

DIVERSIONARY ACTION BY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: ARGENTINA IN THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CASE

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Whereas many of the other essays in this volume on the internationalization of communal strife focus on the sources and dynamics of conflict among communal groups, we will look primarily at the internationalization process itself, on the causal linkages between internal conflict and international conflict. The internationalization of internal conflict can occur through several alternative causal linkages (Gurr 1988; Levy 1989a), and here we focus on one in particular: the use of external military force by political leaders in order to advance their own domestic political interests. This phenomenon of diversionary action can take place in response to numerous forms of internal conflict, including ethnic, religious, class, and institutional conflict, among others. Although our immediate aim in this study is to analyze the use of external military force in response to internal socio-economic and intra-military conflict, we hope that our analysis will facilitate a comparison with diversionary action in response to ethnic and religious conflict and other forms of communal strife examined in this volume, where the conditions under which diversion is most likely to occur and most likely to succeed may be somewhat different.

Theoretical Literature on the Diversionary Theory of War

The pursuit of a belligerent foreign policy by political elites in order to deflect popular attention away from internal socioeconomic and political problems, unify the nation against an external threat, and thereby increase their own domestic political support is an old theme in the literature on international relations. This "scapegoat hypothesis" or "diversionary theory of war"¹ is theoretically grounded in the conflict/cohesion or in-group/out-group hypothesis (Simmel 1898; Coser 1956), and it can be frequently found in theoretical writings, historical and journalistic accounts of diplomacy and war, analytical case studies, and in the quantitative-

empirical literature. It has also figured prominently in the very recent upsurge of interest in the domestic sources of international conflict and security policy (Lebow 1981; Stein 1985; Ostrom and Job 1986; Keohane and Nye 1987; Levy 1988; Russett 1990b; Barnett and Levy 1991).

Here we define diversionary behavior broadly to include military and diplomatic actions undertaken for the purposes of enhancing one's internal political support, although we focus primarily on military actions in this study.² One can make a further analytic distinction (Levy 1989a: 288) between two alternative mechanisms through which the external use of force can advance an elite's domestic political interests (it may also backfire or have no effect). One involves the acquisition through military action of tangible resources which can be used to alleviate internal problems or perhaps co-opt disaffected groups, as Lenin (1939) suggests in his theory of imperialism. The other involves the rallying of the population around the patriotic symbols of the nation, as more commonly suggested in the conflict-cohesion literature. If the first occurs it is usually reinforced by the second, but the second can occur in the absence of the first.³

It is useful to make another conceptual distinction. A successful external war can serve not only to bolster the domestic positions of the political elite in power, but it may also help strengthen the political institutions of the state and hence increase the power of the state relative to society, as emphasized by the literature on war and state-making (Tilly 1975, 1985; Gurr 1988; Rasler and Thompson 1989). Although these two effects may occur simultaneously, and may have a particularly strong impact when they interact together,⁴ they are analytically distinct, for the interests of the state are not necessarily identical to the interests of the regime in power at a particular time. It is conceivable, for example, that a diplomatic or limited military success might increase the domestic popularity of the regime in power without having much of an impact on state strength. Thus we distinguish between diversionary motivations and state-building motivations, acknowledge their potential interaction effects, but focus primarily on the former in this study.

The first systematic empirical examination of the relationship between the internal conflict behavior of states followed the research program which was initiated by Rummel (Rummel 1963; Wilkenfeld 1973) and which utilized events data. Although these studies found no systematic evidence in support of the internal/external conflict hypothesis, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the validity of these findings. In addition to the a priori plausibility of the scapegoat hypothesis and the theoretical and methodological limitations of the Rummel research program (Scolnick 1974; Stohl 1980; Levy 1989a), the case study literature in both history and political science suggests that diversionary-like processes have been important in the sequences leading to numerous wars (Rosecrance 1963; Lebow 1981; Stein 1985).⁵

It is one thing to argue that the diversionary motivation contributed to the outbreak of certain wars, but quite another to evaluate its relative causal weight in the processes leading to those wars; to assess the frequency with which diversionary action occurs; or to identify the internal and external conditions under which it is most likely to arise. Political elites confronted by internal opposition do not always respond with belligerent foreign policies. They usually prefer to eliminate or mitigate the sources of internal social or economic problems, or perhaps co-opt some of the opposition. If necessary, they may identify internal targets to serve as scapegoats, or (particularly in authoritarian regimes) they may attempt to suppress their domestic opposition directly and in some cases violently (Blainey 1973: Ch. 5). If they choose to engage in external diversionary action, they may prefer hostile diplomatic actions or perhaps limited military actions that fall short of war (though such actions can trigger an escalation to war). A choice to use substantial military force against another state (or other actor) also depends on one's assessment of the adequacy of one's military capabilities for this purpose, on the presence of a "legitimate" external target that would facilitate low-risk military actions without creating domestic opposition on moral grounds, on the availability of viable nonviolent alternatives, and on other variables commonly discussed in the causes of war literature (Levy 1989b).

Thus domestic unrest or conflict and the political insecurity of elites is not a sufficient condition for war or even for the external use of force short of war. But neither is it a necessary condition for war, for most wars probably do not involve an attempt to divert attention away from internal problems. In a relatively small number of cases, however, the diversionary motivation can be a critical factor, and perhaps even a necessary or sufficient condition for the use of force in that specific case, and for this reason diversionary action is an important question for theoretical investigation.

Consider the case of the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982. It is widely argued that the Argentine military junta, facing significant public opposition in response to a general economic crisis and highly coercive state policies (including human rights abuses from the "dirty war" against leftist guerrillas), forcibly seized the Malvinas in order to increase the domestic political support for their faltering military regime (Hastings and Jenkins 1983; Moneta 1984: 318; Lebow 1985: 98-99).⁶ It is also argued that it was in part because of expected domestic political benefits that Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher responded with military force to protect an island which had no strategic or economic value and which Britain had been trying to give away for several years (Hastings and Jenkins 1983; Windsor 1983; Franks 1983; Lebow 1985).⁷ One can go further and speculate that if Britain had not responded militarily, or if she had failed to recover the Falklands by force, the Argentine military junta would have remained in power for a considerable period, and that Thatcher would almost certainly

have not remained as Prime Minister. These counterfactual possibilities alone demonstrate the potentially powerful political consequences of diversionary action, and compel us to look more closely at the conditions under which domestic political opposition and elite insecurity lead to the external use of force, however infrequently that might occur.

