

## The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System

**W**HEREAS HISTORIANS COMPLAIN that political scientists are more interested in the elegance of their theoretical models than in the empirical fit between those models and historical reality, political scientists argue that historians' interpretive narratives are based on implicit theoretical assumptions and causal models that influence their interpretations and that ought to be made explicit. Whatever the truth of these claims in general, the charge of a lack of theoretical self-consciousness certainly does not apply to Paul W. Schroeder. In several books and countless articles that span three decades and that demonstrate remarkable thematic consistency, Schroeder has been explicit about his view of the nature of historical explanation and about the analytic assumptions underlying his narrative interpretations.

This essay locates Schroeder's work in international relations theory, analyses his conception of an international system, and identifies the theoretical traditions from which he borrows.<sup>1</sup>

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I begin with a brief discussion of Schroeder's view of international history, which I relate to the levels-of-analysis concept in international relations theory and to the ongoing theoretical debates about international systems between realist and liberal international theories. I show that Schroeder builds on elements from each of these theoretical traditions, though his views most closely approximate a recent development in liberal theory that has been labelled 'neoliberal institutionalism'.

Schroeder's interpretation of the transformation of European politics from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and his

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<sup>1</sup> See also the critiques of Schroeder's view of the Vienna system in 'Did the Vienna Settlement Rest upon a Balance of Power?', *American Historical Review*, xcvi (1992); responses by Enno Kraehe, Robert Jervis, and Wolf Gruner.

general comments about historical explanation, make it clear that he is a 'systems theorist' who emphasizes 'the superiority of systemic-level explanation and structural analysis over unit-level explanations'.<sup>1</sup> He is more interested in explaining structures of power, relationships, and outcomes in the international system as a whole than either the foreign policies of particular states or the preferences and beliefs of individuals. He argues in his work on the Crimean War that 'the dynamics of international relations operate to a considerable degree autonomously, independent of decisions and their determinants,' and that 'the main goal of diplomatic history ought to be accounting not for the determinants of policy, but for the results.' Two decades later, he continues to argue that it is necessary to go beyond the study of the policies of individual actors and to focus on 'how systemic rules and structural limits influenced and shaped these outcomes' (p. xi).<sup>2</sup>

Schroeder's interest in explaining systemic-level outcomes is related to his conception of international politics as an autonomous field of study. He explicitly rejects both the assumption that foreign policy always reflects deeper forces within a country and the implication that diplomatic history should be subsumed within a larger conception of socio-economic, political, or intellectual history. Schroeder recognizes that international history is 'inextricably interwoven' with other aspects of social behaviour, and he does not endorse a return to a Rankean *Primat der Aussenpolitik*. But he argues that international politics should be understood in terms of its own system, structure, rules, and dynamics, and 'not as a dependent variable of any other systems or structures in society' (pp. ix-xi).<sup>3</sup>

Schroeder not only argues that international history should focus on explaining systemic-level patterns and outcomes, but also that the primary determinants of these patterns and outcomes are systemic-level causal factors. In terms of the levels-of-analysis framework so central to international relations theory, Schroeder argues that the primary determinants of systemic-level dependent variables are systemic-level independent variables rather than societal, institutional, or individual variables.<sup>4</sup> Schroeder is particularly critical of attempts to

<sup>1</sup> Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Oxford, 1994), p. xi. Subsequent references to *Transformation* are indicated by parentheses in the text. The distinction between 'system-level' and 'unit-level' phenomena, between the structure of a system and the units or elements that make up that system and interact within it, derives from Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA, 1979), pp. 39-41.

<sup>2</sup> Also, Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert* (New York, 1972), pp. xiv-xvi.

<sup>3</sup> Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. xii-xiv.

<sup>4</sup> Kenneth Waltz identified the individual, state, and system levels, although the term 'levels' was

explain foreign-policy actions in terms of the motivations of statesmen. True motivations are difficult to determine, in part because statesmen have an interest in rationalizing and distorting them.<sup>1</sup> In addition, he argues, constraints are generally far more important than motivations: 'The best practitioners of statecraft have always recognized that opportunities, capabilities, contingencies, and necessities take precedence over motives and intentions.'<sup>2</sup>

In spite of Schroeder's strong endorsement of a systems approach in his general theoretical remarks, his historical interpretations deviate from a strict systems perspective in several ways, as I shall demonstrate later. Unlike some systems theorists such as Kenneth Waltz, Schroeder is interested in explaining the foreign-policy behaviours of individual states as well as systemic patterns and outcomes. He also gives considerable explanatory power to certain individual-level variables, for it is the changing images and belief systems of political leaders that constitute the engine of change for Schroeder's system.<sup>3</sup> In contrast to much historiography and to the more recent work of political scientists, however, Schroeder gives relatively little emphasis to domestic (or bureaucratic) political variables or to the political economy of war.<sup>4</sup>

first suggested later by J. David Singer. Here I decompose the state category into distinct institutional (or bureaucratic/organizational) and societal levels. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York, 1959); Singer, 'The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations', in *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, ed. Klaus Knorr and Sydney Verba (Princeton, 1961), pp. 77-92. See also Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), ch. 1. Waltz's three levels are reflected in A. J. P. Taylor's analogy between the causes of wars and automobile accidents (the individual driver, the nature and condition of the vehicle, and road and weather conditions): Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (Oxford, 1961), p. 102.

<sup>1</sup> Ironically, one of Schroeder's earlier critiques of quantitative studies of international relations was that they focused exclusively on actors' behaviours and neglected their motivations: Paul W. Schroeder, 'Quantitative Studies in the Balance of Power: An Historian's Reaction', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xxi (1977), 3-22.

<sup>2</sup> Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. xv-xvi. Geoffrey Blainey makes a similar argument in *The Causes of War* (3rd ed., New York, 1988), ch. 10, but goes too far in emphasizing constraints (relative power) and neglecting motivations altogether. My own view is closer to rational choice theory, which emphasizes a more balanced combination of preferences (or goals) and constraints. See James D. Morrow, 'Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics', *World Politics*, xli (1988), 45-97.

<sup>3</sup> In contrast to Waltz and other political scientists whose preferences for a systems perspective are driven in part by their quest for parsimonious theory (explaining as much as possible with as few assumptions as possible), Schroeder is less concerned with parsimony. Admittedly, underlying Schroeder's nuanced historical interpretations is a relatively simple theoretical structure.

<sup>4</sup> The emphasis on the domestic politics and domestic political economy of security policy has only come in the last six or seven years for political scientists, two decades behind historians. See Jack S. Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, xviii (1988), 651-73, and 'The Diversionary Theory of War', in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (London, 1989), pp. 259-88; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and Strategic Ideology* (Ithaca, NY, 1991); Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War* (Princeton, NJ, 1992);

Schroeder's theoretical emphasis on systemic explanations of systemic patterns is consistent with a long tradition of scholarship in international relations theory. Realist balance-of-power theories have long dominated the field, and the leading contemporary theoretical debate in the field between realism and liberalism is essentially a debate between alternative systems theories.<sup>1</sup> To help place Schroeder's international history in the context of international relations theory, I shall summarize the realist and liberal theoretical perspectives, note some of the major variations in each (particularly realism), and show how Schroeder's work incorporates elements from each of them.

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Realism has been the dominant tradition (at least in the West) in the study of international politics since the time of Thucydides. It includes Machiavellians, Hobbesians, balance-of-power theorists, hegemonic-transition theorists, Waltzian neorealists, cold-war strategists, and many quantitative analysts. Realism incorporates a number of more specific theories that often generate conflicting predictions but that share a hard core of common assumptions. These assumptions concern the nature of the actors in world politics, their motivations and strategies, and the system within which they operate.

Realists see the international system as anarchic, defined by the absence of a higher legal authority or enforcement mechanism and characterized by conflicting interests and severe threats to security. The key actors are territorial states who define their interests in terms of survival, security, and power and who act rationally to maximize their interests. Given their views of an inherently conflictual world and their uncertainty regarding the present and future intentions of the adversary, political leaders focus on short-term security needs and on their relative position in the system, adopt worst-case thinking, discount long-term security considerations, engage in a struggle for power, and treat the threat and use of force as the *ultima ratio*.

The realist world-view includes assumptions about the bargaining behaviour of states engaged in international crises. States engage in a 'competition in risk-taking' and utilize coercive threats to demonstrate

Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, 1993). The emphasis on bureaucratic politics began in the early 1970s with Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston, 1971).

