his analysis to sovereign state systems in general. He argues that the hegemonic state has the capability and motivation to structure the international political, economic, and cultural systems in a way that serves its own interests — by providing a secure environment for trade and investment, by constructing a stable system of international security which helps avoid destructive wars, and generally by maintaining the status quo and its own position of dominance.

The hegemonic state cannot maintain its dominant position indefinitely, however. Although control over an international system provides an expanded resource base to the dominant power, it is also costly to maintain. These protection costs include expenditures on military forces, the financial support of allies, and the provision of collective goods necessary to maintain an international economy. The maintenance of a lead in military technology becomes increasingly expensive as technology diffuses to potential challengers who do not have to pay the full costs of research and development. Economic wealth also diffuses, in part because the same economic processes that initially favor the hegemon ultimately work to the benefit of others. In addition, prosperity and affluence invariably generate both greater demand for consumer goods and services and the emergence of domestic interests with a stake in the status quo (Olson, 1982), which work to inhibit innovation, reduce productivity, and ultimately to undermine the economic foundations of military power. Gilpin argues that the resources devoted to protection and consumption tend to rise at the expense of productive investment and long-term economic growth. Moreover, the perception of military decline invariably leads to even further diversion of resources from productive investment into the military sector for the purposes of protection, which only accelerates the

decline in productivity and long-term military potential (Gilpin, 1981: Chapter 4; Kennedy, 1987).

As a result of the decline of the hegemonic power and the ascension of other great powers, a disequilibrium arises between the actual distribution of power in the system and the existing distribution of political, economic, and cultural benefits of an international system that the hegemon helped to create while at the peak of its power. Historically, the primary means of resolving this disequilibrium is a hegemonic war that brings the distribution of benefits in the system into line with the new distribution of power. The hegemonic war generally results in the defeat of the declining hegemon and the rise of a new hegemonic power, which then uses its power and influence to restructure the system to serve its own interests. This ushers in a new cycle of growth, expansion, decline, hegemonic war, and system change (Gilpin, 1981: Chapter 6).

It is conceivable that such a disequilibrium in the international system could be resolved through peaceful change, and Gilpin makes it clear that the future of mankind depends on finding a substitute for hegemonic war as a mechanism for systemic change in world politics. He argues, however, that historically there are no examples of declining hegemons who willingly conceded their dominant position to a rising challenger to avoid war, and no examples of rising challengers who refrained from insisting on a restructuring of the system in order to accommodate their changing economic and security interests (Gilpin, 1981:208-9; Kennedy, 1987).

Thus, Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war and change in world politics provides an alternative explanation for the long peace. World War II resulted in the defeat of Germany (the rising challenger) and the transfer of the role of leadership from Britain to the United States. It restored equilibrium to the system and enabled the United States as the new hegemonic power to use its power and influence to restructure the new system in a way that maintained order and served its own economic and security interests (through the creation of a liberal international economy based on the Bretton Woods system and a security system based on NATO and a worldwide network of alliances). The absence of a major war is explained by the persistence of American dominance and the basic equilibrium between the distribution of power in the system and the distribution of political, economic, and cultural benefits in the system. Though American economic and military dominance began to erode by the early 1970s (Keohane and Nye, 1977), that decline has not been so rapid as to create conditions conducive to a new hegemonic war.

In terms of Gilpin's theory, however, the contemporary system is moving in a dangerous direction. The decline of the relative economic and military superiority of the United States continues, and Japan, China, the Federal Republic of Germany, and — at least until recently — the Soviet Union, have continued to gain in strength. This has created an increasing disequilibrium between the emerging system of decon-

centrated power and the system of benefits established at the peak of American hegemony after World War II. The danger is that one or more of the potential challengers will become so dissatisfied with the status quo that it will insist on a share of the benefits of the system congruent with its newly acquired power, and be willing to resort to violence if its objectives cannot be satisfied by peaceful means.¹¹

Although the implications of Gilpin's theory for the future are rather pessimistic, he concludes with a more positive assessment of certain developments that might make it possible to resolve the current disequilibrium in the system without resort to hegemonic war. These developments include the restraints induced by the existence of nuclear weapons; the pluralistic nature of the political, economic, and ideological cleavages in the system (so that they are not mutually reinforcing); and the mutual benefits of economic cooperation (Gilpin, 1981:211-30).

Gilpin's introduction of these qualifications raises some difficulties. First, his optimistic conclusion would be more convincing if he had identified the alternative mechanism that might replace hegemonic war as the vehicle for systemic change. More important, pluralistic cleavages and beneficial economic cooperation are not unique to the contemporary system. To the extent that they have a pacifying effect it is possible that these variables, and not hegemonic order, might explain peaceful periods of the past. It is incumbent upon Gilpin to incorporate these factors into the theory and explain why they should have a greater pacifying effect in the future than in the past.

The introduction of the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons, while certainly plausible, also raises a problem. If mutual deterrence might be sufficient to avoid a hegemonic war in the future, then perhaps it has also had a stabilizing effect during the past four decades. That is, the explanation for the long peace may have less to do with a particular stage of the hegemonic cycle than with the balance of terror. Thus, to a certain degree, Gilpin undercuts the explanatory power of the theory by adding some ad hoc hypotheses in the last chapter.¹²

The implications of Gilpin's theory for explaining the long peace and particularly for projecting the future is open to question for another reason. One problem is that Gilpin provides no separate indicator of when the disequilibrium in the system reaches such a point that the conjunction of the demands of a rising challenger and the concessions offered by the declining hegemon will lead to a military conflict which expands into a hegemonic war. It is unclear, for example, whether American decline relative to its leading adversaries has proceeded so far that the theory would predict conditions conducive to a hegemonic war. In the absence of a well-defined operational indicator of disequilibrium the theory cannot be convincingly tested against historical experience and cannot be used for predictive purposes.¹³

Although Gilpin illustrates his theory of war and change with a variety of examples from different historical eras, he fails to demonstrate

that all hegemonic wars result from systemic disequilibrium or that such disequilibrium always leads to systemic wars.¹⁴ Disequilibrium creates conditions conducive to a hegemonic war but requires an additional trigger before a hegemonic war actually occurs. In this sense Gilpin is positing a necessary but not sufficient condition for hegemonic war. The problem of an operational indicator of the necessary condition still exists, however, and in the absence of such an indicator it is not possible to conduct an empirical test of the theory or to make any predictions as to the point at which conditions are ripe for a hegemonic war. This question cannot be answered by a cyclical theory unless it includes a fairly precise specification of where the system is on the cycle. This is provided by two versions of long-cycle theory, to which we now turn.

MODELSKI'S LONG CYCLES OF WORLD LEADERSHIP

George Modelski (1978, 1987a) and W. R. Thompson (1988) have constructed a theory of long cycles which posits regular cycles of system management and global war in the modern global system since its origins in 1494, and emphasizes the importance of seapower (airpower after 1945) as the basis of power in the system. There are four successive stages of the long cycle: global war, world power, delegitimation, and deconcentration. A global war arises in a period characterized by extreme disorder in the global system and the absence of sufficient political resources to restore and maintain order. The long and intense global war results in the emergence of a "world power" with monopoly control over seapower. The reconcentration of power and the legitimacy of the new global order are confirmed at a comprehensive peace settlement after the global war, which ushers in the world-power phase of the long cycle. The world power uses its monopoly control over seapower and world trade to set up a structure of property rights, provide for peace and security, and regulate the global economy. The costs of the world leadership role and the rise of new rivals lead gradually to a relative decline in the dominant power position of the world power, and to the emergence of nationalistic challenges to the existing global order and a questioning of the legitimacy of that order in the third or delegitimation phase of the cycle. The decline of the world power and the legitimacy of the existing order continue in the fourth or deconcentration phase of the long cycle. This further reduces the political resources needed for the management of an increasingly disordered system, generates a new struggle for global leadership, and gradually leads to a renewed period of global war (Thompson, 1988:51-52).

Modelski and Thompson argue that this cycle has repeated itself once every hundred years. The periods of global war include (1) the Italian Wars (1494-1517), from which Portugal emerged as the world power; (2) the War of Dutch Independence (1585-1609), leading to the rise of the

Netherlands as world power; (3) the Wars of Louis XIV (1689-1715), which gave way to British leadership; (4) the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), which renewed the world-power role of Britain; and (5) the two World Wars of this century (1914-1939), which marked the transition of the United States to world power.

The fundamental cause of global wars is changing distributions of power (seapower), which result primarily from uneven rates of economic development among states. Global wars are the consequence of the rise of challengers who threaten to gain a dominant position on the European continent and thereby gain the resources that might allow them to challenge the naval dominance of the world power in the global system, and in this sense are essentially succession struggles for leadership in the system. Global wars do not begin as direct contests between leader and challenger, however, but rather as localized conflicts which escalate into global wars (Thompson, 1983c:349). The primary contest is not between the declining world power and the state which succeeds it, but instead between the declining leader and the territorially based regional challenger. The causes of both the localized war and of the escalation to global war have yet to be specified by long-cycle theorists, but the consequences are clear: the defeat of the regional challenger and the transition of leadership to a new world power, usually an ally of the declining world power.¹⁵

Several key aspects of long-cycle theory have received support in recent empirical research. Using the Modelski and Thompson (1988) data on the naval capabilities of the global powers over the last five centuries, Thompson (1988: Chapter 9) empirically confirms the long-cycle hypothesis that concentrations of seapower capabilities are consistently associated with periods of peace. Thompson and Rasler (1988) demonstrate that global wars are much more likely than other wars to result in a significant reconcentration of capabilities, which serves as the basis of systemic leadership for the new world power. Thompson (1988: Chapters 6-7) has also developed a measure of the concentration of leading economic sector technology in the hands of the systemic leader. This measure is highly correlated with the naval concentration indicator and further validates the measurement of the dominance of the world power. The use of the naval concentration and leading sector indicators provides independent measures of the position of the system along the four phases of the long cycle, and facilitates a more precise specification of the conditions conducive to global war than does Gilpin's model. This allows for a more definitive explanation for the long peace as well as more precise projections into the future.

The theory suggests that a global war has not occurred in the last four decades because the system has been in the world-power phase and recently the delegitimation phase of the long cycle — where structural conditions in the system are not conducive to a global war and where the world power is still able to provide order in the international political,

economic, and security systems. Forty years into the long cycle, the position of the United States in the system is stronger than that of any previous world power at a comparable point in system time, both along naval concentration and leading sector indicators, and that position is eroding only slowly (Thompson, 1988:277-80).

As the United States' position continues to erode, however, and as the system-management function fails to be satisfactorily fulfilled, the risks of a global war increase. The fact that the leading political-military challenger (the Soviet Union) and the leading economic challenger (Japan) are not the same may extend the duration of the current phase of the cycle, but not forever. Thompson (1988:276) notes that the average interval between global wars has been eighty years, and on this basis projects the year 2025 as the first approximation of the point at which structural conditions would be most conducive for the next global war. Modelski (1987b) makes a similar calculation and argues that a global war is a real threat by the year 2030.

From a long-cycle perspective, nuclear deterrence has contributed little to the long peace, and in the future will not be an adequate substitute for global war in providing for the system-management function. Deterrence theory is flawed because it does not relate the necessity for or effectiveness of deterrence to the nature of the political-military relations in different phases of the long cycle. Deterrence has "worked" in the world-power phase of the current long cycle primarily because this is the most propitious phase of the cycle, but deterrence has had little causal impact because it has been unnecessary, given an ample supply of order. Deterrence is necessary during the deconcentration phase of the cycle when the system's management capabilities deteriorate, but deterrence is unlikely in the long term to overcome the strong structural tendencies toward global war in that period. It has failed to do so in the past, and it is unlikely to do so in the future (Modelski and Morgan, 1985).

In Modelski's (1987a) explicitly functionalist perspective, past global wars have served the essential function of providing a selection mechanism for the next world power and therefore the basis for leadership, management, and order in the system. Modelski and Thompson (1988:48-50) both concede, however, that there might be alternative mechanisms or institutions that could perform these functions for the system. Modelski (1987a) argues that the evolution of the global system through the phases of several long cycles is characterized by innovation and learning, and that this provides some encouragement that a substitute mechanism for global war might be discovered for the future. He and Thompson warn, however, that in the absence of the discovery and implementation of such an alternative mechanism for leadership selection and system restructuring, there is little reason to believe that civilization can escape from the regular cycles of global war that have plagued the last five centuries of the modern world.

The Modelski/Thompson long-cycle theory is one of the most important research programs in the international relations field, and it continues to move forward both in its theoretical development and in the empirical confirmation of many of its key theoretical propositions. There are many reasons, however, why we can only have limited confidence in the theory's explanation for the long peace and its pessimistic projection for the future. One problem concerns the dependent variable that we are trying to explain. Because our concern is with the absence in the recent past and the avoidance for the future of an enormously destructive war between the superpowers, the proper historical referent to serve as the basis for the explanation of the long peace and forecast for the future is the most destructive great-power wars in the past. More specifically, it is the set of general wars in the last five centuries of the modern international system involving nearly all the great powers, extended duration, enormous casualties, and profound consequences for the international system and the states within it (Levy, 1985). The global wars of long-cycle theory are only a subset of this broader class of general wars, and for this reason do not provide an adequate data base for the explanation and prediction of cataclysmic wars in the nuclear age.

Because of long-cycle theory's focus on naval power (and, more recently, innovations in leading economic sector technology) as the primary basis of power in the international system, and because it treats the European system of the past simply as a regional subsystem embedded in a larger global system, long-cycle theory ignores some very important and very destructive European wars (Levy, 1985; Rosecrance, 1987). Several of these wars were at least as destructive as the global wars of the time and had equally important consequences for the structure and evolution of the international system as a whole. The Thirty Years' War (1618-48/59), for example, involved six of the seven great powers (all but the Ottoman Empire), and in terms of its impact on society was one of the most destructive wars in European history (Parker, 1984:208-15). Politically, it marked the end of Spain's reign as the dominant European power, completing a process initiated by the War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada, and ushered in an era of French dominance on the continent. It marked the end of the age of religious wars, settled the question of religion within the Holy Roman Empire, and assured that Northern Europe would not be dominated by Catholicism. The Peace of Westphalia is often taken as the formalization of the modern state system involving the sovereign equality of territorial states, the codification of a system of international law, and the beginning of a system of permanent diplomatic representation. If ever there were a war and associated peace treaty that restructured the international system, it would be the Thirty Years' War and the Treaty of Westphalia. This war is identified as a general or systemic war by nearly all analysts (Gilpin, 1981; Wallerstein, 1984; Levy, 1985; Midlarsky, 1988; Doran, 1971, 1983), but is excluded by Modelski and Thompson.