Unfortunately, the theoretical literature is of little value in helping us understand the conditions conducive to the external use of force for internal political purposes. It raises an important idea and provides interesting anecdotal evidence, but it provides nothing close to a theory of diversionary behavior or even a more limited set of conditional generalizations indicating the situations in which scapegoating is most likely to occur.⁸ In particular, the literature⁸ gives too little attention to regime type and fails to recognize the importance of intra-regime conflict in the processes contributing to diversionary action.

Regime Type and Diversionary Behavior

The literature raises but does not resolve the question of how the relationship between internal and external conflict is affected by the type of regime. Events data studies which control for regime type (in contrast with those that do not) find some modest relationships between internal and external conflict (Wilkenfeld 1973), but these relationships are inconsistent across various studies and bereft of an overarching theoretical framework that might provide a plausible interpretation of these results (Zinnes 1976; Levy 1989a).

In spite of the lack of systematic studies of the impact of regime type on the likelihood of diversionary action, it is often simply assumed that scapegoating is more likely in democratic as opposed to authoritarian regimes because of the electoral accountability of the former (Domke 1988: Ch. 4).⁹ The tendency for the use of force immediately prior to elections to create a short-term "rally 'round the flag" effect in the United States is widely noted (Polsby 1964; Waltz 1967; Mueller 1973; Brody 1984), and there have been numerous efforts to identify the electoral and economic conditions under which the United States and other democratic countries are most likely to use force externally (Stoll 1984; Ostrom and Job 1986; Cotton 1986; Russett 1990a). Authoritarian governments, on the other hand, are said to have less need for such actions because of the coercive basis of their authority and their insulation from society. In addition, it is argued that authoritarian regimes are more likely than democratic ones to respond to serious domestic discontent by directing their armed forces against their domestic opponents (Gurr 1988; Russett and Barzilai 1990).¹⁰

But the diversionary use of force by authoritarian regimes should not be dismissed so easily. Many of the 'classic' historical cases of scapegoating commonly identified by historians (note 5) involve authoritarian regimes.

and these findings have been reinforced further by comparative case studies of the sources of deterrence failure and the outbreak of war by political scientists (Rosecrance 1963; Lebow 1981: 4; Stein 1985). There are also theoretical reasons to expect diversionary action by authoritarian regimes. Political elites in all regimes constantly face challenges from society, and they are often as concerned with the maintenance of their internal political support as with the external interests of their country. One of their primary objectives is to maintain the support of a ruling coalition in some form, whether it be an electoral or parliamentary majority in democratic regimes or a coalition of the military, business sectors, and other key social groups in authoritarian regimes. Even authoritarian regimes must maintain a minimal level of public acceptance or at least apathy towards their policies and their position of political authority.

State officials generally pursue two proximate goals in their attempts to maintain their political support. One is to increase their material resources in order to reward supporters of the regime and to co-opt or possibly coerce opposition. The other is to increase or at minimum maintain their legitimacy, or the acceptance by various societal groups of their claim to exercise the decision-making authority of the state (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry 1989). The need for legitimacy is particularly great in times of economic scarcity, when fewer resources are available to provide material rewards for supporters of the regime. However, state officials in authoritarian regimes are on much weaker ground here than are their counterparts in democratic regimes, for it is much more difficult for the latter to rationalize their legitimacy in society. They have no implicit "social contract" through which citizens willingly grant the authority to rule and control the coercive apparatus of the state in return for certain rights. Moreover, the popular belief that the state is in some ways serving the greater good of society is less likely to arise in authoritarian political systems than in democratic ones. Having suppressed democratic citizenship and sense of substantive justice as "mediations" or linkages between state and civil society (O'Donnell 1979: 291-9), authoritarian regimes have a greater temptation to resort to patriotic symbols of the nation in an attempt to legitimize themselves to society, particularly in difficult economic times. The construction of an external threat and pursuit of a belligerent foreign policy against that threat is one means adopted by political elites for this purpose, though its success is by no means assured.

There may be other reasons why authoritarian regimes might be more prone to diversionary action than democracies are. Because of the problem of legitimacy, the maintenance of the internal unity of the regime itself (as opposed to society's support for it) may be more important for the continued rule of political leaders in autocracies than in democracies, where the political fortunes of the regime and the individuals in it are ultimately determined by electoral politics.¹¹ Consequently, leading state officials in

authoritarian regimes may be more tempted to engage in the external use of force as a means of increasing the internal unity of the regime (by serving the policy interests of its members or by appealing to patriotic symbols) as well as its support in society. In addition, although more research needs to be done on what kinds of external actors are "legitimate" or politically useful targets for scapegoating,¹² it is probably fair to say that these concerns constrain democratic states more than non-democratic ones. For ideological reasons it may be difficult for democratic regimes to gain domestic support for military action against other democracies,¹³ which leaves them with fewer potential targets for scapegoating than authoritarian states have. It is interesting to speculate, for example, whether Prime Minister Thatcher would have been able to mobilize support for military action if Argentina had been governed by a democratic regime.¹⁴

We see that there are numerous reasons to expect diversionary action or external scapegoating by authoritarian as well as by democratic regimes, and to expect that the conditions and processes involved in the former might be different from those related to the electoral cycle in the latter. Whether the external use of force for internal political purposes is actually more likely in one type of regime than in the other is primarily an empirical question which is best resolved by a large-N study utilizing aggregate methods. But that is not our aim here. Instead, we will explore some of the conditions and processes leading to diversionary action by authoritarian regimes.

Just as there are important differences between democratic and authoritarian regimes with respect to the politically-motivated use of external force, there may also be some important distinctions among different types of authoritarian regimes with respect to the structures, conditions, and processes most conducive to external scapegoating. In order to explore these causal dynamics and contextual factors more fully, we have decided to focus our attention on diversionary mechanisms in one particular type of authoritarian regime – the bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) regime.