<sup>1</sup> On the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism, see *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York, 1993); Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate', *International Organization*, xlviii (1994), 313-44; *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (New York, 1995). Many international theorists are not systems theorists, however, and another important paradigm is the decision-making approach, either at the bureaucratic or individual levels. See Allison, *Essence of Decision*; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*.

resolve, exploit the other's fear of war, induce the adversary's compliance with one's demands, and maintain their reputation and credibility for the future. Bargaining power is a function of relative power and resolve.<sup>1</sup> Statesmen are prudent and yield in the face of stronger power and resolve, but they also assume that the adversary will do the same, and crises sometimes resemble games of chicken.

In realist theory, wars occur not only because some states prefer war to peace as a means of maximizing their power and security, but also because of the unintended consequences of actions by those who prefer peace to war and who are more interested in minimizing their losses than in maximizing their gains.<sup>2</sup> Efforts by states to provide for their own security through armaments, alliances, and coercive threats often reduce the security of others (the 'security dilemma'), trigger counter-actions, and lead to entrapment in conflict spirals which become difficult to reverse.<sup>3</sup>

Although all realist theorists share these basic assumptions, there are some important differences in emphasis. For those who engage in debates over 'grand theory' in international relations, the key division is between traditional or 'classical realism' – which goes back to Thucydides, E. H. Carr, and Hans J. Morgenthau, and 'neorealism' – which was formalized by Waltz in an attempt to construct a rigorous, deductive, and parsimonious theory of international politics.<sup>4</sup>

A key difference between these two realist traditions concerns their underlying assumptions regarding the fundamental source of international conflict. Classical realists emphasize both the absence of a

<sup>1</sup> The balance of resolve is a function of the asymmetry of interests at stake. Some realists adopt a 'pure power' model in which the outcomes of crisis bargaining are determined solely by the dyadic balance of power, but a wide range of empirical research demonstrates that relative power does not provide a good explanation of crisis outcomes and that, if anything, relative resolve explains more than relative power. See Russell J. Leng, *Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980: Realism versus Reciprocity* (New York, 1993); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1974).

<sup>2</sup> Recent research in social psychology emphasizes that people tend to overvalue losses relative to comparable gains and to take greater risks to avoid losses than to secure gains. See Jack S. Levy, 'An Introduction to Prospect Theory', *Political Psychology*, xiii (1992), 171-86. This is reflected in the emphasis of some realists on 'defensive state positionalism'. See Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations* (Ithaca, NY, 1990), pp. 10, 28-9.

<sup>3</sup> On crisis bargaining and influence strategies, see Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA, 1960); George and Smoke, *Deterrence*; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton, NJ, 1977); Leng, *Interstate Crisis Behavior*; T. Clifton Morgan, *Untying the Knot of War: A Bargaining Theory of International Crises* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1994). On conflict spirals and models of entrapment, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, ch. 3; Joel Brockner and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts* (New York, 1985).

<sup>4</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Rex Warner (New York, 1954); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (4th ed., New York, 1967); Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London, 1962); Waltz, *Theory*.

higher authority and the inherently aggressive and conflictual propensities of human nature as the primary causes of international conflict. Waltz and his followers eliminate human nature as an explanatory concept, give primacy to the anarchic structure of the international system, and attempt to construct a structural-systemic theory of international politics (which is why some refer to Waltz's theory as 'structural realism').<sup>1</sup> In the process, Waltz retains the classical realists' assumption of the primacy of states; reinforces their assumption of rationality; shifts from Morgenthau's idea that states try to maximize power as an end in itself to the notion that power is a means to the maximization of security; abandons the traditionalists' concerns to develop a theory of statecraft or foreign policy; and argues more strongly for a purely systemic theory of international politics.<sup>2</sup>

For Waltz, the key explanatory variable is the distribution of power, which is reflected by the number of great powers in the system.<sup>3</sup> A core hypothesis is that the dynamics of state interactions differ in bipolar systems and multipolar systems, just as the economic behaviour of firms differs in monopoly, oligopoly, and competitive markets in spite of the fact that the motivations of individual firms remains the same. For Waltz, bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity, which differentiates Waltz's balance-of-power theory from that of classical realists like Morgenthau, Edward V. Gulick, and others, who emphasize the stabilizing features of multipolarity. The empirical evidence, which is conveniently ignored by deductively oriented neorealists, is mixed. Among the major wars occurring during bipolar periods are the Peloponnesian War, the Punic Wars, and the Habsburg-Valois wars of the early sixteenth century.<sup>4</sup> It is somewhat

<sup>1</sup> Waltz argues, correctly in my view, that an unchanging human nature cannot possibly explain the enormous variability in international conflict. Moreover, if human nature changes, then it is the conditions that give rise to these changes which explain variations in conflict, not the amorphous concept of human nature itself. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, ch. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Waltz explicitly aims (in *Theory*) for a theory of international politics rather than a theory of foreign policy; argues that unit-level explanations are 'reductionist' and unable to provide sufficient explanations of international politics; and presents an exclusively systemic theory that excludes lower-level variables. Waltz is correct to argue that systemic variables are necessary to explain how the actions of two or more states interact to lead to war as a systemic outcome (just as national-level variables are necessary to explain how individual beliefs and preferences get translated into state decisions and actions), but wrong to suggest that systemic variables provide sufficient explanations of systemic phenomena.

<sup>3</sup> Waltz also identifies a system's ordering principle and the functions of its formally differentiated parts as the defining elements of any structure. International relations is anarchic rather than hierarchical and consists of units (states) that perform similar functions (struggle for survival). These aspects of structure, unlike the distribution of power, are relatively constant and carry little explanatory power.

<sup>4</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 8; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, chs. 11-14;

puzzling that in his general critique of neorealist theory, Schroeder does not comment on the neorealist proposition that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity.<sup>1</sup>

I cannot deal here with the many criticisms of Waltzian neorealism.<sup>2</sup> It is important to note, however, that, for the sake of parsimony, Waltz defines the structure of the international system very narrowly in terms of the distribution of capabilities and excludes relational phenomena and interaction processes (alliance and trade patterns, for example) from his conception of structure.<sup>3</sup> This leaves Waltz with the distribution of power in the system as his remaining structural variable, which cannot fully explain the enormous variation in the patterns of behaviour in the international system.<sup>4</sup> For this reason, most realists depart from Waltzian neorealism and define structure much more broadly to include alliance configurations, territorial contiguity, patterns of trade, and other systems-level variables.

It is clear that Schroeder's view of the international system is far broader than that suggested either by Waltzian or classical realism. Schroeder defines a system as 'the understandings, assumptions, learned skills and responses, rules, norms, procedures, etc. which agents acquire and use in pursuing their individual divergent aims within the framework of a shared practice'. He goes on to say that "systemic analysis" means a consistent attempt to determine not only how the game of international politics turned out and how the decisions, policies, and actions of individual states led to that outcome, but also how these individual policies and actions were shaped and

Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York, 1955). For quantitative research on polarity and war, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 'Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xxii (1978), 241-66; *Polarity and War*, ed. Alan Ned Sabrosky (Boulder, CO, 1985); Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace?* (New York, 1994).

<sup>1</sup> Paul Schroeder, 'Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory', *International Security*, xix (1994), 108-48.

<sup>2</sup> See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', *World Politics*, xl (1988), 241-5; *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, 1986); Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy* (New York, 1993); Schroeder, 'Historical Reality'.

<sup>3</sup> Waltz also treats the development of nuclear weapons as a unit-level rather than a system-level phenomenon.

<sup>4</sup> Waltz concedes that neorealist theory cannot explain why particular wars are fought, only 'war's dismal recurrence through the millennia': 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, xviii (1988), 620. Most quantitative research has failed to find any consistent relationship between the distribution of power in the system and the frequency and seriousness of war. See Jack S. Levy, 'The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence', in *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*: Vol. 1, ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al. (New York, 1989), pp. 223-58; John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (New York, 1993); and Greg Cashman, *What Causes War?* (New York, 1993). For an empirically supported but controversial structural model, see William R. Thompson, *On Global War* (Columbia, SC, 1988).

limited by these shared rules and understandings, and how these collective understandings were in turn challenged and altered, sometimes violently, by violations or different versions of the rules' (p. xii).

Thus Schroeder goes far beyond Waltz in terms of what he includes in the system. There is no room in Waltz for the rules, norms, procedures, or shared assumptions which play such a central role in Schroeder's international system. As we shall see, Schroeder's conception of the system is much closer to a neoliberal institutionalist view of international society. Some of his interpretations of international behaviour, however, are consistent with more particular realist hypotheses, and to see this we must return to two theories that can each be subsumed within the realist framework but that generate rather different explanations of international politics and foreign policy. These are balance-of-power theory and hegemonic theory. This distinction cuts across the distinction between classical and neorealism but in my view is equally important. Let us consider each in turn.