The two major wars in the mid-eighteenth century are also significant cases that are excluded from the global war category by long-cycle theory. The War of Jenkins' Ear/Austrian Succession (1739-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1755-1763) each involved all of the great powers of the era and together may have accounted for over a million battle fatalities. Neither of these wars was regional either in its geographical scope or its political consequences. Both were fought not only in Europe and the Mediterranean, but also on the North American continent, the West Indies, and the Philippines. These wars confirmed British mastery on the seas and secured her empire against all rivals, and reversed diplomatic alignments that had persisted for over 250 years in Europe. They were struggles over leadership in the system and differed from other global wars primarily in that they did not result in the overthrow of the leading world power (Levy, 1985:358).

It is also puzzling that Modelski and Thompson include the first phase, but only the first phase, of the Italian Wars (1494-1517) in their list of global wars. These wars were primarily concerned with Italy and were indecisive. The subsequent series of wars between Charles V and France (1521-1559) were a struggle for dominance of Europe as well as Italy, involved the intervention of England and the Ottoman Empire for balance of power and other reasons, and resulted in the defeat of France and a century of Spanish supremacy (Mattingly, 1964; Levy, 1990). Still another interesting exclusion from long-cycle theory is the Dutch War of Louis XIV (1672-1678). It involved all of the theory's global powers (and all European great powers save Turkey), and of the three major wars of Louis XIV was the most immediately concerned with issues of global power as opposed to the continental balance of power (Wolf, 1968).

The significance of these exclusions from the set of global wars is all the greater because of the timing of their occurrence in the various cycles. The Thirty Years' War began during the world-power phase of the second long cycle; the War of Jenkins' Ear began only one year after the end of the world-power phase of the third cycle; and the four major wars of Charles V for mastery of sixteenth-century Europe began early in the world-power phase of the first cycle. These are precisely the periods which long-cycle theory claims to be most orderly because of the leadership and system management of the world power. The occurrence of major wars at this time of the cycle, even if one chooses not to define them as global wars, is a serious challenge to the validity of long-cycle theory.

It is true that long-cycle theory intends only to explain the global wars defined by the theory, and that Thompson (1988) has demonstrated that the excluded wars do not have the same consequences as global wars for the concentration of naval power in the system. The exclusion of these cases is still a matter of concern, however, if our aim is to explain the occurrence of general wars involving the strongest states in the international system and enormous human and economic destruction.¹⁶ The inability of the theory to explain several important wars of the past raises

questions about its ability to explain the long peace or to provide forecasts about the future. Had anything on the scale of the two mid-eighteenth-century wars and particularly the Thirty Years' War occurred in the last four decades, it is unlikely that we would continue to refer to this period as the long peace. It would be little consolation in the future if we were able to avoid a "global war" only to suffer through something comparable to the Thirty Years' War.

The explanatory power of long-cycle theory, with its conception of power primarily in terms of naval power in the global system, can even be questioned in the cases of global wars. The theory defines the decline of systemic leadership based on a monopoly of naval power as a necessary condition for global war. This gives far too much emphasis to the importance of naval power relative to land-based military power and to the global system relative to the European system. The causes of World War I, for example, had less to do with the global system than with the fate of Austria-Hungary as an independent great power (and Germany's only major ally) in the face of internal decay, with Germany's fear of the rising power of Russia and her doubts regarding the ability of the German army to hold its own in a European war by 1917, with systems of rigid alliances and mobilization plans which created incentives for preemption in any crisis, and with the domestic crisis within the German Empire (Albertini, 1980; Ritter, 1970; Fischer, 1961, 1974; Fay, 1928; Joll, 1984; Levy, 1991). If the breakdown of leadership and system management were relevant in the origins of World War I, it had far more to do with the collapse of the Bismarckian system than the decline of Britain's naval power and share of world trade.

This argument can be generalized. The primary cause of the great wars of the past, whether they be general wars or the more restricted class of global wars, has been the perception by most of the great powers that one state was threatening to gain a dominant position in Europe. The great powers have always perceived the most serious threats to their interests as coming from the great land powers of Europe — which could threaten their territorial integrity — rather than from the more wealthy naval and commercial powers. This is why the great European military coalitions have always formed against the most threatening continental power rather than against the leading naval power.¹⁷

Thus a traditional balance-of-power perspective may offer a more convincing explanation than long-cycle theory of the most significant wars of the past, whether they be general wars or the more restricted class of global wars.¹⁸ This is not to say that with the expansion of the Eurocentric system into a truly global system in the twentieth century a balance-of-power perspective provides an equally compelling explanation for the long peace or projections for the future.¹⁹ But it does suggest that the validity of long-cycle theory's explanation of the long peace or the accuracy of its projections into the future cannot be based on the presumed validity of its explanation of the great wars of the past.²⁰

Even if long-cycle theory provided a satisfactory explanation of the major wars of the past, it is not clear that one could extrapolate directly into the future. The development of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery vehicles has produced a quantum jump in the costs of all-out war, which makes any major effort to overthrow an existing international order through the use of military force far less likely than in the past. The declining utility (but not obsolescence) of military force for the great powers, particularly against each other (Knorr, 1966; Mueller, 1989), has been paralleled by the increasing viability of a "trading strategy" as a means of influence in the international system, as evidenced by the growing influence of Western Europe and particularly Japan since 1945 (Rosecrance, 1986).²¹ Faced with a new cost-benefit calculus, involving both the enormous costs of nuclear war and the opportunity for increased influence through the expansion of their international trade and finance, states intent on restructuring the global political and economic systems will be less likely to adopt the military expansion route than in the past.²²

The failure of long-cycle theory to recognize the restraining effects of the balance of terror on the behavior of the superpowers (with respect to each other) reflects a more general problem with most cyclical theories of peace and war: they overemphasize the importance of cyclical trends and minimize the importance of long-term secular trends in warfare. The development of nuclear weapons systems and long-range delivery systems is only the most recent manifestation of a secular decline in the frequency of great-power war over several centuries (Levy, 1982; Mueller, 1989), and it is important that this tendency (or at least the underlying conditions which produce it) be incorporated into any explanation of the long peace.²³

GOLDSTEIN'S THEORY OF LONG CYCLES

Joshua Goldstein's (1988) theory of long cycles incorporates long waves of economic stagnation and expansion in the world economy, the rise and fall of hegemonic states, and the occurrence of major wars.²⁴ His method is inductive. He first establishes the existence of long economic waves of fifty-year duration and of comparable cycles of war over the last 500 years, establishes the empirical associations between them, and then constructs a theory to explain these observed empirical patterns. Goldstein's concern is with the broader phenomena of great-power war rather than with the more restricted class of global or general wars.

Building upon the work of others, Goldstein compiles an excellent set of data on a variety of economic indicators over the five-century period since 1495. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of most economists that long waves do not exist, Goldstein finds that long economic waves appear to exist in prices, production, investment (though data are scarce), innovation, and wages, but not in trade. These variables are related sequen-

tially: production is followed by investment and then by innovation, prices, and wages. Using Levy's (1983) war data, Goldstein then finds cycles in the severity of great-power war (measured in terms of battle deaths) but not in the frequency of great-power war. The severity of war is highly correlated with the upswing phase of the long economic cycle: upswings have twenty-five times the average annual battle fatalities that downswings do (seven times more in the period prior to the twentieth century). There is a tendency for production to lead war by a decade and for war to lead prices by one to five years (Goldstein, 1988: Chapters 8-11).²⁵

These inductively determined, lagged structural relationships form the basis for a theory integrating long economic waves, cycles of hegemony, and great-power war. The relationship between production and war constitutes the core of the theory. Goldstein argues that increases in production generate an increased need for resources to support the expanding economy, which in turn triggers a competition for scarce resources. War then becomes desirable as a means to secure the needed resources under conditions of scarcity. At the same time, the expanding economy increases the resources available to the military sector, which makes a major war possible. The conduct of a major war destroys this resource base, however, resulting in a decline in production, leading to economic stagnation. This economic downturn then reduces both the need for war and the resources necessary to prosecute it. The reduction in the level of war in turn begins to generate sustained economic growth, which initiates a new 50-year cycle.

Goldstein (1988: Chapter 15) uses his theory and supporting historical evidence as the basis for a discussion of the contemporary period and a projection into the future. He sees the United States as a hegemonic power in gradual decline, but one which is still the strongest state in the system. In contrast to the common argument that hegemonic decline itself brings increased risks of instability and war, Goldstein argues that declining hegemony is dangerous only in conjunction with economic expansion. Though economic expansion in production continued through 1968, the hegemonic position of the United States assured the absence of major war, thus explaining the first three decades of the long peace. The economic and hegemony cycles have reversed, however, and declining American hegemony is now accompanied by stagnation in production and prices and consequently a downswing in major war.

On the basis of an examination of current economic trends, Goldstein's (1988:350-57) model forecasts a revival of world economic expansion somewhere between 1995 and 2020, along with the continued hegemonic decline of the United States. As a result, he projects an increasing risk of great-power war between 2000 and 2030, a period of economic upswing and "weak hegemony." Given the increasing costs of war, Goldstein suggests that war might come toward the end of this period, after a long military buildup and persistent pressure for war.

Goldstein (1988:357-64) illustrates the dynamics of the system with the concept of a two-dimensional "cycle space." The system follows a path determined by the conjunction of the economic cycle and the hegemony cycle, which are out of phase. An analysis of this cycle space suggests that the closest historical precedent for the contemporary period is 1872-1893. Both were long-wave downturns and periods of gradual hegemonic decline, and both were phases of low great-power war activity following costly wars of containment by the hegemonic power in the previous upswing phase period. The earlier period was followed in two decades by World War I, so that the 1914 case and the military buildups leading up to it become an important historical precedent for Goldstein's theory of long cycles.

Goldstein does not suggest, however, that a repetition of the 1914 pattern is inevitable. Although economic surplus will continue to be diverted to war, and changes in relative national power will continue to bring the eventual recurrence of hegemonic war, Goldstein notes the contradictory tendency toward the ever-greater destructiveness of war. He concludes that "great-power war cannot continue to recur indefinitely while wars become exponentially more destructive. Thus power politics has brought about its own obsolescence" (Goldstein, 1988:366).²⁶

There are several weaknesses in Goldstein's theory of long cycles that limit its utility for explaining the past and therefore for projecting into the future. One concerns the precise temporal relationship between phases of long economic waves and the outbreak of major wars. The theory specifies that major wars should occur toward the end of a long-wave upswing, when states have acquired the military capabilities to fight a major war and when they need war to secure additional resources necessary to sustain productivity. One immediate counterexample that comes to mind, however, is World War II, which began in the last year of an economic downswing (1939).

Goldstein (1988:242-43) acknowledges that World War II is an anomaly (he dates it in 1940, the first year of the new upswing), but asserts that this is the only anomaly out of ten "peak wars." But World War II is not so anomalous. This is evident from an examination of the initiation dates of the ten general or hegemonic wars (Levy, 1985) of the last five centuries with respect to Goldstein's basic phase dating scheme (1988:246-47).²⁷ The War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada began midway through an economic upswing. The Thirty Years' War began two years before the end of an economic downswing in 1620. Two of the three general wars involving Louis XIV began in the downswing phase (one in the last year). The War of Jenkins' Ear/Austrian Succession began one year into an upswing, and the subsequent Seven Years' War occurred later in that upswing. The French Revolutionary Wars began only two years into the economic upswing. World War I began two years before the end of an upswing, and World War II at the very end of a downswing.

Thus, contrary to Goldstein's hypothesis, four of the ten general wars broke out during the middle or end of an economic downswing, and two more occurred within two years of the beginning of an upswing.²⁸ Because six of ten general wars began within two years of the transition from the downswing to upswing phase of the economic cycle, however, the vast majority of the fatalities from these wars get lumped into the upswing phase.²⁹ These patterns help to explain Goldstein's conclusion that the phases of the long economic wave are correlated with the *severity* of great-power war but not with the *outbreak* of great-power war.³⁰

These observations raise important theoretical questions relating to the causes of war. Although the severity of war might very well be explained in terms of some factors existing after the outbreak of the war, the causes of war must logically be explained by factors existing temporally prior to the outbreak of war. In fact, there may be a considerable lag between these causal variables and the actual outbreak of war. Decisions for war are often the cumulation of a series of decisions regarding military buildups, alliance formation, and imperial expansion that span several years and in some cases even decades; they are also influenced by internal socioeconomic conditions that develop over many years. The causes of World War II, for example, had deep roots in social, economic, and political developments during the depression of the 1930s, and the fact that five of ten general wars occurred in the middle or end of a downswing suggest that the causes of these wars can also be traced to developments in economic downswings. Thus, the observed temporal relationships between the economic cycle and the outbreak of general wars (and great-power wars as well) are inconsistent with Goldstein's causal theory linking the upswing phase of the economic cycle with periods of severe warfare.

These empirical anomalies are perhaps not that surprising if we consider some conceptual problems in Goldstein's theory. The central relationship in the theory is between production and war, but the causal linkages between these key variables are not very well developed. One of Goldstein's (1988:262-63) explanations for the linkage between production and war is the "lateral pressure" argument: production upswings lead to growth, competition for resources, and the propensity toward major conflicts and wars among core countries (Choucri and North, 1975). This raises a number of questions. Do increases in production always lead to competition for external resources, or can these resources be generated internally? Even if it becomes necessary to secure external resources, under what conditions can this be accomplished through trade (Rosecrance, 1986) or (though less likely) through the mutual exploitation of the periphery by the great powers (Kautsky, 1970), rather than through war? Moreover, what is the linkage between imperial wars to secure resources and severe great-power wars in the system's core? Under what conditions do resource wars or other forms of imperial expansion create

cross-cutting cleavages and actually reduce the likelihood of a great-power war, as some balance-of-power theorists argue (Morgenthau, 1967:341-42; Levy and Morgan, 1986) and as several diplomatic historians claim was the case for at least two decades prior to World War I (Thomson, 1966: Chapter 20)?