This leads us directly to an interesting puzzle. As we will demonstrate, the theoretical literature on BA regimes, the 'new military professionalism,' and political transitions suggests that these regimes are prone to recurrent crises that lead to transitions to more democratic forms of rule. Although this literature focuses on the internal consequences of these crises for BA regimes and the transition process, and rarely considers their foreign policy implications,¹⁵ the conditions created by these crises are quite similar to the conditions that international relations theorists have suggested are conducive to diversionary action. Argentine behavior in the Falklands/Malvinas appears to be a classic instance of this pattern. The puzzle is that Argentina is one of the few of an admittedly small handful of BA regimes which has resorted to violent external scapegoating of this magnitude. The Pinochet regime in Chile has frequently engaged in sabre-

rattling, but it did not resort to the overt use of force in spite of serious domestic problems and an excellent rationale in the Beagle Channel dispute. The same is true for other BA regimes such as Brazil, Uruguay, or South Korea (O'Donnell 1973; Poulantzas 1975).¹⁶

Thus in some respects Argentina is a typical case, while in others it is an aberrant case. A better understanding of this dilemma, and of why BA states resort to violent external scapegoating under some conditions but not under others, will be facilitated by an intensive examination of the Argentine case in the context of the theoretical literature on BA regimes and external scapegoating. We will explain why BA regimes are prone to conditions that are conducive to diversionary behavior, examine the internal dynamics through which scapegoating occurs, and to apply this analysis to Argentina in the period leading up to the Falklands/Malvinas War. This will help suggest hypotheses regarding the contextual conditions conducive to the diversionary use of force by BA regimes and perhaps by authoritarian regimes more generally, which might then be applied in a subsequent comparative study to explain the variations of behavior among BA and other authoritarian regimes. First, it would be useful to examine briefly previous attempts to interpret the Falklands/Malvinas crisis in terms of diversionary processes.

Applications of the Scapegoat Hypothesis to Argentina

Although nearly all analyses of the origins of the Falklands/Malvinas War gives some attention to the diversionary use of force by Argentina (and perhaps Britain as well), these studies do little to increase our general understanding about how internal politics might lead to external scapegoating and international war. They are not at all informed by the theoretical literature on the diversionary theory of war, and not directly concerned either with developing the causal linkages between internal conditions and diversionary processes or with specifying when this causal sequence is likely to arise.¹⁷ One consequence of this is the failure of these studies to explain why the Argentine regime undertook military action in 1982 but not before. The junta had been confronted with domestic political and economic problems throughout much of its six-year rule, and the dispute with Britain over the Falklands/Malvinas had created high levels of tensions at several points (during that period as well as the previous 150 years), so it would appear that the conditions for scapegoating had existed for some time. An analysis of the outbreak of the war needs to explain not only why war occurred in 1982, but also why it did not occur in the previous six years. By identifying the conditions and processes most conducive to diversionary action, we hope to provide a better answer to this question.¹⁸

A related problem with much of the interpretive literature on the crisis

is that it generally takes the domestic situation in Argentina as given, and fails to recognize precisely how the evolution of internal political and economic problems over time helped shape the nature and severity of the internal crisis and the junta's response to it. By exploring the underlying social, economic, and political forces which affected the rise of the regime to power, we can better understand the dynamics of the crisis facing Argentina, how that crisis was perceived by the regime, and why there was an attempt to resolve that crisis through diversionary action in 1982.¹⁹ In addition, whereas most of the literature focuses on the crisis in state-society relations in Argentina,²⁰ we give equal emphasis to the crisis within the military regime itself.²¹

Conditions for Diversionary External Behavior by BA Regimes

The BA regime typically arises in response to the social, economic, and political tensions generated in populist regimes undergoing a pattern of dependent, capitalist modernization. Its social structure is dominated by a highly oligopolized civilian and military elite which aims to "normalize" the economy through free market principles and the infusion of international capital, and to stabilize the social order by the total suppression of the popular sector. Thus the BA regime is highly coercive and has a support base which is substantially narrowed relative to the preceding populist regime (Collier 1979a: 19-27, 1979b: 387-9; O'Donnell 1979: 291-4; Kaufman 1986: 90).

Because of the economic and political exclusion of the popular classes the BA regime is even more insulated from domestic society than are other authoritarian regimes. This insulation is further reinforced by the increasingly technocratic orientation of the civilian and military bureaucracy, by a liberal economic ideology which sees the road to growth through integration into the international economy, and by the emergence of the "national security doctrine," which views external security as inseparable from internal security and national development and which emphasizes the central role of the military in these processes (O'Donnell 1979: 291-4; Stepan 1986a: 137; Rouquie 1987).²² The military domination of the regime is institutional rather than personal,²³ and is supported by the penetration of the state bureaucracy (including the presidency) and even parts of the private sector by the military (Rouquie 1983: 582; 1987).

There are numerous sources of tensions in BA regimes. These tensions contribute not only to pressures for liberalization, which have been widely discussed (O'Donnell et al. 1986; Malloy and Seligson 1987), but also to conditions ripe for external scapegoating. Although the ultimate source of many of these tensions is the difficulty of establishing legitimacy in a regime whose foundation rests on the highly coercive political and economic exclusion of the popular sectors, our argument is that the impact of this

absence of legitimacy is indirect rather than direct. Threats to the stability of the regime, and therefore conditions conducive to scapegoating, most often stem initially from conflicts within the regime and not directly from domestic pressures. Thus Stepan (1986b: 77) argues that

[The] loss of civilian support alone is not enough for the government to fall. Authoritarian regimes . . . do not have active support requirements. Apathy and acquiescence will suffice. Loss of civilian support must somehow be transformed into a tangible cost or a direct threat to the military-as-institution.²⁴

One source of conflict within BA regimes derives from the fact that the members of the coalition that originally brought the BA regime to power do not necessarily share the same economic and political objectives beyond the establishment of "order" in society and "normalization" of the economy. Because the new economic policies tend eventually to impose severe hardships on the middle sectors as well as lower classes, the former often withdraw their support from the regime (O'Donnell 1979: 297-8). In addition, the coalition of a transnationally-oriented capitalist class and the more nationalistic armed forces, who initially share a belief in the symbiotic relationship between economic development and the coercively-imposed social order in spite of their different conceptions of the nation, can begin to fragment in the face of poor economic performance or loss of agreement on the mission of the state (O'Donnell 1979: 300-2). The internationalization of the economy may be particularly important, in that it may further erode the nationalistic symbols upon which the regime is based. There are also divisions within the armed forces themselves, both along organizational lines (Rouquie 1987: 303-4; Calvert 1982: 49-51) and between the *duros* and *blandos* (hardliners and softliners), primarily over the wisdom of opening and demilitarizing the political process (Fontana 1984; O'Donnell 1978).²⁵