The balance-of-power concept has been used in many ways, as Schroeder recognizes.<sup>1</sup> I focus here on balance of power both as a theory of international politics and as a strategy or policy pursued by states. Each of the many versions of balance-of-power theory is not so much a well-developed theory as a loose collection of hypotheses and strategic prescriptions which are not always mutually consistent. What these 'theories' share in common are the basic realist assumptions outlined above and the core hypothesis that in order to ensure their own survival, independence, and security, states attempt to preserve the decentralized sovereign state system and prevent any single state from achieving a position of dominance over it.<sup>2</sup>

The avoidance of hegemony requires that states maintain a 'balance' or 'equilibrium' of power. This instrumental goal takes priority over peace, which is desirable but not the most highly valued objective for most states (or at least most great powers) at most times. Schroeder agrees that the main purpose of the balance of power 'is not to preserve peace but to prevent empire or hegemony, to preserve the independence of the various units within a multinational system'.<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Paul W. Schroeder, 'The Nineteenth-Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?', *Review of International Studies*, xv (1989), 137; see also Ernst B. Haas, 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda', *World Politics*, v (1953), 442-77.

<sup>2</sup> Some versions of balance-of-power theory add further assumptions such as the existence of at least four or five great powers or an equality of power. I prefer to treat these as hypotheses to be tested rather than assumptions of the theory: Levy, 'Causes of War', p. 230.

<sup>3</sup> Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, p. 402. Also Gulick, *Balance of Power*; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*. For the emphasis on the maintenance of peace, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York, 1962), p. 55.

independence to be preserved is that of the large states; the independence of weaker states is often sacrificed for the sake of the interests of the great powers and peace among them, as Schroeder makes clear in his discussions of the partitions of Poland and the principle of compensations in the eighteenth-century balance-of-power system (pp. 5-19).<sup>1</sup> Balance-of-power theory originated as a theory of great-power behaviour, and consequently some of the theory's key propositions are not necessarily applicable to smaller states operating in regional systems in the shadow of the great powers.

States have two general strategies for maintaining an equilibrium of power. The first is the mobilization of internal resources to build up the state's own military capabilities. The second is external balancing through the formation of alliances and military coalitions as a means of capability aggregation and deterrence against potential aggressors. A key hypothesis is that states, and particularly the great powers, will form blocking coalitions against any bid for hegemony, which is defined as military hegemony over the system as a whole. Thus, great powers tend to balance against the strongest and most threatening states rather than 'bandwagon' with them.<sup>2</sup> Other techniques that serve external balancing (as well as other) functions and that are discussed by Schroeder include the creation of buffer states, territorial partitions, compensations, indemnities, other forms of intervention in the affairs of weaker states, and preventive war (pp. 6-11).<sup>3</sup>

Balance-of-power theorists argue that the balancing mechanism usually works, so that military hegemonies almost never form. But is this because the 'balance of power' successfully deters aspiring hegemonies from arising and threatening the system, or because the hegemonic threats that do arise are defeated by blocking coalitions and general wars to restore equilibrium? Do balance-of-power strategies (and related *realpolitik* prescriptions) lead to peace, as their proponents claim, or do they lead to war?

Balance-of-power theory is not perfectly clear on this point, in part because it is more concerned with explaining national strategies, the formation of blocking coalitions, and the avoidance of hegemony than the origins of wars. Schroeder recognizes this dilemma. He argues that 'balance-of-power arguments ... explain any outcome equally well.

<sup>1</sup> In fact, Schroeder argues that these small buffer states and intermediaries play an important role in maintaining a balance or equilibrium in the system.

<sup>2</sup> On the distinction between balancing and bandwagoning, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 125-6; Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY, 1987).

<sup>3</sup> Gulick, *Balance of Power*, ch. 3; Jack S. Levy, 'Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War', *World Politics*, xl (1987), 82-107.

War or peace can be accounted for either by a balance or by an imbalance of power' (p. 6). In the end, however, Schroeder concludes that balance-of-power policies lead to war; this view is shared by some international theorists, but empirical research on this question has produced mixed results.<sup>1</sup>

Although balance-of-power theory is rather ambiguous, it is possible to make certain inferences as to which conditions are conducive to war and which are more conducive to peace. Balance-of-power theorists disagree somewhat as to whether major war is least likely under conditions of bipolarity or multipolarity, but they agree that movements towards unipolarity are destabilizing because they trigger blocking coalitions and (usually) a hegemonic war to restore equilibrium. Thus, balance-of-power theorists agree that some form of equilibrium of military capabilities increases the stability of the system. This stability is further enhanced by a flexible and non-polarized alliance system and by the existence of a balancer.

Some classical realists, but not Waltzian neorealists, add a normative component to the set of conditions that facilitate the effective functioning of a balance-of-power system. They refer to the concept of a European family of states, a consensus regarding the legitimacy of the system, and a belief that the taming of unrestrained ambition by the balance-of-power mechanism contributes to a just international order.<sup>2</sup> Thus, Morgenthau concedes that the fuel that keeps the motor of the balance of power moving is the 'intellectual and moral foundation of the balance of power', and Gulick speaks of the 'homogeneity' of states in the 'European commonwealth' and distinguishes balance-of-power theory from power politics.<sup>3</sup>

Schroeder acknowledges these moral and prescriptive aspects of balance-of-power theory (and their ideological function) (p. 9). In contrasting his own interpretation of the Vienna system with a balance-of-power perspective, however, Schroeder minimizes the role

<sup>1</sup> Vasquez, *War Puzzle*; Leng, *Interstate Crisis Behavior*.

<sup>2</sup> Some add the limited aims of states as a further condition contributing to a stable balance of power. But this adds a degree of circularity to the theory by suggesting that if states have limited aims and accept the legitimacy of the system, they will not attempt to overthrow it. It also raises the question of whether it is limited aims of states that contribute to a stable balance of power, or a stable balance of power that induces limited aims in states (through the deterrence effects of anticipated blocking coalitions). Most balance-of-power theorists accept the second proposition and believe that the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest works, through the balance of power, to avoid hegemony, preserve the independence of states, and thus contribute to a morally just international order.

<sup>3</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, pp. 212-13; Gulick, *Balance of Power*, pp. 19-24, 298; Stanley Hoffmann, 'Balance of Power', in *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (New York, 1968), p. 507.

of norms, rules, and other non-*realpolitik* elements in balance-of-power theory and highlights them in his own analysis of the system. This tends to conceal some of the similarities and exaggerate the differences between Schroeder's systems theory and that offered by many balance-of-power theorists.

Nevertheless, the treatment of balance of power as essentially a structural theory of *realpolitik* behaviour is a reasonable one. The inclusion of normative and other non-structural elements into balance-of-power theory makes it even less falsifiable than it already is, less distinguishable from alternative theories, and consequently less useful as a theory of international politics. If there is anything distinctive about balance-of-power theory, it is its emphasis on the importance of system structures and the *realpolitik* state behaviours that they induce.<sup>1</sup>

Hegemonic theory shares the realist assumptions that states act rationally on the basis of interests defined as power and security, and that the distribution of power is the primary determinant of behaviour and outcomes in a decentralized sovereign state system. But 'hegemonic realists' differ from 'balance-of-power realists' in that they downplay the significance of anarchy and emphasize hierarchies of power and informal sources of order and 'governance' in the system. There is usually one state that dominates over the others by virtue of its military and economic strength, and this 'hegemon' uses its power to create and maintain a set of political and economic structures and certain norms of behaviour that serve its own interests and enhance its power. Many subordinate great powers benefit from this system of order and align with the hegemon. A hegemonic state cannot maintain its position of dominance forever, however, because of differential rates of growth among states and the costs of imperial over-extension. They are ultimately overtaken and replaced by a rising state, usually as the result of a 'hegemonic war', and the new hegemon then uses its power to create a new political order.

Different versions of hegemonic theory have been proposed by A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, Robert Gilpin, and George Modelski and William R. Thompson.<sup>2</sup> They share the central

<sup>1</sup> This view of balance-of-power theory as a structural theory and the exclusion of normative and ideational elements from the definition of structure is not universally shared, and the nature of structure is a contested issue in international relations theory, and in social theory. See Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, xli (1987), 335-70; Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems of Social Theory* (Berkeley, 1979). In my view, the question of whether or not to define ideational variables as part of system structure is less important than the question of whether such variables, however defined, significantly enhance the explanatory power of our theories and historical interpretations.