Goldstein (1988:261-62) gives greater emphasis to a "cost of wars" argument in support of his production-war hypothesis.³¹ The biggest wars occur only after a sustained period of economic growth, for states have the capability to fight such wars when and only when "treasuries are full." Although this argument may be true for preindustrial times, particularly when the economic ability to hire mercenaries was a critical factor in decisions for war (Howard, 1976: Chapter 2; Kennedy, 1987: Chapter 2), it is not clear whether this argument is valid for the last three or even four centuries.³² The key question is not whether or not the capacity to fight big wars increases during an economic expansion, but whether the magnitude of the increase is large enough to make a significant difference relative to preexisting war-fighting capacity. This is particularly problematic after the industrial revolution and the emergence of permanent military establishments in peacetime by the end of the nineteenth century, which provided the great powers with a fairly substantial and continuous capacity for fighting major wars.

In addition, there are other factors that might also generate enormous increases in the capacity to fight large wars. Innovations in military technology are critical, but do not necessarily coincide with the upswing phase of the economic cycle, as illustrated by the development of airpower and of the tank as an offensive weapon prior to World War II. Access to inexpensive credit on global markets is particularly important, as Rasler and Thompson (1983) and Kennedy (1987) have shown, and it is not clear that this is highly correlated with economic upswings. Political and organizational factors are important in the development of an administrative and financial system and in the rationalization of military organizations, as illustrated by Gustavus Adolphus in Sweden, the Great Elector in Prussia, and by Richelieu and Colbert in France in the seventeenth century, and by the development of the German General Staff late in the nineteenth century (Osgood, 1967:48-56; Organski and Kugler, 1980: Chapters 1-2). Sociopolitical factors can also contribute to a significant expansion in the capacity for war-fighting, as evident in the *levee en mass* and the "democratization of war" beginning in Napoleonic times (Osgood, 1967:51-3; Millis, 1956). Goldstein's argument would be more convincing if he could demonstrate that the increases in productivity associated with changes in the economic cycle have been translated into significant increases in the size of military establishments and the destructive power of their weapons systems. The very fact that so many great-power wars have occurred during economic downturns or within two years after the beginning of an upswing casts serious doubt on Goldstein's argument.

The lateral pressure and cost-of-war arguments provide particularly weak theoretical foundations for explaining the long postwar peace and projecting into the future. The increasing importance of the technological component of national military strength in the nuclear age seriously undercuts the lateral pressure argument regarding the link between increases in production and competition between great powers over external resources. In addition, because of the enormous destructive power of the nuclear and conventional weapons systems of the great powers, increases in productivity generated by economic upswings have a negligible impact on the preexisting capacity of the superpowers to fight a major war.³³

There are also some troubling levels-of-analysis problems in Goldstein's (1988:264) theory. Goldstein's lateral pressure argument is a theory of the motivations for war, and represents a national-level focus relevant to the question of the outbreak of major war. But the empirical analysis focuses on systemic-level patterns in the severity of war, since he finds that there is no relation between economic cycles and the outbreak of major war. Thus, there is a mismatch between Goldstein's lateral pressure theory of motivations for war and his empirical analysis of the severity of major war.

Goldstein's cost-of-war argument refers to the ability to sustain a major war, so that the empirical focus on the severity of war is fully appropriate. But the cost-of-war argument also has important implications for the outbreak of war.³⁴ The economic prosperity that creates the economic surplus that can support a military buildup and therefore a major war is defined by Goldstein as a systemic-level phenomenon — economic cycles refer not to individual states but to the international system as a whole. The implication is that prosperity benefits all states equally and gives *all* great powers an increased capacity to fight a major war. If that were the case, the opportunity for war (defined loosely as the probability of a victorious war at tolerable cost) would not change for any state as the system moves through phases of the economic cycle. The probability of a major war would be constant over time, and the severity of the wars that do occur would be a function of the phase of the cycle.

This is surely an unsatisfactory model of the outbreak of war, and it is inconsistent with empirical reality. Historically, the probability of major war has not been constant over time, but instead has been declining rather rapidly over the last five centuries, and much of this decline can be traced to the increasing costs of war (Levy, 1982).³⁵ In addition, the incidence of major war is not the same for each of the great powers, and if we look at years or decades rather than centuries we find that within a pattern of long-term decline the incidence of involvement in major wars for each of the great powers is anything but constant. These patterns cannot be explained by a systemic-level theory, and this leads us to a levels-of-analysis problem in Goldstein's cost-of-war argument.

Theoretically (from a rational choice perspective), the expected outcome of war is determined primarily by the dyadic balance of power between two states in conjunction with expectations regarding the likelihood and impact of the intervention of third states. If we have learned anything from theories of power transitions and long cycles, it is that dyadic power balances change as a result of differential rates of growth among states, and that these are important variables in the processes leading to major wars. Goldstein's theory does not incorporate differential rates of growth of states and their impact on both the distribution of power in the international system and on dyadic power relationships among individual states, and for this reason it cannot explain the cost-benefit calculations leading states to war.

These variables do get some attention in Goldstein's (1988: Chapters 13-15) discussion of hegemonic leadership and transition in the two historical chapters and in the analysis of the contemporary system and its likely future evolution. There is no connection, however, between this historical analysis and the theory linking long waves to war (Chapter 12). Goldstein does not incorporate cycles of hegemony of the more general distribution of power in the system into his causal theory of long economic cycles and war, and this helps to explain the absence of a pattern linking economic cycles and the outbreak of major wars.

Admittedly, Goldstein is more interested in broad systemic-level patterns than in national-level behavior. But his theoretical cost-of-war argument has direct implications for national decisions regarding war and peace, so that the examination of the theoretical plausibility and empirical validity of those consequences is relevant for an evaluation of the theory. In addition, a severe war presumes the initiation of war, so that any explanation of the severity of war must include an explanation of the outbreak of war, along with an explanation of its escalation or expansion (Levy, 1990). The level and rate of change of the distribution of power in the international system as a whole and between individual dyads are important variables in both the outbreak and the expansion of war, and must be included in the analysis.

Although the other theories examined above give more attention to the role of the changing distribution of power in the international system, none really develops the precise causal mechanism leading to the outbreak of a major war. In long-cycle theory global war satisfies an important functional need of the system, and occurs after the ability of the world power to provide leadership and manage the system has deteriorated, but the causes of the local war and how it escalates are not specified. Organski (1968) argues that the rising challenger usually initiates a war while it is still the weaker party in order to accelerate the power transition, but this hypothesis is problematic from the perspective of a cost-benefit framework (Levy, 1985; Thompson, 1988: Chapter 10).³⁶

Gilpin's (1981) argument that a rising challenger will attempt to change the international status quo as the expected benefits of changing the system begin to exceed the expected costs of change provides a more useful way to conceptualize the problem, even if Gilpin fails to specify the conditions under which this is likely to occur. But the outbreak of major war is not determined by the actions of the challenger alone, and Gilpin (1981:191) notes but does not analyze the possibility of a "preventive war" by the declining power to destroy or weaken the rising challenger while the opportunity is still available and before the power transition is completed. Organski (1968) mentions this possibility but asserts that it is rare. Let us now examine this idea.

HYPOTHESES ON PREVENTIVE WAR

The theoretical importance of preventive war derives from the central role of changing power differentials between states arising from uneven rates of growth.³⁷ This is the core of Organski's (1968) power transition theory, theories of hegemonic war and change, and of other realist theories of international relations. The historical importance of preventive war has also been widely recognized. This was the basis of Thucydides' (1954:1-23) argument that "what made the Peloponnesian War inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." Howard (1983: Chapter 1) argues that this is true for most wars: "The causes of war remain rooted, as much as they were in the pre-industrial age, in perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own." A. J. P. Taylor (1971) suggests that "every war between the Great Powers (in the 1848-1914 period) . . . started out as a preventive war. . .," and the importance of the preventive motivation arises repeatedly in studies of World War I.

Declining power does not always lead to preventive war, however, as evidenced by the current decline of the United States, the decline of Britain a century ago, and by other historical cases. This raises the question of the conditions under which changing power differentials lead to war (in general or by the initiation of the declining state in particular) and the conditions under which they do not. Organski asserts that

war is most apt to occur: if the challenger is of such a size that at its peak it will roughly equal the dominant nation in power; if the rise of the challenger is rapid; if the dominant nation is inflexible in its policies; if there is no tradition of friendship between the dominant nation and the challenger; and if the challenger sets out to replace the existing international order with a competitive order of its own. (Organski, 1968:376)

Others have also attempted to specify the conditions affecting the probability of a major war during periods of changing power differentials.³⁸ Thompson (1988:224-30) accepts Organski's hypotheses but emphasizes in addition the potential power of the challenger and (secondarily) the nature of the developmental sequence involving economic productivity and political effectiveness. Van Evera (1984:72-76) and Snyder (1984:160-61) both note the importance of the magnitude of the shift in power, the relative advantage of the offense compared to the defense, and the expected probability the adversary will initiate a war in the future. Levy (1987) emphasizes the declining state's expectations regarding the magnitude of the power shift, the probability that the challenger will initiate a war in the future, and the probability of victory with tolerable costs in a preventive war fought now, and (secondarily) the risk-taking propensities of decision makers, the influence of the military in the decision-making process, and the existence of internal political incentives for elites to engage in external scapegoating to bolster their internal political support in a period of decline (Levy, 1989a).³⁹

There are other policy options available to a dominant power in decline besides preventive military action. These include economic and technological innovation or industrial revitalization to reverse the underlying sources of decline; the formation of an alliance against the rising challenger; concessions to the rising challenger in order to ensure that a power transition which is perceived to be inevitable is also peaceful; and the reduction of the costs of system leadership through military retrenchment or the reduction of political commitments (Gilpin, 1981:188-94; Levy, 1987). The question of the conditions under which declining power leads to the adoption of one or more of these options rather than preventive military action is an important one and essential for a complete theory of preventive war.

Although there are numerous historical cases which have been labeled as "preventive wars," the causal importance of the preventive motivation relative to other variables in these and other cases has yet to be established through rigorous and systematic empirical research. Moreover, there have been no serious efforts to test any of the above hypotheses regarding the conditions under which a declining state (or even the rising challenger) will initiate a war, so that there is little empirical evidence to validate preventive war hypotheses.⁴⁰

The absence of empirical validation of preventive war hypotheses is compounded by their theoretical limitations. Hypotheses on the preventive motivation for war have not been grounded in any more general theory of international politics, conflict, and change. Changing power is not treated endogenously, so that we cannot explain or predict when changing power differentials will arise. These hypotheses have also failed to incorporate a theory of the strategic interaction or bargaining between the declining state and its rising challenger. This precludes a compre-

hensive analysis of when power shifts lead to war, to the formation of new alliances to compensate for declining power, or to a negotiated settlement to facilitate a peaceful power transition. Thus, a *theory* of preventive war does not really exist.

Although we have no fully developed theory of preventive war to explain the long peace or to make projections into the future (or to discriminate analytically between the last forty years and the next forty years), and although power differentials between states will undoubtedly continue to change, the preventive motivation for war is much less likely to have a significant influence on the superpowers in the nuclear age than it had on great powers in previous historical eras.⁴¹ This conclusion follows directly from the hypotheses suggested herein.

Although the expected magnitude of the power shift has been historically important, its effects should be attenuated somewhat in the nuclear age. Military superiority is more difficult to translate directly into political influence than in the past (at least for the leading states in the system), so that the political consequences of military decline, while not negligible, will be less than in the past (Jervis, 1989). Another important change concerns perceptions of the inevitability of war. Although the preventive motivation for war has been encouraged in the past by the expectation that a future war with the rising challenger was very likely if not inevitable (Lebow, 1981:254-63), such expectations are much less likely to occur in the nuclear age (Jervis, 1989:153-64). The attitudes of political decision makers regarding war have been changing (Bundy, 1988; Nye, 1987), and perceptions of the consequences of an all-out war and confidence in the stability of mutual deterrence make it much more difficult for self-fulfilling prophecies regarding the inevitability of war between the superpowers to arise. This was one of several important factors, for example, that differentiated the Cuban Missile Crisis from World War I and other international crises. Still another key factor in the past was the perception by the declining leader that it had the ability to fight and win a preventive war with acceptable costs, but the destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes this much less likely in the contemporary period.⁴²

Another important factor in the past was the offensive/defensive balance of military technology, and in particular the extent to which it created an incentive for a first strike in any crisis (Jervis, 1978). This would compound the preventive motivation with the preemptive motivation for war (Levy, 1987:90-93). The current strategic balance is quite stable, however, given the sheer numbers of strategic forces, the invulnerability of retaliatory forces under existing technology, and the mutual hostage relationship between the superpowers. It is unlikely that new technological innovations will undermine the invulnerability of retaliatory forces to the point of creating politically significant incentives to strike first, at least for the foreseeable future.

Thus, although we may not understand all of the conditions that contributed to the use of force for preventive reasons in previous historical

eras, hypotheses on preventive war themselves suggest that the preventive motivation for war will be far weaker for the nuclear powers of the present and future than for the great powers of the past.

CONCLUSION

We have examined several theories of hegemonic transitions, cycles, and war, including hegemonic stability theory, Organski's power transition theory, Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war and change, Modelski's and Thompson's theory of long cycles of world leadership, and Goldstein's theory of long cycles. These structural theories of major wars focus on long-term economic cycles and patterns of hegemonic ascension and decline over which statesmen have little immediate control. They posit that cycles are an inherent feature of the international system, that they continue to operate in the nuclear era, and that they provide an explanation for the long peace and a basis for projecting into the future.

Hegemonic and cyclical explanations of the long peace are troublesome because the theories of war upon which they are based have only limited explanatory power with respect to major wars of the past. These theories are either insufficiently operational to provide testable predictions (Gilpin), too narrowly focused on seapower to explain either major land-based wars or global wars (Modelski and Thompson), or characterized by too large a gap between the observed empirical patterns and the theoretical linkages that are hypothesized in order to account for them (Goldstein). Moreover, none of the theories provides a convincing explanation of the causal mechanisms through which a major war might occur or escalate from a local war. Each posits what are essentially necessary conditions for the outbreak of major war, but none pays much attention to the conditions and processes that might trigger a major war in an era of decline.⁴³ They emphasize the underlying causes of war but downplay the importance of immediate causes. Stated differently, they focus on conditions of general stability but ignore the sources of crisis stability.