There are two particularly important developments in the transition process, each of which results in part from the economic crisis, occurs repeatedly in BA regimes, but follows no regular pattern and is difficult to predict. One is the loss of a shared sense of mission by the military regime. This creates splits in the military regarding ends as well as means, results in the elevation of ideological and personal interests over the institutional interests of the military, and threatens the viability of the military institution (Pion-Berlin 1985: 56). In the Argentine case, for example, the failure of the economic program and the success of the internal war against the Montoneros left the military without a mission to unite them. In other BA regimes, or in authoritarian regimes more generally, these divisions may arise in the ruling coalition as a whole rather than in the military alone.

A second key development is the opening to society undertaken by an

increasingly isolated military regime in an attempt to bring new socio-economic groups into the ruling coalition and broaden the base of its narrowing political support. Alternatively, one faction may attempt to bolster its own position within the regime by mobilizing its allies in society, who are often eager to gain military support for their own objectives. Thus Przeworski (1986: 56) concludes "the first critical threshold in the transition to democracy is precisely the move by some group within the ruling bloc to obtain support from forces external to it."²⁶

But this opening to society may backfire, undercut the viability of fear as an instrument of social order, help mobilize a variety of groups throughout society, and create a rupture in the self-imposed isolation of the regime, all of which increase the costs of either further liberalization or clamping down through repression (Kaufman 1986: 93).²⁷ The military, sensitive to the long-term costs of supporting an isolated BA government, may choose to give up its political power in order to secure the institutional survival of the military and its future influence. In doing so, however, the military will often attempt to control the liberalization process in a way that serves their own political interests, which frequently involves the establishment of sympathetic political parties and the attempt to use elections to put their own political allies in power (Rouquie 1986: 121, 1987: 386-9; Stepan 1986b: 76-7).

It is often assumed that at this point - whenever it might occur - that the BA regime has little choice other than acquiescing to the pressures for liberalization (and perhaps temporarily relinquishing its position of power) or clamping down through further repression (Kaufman 1986: 93; Vacs 1987: 18). Our argument is that BA regimes faced with a narrowing base of public support, an economic crisis that leaves it unable to implement redistributionist policies that might mollify the public, the absence of a unifying mission, and internal divisions within the regime over the mission of the state, often perceive a third option - diversionary behavior. If the target is carefully selected, diversionary actions can work both to unify the regime internally around a new mission and to increase its domestic political support (or at least buy some additional time) through appeals to patriotic symbols of nationalism. If external scapegoating fails, however, either through unexpected military escalation or particularly military defeat, it will further discredit the regime and rapidly accelerate the processes of transition. These processes are illustrated by Argentine behavior in the Falklands/Malvinas crisis.

ARGENTINA IN THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CRISIS: A CASE STUDY²⁸

The diplomatic dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands began between Britain and Spain in the 1770s and between Britain and Argentina

(then the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata) in the 1820s. It has been told many times (Goebel 1927; Eddy and Linklater 1982; Hastings and Jenkins 1983; Moro 1985), and there is no need to repeat it here. It is worth noting, however, that in spite of Argentina's long-standing interest in the recovery of the Malvinas and their diplomatic pressure on Britain for over a century, the possible use of military force has not been central to their thinking about the issue (Makin 1983b). In fact, Argentina had not fought in a foreign war since 1870. Our argument is that the change in Argentine policy, at least since 1976, has more to do with internal developments within Argentine state and society as with external military or diplomatic considerations.

The military coup that overthrew the government of Isabel Peron in 1976 was precipitated by extreme economic instability coupled with the rise of a leftist guerrilla movement, the Peronist-affiliated Montoneros, which threatened the interests of the two leading sectors in Argentina – the financial community and the military (Pion-Berlin 1985: 57; Makin 1983a: 56–9; Cavarozzi 1986: 41–3). In taking control of the government the armed forces initiated a national development project (the *Proceso*), the primary goals of which were the reestablishment of order and the normalization of the economy to facilitate advanced industrialization (Makin 1983a: 58–61).²⁹

The new regime's economic policy involved the reorganization of the economic and social sector, with a greater reliance on international capital and the use of the market as an instrument for social control (Moneta 1984: 312, 313; Pion-Berlin 1985: 57–60; Vacs 1987: 22–3). The primary benefactors of the regime's orthodox economic policies were international financial capital and national industrialists, while the middle and lower sectors of society were to bear a disproportionate share of the costs (Pion-Berlin 1985: 58–9). This harsh economic program was accompanied by a highly coercive political program designed to eliminate the predominance of Peronism, the trade unions, and the radical left by severing all sources of communication and mediation between the regime and civil society (*El Diario del Juicio*, December 11 1985; Moneta 1984: 317; Cavarozzi 1986: 44–5; Pion-Berlin 1985: 60).

The military institution dominated the Argentine political system from 1976 to 1982. It controlled the presidency and occupied many other key positions of the government, blocking all traditional channels of input into policy-making (Makin 1983a; Fontana 1984; Tulchin 1984; Moneta 1984). Military unity was facilitated by their formal equality in the junta and the *veto compartido*, or shared veto over policy (Fontana 1984: 7; Pion-Berlin 1985).³⁰ Conflicts within the regime revolved around questions of economic policy, the proper relationship between the regime and civil society, and most importantly the mission of the regime (Kaufman 1986: 94). For the first several years of military rule, from 1976 to 1980, the military was

preoccupied and unified by the mission of the restoration of order in society through the war against subversion (*El Diario del Juicio* December 3 1985, December 11 1985; *Bimestre* 2/8: 88–100). By 1980, however, the “dirty war” had largely been won, leaving the armed forces without an important mission that had unified them internally and helped legitimize their retention of power (Kaufman 1986: 92–4; Calvert 1982: 28–9).