<sup>2</sup> A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, 'The Power Transition', in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed.

hypothesis that the probability of a major war is least likely under conditions of hegemonic dominance and most likely at the point of the 'power transition' from one hegemonic power to the next. They each identify a set of hegemonic or global wars which constitute major turning-points in the international system, though they disagree somewhat on which particular wars should be included and the particular causal dynamics from which they arise.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, balance-of-power theory and hegemonic transition theory share basic realist assumptions but yield diametrically opposed hypotheses regarding the dynamics of power politics and the conditions most likely to lead to major war. Balance-of-power theory posits that hegemony is rare; that increasing concentrations of military and economic power tends to increase the likelihood of a major war; that the dispersion of military power among several great powers is conducive to stability and peace; that great powers tend to balance against the leading state rather than bandwagon with it; and that alliances play a central role in the balancing process to maintain order. Hegemonic transition theory suggests that hegemony is relatively common; that concentrations of power minimize the likelihood of a major war and that dispersions of military capabilities are destabilizing; that great powers bandwagon with hegemony as often as they balance against them; and that alliances play a secondary role in deterring aggression.

The debate over balancing and bandwagoning is particularly important because of the central and unambiguous role of great-power balancing behaviour in balance-of-power theory, and Schroeder makes an important contribution to this debate.<sup>2</sup> He notes, first of all, that if one follows Stephen Walt and emphasizes balancing against the greatest threat rather than against the greatest power, it often becomes very difficult to distinguish between balancing and bandwagoning because of the difficulty of measuring threat perception. Second, although balance-of-power theory can accommodate bandwagoning

Midlarsky, ch. 7; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York, 1981), and 'The Theory of Hegemonic War', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, xviii (1988), 591-613; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, 'Long Cycles and Global War', in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Midlarsky, ch. 2. All but Gilpin include extensive quantitative empirical research.

<sup>1</sup> For comparisons of the wars and critiques of the theories, see Jack S. Levy, 'Theories of General War', *World Politics*, xxvii (1985), 344-74, and 'Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions, and the Long Peace', in *Long Postwar Peace*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (New York, 1991), pp. 147-76; Vasquez, *War Puzzle*, chs. 3, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Schroeder identifies bandwagoning (joining the stronger side for protection and payoffs) as one of three alternatives to the 'self-help' strategy emphasized by realists. The others are 'hiding' through neutrality or isolationism and 'transcending' through some kind of institutional arrangement: Schroeder, 'Neo-realist Theory', pp. 116-18. Schroeder discusses the strategy of appeasement in 'Munich and the British Tradition', *Historical Journal*, xix (1976), 223-43.

by smaller powers, it cannot explain Schroeder's examples of great-power bandwagoning during periods of French dominance in the late seventeenth century and in the Revolutionary Wars, during the Crimean War, and in other cases. When France emerged dominant after its final defeat of Spain in 1659, for example, Schroeder argues that 'everybody except Spain, which as victim and loser had no choice, bandwagoned with France and increased the French hegemonic threat.'<sup>1</sup>

A related form of alliance behaviour which stems from slightly different motivations is the use of alliances as 'tools of management and control'.<sup>2</sup> State A may ally with state B not for the primary purposes of increasing its own effective military power, as posited by the traditional realist 'capability aggregation model' of alliances, but to restrain B from taking certain actions that might threaten A's security and other interests. This may be part of a self-interested, short-term influence strategy by A with respect to B, or part of a more encompassing effort to restrain a potentially threatening B within a broader structure for system management. Schroeder emphasizes the managing function of restraining alliances, or *pacta de contrahendo*, during the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Concert period. He notes that, as early as 1802, some continental statesmen assumed that 'political equilibrium could best be achieved, not by confronting an aggressive state (here, France) with a hostile coalition, but by grouping it within a restraining alliance' (p. 236).

Note that the focus of influence or control may not be limited to an ally's foreign policy. Schroeder argues that 'during the 1820s and 1830s, Metternich used the [German Confederation of 1815] much more for controlling the internal policies of member states and for managing Austria's junior partner Prussia than he used it for European high politics.' Similarly, Schroeder argues that Prince von Bismarck viewed his alliances with Austria not only as a way of managing power relations in the Balkans and controlling the traditional Austro-Russian rivalry, but also as a means of managing Austria's internal policy and constitution in an attempt to minimize the internal instability that might render Austria-Hungary an unsafe or unpredictable ally.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Schroeder, 'Neo-realist Theory', p. 133; Walt, *Origins of Alliances*. See also the symposium on balancing and bandwagoning in *Security Studies*, i (1992); Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit', *International Security*, xix (1994), 72-107.

<sup>2</sup> Schroeder raises this theme throughout *Transformation* and develops it more systematically in 'Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management', in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence, KN, 1976), pp. 227-62.

<sup>3</sup> Schroeder, 'Alliances', pp. 232, 242. See also Paul W. Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1823* (Austin, TX, 1977).

Schroeder's conceptualization of the *pactum de contrahendo* as an alternative to the capability aggregation model of alliances provides a useful contribution to the theoretical literature on alliances. Although bandwagoning and the use of alliances as a tool of management, restraint, and influence are not consistent with the balance-of-power hypothesis that great powers balance against the strongest states and/or greatest threats to the system, they are consistent with the hegemonic realist proposition that hegemons will use alliances with other great powers to help the system maintain order. In my view, Schroeder's analysis of bandwagoning and restraining alliances has demonstrated the complexity of behaviour that one might expect in a competitive, anarchic world rather than dealt a serious blow to realist theory.<sup>1</sup>

Both balance-of-power and hegemonic realist theories are structural theories in that they posit that objectively identifiable international structures are the primary determinants of national behaviour and international interactions. The larger realist paradigm in which they are embedded includes hypotheses about state strategies and the processes through which they interact, but the general assumption – shared by classical realists as well as neorealists – is that such *realpolitik* behaviour is the inevitable consequence of the severe constraints imposed on state choices in an anarchic Hobbesian world. As Morgenthau argues, 'political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws.' One of these laws is the 'inevitability' of the balance of power.<sup>2</sup>

It is possible to accept the argument that states usually engage in power politics but to reject the additional argument that such behaviour is structurally determined (or, more generally, that it follows from objective laws of nature). It is important to distinguish between power politics as a description of how states behave and realism as a theory constructed to explain that behaviour. As John Vasquez argues, 'power

<sup>1</sup> The larger problem is that realist theory is so encompassing that a wide range of actions is consistent with it, which reduces the discriminating power of the theory and renders it less falsifiable. This leads me to believe that we ought to shift our focus away from realism as a framework towards the more testable theories subsumed within it. For alliance behaviour that is more at odds with realist theory, see Jack S. Levy and Michael N. Barnett, 'Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security', *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, xiv, (1992), 19–40.

<sup>2</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, pp. 4–14, 161–3. Morgenthau is ambiguous as to whether the balance of power is an empirical law or normative requirement. Do states always follow balance-of-power principles, or do states sometimes violate those principles but suffer severe costs to the national interest when they do because of the severity of structural constraints on strategic choices? It is probably the latter, which means that Morgenthau's balance-of-power system does not quite approximate the 'automatic' balance-of-power system described by Claude in *Power and International Relations*, pp. 28–37, 43–7.

politics is not so much an explanation of world politics, as it is a form of behavior that must itself be explained.' In Vasquez's view, *realpolitik* is not structurally determined but is instead learned behaviour that derives from a particular *image* of the world held by political leaders, an image characterized by insecurity, distrust, and a struggle for power.<sup>1</sup>

For Vasquez, image is a key intervening variable between structure and behaviour. Through their images and practices, political leaders help shape (or socially construct) the system within which they interact. Whereas neorealist theory posits that there is a direct and invariant link between objective structures and intervening images or beliefs, so that those images are epiphenomenal, Vasquez argues that decentralized international systems can give rise to different images and consequently to different *foreign-policy practices* and behaviour.<sup>2</sup>

Although Vasquez rejects the premises of realist theories, he accepts the validity of many realist hypotheses for empirical domains where political élites share *realpolitik* images of the world: 'Power politics theory provides an accurate description of behavior to the extent that collectivities continue to adopt its perspective and/or practices.' That is, realist images lead to realist practices through a self-fulfilling process: if everybody believes that states adopt *realpolitik* policies, everybody will. Moreover, these images – and consequently the practices that emerge from them – are in fact quite common in the modern era because of learning, evolution, and diffusion of images. But for Vasquez, power-politics practices generally lead to war rather than to peace, and constitute an important step on the 'realist road to war' that must be explained. Thus, a theory of war must include an explanation of how and under what conditions certain kinds of images arise, what kinds of behaviour or foreign-policy practices they generate, and the conditions under which those practices contribute to the outbreak and escalation of war.<sup>3</sup>

Vasquez's argument that realist hypotheses are often valid in periods in which leaders share realist images of the world, but that *realpolitik* practices lead to war rather than to peace, is reflected in Schroeder's interpretation of the balance of power. He concedes that balance-of-power principles have often governed the conduct of states, particularly in the eighteenth century. Schroeder summarizes the key rules

<sup>1</sup> Vasquez, *War Puzzle*, p. 86.