The lack of attention to the most immediate causal mechanisms leading to war becomes particularly problematic in the nuclear era. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons in conjunction with long-range delivery vehicles undermines the capacity of even the strongest states to defend their populations (Schelling, 1966), and the resulting balance of terror makes it more and more difficult to conceive of situations in which the expected benefits of an all-out war exceed its expected costs. This does not mean that nuclear war is impossible, but it forces us to give greater attention to the question of why decision makers might make choices that could lead to massive and unprecedented levels of destruction for their own societies as well as those of their adversaries. Most contemporary analysts believe that such choices, though unlikely, are most likely to be made in situations of crisis; they reject the plausibility of a

"bolt from the blue." This directs our attention to the conditions for crisis stability and instability. These cannot be fully analyzed here, but because this perspective is not emphasized elsewhere in this volume, a brief discussion is in order.

Two of the most plausible sequences that might lead to a superpower war involve preemption and loss of control, generally after a process of escalation (Jervis, 1989; Lebow, 1987b; Levy, 1989b). Statesmen who prefer almost anything — including making significant political concessions — to all-out war might still rationally initiate war if they were to perceive that war was inevitable (Jervis, 1989: Chapter 5) and that the failure to preempt would result not in peace but in an adversary's first strike. This accounts for the dangerous dynamics following from the reciprocal fear of surprise attack (Schelling, 1960). Political leaders might also act deliberately to exploit their adversary's fear of war, and in so doing might move the conflict to the point that further escalation toward an undesirable outcome is perceived to be rational,⁴⁴ or to the point that they lose control over events (Lebow, 1987b: Chapter 3). Given the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, these scenarios are much more likely to come at the end of an escalation process than at its beginning, and could conceivably lead to war through preemption.

Because of their structural orientation, hegemonic/cyclical theories do not attempt to deal with these processes of escalation, preemption, or loss of control. But these processes have become increasingly important as the quantum jump in the costs of major war eliminates other plausible paths to war, and in their absence it is difficult to explain the final chain of events leading to all-out nuclear war between the superpowers.

My argument is that our understanding of the long peace and the likelihood of its persisting into the future has less to do with cycles of hegemony and prosperity than with the strategic, domestic, political, and psychological conditions under which decision makers come to perceive that (1) war is inevitable, (2) incremental escalation toward an undesirable outcome is rational, and (3) preemption is a viable option, and where (4) psychological dynamics further fuel these rational escalation processes. The exploration of these conditions and processes is an essential task for future research on the sources of the long peace and its prospects for the future.

ENDNOTES

This research has been supported by a Social Science Research Council/MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in International Security and by the University of Minnesota. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the supporting institutions. The author is grateful for many helpful comments and criticisms on earlier versions of this study from Joshua Goldstein, William R. Thompson, and George Modelski, and from Donald Puchala, James Ray, and

other participants at the conference on "The Long Postwar Peace" at Rutgers University, April 28-29, 1989.

1. This calculation is based on the application of a Poisson probability model to Levy's (1983) war data. The analysis is very sensitive to certain analytic assumptions and to the question of precisely what it is that is defined not to have occurred since 1945. If the missing event is a general or hegemonic war involving all the leading powers in the system, of which there have been ten during the past five centuries (Levy, 1985), the probability changes to .41 (though the blurring of the distinction between great-power war and hegemonic war in the nuclear age complicates this analysis). Thus, while the absence of a *great-power war* involving any two great powers since 1945 is exceedingly rare by historical standards, the absence of a *hegemonic war* is not particularly surprising.

2. Other explanations for the long peace include long-term historical trends in warfare predating the nuclear age (Mueller, 1989; Levy, 1982); the stabilizing effect of alliances (Kegley and Raymond, 1990); and the role of arms control (Kruzel, 1990). For a good analysis of many of the leading theories see Gaddis (in this book), and for analyses which minimize the role of nuclear weapons see Mueller (1988b), Vasquez (in this book), Kugler (1984), and Morgan and Ray (1989).

There are two other factors which have been tremendously important for the long peace but which have not been given adequate attention in the literature. One is the weakening of the traditional linkage between economic and military power and the fact that the leading military rivalry and the leading economic rivalries are not congruent (at least for the last two decades). The dynamics of the Cold War would have been considerably different had the Soviet Union been the major economic competitor of the United States as well as its leading military challenger. A second factor is the historically unprecedented role of the United States in reconstructing the domestic political and economic structures of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany in a way that created a set of shared incentives within the Western alliance regarding economic and military issues (Katzenstein, 1978). Theories of interdependence, regimes, and alliances incorporate these shared values but usually treat them exogenously, and fail to explain the role of the United States as hegemonic power in facilitating their emergence. My thanks to Peter Katzenstein for bringing this point to my attention.

3. Because balance-of-power theory and hegemonic theories are based on different analytical assumptions regarding the basis of power, the geographical scope of the system, and the nature of hegemony (Levy, 1985), it does not necessarily follow from the above discussion that these theories are mutually incompatible. They may simply provide different answers to different questions and therefore constitute "incommensurable paradigms" (Kuhn, 1962), but this is a question requiring further research.

4. Because the domain of hegemonic stability theory is limited to those relatively rare instances where political dominance, economic efficiency, and liberal ideology coincide, it is not a general theory of international political economy. It has been applied only to the two periods of British and American leadership in the last two centuries, which is a serious limitation of the theory. For a more general critique of the theory see Keohane (1984: Chapter 3). One study of the last five centuries disputes the hypothesis that free trade is associated with hegemony, and finds instead that it is likely to occur in periods of hegemonic decline (Frederick, 1987).

5. Keohane (1984:39-41), for example, argues that "the hegemonic power need not be militarily dominant world-wide."

6. In his chapter in this book, Gaddis also recognizes that hegemonic stability theory has limited relevance for the Cold War or the long peace, though in the end he is more willing than I am to consider some of the theory's geopolitical implications.

7. We will return to this point in a subsequent section on preventive war.

8. This question is addressed in a recent piece by Kugler and Organski (1989:185-90).

9. Organski and Kugler (1980) use the somewhat questionable gross national product indicator of national power in their empirical test of the theory, and by this measure American dominance, and hence international stability, is still secure.

10. Organski (1968) does not give adequate attention, for example, to the meaning of power, the relationship between politics and economics, the nature of hegemony and how it is maintained, or to the concept of hegemonic war. In addition, the Organski and Kugler (1980: Chapter 1) test of power transition theory is seriously flawed. Two of the four cases upon which it is based — the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Japanese War (the others being the two World Wars) — are not of sufficient importance to be classified as hegemonic wars and probably do not even satisfy the more narrow Organski-Kugler definition of a "major war." For more thorough critiques of power transition theory, see Bueno de Mesquita (1980:376-80), Thompson (1988: Chapter 10), and Levy (1985:353-54).

11. One limitation of this and other theories of hegemonic transition is that they fail to specify *which* of several potential challengers to the dominant position of the hegemon will resort to force to achieve its objectives.

12. The pacifying effect of nuclear weapons probably has more to do with the mutual fear of the consequences of nuclear war induced in both adversaries than with the deterrent effect of strategic superiority in specific situations (Jervis, 1989; Bundy, 1988; Organski and Kugler, 1980: Chapter 4; Betts, 1987).

13. Another problem with regard to testing the theory concerns the definition and identification of hegemonic wars (Levy, 1985). We will return to this point in our discussion of long-cycle theory.

14. For a brief discussion of the related question of whether hegemonic war is a necessary or sufficient condition for systemic transformation, see Levy (1990).

15. The continental challenger loses because it fails to augment its land-based military power with the naval strength necessary to defeat the world power's coalition; because it mounts its challenge prematurely, while the world power is still too strong; and because it underestimates the seriousness of its threat to the global position of the world power and thus fails to anticipate the expansion of the war (Thompson, 1988).

16. The exclusion of these cases also suggests that an element of circularity has been introduced into the definition and analysis of global war. If global war is defined in terms of its systemic consequences, then the critical question of the consequences of global war is defined away and cannot be investigated empirically. This raises the question of whether the excluded wars do not fit the long cycle because they are not global wars, whether they are not included as global wars because they do not fit the cycle, or whether they are empirical anomalies

in a cyclical theory of global war (Levy, 1985:359-60). For a response to this criticism, see Thompson and Rasler (1988:339-43).

17. Consider the alliance of England, the Netherlands, and France against the expansionist ambitions of Philip II of Spain late in the sixteenth century; of France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and England against the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs in the Thirty Years' War; of England, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden against Louis XIV of France in the War of the League of Augsburg and (except Sweden) in the War of the Spanish Succession in the late seventeenth century; of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain against France in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; and of all of the allied powers against Germany (and Austria-Hungary) in World War I and again (with Japan) in World War II. The coalitions in the two general wars of the mid-eighteenth century and in the Dutch War of Louis XIV were more evenly balanced, which reflected the absence of the perception of a single threat of hegemony on the European continent. This suggests that the widespread perception of an immediate threat of European hegemony approaches a sufficient condition for general war but is not a necessary condition. Note that my argument regarding the seriousness of land-based threats is consistent with Walt's (1987:21-26) emphasis on balancing against threats rather than against power, and on the importance of geographic proximity as a primary source of threat.

18. I readily concede that, in terms of its theoretical structure, balance-of-power theory is not as fully developed as long-cycle theory, and that therefore it cannot at this time be fully tested. One important task for future research is the construction of a theory of general/hegemonic war based on balance-of-power assumptions, and the testing of the theory against the historical evidence.

19. A traditional balance-of-power explanation of the long peace would focus on the role of strategic deterrence, the stability of the postwar alliance system, the effectiveness of U.S. containment of the Soviet Union (the primary threat to the continental balance of power), and the absence of direct and tangible conflicts of interest between the two superpowers.

20. That is, the argument that a Eurocentric balance-of-power perspective is inferior to a globalist perspective for understanding the contemporary world does not lead logically to the conclusion that a balance-of-power perspective is inferior for the purposes of understanding the major wars of previous centuries.

21. Although the importance of trade relative to military strength as an instrument of influence has undoubtedly increased in the postwar period, Rosecrance (1986) underestimates the importance of "trading strategies" in earlier centuries.

22. The current Soviet efforts to reconstruct its internal economic and political system in an attempt to enhance its competitiveness, and its willingness to accept a significant reduction of direct political and military influence over its East European allies, is significant in this regard.

23. Modelski and Thompson would probably attribute the declining frequency of great-power war to some form of historical learning curve.

24. The following discussion builds on Levy (1989c).

25. In a more recent paper Goldstein (1989) uses a vector autoregression model to test the causal dynamics among these economic and war variables for the 1750-1935 period.

26. Goldstein is ambiguous as to whether the obsolescence of power politics has already occurred, or whether it will take another hegemonic war to bring that about.

27. General wars constitute a reasonable basis for analysis because they are undoubtedly the most serious wars of the modern system, and include over 85 percent of the battle fatalities of all interstate wars involving the great powers over that period (Levy, 1983:88-91).

28. The fact that six of the ten general wars occur within three years of a phase change suggests the potential sensitivity of Goldstein's analysis to his phase datings, for small errors in measurement could result in a significant change in his findings. Goldstein conducts his analyses in several different ways to minimize this problem, though some questions remain (Thompson, 1988:188-95).

29. Because of Goldstein's (1988:246) datings of the beginnings of the Thirty Years' War, War of the League of Augsburg, and World War II, all of the fatalities from these wars are put into the upswing phase of the cycle. In addition, for some reason very few of the World War I casualties are put into the downswing period beginning in 1917.

30. I am following Goldstein (1988:247) here and using the standard economic phase periods listed in his book. These phase periods are the basis for Goldstein's findings of a strong tendency for the severity of war to peak at the end of the upswing phase of the economic cycle, and for his acknowledgment of World War II as an "anomaly" (Goldstein, 1988:242-43; 1989). But things in fact are more complex. These standard phases are *price* phases. The central theoretical relationship in Goldstein's model is between *production* and war, and Goldstein finds that production leads price by ten to fifteen years. Thus it would be useful to examine the timing of war in terms of the production cycle (p. 216), recognizing that the production data are less reliable than price data and that the absence of production data prior to the early eighteenth century restricts the historical scope of our analysis.

In terms of the production cycle, we find that World War II is not the anomaly that Goldstein claims, for it occurs in the middle of a production upswing phase (1925-1965). The timing of other general wars presents a mixed picture for Goldstein's theory. The War of Jenkins' Ear/Austrian Succession occurs in the middle of an upswing phase of the production cycle (1732-1746), but the Seven Years' War (which, more important for Goldstein's theory, involved nearly three times the fatalities) occurs a third of the way into the subsequent downswing. The French Revolutionary Wars occur as predicted at the tail end of a production upswing, but the Napoleonic Wars break out in the downswing phase, and nearly seventy-five percent of the fatalities from this combined general war occur in the downswing phase. Finally, World War I (and all of its fatalities) occurs halfway through a production downswing (1902-1924). This pattern of the incidence of general wars and the distribution of their fatalities over the economic production cycle does not provide much support for Goldstein's theory. It would be interesting to see what happens to Goldstein's strong correlation between all great-power wars and the economic cycle if the economic indicator is based on the production cycle rather than the price cycle.

31. Goldstein (1988:288) also mentions (but does not emphasize) a psychological link between economic growth and major wars: economic growth generates a "gung-ho" social mood, which increases the propensity for war.

32. Goldstein (1988:261-62) concedes that "the cost-of-wars argument is especially applicable to preindustrial times."

33. Technological innovations which affect the offensive/defensive balance of military technology, and particularly the vulnerability of strategic retaliatory forces and hence incentives to strike first, affect crisis stability and may be important, but there is no reason to expect that these are correlated with the production cycle.

34. These implications cannot be ignored, for the empirical validity of the logical implications of a theory are an important measure of the validity of the theory itself.

35. At the same time, the revolutions in industrial, nuclear, and communications technologies have diminished the relative importance of territory as an element of national power, at least for the great powers, so that the diminishing value of territorial conquest has contributed further to the declining frequency of war (Knorr, 1966).