Two other factors contributed further to the development of internal conflicts within a regime by 1980. First, the term of president General Videla was due to expire in March 1981, and a succession decision loomed ahead. Second, the liberal monetarist economic policies designed and implemented by the finance minister Martinez de Hoz resulted in an increasingly precarious national economy by early 1980. The collapse of several major banks in March triggered a major financial crisis which hurt the middle classes quite badly, and previously supportive business sectors began to distance themselves from the regime (Vacs 1987: 24–5). The splintering of the monolithic image of the regime became more evident in April, when naval Commander-in-Chief Lambruschini publicly criticized de Hoz's economic policies. The combination of a lack of a clear sense of mission, the failure of the economy, and the impending succession had sharpened the internal conflicts within an increasingly strained military regime (Pion-Berlin 1985: 61–2; Fontana, 1984: 11).

The succession crisis was settled by the selection of General Roberto Viola over the opposition of the navy, which feared (correctly) that Viola might not be an ardent enough proponent of neoclassical economic policies. Viola departed from prior policy in political as well as economic realms by bringing seven civilian ministers to the thirteen-member cabinet, broadening the representation in several ministries, and relaxing the enforcement of the ban on political activity (Fontana 1984: 6–13; Calvert 1982: 53–5; Vacs 1987: 26). Though intended to stabilize the foundations of the regime, these actions provided the opening that Kaufman (1986), Przeworski (1986), and others argue inadvertently initiates the transition process.

Viola's tentative steps towards political liberalization gave rise to a division within the regime between the government headed by Viola and the faction headed by hardliners within the junta and backed by the navy, air force, and various army commanders. The *duros* in the military were bitterly opposed to any form of political opening and to the anti-Western bent of Viola's foreign policy, including grain sales to the former Soviet Union, and were supported by the liberal economic right, who resented the abandonment of its orthodox economic program (Fontana 1986: 4; Vacs 1987: 26). The junta warned Viola against proceeding with “innovative politics and warming to civil society” (Fontana 1984: 14), and Galtieri cautioned that “the ballot boxes are well guarded” (Pion-Berlin 1985: 65).

The political crisis was resolved in December 1981 by the replacement of Viola by General Galtieri, who assumed the presidency while also

retaining his position as Commander-in-Chief of the army. Galtieri was supported by recently appointed members of the junta, air force commander Lami Dozo and naval commander Admiral Anaya, and by a number of prominent army generals (Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 46; Calvert 1982: 54–5). Galtieri's immediate aim was the protection of the cohesion and insularity of the military regime and the health of the military institution, and he initiated several efforts to advance these goals: (1) strengthening the relationship between the Argentine military regime and the Reagan administration; (2) creating a political party friendly towards the military and its allies; and (3) prioritizing the Malvinas issue. Let us consider these in turn.

The Galtieri regime and the Reagan administration shared several interests in common. The US fear of political instability in Central America and the Argentine military's success in combating subversion at home and elsewhere led to a US attempt to enlist Argentine support for combatting insurgency in Central America (Calvert 1983: 71, 72; *LAWR* January 8 1982: 2, February 12 1982: 1–2). This was politically attractive to the Galtieri regime for several reasons. By strengthening its ties with the US, particularly in the struggle against communism, the Galtieri regime would significantly bolster its hardline position against the *blandos* within the military, and also help de-legitimize the domestic opposition. It might also provide a sense of mission the regime so desperately needed.

Galtieri also attempted to forge a domestic political alliance that reflected the interests of the military, particularly the hardline faction within the military (*LAWR* February 26 1982: 6–7; Makin 1983a: 63). This was not only another means by which to de-legitimize an emerging political opposition, but also a means to provide a “democratic” forum from which to preserve the power and interests of the military-as-institution in the event of a transition to liberalization or redemocratization. Galtieri, anticipating a possible transition, apparently hoped that the formation of a political party sympathetic to the military would provide him with a political base in the post-military regime (Fontana 1986: 7; Vacs 1987: 28).

The military institution's interest in influencing any possible transition process was linked to the Malvinas issue. In addition to the general and long-standing interest in the Malvinas as a national symbol shared by nearly all segments of society (Moneta 1984: 321–2), and the military's particular interest in an expansion of their geopolitical influence in the South Atlantic,³¹ the military also had more narrow institutional interests at stake in the possible recovery of the islands. It would help maintain the military corporation's *Proceso* and put an end to their internal squabbling. It would also bolster their prestige in the country as a whole. This was essential, for the military had begun to recognize the possibility of a transition to democracy, and feared that the brutality of the dirty war had

so alienated the population that Nuremburg-style investigations and trials were a distinct possibility.

The successful recovery of the islands would demonstrate that the military could act on the behalf of sovereignty (and not just repressively against internal enemies), and provide the legitimacy which might prolong its hold on power or at least help it regain control over the political process and direct it towards an electoral solution consistent with its own interests. There is some evidence that Galtieri's plan was to follow the successful recovery of the Malvinas – for which he could claim credit for the fulfillment of Argentina's historic mission – with a call for elections, in which he could be confident of popular support (Fontana 1986: 7; Moneta 1984: 318–21; Monterfegro and Aliverti 1982: 23; Vacs 1987: 28; Gamba 1987: 131).

Though the recovery of the islands would bring prestige to the military as a whole, the navy had a particular interest in the Malvinas operation. A successful invasion would not only extend their power into the South Atlantic, but also give them a disproportionate share of the glory on the basis of their primary operational responsibility for the military operation. This would be an opportunity to increase their influence within the military and perhaps even replace the army as the traditionally dominant service, at a time when the priority given to the internal war against subversion had diminished the navy's role. Admiral Anaya in particular had an obsession with the Malvinas, and had overseen earlier contingency planning on the issue (Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 31). It has been suggested that a political deal had been reached earlier in December 1981, in which Anaya agreed to support Galtieri in ousting Viola in return for a guarantee that the Malvinas invasion be placed on the new government's immediate agenda (Cardoso et al. 1983: Ch. I, IV; Fontana, 1986: 6; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983: 46).³² The internal implications of the invasion had not been lost on the army and the air force, which were supportive but not as belligerent as the navy (Eddy and Linklater 1982: 28–30; *LAWR* May 14 1982: 9).