<sup>2</sup> Some of these practices may also lead to war, but through different causal paths. On the theoretical importance of belief systems, see Alexander L. George, 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making', *International Studies Quarterly*, xiii (1969), 190–222.

<sup>3</sup> Vasquez, *War Puzzle*, p. 87 and ch. 5.

governing the operation of the eighteenth-century balance-of-power system and argues that eighteenth-century statesmen often explicitly referred to balance-of-power language and doctrine and behaved accordingly. They 'by and large accepted this system, more or less believed in it, operated by its rules, and were thus trapped by it' (pp. 6-10).<sup>1</sup>

They were trapped by it because the pursuit of balance-of-power policies leads to war rather than to peace. Schroeder argues that the 1763 to 1787 period (as well as other periods) demonstrates that balancing behaviour produces not equilibrium, limited conflict, and the independence of essential actors, but rather 'imbalance, hegemony, and systemic conflict' (p. 48). States' conceptions of a suitable balance of power were mutually contradictory,<sup>2</sup> and the structure of power was such that the free play of competitive forces would lead to hegemony for one or two actors and destruction or dependence for others. In addition, the assumptions and methods required by the balance of power to maintain equilibrium actually blocked the peaceful resolution of disputes, promoted conflict, and increased the likelihood that particular conflicts would periodically escalate into general systemic wars. As Schroeder explains in his analysis of the 'general systemic crisis' that led to the First World War, 'the very devices built into a system to keep it stable and operative under stress, subjected to intolerable pressures, generate forces of their own which cause the system to destroy itself' (pp. 6-10).<sup>3</sup>

If there was ever a time when the balance of power should have worked, Schroeder argues, it was in the eighteenth century after the Seven Years War, which generated a military stalemate and political results that should have been conducive to a durable peace. Schroeder rejects the traditional view that the period after 1763 was a system of limited warfare and controlled competition which was destroyed only by ideological and military forces unleashed by the French Revolution. Rather, it was only 'a truce marred by constant crises and smaller wars threatening to spread and become general', and by the mid-1780s Europe was in the midst of a general security crisis. 'Europe in the 1780s was not heading inexorably toward revolution, but

<sup>1</sup> Also Schroeder, 'Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?', *American Historical Review*, xcvi (1992), 683-706.

<sup>2</sup> Paul W. Schroeder, 'The Transformation of Political Thinking, 1787-1848', in *Coping with Complexity in the International System*, ed. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder, CO, 1993), p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> Also Schroeder, 'World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak', *Journal of Modern History*, xlv (1972), 321.

toward war, whether or not there was revolution. Revolution was contingent; war systemic and structural' (pp. 51-2).<sup>1</sup>

Schroeder's balance of power and associated *realpolitik* practices that provide the seeds of the system's self-destruction are not the inevitable consequence of objective laws of nature or impersonal international structures, as they are for Morgenthau or Waltz. They are more like Vasquez's foreign-policy practices, which constitute learned behaviour and which reflect political leaders' images of the world. Images can change without structural change, and changes of images can lead to changes in practices and consequently to changes in the system.<sup>2</sup> For Schroeder, this is precisely what happened in 1813-15: 'A competitive balance-of-power struggle gave way to an international system of political equilibrium based on benign shared hegemony and the mutual recognition of rights underpinned by law.' This system transformation was driven by changes in the assumptions, beliefs, and goals of political leaders and institutionalized in the rules, norms, and conventions of the European Concert, which endured until it was destroyed by the Crimean War.<sup>3</sup>

The Vienna settlement did not lead to a restoration of a balance-of-power system and related *realpolitik* practices, but to a new and 'decisively different' system. In fact, the transformation of political thinking in 1813-15 contributed to the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the construction of the Vienna settlement itself. Moreover, it was this new international system and not a revived balance-of-power system, a conservative-monarchical 'Holy Alliance' against the transnational class struggle and internal revolution, or general war weariness which explains the relative peace and stability of international politics of the period between 1815 and 1854 (chs. 11-12).<sup>4</sup> More so than all

<sup>1</sup> Also Schroeder, 'Transformation of Political Thinking', pp. 50-1. This characterization of the balance-of-power system of the late eighteenth century is important because that system is the basis of comparison with Schroeder's norm-based and more stable system after 1815. I think that the hypothesized instability of the system needs more empirical support.

<sup>2</sup> They can also lead to actors' changing conceptions of the meaning of the balance of power: 'instead of the balance of power explaining what happened in European politics, what happened in European politics largely explains what happened to the idea of the balance of power'; Schroeder, 'Nineteenth-Century System', p. 141.

<sup>3</sup> Schroeder rejects the argument that any change in the nature of international politics after 1815 was temporary; that the Concert had begun to break down by 1820; that the decline had accelerated by 1830; and that the Concert had collapsed and had been replaced by competitive balance-of-power politics by 1848. He emphasizes the fact that neither the revolutions of 1848-50, which were far more extensive and nearly as radical as those of 1789-93, nor the Crimean War led to a general European war, and traces this to the effects of an enduring (though weakened) Concert system: Paul W. Schroeder, 'The Nineteenth-Century International System: Changes in the Structure', *World Politics*, xxxix (1986), 1-26.

<sup>4</sup> For balance-of-power interpretations of the stability of the Concert period, see Gulick, *Balance*

other times in European history when statesmen of Europe attempted to construct a peaceful international system after a general systemic war – 1648, 1713–14, 1763, 1919, 1945 – the Vienna system succeeded (p. 577).<sup>1</sup>

Structurally, the new system did not rest on an equal distribution of power among five great powers, but on a shared hegemony.<sup>2</sup> The two flanking powers, Britain and Russia, were each invulnerable, able to provide for its security without the help of allies, and strong enough to be able to withstand even an unlikely alliance of the three great powers of central Europe.<sup>3</sup> Britain was hegemonic in the colonial world and on the high seas, and Russia was hegemonic in eastern Europe and throughout much of northern Asia, and the two retained dominance in the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Levant, the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, and the Baltic. The other great powers – France, Austria, and Prussia – were considerably weaker, dependent on allies for security, and able to secure alliances only with considerable costs, if at all. This was ‘not balance of power but hegemony’.<sup>4</sup>

This shared hegemony was supplemented by several other inter-related elements. One was a series of ‘sub-hegemonies’. Austria dominated central Europe and Italy, Prussia northern Europe, and together they managed the German Confederation. The joint management of the *Bund* was important because it dampened and controlled rivalries and territorial disputes among states and other

of Power, Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (New York, 1964); Enno E. Kraehe, ‘A Bipolar Balance of Power’, *American Historical Review*, xcvi (1992), 707–15; Wolf D. Gruner, ‘Was There a Reformed Balance of Power System or Cooperative Great Power Hegemony?’, *American Historical Review*, xcvi (1992), 725–32. On the limited role of the conservative monarchical spirit, see Schroeder, ‘Changes in Structure’, pp. 4–5. As to the fear of revolution, Schroeder argues (‘Vienna Settlement’, p. 700) that political leaders feared war and its destabilizing consequences more than revolution from within.

<sup>1</sup> For comparative studies of other efforts to construct a lasting peace after a general war, see Charles F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation* (Baltimore, MD, 1971); Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989* (New York, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> This was the consequence of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which Schroeder interprets (at least through 1807) not as wars unleashed by French hegemony and imperialism and fought by the allies to restore a balance of power, but a great contest between France, Britain, and Russia for hegemony in Europe: ‘Vienna Settlement’, p. 691.

<sup>3</sup> For this reason, the Concert did not technically satisfy one of the key requirements for a ‘collective security system’ – that all states in the system must be vulnerable to collective sanctions. See Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p. 195; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, ‘Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe’, *International Security*, xvi (1991), 124.