36. This hypothesis has been refuted by subsequent empirical analysis (Organski and Kugler, 1980).

37. This section builds on a discussion in Levy (1987).

38. Whereas Organski (1968) frames the question in terms of the conditions under which power transitions are most likely to lead to war, it is important to recognize that rapidly narrowing power differentials may be destabilizing even if they do not lead to a power transition (Levy, 1987; Wayman, 1989).

39. Hypotheses on preventive war are not restricted to the leading states in the system, but may also apply to other states in decline relative to particular adversaries.

40. For recent quantitative empirical tests of the relationship between power shifts and war, see Houweling and Siccamo (1988), Wayman (1989), and Kim and Morrow (1990).

41. The effects of regional power shifts on the likelihood of secondary states initiating war for preventive reasons should not be significantly different in the nuclear age than in the past, for none of the conditions for preventive war against an adversary is greatly affected by the possession of nuclear weapons by third states.

42. The costs of preventive war are further increased, at least for the advanced industrial democracies, by the diplomatic and domestic political consequences of the growing popular belief that war is an illegitimate instrument of policy except for the defense of interests that are most directly and immediately threatened (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989:471; Knorr, 1966; Mueller, 1989).

43. Gilpin provides a framework for analysis, but does not go on to test it against the historical evidence. Hypotheses regarding the preventive motivation for war posit a more specific causal mechanism.

44. Rational escalation toward a mutually undesirable outcome has been modeled by the "dollar auction" (O'Neill, 1986).

References (combined for volume)

- Abshire, David M. 1988. *Preventing World War III: A Realistic Grand Strategy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Acheson, Dean. 1969. *Present at the Creation*. New York: Norton.
- Albertini, Luigi. 1980. *The Origins of the War of 1914*. 3 vols. Trans. and ed. by Isabella M. Massey. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Allison, Graham T. 1988. "Testing Gorbachev," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Fall): 18-32.
- Allison, Graham T., and Morton H. Halperin. 1972. "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *World Politics* 24 (Spring): 40-89.
- Altfeld, Michael F. 1984. "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test," *Western Political Quarterly* 30 (March): 107-14.
- Amuzegar, Jahangir. 1987. "Dealing with Debt," *Foreign Policy* 68 (Fall): 140-58.
- Anderson, Marion, Michael Frisch, and Michael Oden. 1986. *The Empty Pork Barrel: The Employment Cost of the Military Buildup 1981-85*. Lansing, MI: Employment Research Associates.
- Anderson, M. S. 1961. *Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1783*, 2nd ed. London: Longman.
- Anderson, Paul A. 1987. "What Do Decision Makers Do When They Make a Foreign Policy Decision?" pp. 285-308 in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Angell, Norman. 1910. *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relationship of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage*. London: William Heinemann.
- Aron, Raymond. 1967. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Art, Robert J., and Kenneth N. Waltz. 1983. "Technology, Strategy, and the Uses of Force," in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Atlas, James. 1989. "What Is Fukuyama Saying and To Whom Is He Saying It?" *New York Times Magazine* (October 22).
- Avenhaus, Rudolf, Steven J. Brams, John Fichtner, and D. Marc Kilgour. 1989. "The Probability of Nuclear War," *Journal of Peace Research* 26 (February): 91-99.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Azar, Edward E., et al. 1977. "A System for Forecasting Strategic Crises: Findings and Speculations About Conflict in the Middle East," *International Interactions* 3 (No. 3): 193-222.
- Ball, Nicole. 1988. *Security and Economy in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- arkun, Michael. 1968. *Law Without Sanctions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- arnet, Richard J. 1988. "Looking to a Post-Cold War World," *Los Angeles Times* (June 6): II-7.
- arringer, Richard E. 1972. *Patterns of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- atra, Ravi. 1987. *The Great Depression of 1990*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- echhoeffer, Bernard B. 1961. *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- eer, Francis A. 1981. *Peace Against War*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
- eilenson, Lawrence W. 1980. *Survival and Peace in the Nuclear Age*. Chicago: Regnery/Gateway.
- eilenson, Lawrence W. 1969. *The Treaty Trap*. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
- erkowitz, Bruce. 1987. *Calculated Risks*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- est, Geoffrey. 1980. *Humanity in Warfare*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- etts, Richard K. 1987. *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- ezdek, Roger. 1975. "The Economic Impact — Regional and Occupational — of Compensated Shifts in Defense Spending," *Journal of Regional Science* 15 (No. 2): 183-98.
- ialer, Seweryn. 1986. *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline*. New York: Knopf.
- lachman, Morris J., William M. LeoGrande, and Kenneth Sharpe (eds.). 1986. *Confronting Revolution*. New York: Pantheon.
- lackaby, Frank. 1986. "On the Nature of SIPRI's Peace Research Studies," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 17 (No. 3-4): 217-28.
- lainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. London: Macmillan.
- Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. 1989. *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Re-examine the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Blight, James G., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch. 1987. "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (Fall): 170-88.
- Bloch, Ivan. 1898. *The Future of War*. New York: Doubleday & McClure.
- Bloch, Jean de. 1899. *The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations: Is War Now Impossible?* Boston: Ginn and Co.
- Borden, William S. 1984. *The Pacific Alliance: U.S. Foreign Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Boston Study Group. 1982. *Winding Down: The Price of Defense*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
- Boswell, John. 1989. *The Kindness of Strangers: The Abandonment of Children in Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance*. New York: Pantheon.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1978. *Stable Peace*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Boyer, Paul. 1985. *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*. New York: Pantheon.
- Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1989. *Crisis, Conflict, and Instability*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Brecher, Michael, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Moser. 1988. *Crises in the Twentieth Century, Vol. I: Handbook of International Crises*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Brecher, Michael, Patrick James, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1990. "Polarity and Stability: New Concepts, Indicators and Evidence," *International Interactions* 16 (No. 1): 49-80.
- Brecher, Michael, and Patrick James. 1986. *Crisis and Change in World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Brennan, Donald G. (ed.). 1961. *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security*. New York: George Braziller.
- Brewin, Christopher. 1988. "Liberal States and International Obligations," *Milennium* 17 (Summer): 321-38.
- Bridge, F. R., and R. Bullen. 1980. *The Great Powers and the European States System: 1815-1914*. London: Longman.
- Broder, David. 1983. "The Great Stabilizer," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition* (December 5).
- Brodie, Bernard (ed.). 1966. *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brodie, Bernard (ed.). 1946. *The Absolute Weapon*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Brown, Harold, and Lynn E. Davis. 1984. "Nuclear Arms Control: Where Do We Stand?" *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Summer): 1145-46.
- Brown, Seyom. 1968. *The Faces of Power*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1990. *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Charles Scribner's.
- Brzoska, Michael, and Thomas Ohlson (eds.). 1986. *Arms Production in the Third World*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Buchan, Alastair. 1974. *Change Without War*. London: Chatto Windus.
- Buchan, Alastair. 1965. "Problems of an Alliance Policy: An Essay in Hindsight," pp. 293-310 in Michael Howard (ed.), *The Theory and Practice of War*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The War Trap*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1980. "Theories of International Conflict: An Analysis and an Appraisal," pp. 361-98 in Ted Robert Gurr (ed.), *Handbook of Political Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1978. "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (June): 241-67.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and J. David Singer. 1973. "Alliances, Capabilities, and War: A Review of Synthesis," pp. 237-80 in Cornelius Cotter (ed.), *Political Science Annual*, Vol. IV. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Bull, Hedley. 1963. "Limitations in Strategic Nuclear War," *The Listener* 69: 147-49.
- Bull, Hedley. 1961. *The Control of the Arms Race*. New York: Praeger.
- Bullock, Alan. 1962. *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Bundy, McGeorge. 1989. "Revising the Bomb Thesis: Maybe War is Simply Gone," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition* (March 20-26): 36-37.
- Bundy, McGeorge. 1988. *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*. New York: Random House.
- Bundy, McGeorge. 1952. *The Pattern of Responsibility*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Burton, John. 1982. *Dear Survivors*. London: Frances Pinter.
- Burton, John. 1979. *Deviance, Terrorism and War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Butterfield, Herbert. 1981. *The Origins of History*. New York: Basic Books.

- Buzan, Barry. 1984. "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," *International Organization* 38 (Autumn): 597-624.
- Caldwell, Dan. 1981. *American-Soviet Relations: From 1947 to the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Callego, David P. 1987. *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance*. New York: Basic Books.
- Campbell, Jeremy. 1982. *Grammatical Man: Information, Entropy, Language and Life*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Carnesale, Albert, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Scott D. Sagan. 1989. "How Might Nuclear War Begin?" pp. 242-57 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Nuclear Reader*, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Carnesale, Albert, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Graham T. Allison. 1985. "An Agenda for Action," pp. 223-46 in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), *Hawks, Doves, & Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Carnesale, Albert, et al. 1983. *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Bantam.
- Carr, Edward Hallett. 1961. *What is History?* New York: Vintage.
- Carty, Anthony. 1986. *The Decay of International Law?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Chernus, Ira. 1987. *Dr. Strangegod: On the Symbolic Meaning of Nuclear Weapons*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1957. *Syntactic Structures*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Choucri, Nazli, and Robert C. North. 1975. *Nations in Conflict*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
- Clark, Ian. 1982. *Limited Nuclear War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Claude, Inis L., Jr. 1989. "The Balance of Power Revisited," *Review of International Studies* 15 (April): 77-86.
- Claude, Inis L., Jr. 1986. "The Common Defense and Great-Power Responsibilities," *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (December): 719-32.
- Claude, Inis L., Jr. 1981. "Casual Commitment in International Relations," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Fall): 367-79.
- Claude, Inis. 1962. *Power and International Relations*. New York: Random House.
- Cox, Robert W. 1986. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," pp. 204-54 in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cox, Robert W. 1981. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium* 10 (No. 2): 126-55.
- Craig, Gordon A., and Alexander L. George. 1983. *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Crankshaw, Edward. 1981. *Bismarck*. New York: Viking.
- Crowe, William J. 1989. "Don't Cut a Winner," *New York Times* (April 10): A19.
- Cummings, Bruce. 1981. *The Origins of the Korean War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1970. *Modern Political Analysis*, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Darnton, Robert. 1984. *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History*. New York: Basic Books.
- Deger, Saadet. 1986. *Military Expenditures in Third World Countries: The Economic Effects*. New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall.
- Deger, Saadet, and Robert West (eds.). 1987. *Defense, Security and Development*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- DeGrasse, Robert. 1983. *Military Expansion and Economic Decline*. New York: Council on Economic Priorities.
- Deibel, Terry L. 1987. "Alliances for Containment," pp. 100-119 in Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containing the Soviet Union*. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassy's.
- DePorte, A. W. 1979. *Europe Between the Superpowers*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren, Francis Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deutscher, Isaac. 1966. *Stalin*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Diehl, Paul. 1985. "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980," *Journal of Politics* 47 (No. 4): 1203-11.
- Diehl, Paul. 1983. "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," *Journal of Peace Research* 20 (No. 3): 205-12.
- Dingman, Roger. 1988/89. "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," *International Security* 13 (No. 3): 50-91.
- Djilas, Milovan. 1961. *Conversations with Stalin*. Trans. by Michael B. Petrovich. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Doerner, William R. 1989. "Why the Bear's Cupboards Are Bare," *Time* (January 16): 33-37.
- Doran, Charles F. 1983. "Power Cycle Theory and the Contemporary State System," pp. 165-82 in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Doran, Charles F. 1971. *The Politics of Assimilation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1983a. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer): 205-35.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1983b. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Fall): 323-53.
- Draper, Theodore. 1988. "Coalition Dynamics: NATO, the Phantom Alliance," pp. 150-58 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Global Agenda*. New York: Random House.
- Dukes, Paul. 1989. *The Last Great Game: USA Versus USSR, Events, Conjunctions, Structures*. London: Pinter.
- Dumas, Lloyd J. 1986a. *The Overburdened Economy: Uncovering the Causes of Chronic Unemployment, Inflation, and National Decline*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dumas, Lloyd J. 1986b. "Military Burden on the Economy," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 42 (October): 22-26.
- Eckhardt, William. 1989. "Civilian Deaths in Wartime," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 20 (March): 89-98.
- The Economist*. 1989. "Third-World Missiles: Look What I Found in My Backyard," *The Economist* (May 24): 44-45.
- The Economist*. 1988. "Tax Gas," *The Economist* (December 24): 13-14.