The bureaucratic and domestic pressures for forceful action by the new Galtieri regime were reinforced by the lack of progress in negotiations with Britain. The British Parliament's rejection of the Ridley leaseback proposal (Fall 1981), which involved the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina and which therefore probably would have been acceptable to the Argentines, and the hardening of the Islanders' attitudes against negotiations on sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Legislative Council Elections (October 1981) were particularly discouraging. There was a consensus among Argentine decision-makers that they needed to regain sovereignty over the Malvinas by January 1983 at the latest, for that was the date of the 150th anniversary of the British occupation (Calvert 1982: 56; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983: 46; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990: 4, 296).³³ As the

Galtieri regime assumed power in December, Anaya ordered an updating of earlier plans for a military occupation of the Malvinas, and on January 12 a planning group was established to evaluate how the military force might best be used to support the junta's goals of recovering the Malvinas (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990: 104).

At this time the Argentines were planning for an invasion sometime between July and October 1982 (Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 48; Moneta 1984: 318).³⁴ The Argentines were confident that by July they would have received all of the Super Entendard planes and Exocet missiles from France (and the former modified for carrier use), that conscript troops would have been fully trained for the operation, that the British would have withdrawn their warship *Endurance* from the South Atlantic, and that the winter weather would effectively preclude any British naval response (Gamba 1987: 130).

It is important to distinguish between the initial decision to invade the Malvinas and the actual timing of the invasion, for it appears that the influence of societal variables was even stronger for the question of timing. In spite of the compelling military and logistical reasons for the initial plan for a July–October invasion, a series of events brought forward the invasion of the islands to April 2 1982: (1) the breakdown of negotiations with Britain in late February; (2) the March 19 landing of the Davidoff expedition on South Georgia and the British reaction to it; and (3) increasingly active public opposition to the regime, culminating in the call for labor demonstrations on March 30.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez had become aware of the junta's plan for a mid-year invasion in early February 1982.³⁵ One of his aims in the approaching February negotiations with Britain was to increase the British awareness of the seriousness of Argentine concerns regarding negotiations without triggering their fears of an invasion. But the Argentine negotiating team was headed by Deputy Minister Enrique Ros, who was unaware of the junta's invasion plan and insensitive to the need to put some pressure on Britain (Cardoso et al. 1983: 39–43). For this reason Ros and his delegation had no objection to a joint communiqué with Britain (March 1 1982) which suggested that steady and cordial progress was being made (Franks, 1983: 40). This was not the view of the junta, which saw the outcome of the meetings as a breakdown of negotiations and as compelling evidence that military force was the only viable option for regaining sovereignty over the Malvinas. Costa Mendez, concerned both to send the proper signal to Britain and to maintain his own credibility, issued a unilateral communiqué from the Foreign Ministry the same day. It stated that the Argentine government reserved the right to "choose freely the procedure which best accords with her interests" (Franks 1983: 41). This unilateral communiqué, which was the product of bureaucratic politics within the Argentine Foreign Ministry, was perceived by Britain as an

ambiguous but definite hardening of the Argentine position and contributed to the escalation of the dispute (Cardoso et al. 1983: 39–43).

In the context of the war warnings coming out of the Buenos Aires press and the tensions raised by the March 1 communiqué, the March 19 landing on South Georgia by the scrap merchant dealer Constantin Davidoff fueled British concerns and contributed to a significant escalation of the conflict. Nearly every analysis of the South Georgia event has speculated on the extent of the involvement of the Argentine navy in the landing. Cardoso et al. (1983: 68–9, 94–5) and Hastings and Jenkins (1983) have argued (in part on the basis of interviews with military officers) that the navy had a plan (Operation Alpha) to establish a military station on South Georgia similar to the Southern Thule station established in 1977, that the plan had been officially terminated in light of the Malvinas invasion plan, but that under the orders of Admiral Anaya the navy had none the less proceeded with the operation, in part out of fear that the army and air force might attempt to block the implementation of the invasion plan (Feldman 1985: 9). In addition, the South Georgia manoeuvre could be a means for securing a toe-hold on a British possession in preparation for the eventual invasion (Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 55), and perhaps also serve as a probe of British intentions.³⁶

Whatever control the junta may have had over the invasion, proceedings began to seriously disintegrate at this point. The British reaction to the South Georgia landing – sending the HMS *Endurance* to evict the Argentines – profoundly altered the situation and restricted the junta's room for maneuver. As Cardoso et al. (1983: 72) argue:

[A delay] would provoke open unrest between the armed forces, whose co-existence was already decidedly uncomfortable. Anaya had agreed to support Galtieri's access to the Casa Rosada only in return for the green light on the Falklands. Any further postponement would finish this pact, bringing with it, sooner or later, deep dissension in the heart of the military regime.

Such dissension would have fueled domestic opposition, which would have further constricted the military regime's ability to control the terms of a political transition.

At the same time the domestic opposition to the regime had become increasingly open as the instrument of fear had begun to lose its force. A multiparty coalition (the *Multipartidaria*) had formed and demanded changes in economic policy and a return to democracy. Middle class sectors were increasingly vocal in their discontent, and made charges of corruption and demands for explanations about the fate of "disappeared persons" and for the restoration of civil liberties (Vacs 1987: 27–8). The General Confederation of Labor's call for labor demonstrations, announced March 20 and scheduled for March 30, would be the first labor demonstrations

since the beginning of military rule in 1976, and they significantly transformed the political and social context within which the military had been able to maintain its autonomy (Fontana 1986: 8; Moneta 1984: 318; Lebow 1985: 98). This further increased the pressure on the regime and provided additional incentives for the junta to pursue its military solution.

The junta met to review the implications of the South Georgia crisis on March 26, and at that time made the decision to bring forward the invasion date (Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 59; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990). Argentine naval forces invaded the Malvinas on April 2 and South Georgia the following day. A week after massive labor demonstrations against the regime, the people took to the streets once again, this time in enthusiastic support of the regime. Most of the political parties, business groups, labor, and religious organizations all demonstrated their support for the invasion.