<sup>4</sup> Schroeder, ‘Vienna Settlement’, pp. 686–91. Although Britain and Russia each proclaimed its aim of restoring a balance of power on the continent, they each interpreted balance to mean hegemony in its own sphere. Thus Schroeder argues that ‘balance-of-power slogans and rules served hegemonic aims’.

factions within Germany, temporarily settled the Austro-Prussian rivalry, and created an independent centre to fill the power vacuum in central Europe that had been an important source of European wars for over three centuries. Closely related was a system of smaller states that were situated and organized to serve as buffers and spheres of influence to separate the great powers and reduce both the opportunities and incentives for war.<sup>1</sup>

The debate over whether Schroeder's system is really one of shared hegemony, a bipolar balance of power, or a reformed multipolar balance of power has largely focused on the characterization of the structure of the system defined in terms of the distribution of power.<sup>2</sup> In this sense, I see all three, including Schroeder's shared hegemony, as consistent with a broadly defined balance-of-power framework. This was not hegemony over the entire system (whether continental or world-wide), as hegemonic realists define the term,<sup>3</sup> and regional hegemonies or sub-hegemonies are perfectly consistent with the spheres-of-influence concept in balance-of-power theory. In addition, hegemonic aspirations by individual great powers are not in principle inconsistent with equilibrium at the systemic level because they are tempered and contained by the distribution of power and other structural constraints. Finally, Schroeder's model of his own system as a ‘catamaran – a light, frail, but mobile and buoyant vessel, its vulnerable centre held above the waves by outriggers on both sides, needing constant attention and seamanship to keep it afloat’ – is also structurally consistent with a balance-of-power perspective (p. 591).<sup>4</sup>

Thus, the structure of the system in terms of the distribution of capabilities does not distinguish Schroeder's system from a balance-of-power system. Nor does it explain four decades of great-power peace, whereas other hegemonic systems have been much more violent. As

<sup>1</sup> Schroeder, ‘Changes in Structure’, pp. 17–25 and *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 406–7.

<sup>2</sup> Kraehe, ‘Bipolar Balance of Power’; Gruner, ‘Reformed Balance of Power’.

<sup>3</sup> ‘Hegemonic stability theory’ defines hegemony in economic terms and permits the conceptualization of economic hegemony over part of the system, as illustrated by nineteenth-century British hegemony or post-1945 American hegemony: Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, NJ, 1984), ch. 3.

<sup>4</sup> In many respects, Schroeder's system of shared hegemony fits Midlarsky's model of ‘hierarchical equilibrium’, in which there is an equilibrium of power between two leading states but hegemonic dominance by each within its own sphere. But Midlarsky envisions stability to include a polarized alliance system around two leading rivals, whereas in Schroeder's description of Europe after 1815 there are no polarized (or even permanent) alliances and no significant rivalry between the two leading states. Manus I. Midlarsky, ‘Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability of Multipolar Systems’, *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Midlarsky, pp. 55–81; Schroeder, ‘A Mild Rejoinder’, *American Historical Review*, xcvi (1992), 733–5.

Schroeder argues, in structural terms Europe of 1815 was much like that of 1763, but the former was far more stable: 'Eighteenth-century balance of power rules and practices produced predatory, destabilizing hegemony. The Vienna era's equilibrist rules and practices promoted benign, stabilizing kinds of hegemony' (pp. 3-5). How do we explain the difference?

The answer lies in four interrelated non-structural elements: the new system of great-power management; the informal norms and rules of the Concert system; the new conceptions of state interests and security which helped to shape and maintain the rules and norms of the Concert; and the transformation in political thinking through experiential learning that generated this new conceptual orientation towards international politics. None but the first can fit easily into a balance-of-power or broader realist framework. Together, these components are more compatible with the concept of a 'security regime' and a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, to which we now turn.

Whereas the realist tradition sees international politics as a conflictual Hobbesian world in which concerns for power and security dominate and co-operation is difficult, the 'liberal' tradition sees a more benign Grotian international society or Lockean state of nature where anarchy does not imply disorder and where states have common as well as conflictual interests. They aim to maximize economic welfare as well as provide for security, and they often create international institutions which help to regulate conflict and promote co-operation. As Hedley Bull writes, an 'international society exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions'.<sup>2</sup> Schroeder's inclusion of 'shared rules and understandings' in his conception of the system fits nicely into this perspective.

The liberal tradition in international politics has evolved from the Kantian conception of a cosmopolitan world society and eternal peace between democracies, to the commercial liberalism of the nineteenth century based on the pacific effects of free trade, to the 'neofunctionalism' of the 1950s and the emphasis on regional integration, to 'complex interdependence' of the late 1970s, and finally to 'regime

<sup>1</sup> Also, 'Vienna Settlement', p. 702. Similarly, Benjamin Miller argues that structural theory alone cannot account for the fact that an effective conflict-management system emerged after 1815 but not after 1918 or 1945, though he relies more on domestic factors: Miller, 'Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management', *World Politics*, vi (1992), 1-46.

<sup>2</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York, 1977).

theory' of the 1980s and its further refinement into 'neoliberal institutionalism', which is now the leading alternative to realism as a general framework for the study of world politics.<sup>1</sup>

Institutions include formal organizations, regimes with explicit rules (such as the Bretton Woods monetary regime), and informal conventions or understandings. Institutions shape how states define their interests, perceive external constraints on their choices, and form expectations and interpretations of others' intentions and actions. A core hypothesis is that there are variations in degree and form of the institutionalization of international politics and that these variations have a significant impact on the behaviour of states and the interactions between them. Although these institutions may be shaped by state interests, they do not change directly and immediately in response to changes in state interests and consequently have an independent causal impact on behaviour.<sup>2</sup> Neoliberals thus significantly broaden the neorealists' narrow conception of system structure through their inclusion of international institutions. They have also begun to emphasize the role of domestic factors and how they combine with international institutions to shape foreign policy preferences and behaviour.<sup>3</sup>

Neoliberal institutionalists also introduce non-structural components into the theory and, in the process, provide a broader framework for understanding both preference formation and change in international politics, two widely recognized limitations of realist theory. Whereas realists conceptualize change in terms of states' adaptation to changing power distributions in the system, neoliberals include both domestic political change and changes in preferences and causal assumptions that derive from experiential learning.<sup>4</sup> Neoliberals are more interested in the impact of ideas than in the sources of those

<sup>1</sup> On different forms of liberal international theory, see Robert O. Keohane, 'International Liberalism Reconsidered', in *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics*, ed. John Dunn (New York, 1990), pp. 165-94.

<sup>2</sup> Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, CO, 1989), pp. 2-3. In contrast, hegemonic realists acknowledge the role of international institutions but insist that these institutions mirror the interests of the hegemonic power and change when those interests change as a function of the distribution of power: Stephen D. Krasner, 'Regimes and the Limits of Realism', in *International Regimes*, ed. Krasner (Ithaca, NY, 1983), pp. 355-68.

<sup>3</sup> Earlier liberal theory minimized the impact of domestic factors: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston, 1977).

<sup>4</sup> The question of how political leaders learn and the extent to which learning influences policy is attracting more and more attention in international politics: Jack S. Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', *International Organization*, xlviii (1994), 279-312; *Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. G. Breslauer and P. E. Tetlock (Boulder, CO, 1991). On learning in liberal theory, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Power and Interdependence Revisited', *International Organization*, xli (1987), 725-53.

ideas, however, and, like realists, insist on the rationality postulate and minimize the impact of psychological variables.<sup>1</sup>

This emphasis on the impact rather than the sources of ideas differentiates neoliberal institutionalism from an emerging group of scholars known as 'constructivists' or 'reflectivists', who emphasize both the social construction of ideas and institutions and the need to focus on the processes through which these ideas and institutions arise. Although Schroeder demonstrates some constructivist tendencies (as we shall see), his greater attention to the impact of ideas than to their origins leads me to put him closer to a neoliberal institutionalist perspective. This is a fine line, however, and one that might very well vanish with the further development of liberal institutionalist theory.<sup>2</sup>

Liberals also differ from realists in their view of military power. They are more sensitive to the different contexts which govern the effectiveness of military force; critical of the traditional assumption of the fungibility of force across different issue-areas; and insistent that the development of nuclear weapons, increasing economic interdependence, and other changes in world politics has generally reduced (but not eliminated) the utility of military power in international politics.<sup>3</sup> Still, most empirical applications of neoliberal institutionalism have been to non-security issues.<sup>4</sup> The handful of attempts to develop the concept of a security regime or to analyse collective-security systems as an alternative to a balance-of-power system have been applied to one or two limited periods of international politics (most

<sup>1</sup> Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 'Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework', in *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, ed. Goldstein and Keohane (Ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 7. There are many liberals who reject the rationality assumption and who incorporate a decision-making perspective into their theories, but these scholars generally do not fit under the 'neoliberal institutionalist' label and are less inclined to engage in systems-level debates. Neoliberals will have to reconcile their insistence on both rationality and learning, because most theories of learning emphasize the impact of non-rational psychological variables on the learning process.