- Fairbanks, Charles H., Jr., and Abram N. Shulsky. 1987. "From 'Arms Control' to Arms Reductions: The Historical Experience," *Washington Quarterly* 10 (Summer): 59-73.
- Falk, Richard. 1989. "International Law: The Damaged U.S. Image," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 45 (January/February): 59-61.
- Falk, Richard A. 1983. *The End of World Order*. New York: Holmes & Meier.
- Falk, Richard A. 1981. *Human Rights and State Sovereignty*. New York: Holmes & Meier.
- Falk, Richard. 1975a. "Arms Control, Foreign Policy, and Global Reform," *Daedalus* 104 (Summer): 35-52.
- Falk, Richard. 1975b. *A Study of Future Worlds*. New York: Free Press.
- Fay, Sidney B. 1928. *The Origins of the World War*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan.
- Finnis, John, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., and Germain Grisez. 1987. *Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Fischer, David Hackett. 1970. *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Fischer, Dietrich. 1984. *Preventing War in the Nuclear Age*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.
- Fischer, Fritz. 1974. *War of Illusions*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Fischer, Fritz. 1961. *Germany's Aims in the First World War*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Foot, Rosemary. 1988/89. "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," *International Security* 13 (No. 3): 92-112.
- Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1946. Vol. VI. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Fox, Richard. 1985. *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography*. New York: Pantheon.
- Francis, David R. 1989. "Soviets Eye Economic Institutions," *Christian Science Monitor* (October 24): 9.
- Franck, Thomas M., and Edward Weisband. 1971. *Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Frederick, Suzanne Y. 1987. "The Instability of Free Trade," pp. 186-217 in George Modelski (ed.), *Exploring Long Cycles*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Freedman, Lawrence. 1983. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Frisch, David H. (ed.). 1961. *Arms Reduction: Program and Issues*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (Summer): 3-16.
- Fuller, J. F. C. 1933. *The Dragon's Teeth*. London: Constable.
- Fuller, Lon L. 1964. *The Morality of Law*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fussell, Paul. 1975. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1990. *Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretative History*, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1989. "Hanging Tough Paid Off," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 45 (January/February): 11-14.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1988. "The Evolution of U.S. Policy Goals Toward the USSR in the Postwar Era," pp. 303-46 in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.), *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1987a. "How the Cold War Might End," *The Atlantic Monthly* 260 (November): 88-100.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1987b. *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1986. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10 (Spring): 92-142.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1987. "The 1929 Parallel," *The Atlantic Monthly* (January): 62-66.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1972. *The Great Crash 1929*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Galtung, Johan. 1980. *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective*. New York: Free Press.
- Gardner, Lloyd C. 1974. *American Foreign Policy: Present to Past*. New York: The Free Press.
- Gardner, Lloyd C. 1964. *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Garner, James W. 1927. "The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Termination of Treaties," *American Journal of International Law* 21 (July): 509-16.
- Garthoff, Raymond L. 1987. *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Garthoff, Raymond. 1985. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Garthoff, Raymond. 1966. *Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis*. New York: Praeger.
- Garthoff, Raymond. 1962. *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*. New York: Praeger.
- Gasiorowski, Mark J. 1986. "Economic Independence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (March): 23-38.
- Gatlin, Lila L. 1972. *Information Theory and the Living System*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. "Thick Description," pp. 3-30 in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- George, Alexander. 1988. "U.S.-Soviet Efforts to Cooperate in Crisis Management and Crisis Avoidance," pp. 581-99 in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.), *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- George, Alexander L. 1986. "U.S.-Soviet Global Rivalry: Norms of Competition," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (September): 247-62.
- George, Alexander L. 1984. "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations," *Survival* 26 (September/October): 323-24.
- George, Alexander L., et al. 1983. *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- George, Alexander L., Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.). 1988. *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- George, Alexander L., David Kay Hall, and William E. Simons. 1971. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. 1974. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Gilpin, Robert. 1987a. "American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era," *Daedalus* 116 (Summer): 33-67.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1987b. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1975. *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gleick, James. 1987. *Chaos: Making a New Science*. New York: Viking.
- Gochman, Charles S., and Russell J. Leng. 1988. " Militarized Disputes, Incidents and Crises: Identification and Classification," *International Interactions* 14 (No. 2): 157-63.
- Gochman, Charles, and Russell J. Leng. 1983. "Realpolitik and the Road to War," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (March): 97-120.
- Gochman, Charles S., and Zeev Maoz. 1984. " Militarized Interstate Disputes 1816-1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December): 585-616.
- Goldblat, Jozef, and David Cox. 1988. *The Debate About Nuclear Weapon Tests*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.
- Goldman, Marshall I., and Merle Goldman. 1987/88. "Soviet and Chinese Economic Reforms," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (No. 3): 551-73.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 1989. "A War-Economy Theory of the Long Wave." Paper presented at the International Economic Association conference on Business Cycles, Copenhagen, Denmark, June.
- Goldstein, Joshua A. 1988. *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gompert, David C., Michael Mandelbaum, Richard L. Garwin, and John H. Barton. 1977. *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail S. 1987. *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and for the World*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Gordon, Michael. 1986. "U.S. Again Says It Won't Join Soviet Moratorium," *New York Times* (August 19).
- Gould, Stephen Jay. 1987. *Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geologic Time*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1983. *Closing the Gold Window*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Green, Philip. 1966. *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.
- Greenhouse, Steven. 1988. "The Growing Fear of Fortress Europe," *New York Times* (October 23): 3/1.
- Grotius, Hugo. 1925. *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Haas, Ernst B. 1986. *Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Haas, Ernst B. 1953. "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" *World Politics* 4 (July): 442-77.
- Hadley, Arthur T. 1961. *The Nation's Safety and Arms Control*. New York: Viking.
- Hall, John A. 1987. *Liberalism: Politics, Ideology and the Market*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Hall, John A. 1985. *Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Halle, Louis J. 1967. *The Cold War as History*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Halperin, Morton H. 1989. "Has Arms Control Worked?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 45 (May): 26-45.
- Haraszti, Gyorgy. 1975. "Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances," *Recueil Des Cours* 146 (No. 3): 1-93.
- Harding, Harry. 1987. *China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- The Harvard Nuclear Study Group. 1983. *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. Toronto: Bantam Books.
- Heilbroner, Robert. 1989. "The Triumph of Capitalism," *New Yorker* 65 (January 23): 98-109.
- Helprin, Mark. 1988. "War in Europe: Thinking the Unthinkable," *Wall Street Journal* (November 1): A28.
- Henkin, Louis (ed.). 1961. *Arms Control: Issues for the Public*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Hermann, Charles F. 1988. "Crisis Stability in Soviet-American Strategic Relations," pp. 211-28 in Joseph Kruzel (ed.), *American Defense Annual 1988-1989*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Herz, John. 1951. *Political Realism and Political Idealism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hinsley, F. H. 1967. *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hixson, Walter. 1989. *George Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. 1989. "Do Nuclear Weapons Matter?" *The New York Review of Books* 36 (February 2): 28-31.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. 1988. "Lessons of a Peace Epidemic," *New York Times* (September 6): 27.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. 1981. *Duties Beyond Borders*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. 1971. "International Law and the Control of Force," pp. 34-66 in Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), *The Relevance of International Law*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday-Anchor.
- Hollins, Harry B., Averill L. Powers, and Mark Sommer. 1989. *The Conquest of War*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Holloway, David. 1984. *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*. New York: Yale University Press.
- Holloway, David. 1981. *War, Militarism, and the Soviet State*. New York: Institute for World Order.
- Holsti, K. J. 1987. *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
- Holsti, K. J. 1986. "The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: At the Gate, Detoured, or Retreating?" *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (December): 355-72.
- Holsti, Ole R. 1989. "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Winter): 15-43.
- Holsti, Ole R. 1972a. *Crisis Escalation War*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Holsti, Ole R. 1972b. "Time, Alternatives, and Communications: The 1914 and Cuban Crises," pp. 58-80 in Charles Hermann (ed.), *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research*. New York: Free Press.

- Holsti, Ole R., Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody. 1968. "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," pp. 123-58 in J. David Singer (ed.), *Quantitative International Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Holsti, Ole R., Richard A. Brody, and Robert C. North. 1964. "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers* 2: 170-90.
- House, Karen Elliott. 1989. "As Power Is Dispersed Among Nations, Need for Leadership Grows," *Wall Street Journal* (February 21): A1, A10.
- Houweling, Henk, and Jan G. Siccama. 1988. "Power Transitions as a Cause of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (March): 87-102.
- Houweling, Henk W., and Jan Siccama. 1981. "The Arms Race-War Relationship: Why Serious Disputes Matter," *Arms Control* 2 (September): 157-97.
- Howard, Michael. 1983. *The Causes of Wars*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Howard, Michael. 1979. "War and the Nation-State," *Daedalus* 108 (Fall): 101-10.
- Howard, Michael. 1976. *War in European History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1989. "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," *The National Interest* 17 (Fall): 3-11.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1988/89. "The U.S. — Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Winter): 76-96.
- Huth, Paul. 1988a. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *American Political Science Review* 82 (June): 423-43.
- Huth, Paul. 1988b. *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. 1988. "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (March): 29-45.
- Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. 1984. "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36 (December): 496-526.
- Ikenberry, G. John. 1989. "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," *Political Science Quarterly* 190 (Fall): 4375-400.
- Immerman, Richard H. 1982. *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*. Austin: The University of Texas Press.
- Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. 1982. *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- International Intermediary Institute, The Hague. 1922. *The Permanent Court of International Justice*. Leiden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff.
- Intriligator, Michael D., and Dagobert L. Brito. 1984. "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (March): 63-84.
- Jackson, Robert J. 1985. *Continuity of Discord: Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community*. New York: Praeger.
- Jervis, Robert. 1989. *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 1988. "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 13 (Fall): 80-90.
- Jervis, Robert. 1985. "Perceiving and Coping with Threat," pp. 2-12 in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 1984. *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 1983. "Security Regimes," pp. 173-94 in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 1982. "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring): 357-78.
- Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January): 167-214.
- Johansen, Robert. 1989. "Global Security Without Nuclear Deterrence," pp. 72-80 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Nuclear Reader*. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Johansen, Robert C. 1986. "The Reagan Administration and the U.N.: The Costs of Unilateralism," *World Policy Journal* 3 (Fall): 601-41.
- Johansen, Robert C. 1985. "The Future of Arms Control," *World Policy Journal* 2 (Spring): 193-227.
- Johansen, Robert C. 1983. *Toward an Alternative Security System*. New York: World Policy Institute.
- Johansen, Robert C. 1980. *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, James Turner. 1987. *The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, James Turner. 1984. *Can Modern War Be Just?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Johnson, James Turner. 1981. *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, James Turner. 1975. *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Joll, James. 1984. *The Origins of the First World War*. London: Longman.
- Jönsson, Christer. 1982. "The Ideology of Foreign Policy," pp. 91-110 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Pat McGowan (eds.), *Foreign Policy: USA/USSR*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Jordan, Amos A., and William J. Taylor, Jr. 1984. *American National Security*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Joynt, Carey B., and Nicholas Rescher. 1961. "The Problem of Uniqueness in History," *History and Theory* 1: 150-62.
- Kahn, Herman. 1960. *On Thermonuclear War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kaiser, Robert G. 1988/89. "The U.S.S.R. in Decline," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Winter): 97-112.
- Kaldor, Mary. 1981. *The Baroque Arsenal*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Kaplan, Morton A. 1957. *System and Process in International Politics*. New York: Wiley.
- Kaplan, Morton A., and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach. 1966. "Resort to Force: War and Neutrality," pp. 276-306 in Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), *The Strategy of World Order, Vol. II, International Law*. New York: World Law Fund.
- Karp, Arron. 1988. "The Frantic Third World Quest for Ballistic Missiles," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 44 (June): 14-20.
- Kattenburg, Paul M. 1985. "MAD Is the Moral Position," pp. 77-84 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Nuclear Reader*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Katzenstein, Peter J. 1978. "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy," in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Kaufman, Daniel J., Jeffrey S. McKittrick, and Thomas Leney (eds.). 1985. *U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis*. Washington, DC: Heath.
- Kautsky, Karl. 1970. "Ultra-Imperialism," *New Left Review* 59 (January/February): 41-46.
- Keesing's Contemporary Archives*. 1980. (May 9): 30236.
- Keesing's Contemporary Archives*. 1958. (June 14-21): 16237.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr. 1988. "Neo-Idealism," *Ethics and International Affairs* 2: 173-97.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr. 1987. "Decision Regimes and the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," pp. 247-68 in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Patrick J. McGowan. 1979. "Environmental Change and the Future of American Foreign Policy," pp. 13-39 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Patrick J. McGowan (eds.), *Challenges to America*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond. 1990. *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond. 1989. "Going It Alone: The Decay of Alliance Norms," *Harvard International Review* 12 (Fall): 39-43.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond. 1986. "Normative Constraints on the Use of Force Short of War," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (No. 3): 213-27.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond. 1984. "Alliance Norms and the Management of Interstate Disputes," pp. 199-220 in J. David Singer and Richard J. Stoll (eds.), *Quantitative Indicators in World Politics*. New York: Praeger.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond. 1982. "Alliance Norms and War: A New Piece in an Old Puzzle," *International Studies Quarterly* 26 (December): 572-95.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Kenneth L. Schwab (eds.). 1991. *After the Cold War: Questioning the Morality of Nuclear Deterrence*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. 1989. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 3rd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Keller, Bill. 1988. "The Consolidator: Why a Stronger Gorbachev Might Not Be Strong Enough," *New York Times* (October 9): 4/1.
- Kennan, George F. 1987. "Containment Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Spring): 885-90.
- Kennan, George F. 1984. *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War*. New York: Pantheon.
- Kennan, George F. 1982. *The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age*. New York: Pantheon.
- Kennan, George. 1967. *Memoirs, 1925-1950*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Kennedy, Paul. 1989. "Can the U.S. Remain Number One?" *New York Review of Books* 36 (March 16): 36-42.
- Kennedy, Paul. 1988. "Why We Can't Give Up the Bomb," *Atlantic Monthly* 262 (August): 77-79.
- Kennedy, Paul. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1989. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1986. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," pp. 158-203 in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1980. "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes," pp. 131-62 in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George (eds.), *Change in the International System*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1989. *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1977. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Kern, Stephen. 1983. *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1914*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kilgour, D. Marc, and Frank C. Zagare. 1989. "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence," mimeo.
- Kim, Woosang, and James D. Morrow. 1990. "When Do Power Transitions Lead to War?" Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 5-7.
- Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kissinger, Henry A. 1984. *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America*. Submitted to the President of the United States, January 10, 1984.
- Kissinger, Henry A. 1957. *A World Restored: Matternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822*. Boston: Houston Mifflin.
- Knorr, Klaus. 1966. *On the Utility of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kochan, Lionel, and Richard Abraham. 1983. *The Making of Modern Russia*, 2nd ed. Hammondswoth, England: Penguin.
- Koebner, Richard. 1965. *Empire*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.). 1983. *International Regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (April): 317-47.
- Kristol, Irving. 1986. "'Global Unilateralism' and 'Entangling Alliances,'" *The Wall Street Journal* (February 3): 23.
- Kruzel, Joseph. 1981. "Arms Control and American Defense Policy: New Alternatives and Old Realities," *Daedalus* 110 (Winter): 137-57.
- Kugler, Jacek. 1984. "Terror Without Deterrence: Reassessing the Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (September): 470-506.
- Kugler, Jacek, and A. F. K. Organski. 1989. "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," pp. 171-94 in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