The Argentine junta had made the invasion decision with the expectation that there would be no British military response. The invasion was intended as a *fait accompli* within a broader strategy of coercive diplomacy to force the British government into serious negotiations on a transfer of sovereignty, not as a purely military action to seize and hold the islands for an indefinite period of time.³⁷ The decision was also based on the confident assumption that the United States would either side with Argentina diplomatically or at a minimum stay neutral (Franks 1983: 76-7; Williams 1983: 144-5; Rouquie 1983; Feldman 1985; Lebow 1985: 112-14; Gamba 1987).³⁸

For both the Galtieri and Thatcher governments the domestic-political costs of backing down increased significantly once the British task force set sail. Mediation efforts conducted by the US and others in the weeks following the invasion were constrained by the inevitability of the arrival of the task force in the South Atlantic.³⁹ British and Argentine positions left little room for compromise as the British demanded an Argentine withdrawal from the island prior to any discussion regarding the resumption of sovereignty negotiations, while Argentina refused to withdraw its troops without, at the very least, an express acknowledgement by Britain of the validity of the Argentine claim to the islands (Eddy and Linklater 1982: 121-34; Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 107-13; Freedman 1982: 200-1; Haig 1984: 282). The overriding importance of domestic politics is indicated by Galtieri's statement to Alexander Haig on April 8 that though "as a soldier" he understood the need to avoid war, he would not "last a week" if he withdrew both his military and administrative presence from the Malvinas (Haig 1984: 282).

Hostilities broke out on April 25 with the British recapture of South Georgia. Any chances for a negotiated settlement were lost for good with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser *Belgrano* on May 2 (Gamba 1987: 167; *LAWR* May 5 1982: 1) and then the Argentine attack on the HMS *Sheffield*

on May 4. The Argentine military surrendered on June 14. The streets of Buenos Aires filled once again, this time accompanied by cries of outrage directed towards the military. Within one month, the senior commanders of the military regime had all resigned or been stripped of their command, and the initial stages of the transition to civilian rule had begun (Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 324-5; *LAWR* June 18 1982: 1-2).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have argued that domestic pressures play a significant role in foreign policy issues for BA regimes only when combined with intra-military conflict within the regime, which usually but not necessarily occurs in the later stages of the regime's development. When BA regimes first attain power they have internal unity, a well-defined mission, and support among several sectors whose interests had been threatened by the social and economic crisis of the previous regime. They are successful in insulating themselves from domestic pressures, so that domestic demands have little impact on foreign policy decisions. The new economic policies of the BA regime invariably fail, however, undercutting the sense of mission around which the regime had been able to unify and narrowing its base of domestic support. It is at this point that key decision-makers attempt to go outside of the regime for support, thereby creating cracks in the regime and conditions conducive to the formation of an active opposition, which they acquire a political momentum and influence of its own. Hard-pressed elites are then tempted to engage in diversionary action for the twin purposes of unifying the regime internally and establishing its legitimacy in domestic society.

This hypothesized pattern provides the basis for our explanation of Argentine behavior with respect to the Falklands/Malvinas issue. From the military coup in 1976 to 1980 the military regime was united behind the goals of economic normalization and political order, and successfully insulated itself from the domestic pressures generated by its increasingly unpopular political and economic programs. Because of its internal unity, shared mission, and insulation from domestic pressures, the regime had little incentive to engage in diversionary actions. But the failure of the economic program and successful completion of the internal war against the Montoneros left the military regime without a shared sense of mission and with serious disagreements over economic and social policy and how best to secure the institutional interests of the military. The political crisis within the regime was intensified as the internal bureaucratic struggle facilitated the formation of a domestic opposition. In the absence of viable alternatives, internal bargaining within the military regime led to the decision for an invasion of the Malvinas as a means of reestablishing the corporate unity of the military around the Malvinas issue and at the same

time establishing the regime's legitimacy with society. Thus our argument is that the occurrence of the Argentine invasion in 1982 but not in the previous six years can be explained primarily by bureaucratic and domestic politics.

This study raises a number of questions for future research. One important task is to demonstrate that our interpretation of Argentine behavior in the Falklands/Malvinas crisis is not only consistent with the evidence, as we have shown here, but also superior to alternative interpretations. A comparative longitudinal study of the relative impact of internal and external factors on Argentine decision-making at different points in time would be necessary to demonstrate conclusively that the timing of Argentine action was affected more by internal than external considerations.

Another important task is to explain the variation in diversionary behavior among the admittedly small set of BA regimes. Whereas the Argentine regime engaged in violent external actions in an attempt to further its internal political interests, and whereas more moderate scapegoating by the Greek regime arguably contributed to the war with Turkey over Cyprus (note 16), Chile limited its scapegoating to low-risk sabre-rattling and Brazil and Uruguay pursued more conciliatory foreign policies. How can we account for these differences? Among the variables that would have to be included in any comparative study would be the existence of an external target that provided the potential of enormous internal benefits at low external risks. Whereas other regimes had tempting targets for low-level scapegoating short of war (for example, Chile with the Beagle Channel dispute), arguably only Argentina had reason to believe that a major military action would not be reciprocated by the adversary or at least that the risks of escalation could be controlled. Uruguay was too weak relative to its neighbors to render diversionary action a plausible option.

The degree of unity in the military regime itself and the existence of a strong leader (Pinochet in Chile, for example) to maintain that unity would also need to be included in any comparative analysis, for the absence of both in Argentina were important factors contributing to the regime's resort to external scapegoating. Another important variable would be the role of labor in society and the threat it posed to the regime. Unlike other BA regimes (arguably), the Argentine junta was confronted with a labor organization which had historically been powerful, which had never been fully repressed, and which possessed a fairly strong infrastructure, so that any opening might catalyze an extensive mobilization. More generally, the use of the strong state/weak state dichotomy (Katzenstein 1978) might be fruitful in the analysis of diversionary behavior. We might hypothesize that states which are weak relative to society are more likely to engage in scapegoating than are states which are strong relative to society (Gurr 1988). The intensity of diversionary activity by the BA regimes in Argen-

ina, Chile, and Brazil, for example, appears to be inversely related to the strength of the state relative to society.⁴⁰

A more general question concerns the extent to which elements of the hypothesized pattern of external scapegoating by BA regimes can also be found in other authoritarian regimes. Although the particular nature of the ruling coalition in BA regimes and its fairly common pattern of development may not be shared by other authoritarian regimes,⁴¹ the problems of economic crises, domestic legitimacy, internal unity of the ruling coalition, shared perceptions of the mission of the state, and opening to society are common to all authoritarian regimes, and it would be useful to explore whether the hypothesized pattern of scapegoating in BA regimes can be generalized.⁴² ?