<sup>2</sup> For the distinction between 'rationalist' and 'reflectivist' conceptions of international institutions, see Keohane, *International Institutions*, ch. 7. For the development of a constructivist perspective, see Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, lxxxviii (1994), 384-96. For a constructivist interpretation of Schroeder's system, see Mlada Bukovansky, 'Normative Innovation in the Eighteenth-Century International System: Republicanism and Popular Sovereignty' (Unpublished MS, 1994).

<sup>3</sup> Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.

<sup>4</sup> For attempts to incorporate norms into theories of international conflict, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics* (Columbia, SC, 1990); Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, 'Toward a Theory of International Norms', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xxxvi (1992), 634-64; Christopher Gelpi, 'Power and Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining Behavior' (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan, 1994). Research on the absence of wars between democracies also looks at shared democratic norms: Russett, *Democratic Peace*, pp. 30-8, and ch. 4; Gregory A. Raymond, 'Democracies, Disputes, and Third-Party Intermediaries', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xxxviii (1994), 24-42.

notably the period of the European concert).<sup>1</sup> The relative lack of theoretical and empirical research on the role of institutions and norms in peace, war, and security issues is a problem that needs to be rectified, particularly given the claim that neoliberalism is not an alternative to realism, but that it instead subsumes realism.<sup>2</sup>

This takes us back to the question of why the international system was more stable after 1815 than it was before, and to Schroeder's emphasis on great-power management, the informal norms and rules of the Concert system, new concepts of state interests and security, and the transformation in political thinking. Schroeder emphasizes that the international system cannot run well by itself; it requires skilful management by one or more great powers, the proper conditions for leadership, the use of restraining alliances, and some subordination of short-term self-interest to a common purpose. The conditions for effective management include both the structural elements described above and a centrally located and satisfied great power: 'the state best suited to provide this management is not one whose power and position render it fairly independent of the system, able to live without it, but the power dependent on it, compelled by its central position and vulnerability to be a prime investor in its stability and survival' (p. 425).

It is important to note that, for Schroeder, it is not necessarily the most powerful state in the system or the 'balancer' that plays the key management role. The key manager during the Concert period was not one of the hegemonic flanking powers but instead Metternichian Austria, the most exposed state in the system and the one with the greatest vested interests in peace. Later, it was Bismarckian Germany. Contrast this with hegemonic theory, where the hegemon manages the system and provides the collective goods without which the system cannot endure. For nearly all hegemonic theorists, including hegemonic stability theorists who focus on the international political economy, it was Britain who played this role in the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup> Britain was also the balancer in balance-of-power theory, which reserves that role to an insular state in 'splendid isolation' which can pursue its interests outside the system as long as it can maintain an equilibrium of power in the system.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On regime theory in international relations theory, see *International Regimes*, ed. Keohane. On the unique characteristics of security regimes, see R. Jervis, 'Security Regimes', in *ibid.*, p. 173.

<sup>2</sup> See Keohane, *International Institutions*, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Gilpin, *War and Change*; Keohane, *After Hegemony*, ch. 3; Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley, CA, 1973).

<sup>4</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, pp. 187-90; Ludwig Dehio, *The Precarious Balance* (New

In addition to a centrally located and satisfied great power, effective management also requires, for Schroeder, a system of procedural norms and the ability of states to see beyond their own short-term self-interests. Thus, he argues that 'the stable, peaceful political equilibrium Europe enjoyed from 1815 to 1848 rose not from a balance of power but from a mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law, and an overall balance among the various actors in terms of rights, security, status, claims, duties, and satisfactions rather than power.' These ideas fit quite nicely into a neoliberal institutionalist perspective.

Schroeder argues that although the statesmen of the time spoke the language of political equilibrium, they did not mean a narrowly defined balance of power. Although checking and balancing power was one element in the process, the essence of the system was a 'balance of satisfactions, a balance of rights and obligations and a balance of performance and payoffs, rather than a balance of power'. Schroeder argues, for example, that the redistribution of territories, peoples, and thrones at Vienna was driven as much by concerns for the balance of rights and long-term security as by the balance of power.<sup>1</sup>

Schroeder argues that the behaviour of the great powers deviated in significant ways from standard *realpolitik* practices. States did not always attempt to maximize their power positions: they were often willing to forgo gains that were within their grasp, they did not always try to exploit others' temporary weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and they made concessions that were not dictated by the realities of power. These tendencies are illustrated by the moderate treatment of France in the Vienna settlement, the even more lenient peace terms offered to Napoleon after his army was virtually destroyed at Leipzig in October 1813, Russia's promotion of an Austro-Prussian partnership in Germany in 1815 rather than its traditional exploitation of divisions between the two leading German powers, and even as late as 1848 the great powers' hesitancy to exploit Austria's problems (p. 558).<sup>2</sup>

Political leaders were also less likely to resort to force or prepare for war when others were intransigent, in part because they expected others to reciprocate their conciliatory behaviour and because these expectations dampened the self-fulfilling prophecies that often fuel a conflict spiral. As a result, crises (in 1830, 1840, and 1848, for example) that probably would have led to war at any other time were instead settled peacefully.

York, 1962).

<sup>1</sup> Schroeder, 'Vienna Settlement', pp. 694-8 and 'Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?', p. 143.

<sup>2</sup> Also, Schroeder, 'Transformation of Political Thinking', p. 65.

These rather different patterns of great-power behaviour were more than simply a reflection of underlying conditions conducive to more peaceful relations among states, but rather the result of a Concert system that was deliberately constructed for that purpose.<sup>1</sup> The Concert system included a code of conduct or set of rules regarding acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and these rules relied for compliance on enlightened self-interest and moral suasion rather than contractual obligation or a formal enforcement mechanism.

Perhaps the central rule of the Concert system was that only the five great powers, the Directory of Europe, would decide the great questions of the day and take responsibility for preserving the peace of Europe. This was a tacit bargain between the great powers and smaller states. The great powers recognized that weaker states had rights and responsibilities to be protected and that the stability of the system and great-power independence was intertwined with that of weaker states, who in turn tacitly accepted great-power management of the system. The result was that smaller states were not pawns on the great-power chessboard as in the eighteenth century, but instead could be confident that they would not be targets of great-power partitions, annexations, and conquests.<sup>2</sup>

In their mutual relations, great powers would forswear attempts to gain unilateral advantage, whether through territorial gain or the promotion of rebellion or unrest within the spheres of influence of other powers. They would agree to consult with each other in times of crisis or great conflict, and agree to resolve disputes through conference diplomacy, from which no great power could be excluded. All territorial changes were subject to great-power sanction, and all essential members of the system should be protected – including not only the great powers but key buffer states or other areas (the Ottoman Empire, for example) where instability might create temptations for a great-power scramble for power. Moreover, no great power should directly challenge or humiliate another, but should refer any issue in contention to the Concert.

There was one set of issues which was deliberately excluded from the purview of the Concert and thus decoupled from European

<sup>1</sup> For the contrasting view that 'it was the peace which maintained the Concert and not the Concert that maintained the peace', see W. N. Medlicott, *Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe* (London, 1956), p. 18. Also Richard K. Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War?', *International Security*, xvii (1992), 5-43.

<sup>2</sup> Schroeder, 'Changes in Structure', p. 25. In emphasizing the distinctive roles of the great powers, a leading manager, and buffer states and intermediaries, Schroeder (along with hegemonic realists) rejects Waltz's argument that states all serve similar functions in the international system. For more on this point, see Schroeder, 'Neo-realist Theory', pp. 124-9.

politics, and that concerned commercial, maritime, and colonial competition between European powers in the non-European world. In particular, European states tacitly accepted British naval and colonial supremacy. Schroeder emphasizes the stabilizing effects of this norm for European politics and contrasts it with the system of the eighteenth century, where wars in North America, in India, and on the high seas spilled over into Europe, and vice versa (pp. 579-82).<sup>1</sup>

All of these norms were reinforced by the norm of reciprocity and by the expectation that one's own self-restraint and concessions would be reciprocated by others (pp. 579-82).<sup>2</sup> Although the great powers occasionally stretched or even broke these rules, or disagreed as to whether certain issues were subject to Concert jurisdiction or what form Concert action should take, Schroeder argues that with some exceptions – for example, Britain's break with the Congress system in 1822-3 – the great powers generally followed these norms.