- Kugler, Jacek, and Frank C. Zagare. 1990. "The Long-term Stability of Deterrence," *International Interactions* 15 (Nos. 3-4): 255-78.
- Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed., enlarged. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kupchan, Charles A. 1989. "Empire, Military Power, and Economic Decline," *International Security* 13 (Spring): 36-53.
- Lackey, Douglas P. 1985. "Missiles and Morals: A Utilitarian Look at Nuclear Deterrence," pp. 109-51 in Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, and A. John Simmons (eds.), *International Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- LaFeber, Walter. 1989. *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, From 1750 to the Present*. New York: Norton.
- LaFeber, Walter. 1971. *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Lamb, Christopher J. 1988. *How to Think About Arms Control, Disarmament, and Defense*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- LaRoe, Ross M., and John Charles Pool. 1988. "Mixing Economics with Mysticism," *Challenge* 31 (January/February): 63-65.
- Larson, Deborah Welch. 1985. *The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Layne, Christopher. 1987. "Atlanticism Without NATO," *Foreign Policy* 67 (Summer): 22-45.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. 1987a. "Is Crisis Management Always Possible?" *Political Science Quarterly* 102 (Summer): 181-92.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. 1987b. *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. 1985. "Conclusions," pp. 203-32 in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. *Between Peace and War*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Leffler, Melvyn. 1988. "Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," *Diplomatic History* 12 (Summer): 279-306.
- Leiken, Robert, and Barry Rubin (eds.). 1987. *The Central American Crisis Reader: The Essential Guide to the Most Controversial Foreign Policy Issue Today*. New York: Summit Books.
- Leng, Russell J., and Hugh B. Wheeler. 1979. "Influence Strategies, Success and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23 (December): 655-84.
- Leng, Russell J. 1983. "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September): 379-419.
- Levi, Werner. 1981. *The Coming End of War*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Levy, Jack S. 1991. "The Role of Crisis Mismanagement in the Outbreak of World War I," forthcoming in Alexander L. George (ed.), *Inadvertent War: Problems of Crisis Management*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Levy, Jack S. 1990. "Big Wars, Little Wars, and Theory Construction," *International Interactions* 16: forthcoming.
- Levy, Jack S. 1989a. "The Diversionary Theory of War," pp. 257-86 in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Levy, Jack S. 1989b. "The Causes of War: A Theoretical Review," chapter 4 in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly (eds.), *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Levy, Jack S. 1989c. Review of Joshua Goldstein, *Long Cycles*, in *Futures* 21 (April): 206-8.
- Levy, Jack S. 1989d. "How Rare Is the Long Peace?" University of Minnesota. unpublished manuscript.
- Levy, Jack S. 1988. "When Do Deterrent Threats Work?" *British Journal of Political Science* 18 (October): 485-512.
- Levy, Jack S. 1987. "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40 (October): 82-107.
- Levy, Jack S. 1985. "Theories of General War," *World Politics* 37 (April): 344-74.
- Levy, Jack S. 1983. *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Levy, Jack S. 1982. "Historical Trends in Great Power War," *International Studies Quarterly* 26 (June): 278-301.
- Levy, Jack S. 1981. "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (December): 581-613.
- Levy, Jack S. 1976. "Military Power, Alliances, Technology: An Analysis of Some Structural Determinants of War Among Great Powers," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin.
- Levy, Jack S., and T. Clifton Morgan. 1986. "The Structure of the International System and the Frequency and Seriousness of War," pp. 75-98 in Margaret P. Karns (ed.), *Persistent Patterns and Emergent Structures in a Waning Century*. New York: Praeger.
- Levy, Jack S., and T. Clifton Morgan. 1984. "The Frequency and Seriousness of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December): 731-49.
- Lewis, John Wilson, and Xue Litai. 1988. *China Builds the Bomb*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lichtenburg, Frank R. 1986. "Military R & D Depletes Economic Might," *Wall Street Journal* (August 22): 22.
- Lilienthal, David E. 1964. *The Journals of David Lilienthal*, Vol. 2. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lippman, Walter. 1932. "Ten Years: Retrospect and Prospect," *Foreign Affairs* 11 (October): 51-53.
- Lipson, Charles. 1984. "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics* 37 (October): 1-23.
- Liska, George. 1967. *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Liska, George. 1962. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lowenthal, Abraham F. 1971. "The United States and the Dominican Republic," pp. 99-114 in Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *Conflict in World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.
- Luard, Evan. 1986. *War in International Society*. London: I. B. Taurus.
- Lundestad, Geir. 1986. "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (No. 2): 263-77.
- Lynn-Jones, Sean. 1985. "A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea," *International Security* 9 (Spring): 154-84.

- Malawer, Stuart S. 1988. "Reagan's Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-1987: The Reagan Corollary of International Law," *Harvard International Law Journal* 29 (Winter): 85-109.
- Manchester, William. 1973. *The Glory and the Dream*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Mandelbaum, Michael. 1989. "Ending Where It Began," *New York Times* (February 29): A19.
- Mandelbaum, Michael. 1988. *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mandelbaum, Michael. 1981. *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mandelbaum, Michael. 1979. *The Nuclear Question*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mansbach, Richard W., and John A. Vasquez. 1981. *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Maot, Zeev. 1990. *Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Markham, James M. 1988. "Some Wars Are Failing the Cost-Benefits Test," *New York Times* (August 15): 4/1.
- Mattingly, Garrett. 1964. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. Baltimore: Penguin.
- May, Ernest. 1984. "The Cold War," pp. 209-30 in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mazour, Anatole G. 1962. *Russia: Tsarist and Communist*. Princeton: Van Nostrand.
- McCain, Morris. 1989. *Understanding Arms Control*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- McClelland, Charles A. 1972. "The Beginning, Duration, and Abatement of International Crises: Comparisons in Two Conflict Arenas," pp. 83-105 in Charles Hermann (ed.), *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research*. New York: Free Press.
- McCloy, John J. 1969. *The Atlantic Alliance: Its Origin and Its Future*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- McDougal, Myres S., and Florentino P. Feliciano. 1961. *Law and Minimum World Public Order*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McNamara, Robert S. 1989. "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," pp. 174-85 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, Weapons, War*, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- McNeill, William H. 1982. *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mead, Walter Russell. 1987. *Mortal Splendor: The American Empire in Transition*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Mendlovitz, Saul M. (ed.). 1975. *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990s*. New York: Free Press.
- Messer, Robert L. 1986. "World War II and the Coming of the Cold War," pp. 107-25 in John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (eds.), *Modern American Diplomacy*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.
- Meyrowitz, Henri. 1970. *Le Principe de l'Egalite des Belligerents Devant le Droit de la Guerre*. Paris: A. Pedone.
- Midlarsky, Manus I. 1988. *The Onset of World War*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Midlarsky, Manus I. 1986. "A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (March): 77-105.
- Midlarsky, Manus I. 1984. "Preventing Systemic War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December): 563-84.
- Midlarsky, Manus I. 1984. "Political Stability of Two-Party and Multiparty Systems: Probabilistic Bases for the Comparison of Polarity Systems," *American Political Science Review* 78 (December): 929-51.
- Midlarsky, Manus I. 1983. "Absence of Memory in the Nineteenth-Century Alliance System: Perspectives from Queuing Theory and Bivariate Probability Distributions," *American Journal of Political Science* 27 (November): 762-84.
- Miller, J. D. B. 1986. *Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Millis, Walter. 1956. *Arms and Men*. New York: Mentor Books.
- Millis, Walter. 1951. *The Forrestal Diaries*. New York: Viking Press.
- Modelski, George. 1987a. "A Global Politics Scenario for the Year 2016," pp. 218-48 in George Modelski (ed.), *Exploring Long Cycles*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Modelski, George (ed.). 1987b. *Exploring Long Cycles*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Modelski, George. 1987c. *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Modelski, George. 1983. "Qualifications for World Leadership," *Voice (Japan)* (October): 210-29.
- Modelski, George. 1978. "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April): 214-35.
- Modelski, George, and Patrick M. Morgan. 1985. "Understanding Global War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29 (September): 391-417.
- Modelski, George, and William R. Thompson. 1988. *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Morgan, Patrick M. 1983. *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, 2nd ed. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Morgan, Patrick M. 1981. *Theories and Approaches to International Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Morgan, T. Clifton, and James Lee Ray. 1989. "The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on Crisis Bargaining: Implications of a Spatial Model," pp. 193-208 in Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward (eds.), *Power in World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. 1973. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. 1970. "The Origins of the Cold War," pp. 79-102 in J. Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I. Susman (eds.), *The Origins of the Cold War*. Waltham, MA: Ginn.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. 1967. *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed. New York: Knopf.
- Most, Benjamin A., Philip Schrodt, Randolph M. Siverson, and Harvey Starr. 1990. "Border and Alliance Effects in the Diffusion of Major Power Conflict, 1815-1965," pp. 209-29 in Charles S. Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky (eds.), *Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. 1989. *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Most, Benjamin, and Harvey Starr. 1980. "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December): 932-46.

- Mottahedeh, Roy. 1985. *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran*. New York: Pantheon.
- Mueller, John. 1989. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. New York: Basic Books.
- Mueller, John. 1988a. "Dropping Out of the War System," *Los Angeles Times* (September 12): 5.
- Mueller, John. 1988b. "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security* 13 (Fall): 55-79.
- Murray, Alan. 1988. "Will Foreigners Shape Bush Policies?" *Wall Street Journal* (December 5): A1.
- Myrdal, Alva. 1977. *The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race*. New York: Pantheon.
- Nagel, Ernest. 1961. *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Nance, R. Damian, with Thomas R. Worsley and Judith R. Moody. 1988. "The Supercontinent Cycle," *Scientific American* 219 (July): 72-79.
- Nardin, Terry. 1983. *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- National Conference of Catholic Bishops. 1989. "Nuclear Strategy and the Challenge of Peace: The Moral Evaluation of Deterrence in Light of Policy Developments, 1983-1988," pp. 54-71 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, Weapons, War*, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- National Conference of Catholic Bishops. 1983. *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response*. Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference.
- New York Times* (Editorial). 1988. "Stirrings of Peace," *New York Times* (July 31): 24.
- Newhouse, John. 1989. "Nuclear Hair Trigger Persists," *The Christian Science Monitor* (February 27): 19.
- Nichols, Robert S. 1978. "Factors Influencing Perceptions of the US/USSR Military Balance," (May 30). Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
- Nogee, Joseph L., and John Spanier. 1988. *Peace Impossible — War Unlikely: The Cold War Between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown.
- Nunn, Sam. 1988. "Arms Control in the Last Year of the Reagan Administration," *Arms Control Today* 18 (March): 3-7.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1989. "The Long-Term Future of Deterrence," pp. 81-89 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, Weapons, War*, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1988a. "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40 (January): 235-51.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1988b. "Old Wars and Future Wars: Causation and Prevention," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring): 581-90.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1987. "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (Summer): 371-402.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1986. *Nuclear Ethics*. New York: Free Press.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr., Graham T. Allison, and Albert Carnesale (eds.). 1988. *Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe*. New York: Ballinger.
- O'Brien, William V. 1981. *The Conduct of Just and Limited War*. New York: Praeger.
- Oden, Michael Dee. 1988. "Military Spending Erodes Real National Security," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 45 (June): 36-42.
- O'Donovan, Oliver. 1988. *Peace and Certainty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- O'Neill, Barry. 1986. "International Escalation and the Dollar Auction," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30 (March): 33-50.
- Oren, Nissan (ed.). 1984. *When Patterns Change: Turning Points in International Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Organski, A. F. K. 1968. *World Politics*, 2nd ed. New York: Knopf.
- Ornstein, Donald S. 1973. *Ergodic Theory, Randomness and Dynamical Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Osgood, Robert E. 1967. "The Expansion of Force," pp. 41-120 in Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker (eds.), *Force, Order, and Justice*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ostrom, Charles, Jr., and Francis W. Hoole. 1978. "Alliances and Wars Revisited," *International Studies Quarterly* 22 (June): 215-36.
- Oye, Kenneth A. (ed.). 1986. *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pagels, Heinz R. 1988. *The Dreams of Reason: The Computer and the Rise of the Sciences of Complexity*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Pagés, Georges. 1970. *The Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648*. Trans. by D. Maland and J. Hooper. New York: Harper.
- Parker, Geoffrey. 1984. *The Thirty Years' War*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Pearson, Frederick S., and Robert A. Baumann. 1988. "International Military Interventions: Identification and Classification," *International Interaction* 14 (No. 2): 173-80.
- Peterson, Peter G. 1987. "The Morning After," *The Atlantic Monthly* 260 (October): 43-69.
- Phillips, Cabell. 1966. *The Truman Presidency*. New York: Macmillan.
- Powaski, Ronald E. 1989. *March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Powell, Colin L. 1989. "Why History Will Honor Mr. Reagan," *New York Times* (January 15): 27.
- Powell, Charles A., Helen E. Purkitt, and James W. Dyson. 1987. "Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Decision Making," pp. 203-20 in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Princeton Seminar. 1953. Transcripts from the Harry S Truman Library. Independence, MO.
- Pyne, Stephen J. 1986. *The Ice: A Journey to Antarctica*. New York: Ballantine Books.

- Quester, George. 1987. *The Future of Nuclear Deterrence*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Rasler, Karen A., and W. R. Thompson. 1983. "Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle," *World Politics* 35 (July): 485-516.
- Ray, James Lee. 1989. "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War," *International Organization* 43 (Summer): 405-39.
- Ray, James Lee. 1987. *Global Politics*, 3rd ed. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Raymond, Gregory A., and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. 1987. "Long Cycles and Internationalized Civil War," *Journal of Politics* 49 (May): 481-99.
- Record, Jeffrey. 1988. "The Nukes as Peacemakers," *The Sun* (Baltimore) (October 12): 5.
- Reshetar, John S., Jr. 1989. *The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper & Row.
- Reston, James. 1988. "25 Wars Are Still Going On," *New York Times* (June 3): 25.
- Rhodes, Richard. 1986. *The Making of the Atomic Bomb*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Rice, Condoleezza. 1988. "SALT as a Limited Security Regime," in Alexander George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.), *U.S.-Soviet Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. *Arms and Insecurity*. Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press.
- Ritch, John B. III, and James P. Rubin. 1988. "Arms Control — Now or Never," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 44 (December): 9-13.
- Ritter, Gerhard. 1970. *The Sword and the Scepter, Vol. II: The European Powers and the Wilhelminian Empire, 1890-1914*. Trans. by Heins Norden. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press.
- Ritter, Gerhard. 1968. *Frederick the Great: A Historical Profile*. Trans. by Peter Paret. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Rock, Stephen R. 1989. *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1943. *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol 12. Ed. by Samuel I. Roseman. New York: Macmillan.
- Rosecrance, Richard. 1987. "Long Cycle Theory and International Relations," *International Organization* 41 (Spring): 283-301.
- Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *The Rise of the Trading State*. New York: Basic Books.
- Rosecrance, Richard. 1963. *Action and Reaction in World Politics*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: Toward a Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rosenau, James N. 1988. "Patterned Chaos in Global Life: Structure and Process in the Two Worlds of World Politics," *International Political Science Review* 9 (October): 357-94.
- Rosenau, James N. 1980. *The Study of Global Interdependence*. London: Pinter.
- Rosenbaum, David E. 1989. "Pentagon Spending Could Be Cut in Half, Ex-Defense Officials Say," *New York Times* (December 13): 1, 16.
- Rosenberg, David Alan. 1983. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security* 7 (Spring): 3-71.
- Rostow, Walt W. 1988. "Beware of Historians Bearing False Analogies," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Spring): 863-68.
- Rothschild, Joseph. 1971. "The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia," pp. 115-37 in Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *Conflict in World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers.
- Rotter, Andrew. 1987. *The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1920. *L'Etat de Guerre and Projet de Paix Perpetuelle*. Introduction and notes by Shirley G. Patterson. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1986. "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," pp. 131-57 in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36 (Spring): 379-415.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1978. "Changing Frameworks of International Collective Behavior: On the Complementarity of Contradictory Tendencies," in Nazli Choucri and Thomas W. Robinson (eds.), *Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
- Ruina, Jack. 1987. "More Is Not Better," *International Security* 12 (Fall): 187-92.
- Russett, Bruce. 1989. "The Real Decline in Nuclear Hegemony," pp. 177-93 in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Russett, Bruce. 1985. "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring): 207-31.
- Russett, Bruce M. 1974. *Power and Community in World Politics*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
- Russett, Bruce M. 1963. "The Calculus of Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7 (March): 97-109.
- Sabin, Edward P. 1989. "Threat Inflation: U.S. Estimates of Soviet Military Capability," *Peace & Change* 14 (April): 191-202.
- Sabrosky, Alan Ned. 1985. "Alliance Aggregation, Capability Distribution, and the Expansion of Interstate War," pp. 145-89 in Alan Ned Sabrosky (ed.), *Polarity and War*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Sabrosky, Alan Ned. 1980. "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," pp. 161-98 in J. David Singer (ed.), *The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models*. New York: Free Press.
- Sagan, Carl. 1989. "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: A Nuclear Winter," pp. 320-35 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, Weapons, War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sagan, Carl. 1983/84. "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Winter): 257-92.
- Sanders, Jerry W. 1983. *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment*. Boston: South End Press.
- Scarborough, Grace E. Iusi, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1988. "Threat and Alignment," *International Interactions* 14 (No. 1): 85-93.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1989. "Has Arms Control Worked?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 45 (May): 29-31.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schelling, Thomas C., and Morton H. Halperin. 1961. *Strategy and Arms Control*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund.
- Schindler, Dietrich, and Jiri Toman (eds.). 1973. *The Laws of Armed Conflicts*. Leiden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff.
- Schlesinger, Arthur S., Jr. 1967. "The Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 46 (October): 22-52.
- Schwarzenberger, Georg. (ed.). 1967. *A Manual of International Law*, 5th ed. London: Stevens and Sons.
- Schwarzenberger, Georg. 1962. *The Frontiers of International Law*. London: Stevens and Sons.
- Shannon, Claude E., and Warren Weaver. 1949. *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Shelton, Judy. 1988. *The Coming Soviet Crash*. New York: Free Press.
- Sherry, Michael S. 1987. *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sherry, Michael S. 1977. *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Shulman, Marshall. 1987/88. "The Superpowers: Dance of the Dinosaurs," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (No. 3): 494-515.
- Shultz, George F. 1988. "The INF Treaty: Strengthening U.S. Security," *Current Policy* No. 1038, Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State.
- Silberner, Edmund. 1946. *The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought*. Trans. by Alexander H. Krappe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Simes, Dimitri K. 1984. "Soviet Policy Toward the United States," pp. 291-322 in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sinai, Y. G. 1976. *Introduction to Ergodic Theory*. Trans. by V. Scheffer. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Singer, J. David. 1986. "The Missiles of October — 1988," *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives* 2 (No. 5): 5-13.
- Singer, J. David. 1963. "The Return to Multilateral Diplomacy," *The Yale Review* 52: 36-48.
- Singer, J. David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," pp. 77-92 in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The International System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. 1968. "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War: 1815-1945," pp. 247-86 in J. David Singer (ed.), *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence*. New York: Free Press.
- Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. 1966. "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description," *Journal of Peace Research* 3 (January): 1-32.
- Singer, J. David, and Richard J. Stoll (eds.). 1984. *Quantitative Indicators in World Politics: Timely Assurance and Early Warning*. New York: Praeger.
- Singer, J. David, and Michael D. Wallace (eds.). 1979. *To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1989. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989*. Washington, DC: World Priorities.
- Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1987. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88*. Washington, DC: World Priorities.
- Siverson, Randolph M., and Joel King. 1979. "Alliances and the Expansion of War," pp. 37-49 in J. David Singer and Michael D. Wallace (eds.), *To Augur Well*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1982. *Resort to Arms*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1979. "Conflict in the International System, 1816-1977: Historical Trends and Policy Futures," pp. 89-115 in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Patrick J. McGowan (eds.), *Challenges to America*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Smith, Gaddis. 1972. *Dean Acheson*. New York: Cooper Square.
- Smith, R. Jeffrey. 1987. "Ex-Secretaries Urge Adherence to ABM Pact," *Washington Post* (March 10).
- Smith, Ron P. 1980. "Military Expenditure and Investment in O.E.C.D. Countries 1954-1973," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 4 (March): 19-32.
- Smith, Ron P. 1978. "Military Expenditure and Capitalism: A Reply," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 2 (No. 3): 299-304.
- Smith, Ron P. 1977. "Military Expenditure and Capitalism," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1 (No. 1): 61-76.
- Smoke, Richard. 1984. *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36 (July): 461-95.
- Snyder, Jack. 1984. "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9 (Summer): 108-46.
- Soviet Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1985. *Helsinki: Ten Years Later*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Spanier, John. 1988. *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 11th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Spector, Leonard S. 1988. *The Undeclared Bomb*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
- Stackhouse, Max L. 1984. *Creeds, Society, and Human Rights*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.
- Stalin, Joseph V. 1946. *Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Voters, February 9, 1946*. Washington, DC: Embassy of the U.S.S.R.
- Starr, S. Frederick. 1988. "The Changing Nature of Change in the USSR," pp. 3-35 in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.), *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Stein, Janice Gross. 1985. "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," pp. 34-59 in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Stone, Lawrence. 1979. *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Strange, Susan. 1987. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization* 41 (Fall): 551-74.

- range, Susan. 1983. "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," pp. 337-54 in Steven D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- rbott, Strobe. 1988. *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace*. New York: Knopf.
- ylor, A. J. P. 1971. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ylor, A. J. P. 1954. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ibaut, John W., and Harold H. Kelly. 1959. *The Social Psychology of Groups*. New York: Wiley.
- ompson, E. P. 1982. "Deterrence and 'Addiction,'" *The Yale Review* 72 (October): 1-18.
- ompson, Stanley L., and Stephen H. Schneider. 1986. "Nuclear Winter Reappraised," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Summer): 981-1005.
- ompson, William R. 1988. *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- ompson, William R. 1983a. "Cycles, Capabilities and War: An Ecumenical View," in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- ompson, William R. 1983b. "Succession Crises in the Global Political System: A Test of the Transition Model," in Albert Bergesen (ed.), *Crises in the World-System*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- ompson, William R. 1983c. "Uneven Economic Growth, Systemic Challenges, and Global War," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (September): 341-55.
- ompson, William R., and Karen A. Rasler. 1988. "War and Systemic Capability Reconstruction," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (June): 335-66.
- ompson, William R., Karen A. Rasler, and Richard P. Y. Li. 1980. "Systemic Interaction Opportunities and War Behavior," *International Interactions* 7 (No. 1): 57-85.
- omson, David. 1966. *Europe Since Napoleon*, 2nd ed. New York: Knopf.
- ucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*. Trans. 1954 by E. V. Rieu. New York: Penguin.
- illema, Herbert K. 1989. "Foreign Overt Military Intervention in the Nuclear Age," *Journal of Peace Research* 26 (May): 179-95.
- olstoy, Leo. 1957. *War and Peace*. Harmondsworth, Sussex: Penguin.
- oyntee, Arnold J. 1954. *A Study of History*. London: Oxford University Press.
- rooboff, Peter D. (ed.). 1975. *Law and Responsibility in Warfare*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- rudeau, Robert, and Lars Schoultz. 1986. "Guatemala," pp. 23-49 in Morris J. Blachman, William M. LeoGrande and Kenneth Sharpe (eds.), *Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America*. New York: Pantheon.
- ruman, Harry S. 1955. *Memoirs*. Vol. I. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- ullberg, Ruth. 1986a. "World Military Expenditure," pp. 209-30 in *SIPRI Yearbook 1986*. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- ullberg, Ruth. 1986b. "World Military Expenditure," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 17 (No. 3-4): 229-334.
- ullberg, Ruth. 1985. "World Military Expenditure," *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- Twining, Nathan F. 1966. *Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson.
- United Nations. n.d. *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. New York: United Nations Press.
- United States Department of State. 1928. *The General Pact for the Renunciation of War. Text of the Pact as Signed*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- United States War Department. 1863. *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*. New York: D. van Nostrand.
- U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 1987. *The ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Van Alstyne, Richard W. 1974. *The Rising American Empire*. New York: Norton.
- Van Creveld, Martin. 1989. *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present*. New York: Free Press.
- Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9 (Summer): 58-107.
- Vasquez, John A. (Forthcoming). *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vasquez, John A. 1987. "The Steps to War: Toward a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings," *World Politics* 40 (October): 108-45.
- Vasquez, John A. 1983. *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Vattel, Emmerich de. 1916. *The Law of Nations; or, The Principles of Natural Law*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution.
- Väyrynen, Raimo. 1983. "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (December): 389-418.
- Vernadsky, G. 1953. *The Mongols and Russia*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Wallace, Michael D. 1982. "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," *International Studies Quarterly* 26 (March): 37-51.
- Wallace, Michael D. 1979. "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23 (March): 3-16.
- Wallace, Michael D. 1973. "Alliance Polarization, Cross-Cutting, and International War, 1815-1964," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17 (December): 83-111.
- Wallace, Michael D. 1972. "Status, Formal Organization, and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the Onset of War, 1820-1964," pp. 49-69 in Bruce M. Russett (ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Wallace, Michael D., Brian L. Crissey, and Linn I. Sennot. 1986. "Accidental Nuclear War: A Risk Assessment," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (March): 9-27.
- Wallensteen, Peter. 1984. "Universalism vs. Particularism: On the Limits of Major Power Order," *Journal of Peace Research* 21 (No. 3): 243-57.
- Wallensteen, Peter. 1981. "Incompatibility, Confrontation, and War: Four Models and Three Historical Systems, 1816-1976," *Journal of Peace Research* 18 (No. 1): 57-90.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1984. *The Politics of the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1986. "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics*," pp. 322-47 in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1981. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi Papers, No. 171. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Warner, Edward L., III, and David A. Ochmanek. 1989. *Next Moves: An Arms Control Agenda for the 1990s*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Warnke, Paul C., Gerard C. Smith, Robert S. McNamara, and Spurgeon M. Keeny. 1986. "The Folly of Scrapping SALT," *Arms Control Today* 16 (May/June): 3-7.
- Washington, George. 1790. "Annual State of the Union Address to Congress" (January 8), in Saxe Commins (ed.), *Basic Writings of George Washington*. New York: Random House.
- Watkins, Frederick M. 1934. *The State as a Concept in Political Science*. New York: Harper and Bros.
- Wayman, Frank. 1989. "Power Shifts and War, 1816-1980: An Empirical Analysis." Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, London, March 29-April 1.
- Wayman, Frank. 1985. "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Threat of War," pp. 115-44 in Alan Ned Sabrosky (ed.), *Polarity and War*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Wear, Spencer. 1988. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Weede, Erich. 1983. "Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (June): 231-54.
- Weede, Erich. 1980. "Arms Races and Escalation: Some Persisting Doubts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24 (June): 285-87.
- Weede, Erich. 1975. "World Order in the Fifties and Sixties: Dependence, Deterrence, and Limited Peace." *Papers of the Peace Science Society (International)*, 24: 49-80.
- Weinstein, Franklin B. 1969. "The Concept of Commitment in International Relations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13 (March) 39-56.
- Weltman, John J. 1974. "On the Obsolescence of War," *International Studies Quarterly* 18 (December): 395-416.
- Wendt, Alexander E. 1987. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41 (Summer): 335-70.
- Westerfield, H. Bradford (ed.). 1959. *The Arms Race and Current Soviet Doctrine*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Westing, Arthur. 1982. "War as a Human Endeavor: The High Fatality Wars of the Twentieth Century," *Journal of Peace Research* 19 (No. 3): 261-70.
- White, Ralph K. 1984. *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations*. New York: Free Press.
- Wieseltier, Leon. 1983. *Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace: The Sensible Argument About the Greatest Peril of Our Age*. New York: Holt, Rinehart.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. 1989. "Serious Talk About the Nuclear Era," *Wall Street Journal* (March 16): A16.
- Williams, Phil. 1976. *Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*. New York: Wiley.
- Wohlstetter, Albert. 1985. "Between an Unfree World and None: Increasing Our Choices," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Summer): 962-94.
- Wolf, John B. 1968. *Louis XIV*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Wolfe, Alan. 1984. *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat*. Boston: South End Press.
- Wolfe, Thomas W. 1970. *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
- Wolfers, Arnold. 1968. "Alliances," pp. 268-71 in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan.
- Wolfers, Arnold. 1952. "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (December): 481-502.
- World Bank. 1988. *World Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. *Our Common Future*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- World Press Review. 1989. "Viewpoints: The Soviet Republics," *World Press Review* (January 10).
- Wright, Quincy. 1965. *A Study of War*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Yergin, Daniel. 1977. *Shattered Peace*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Zagare, Frank C. 1989. "Rationality and Deterrence," mimeo.
- Zhdanov, Andrei. 1947. *The International Situation*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.