The other pillar of peace and stability in the European system from 1815 to 1854, in addition to the Concert system and the particular distribution of power upon which it was based, was a new conceptual orientation towards international politics, a new set of shared assumptions, attitudes, and goals. This constituted a 'transformation of political thinking' based on historical learning and the failure of the balance of power, which had led not to security and stability but to instability and recurrent wars. Schroeder argues that the new thinking finally crystallized in the 1813-15 period and constituted a necessary condition for the emergence of a stable peace after the Napoleonic Wars and the establishment of the Concert system. He asserts that an allied victory before 1814 would probably have aborted the learning process, precluded a stable peace settlement, and perpetuated the old self-destructive international principles and practices of the prior century (p. 581).

The central components of this new conceptual framework were a broadening of the concept of self-interest and security and new attitudes towards war and peace. Leaders increasingly recognized the implications of the security dilemma and the fact that actions to secure short-term interests often generated unintended consequences that diminished long-term security. Short-term power maximization often

<sup>1</sup> Also, Schroeder, 'Changes in Structure', pp. 13-15.

<sup>2</sup> Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 405-6; see also Richard B. Elrod, 'The Concert of Europe', *World Politics*, xxviii (1976), 159-74; William H. Daugherty, 'System Management and the Endurance of the Concert of Europe', in *Coping with Complexity*, ed. Snyder and Jervis, pp. 71-105. Reciprocity is a central concept in liberal international theory: Kohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, ch. 6.

led to long-term insecurity, coercive threats provoked counter-threats and conflict spirals rather than compliance, and war was an ineffective, self-defeating, and counter-productive instrument of statecraft. In Schroeder's terms, this was a shift from 'linear' to 'systemic' thinking, from a focus on unilateral solutions for security problems to systemic solutions. Political leaders learned that their own security depended on the security of others and the stability of the system as a whole.<sup>3</sup> The key to the emergence of a stable and enduring peace at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, for example, was the development of a clear conception of what peace might look like and the recognition that a durable peace must be given priority over a military victory (pp. 581, 773).

It is clear that the critical process that drove the transformation of European politics from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century was the transformation of political thinking as a result of experiential learning. Statesmen learned from the cumulative failures of eighteenth-century practices and from the failure to end the war against Napoleon in particular.<sup>4</sup> Some learned earlier than others (the Habsburg emperor, Leopold II, by 1792, for example), but learning could not have an impact on the system until the lessons of the past were shared by all, for otherwise the temptation of short-term gain would dominate over the long-term benefits of restraint and allow *realpolitik* thinkers to exploit the others. The learning process was a gradual and uneven one as political leaders learned from their mistakes, but it had spread and become system-wide for great-power leaders by 1813-15. The result was a fairly sudden transformation of international politics. For Schroeder, it is a story of 'the long gestation and sudden birth of a new international system' (pp. ix [quote], 287, 581).<sup>5</sup>

Schroeder does not focus in detail on the process through which political leaders changed their beliefs about international politics. It is clear, however, that what drove the transformation of European politics was learning through experience by individual leaders rather than the replacement of one set of leaders with another group with different beliefs.<sup>6</sup> This was more than a simple case of straightforward

<sup>1</sup> Schroeder, 'Transformation of Political Thinking'. Schroeder's discussion of linear and systemic thinking builds on Robert Jervis, 'Systems and Interaction Effects', in *Coping with Complexity*, ed. Snyder and Jervis, pp. 25-46, and Schroeder, *Transformation*, p. 581.

<sup>2</sup> On the tendency to learn more from failure than from success, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, pp. 275-80; Levy, 'Learning', pp. 304-6.

<sup>3</sup> Also, Schroeder, 'Transformation of Political Thinking', pp. 56-7, 67-8.

<sup>4</sup> Recent work in political science emphasizes the interplay between learning and political change: politics affects the political power and influence of those who have learned, and learning or the failure to learn may affect one's political influence and position in the government.

adaptation to changing material conditions, but a change in causal beliefs about the dynamics of international politics that emerged from creative reflection and insight.<sup>1</sup> Ideas about the world had an autonomous role and independent causal impact on state actions and international outcomes. The autonomous role of ideas plays an important role in liberal international theory and is another respect in which Schroeder's view of international politics fits a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, though both pay more attention to the impact of learning than to the processes through which learning occurs.<sup>2</sup>

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In analysing Schroeder's theory of international systems and his interpretation of the transformation of European politics between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, I have shown how he builds upon several different theoretical traditions in the political science literature. His concept of shared hegemony is consistent with notions of a bipolar balance of power and with hegemonic theory's emphasis on hierarchical order, though for Schroeder it is dominance within an alliance or region rather than the system as a whole. Schroeder's argument that the system cannot run effectively by itself but requires some kind of involved and skilful great-power management is quite compatible with the emphasis on order, governance, and management in hegemonic theory, though, unlike hegemonic theory, the key management role does not necessarily fall to the strongest military power in the system. In most other respects, however, Schroeder departs significantly from a realist framework, and particularly from the narrow conception of system structure in Waltzian neorealism.

Schroeder's insistence that *realpolitik* practices are a function of leaders' shared images of the world rather than structurally determined behaviours cannot be reconciled with realism's emphasis on objective laws of history, but they do reflect Vasquez's notion of learned

Greater attention to the interaction effects between learning and politics would have made for a more complete explanation of the transformation of European thinking and politics, but admittedly these effects are less important in the monarchical systems that Schroeder analyses than in pluralist or bureaucratic systems. See Levy, 'Learning', pp. 300-4.

<sup>1</sup> Sometimes, however, Schroeder downplays the creative element of learning and implies that political leaders simply adapted to changing circumstances. They 'did not actively look for new and better ways of thinking about international politics and practicing it; nor did they willingly accept them. They were forced into systemic thinking by repeated failures, the exhaustion of alternatives' and by 'Napoleonic imperialism': 'Transformation of Political Thinking', p. 68. In some respect, this view of the learning process approximates what theorists describe as 'trial-and-error' learning; see Levy, 'Learning', p. 284.

<sup>2</sup> On the autonomy of ideas, see Goldstein and Keohane, 'Ideas and Foreign Policy'.

foreign-policy practices. His emphasis on norms and rules within a society of states, the importance of shared expectations and reciprocity, the role of institutions in facilitating co-operation among states, and the autonomous impact of ideas is quite compatible with a neoliberal institutionalist framework. Finally, his emphasis on conceptual transformations as the underlying causal mechanism driving system change is closely related to theories of foreign-policy learning.

Whether Schroeder's particular interpretations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the transformations from one system to the next are empirically valid is something I leave to historians with more expertise on those periods. I can say, however, that Schroeder has made several important contributions to international relations theory. His emphasis on the role of alliances as tools of management and control adds a new theoretical dimension to the rather narrow literature on international alliances, and his historical critique of the balancing hypothesis of balance-of-power theory adds an important empirical dimension to a major theoretical debate.

Schroeder's argument that *realpolitik* strategies reflect the conceptual images of political leaders rather than the necessary consequence of objective and structurally determined laws of nature is an important challenge to realist theory and to Waltz's structural realism in particular. It is a good illustration of Vasquez's argument that power politics is a learned foreign-policy practice and of the neoliberal view that ideas have an autonomous impact on behaviour.<sup>1</sup>

Schroeder's discussion of the role of rules and norms in the functioning of the European security system is a major contribution to the empirical research programme of neoliberal institutionalism, which has thus far focused primarily on economic and ecological issues to the neglect of security issues. Schroeder demonstrates fairly convincingly that a critical difference in the periods before and after 1815 was the development of a system of informal rules and norms during the Vienna settlement; that this security regime had a significant causal impact on state policies and international outcomes; and that the regime endured longer than many prior accounts had suggested. Schroeder's detailed analyses of this period, along with that of other historians, provides a rich body of data that can be used by political scientists in more explicit tests of key propositions from neoliberal institutionalist theory about the conditions for peace and the causes of war.

Similarly, Schroeder's discussion of the transformation of political

<sup>1</sup> It also has important implications for more abstract 'agent-structure' debates in international relations theory: Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem', pp. 321-4.

thinking and changing conceptions of self-interest provide data relevant to theories of learning in foreign policy, whether tied to neoliberal theory or an alternative theoretical framework. Because of Schroeder's orientation, this data is particularly useful for hypotheses on the impact of learning on behaviour. The period between 1789 and 1815 also provides an intriguing case for the further exploration of hypotheses about the conditions and processes leading to conceptual change and also of hypotheses relating to the interaction of learning and politics in policy change.

All of this reflects a theme that has been implicit throughout this essay: the fact that Schroeder's historical analyses are theoretically grounded and that his theoretical contributions are historically informed provides a superb illustration of how an emphasis on the interplay of theory and history can enhance our explanations of international politics.

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