Finally, another set of questions concerns whether the likelihood of scapegoating, the strategies and tactics which are adopted, or its probability of success are affected by particular forms of divisions within society or the types of issues which are involved. Readers of this volume might be especially interested in the question of whether conflicts between ethnolinguistic or religious communities within society are more or less likely than institutional or class conflicts to lead to external diversionary actions by the regime in power. One can generate several conflicting hypotheses relating to this question. On the one hand, internal ethnic or religious groups are more likely than other groups to be supported by external actors, and to the extent that the external actor can be partially blamed for one's internal problems, that actor would serve as an ideal target for scapegoating. Military action (or coercive threats) which succeeded in eliminating or reducing external support for internal dissidents would not only reduce the threat, but also rally popular support around political leaders who took forceful and successful action.

On the other hand, the conflict-cohesion literature implies that the external targets likely to be most useful in rallying the in-group around its political leadership are those which are perceived to threaten the in-group as a whole rather than a particular subgroup within it (Coser 1956). In this sense diversionary actions against external supporters of internal groups may be more likely to accentuate internal divisions, and involve particularly serious downside risks in the event that the diversionary actions are unsuccessful or result in a military defeat. A key question, of course, concerns the size of the disaffected groups and whether a ruling coalition can be built without their support. This is likely to vary considerably in different political systems. A theory of diversionary behavior must ultimately be integrated into a theory of political processes and decision-making within different types of regimes.

NOTES

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- 1 The concepts of scapegoating and diversionary action are often used interchangeably in the literature, but we prefer the concept of diversion because it carries less conceptual baggage. Whereas scapegoating implies that the target actually be blamed for one's internal social, economic, or political problems, and although the reality or perception that one's internal problems can be traced to a specific actor might increase the internal utility of diversionary action, that is not a necessary condition for political elites to attempt to divert attention away from internal difficulties. To avoid repetitious language, however, we occasionally use the notion of scapegoating.
- 2 Although diversionary action can be directed against internal as well as external targets (Hitler against the Jews in Germany, for example), we use the concept here to refer to externally-directed foreign policy actions unless we explicitly indicate otherwise.
- 3 This is illustrated by the British public's response to the defeat of Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas War (Norpoth 1987).
- 4 Thus the Iran-Iraq War strengthened both the institutions of state power in Iraq and Saddam Husayn's own political security, and both motivations contributed to the Iraqi decision for war (Davis 1992; also Levy and Froelich 1984).
- 5 Some of the "classic" cases of scapegoating identified by historians include France in the French Revolutionary Wars (Blanning 1986) and in the Crimean War (Kinglelake 1863), Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (White 1964: 38), Germany and others in World War I (Joll 1984), and both Argentina and Britain in the Falklands/Malvinas War (Hastings and Jenkins 1983).
- 6 For an important recent study which emphasizes the strategic as opposed to the domestic causes of the Falklands/Malvinas War, see Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1990).
- 7 See Norpoth (1987) for an analysis of the domestic political impact of the war in Britain.
- 8 Preliminary attempts to specify conditions conducive to scapegoating can be found in Lebow (1981: 66-79) and Levy (1989a).
- 9 The question of the relative likelihood of the diversionary use of force by democratic and authoritarian regimes is analytically distinct from the question of their relative war-proneness.
- 10 Note that in one respect the external use of force for internal political reasons is easier to analyze in democratic as opposed to authoritarian regimes, for there is nothing in the latter quite as easy to measure as the electoral cycle in democracies.
- 11 Even in democracies, however, political elites may be more concerned with popular support within their own political party than among the public at large (Morgan and Bickers 1989).
- 12 Further research on the optimum targets for diversionary action could profit from the literature on the "concept of the enemy" (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagan 1967).

- 13 This is based on the empirical generalization that with very few exceptions democracies have not fought other democracies in modern times (Doyle 1986; Maoz and Abdolai 1989).
- 14 In addition, authoritarian regimes, and particularly those based on personalist rather than bureaucratic rule, may have fewer institutional constraints than democracies that might work to inhibit the use of military force for purposes other than securing vital national interests.
- 15 Exceptions include Pion-Berlin (1985) and Collier (1979b: 393).
- 16 The case of Greece in the Cyprus crisis is more complex. There are numerous references in the literature to Greece as a BA regime and to parallels between the demise of the military regimes in Argentina (1976-1982) and in Greece (1967-1974) (Poulantzas 1975). Danopoulos (1984, 1989) argues that the Greek junta was faced with intra-military conflict, a deteriorating economy, and public discontent, and viewed the Cyprus situation as a means for bolstering domestic support and unifying an increasingly divided military institution. Though Turkey acted preemptively in this case, it would be useful to examine the extent to which scapegoating by the Greek junta contributed to the escalation of the crisis.
- 17 Lebow (1985) is an exception.
- 18 A complete analysis of why war occurred in 1982 but not before would also have to incorporate diplomatic considerations, including the intensification of the long-standing dispute in 1975 after many years of quiescence, the Argentine perception beginning in late 1981 that the United States would not actively oppose an Argentine move on the islands, the breakdown of Anglo-Argentine negotiations in February 1982, and the failure of mediation efforts (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990).
- 19 This approach is consistent with the call for a shift from cross-sectional to longitudinal research designs in the analysis of linkages between internal and external conflict (Levy 1989a).
- 20 An exception is Hochstetler (1987), who focuses on bureaucratic politics within the Argentine regime.
- 21 Another limitation of most English-language studies of the Falklands/Malvinas War is their failure to utilize Argentine sources (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse [1990] is an important exception), which we have tried to do.
- 22 A primary source of this change from the "old professionalism," which emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in both developed and underdeveloped nations, was the response to the successes of revolutionary warfare in China, Indochina, Algeria, and particularly Cuba (Stepan 1986a: 136).
- 23 This distinguishes BA regimes from traditional *caudillo* authoritarian regimes in South America.
- 24 Przeworski (1986: 50-3) also emphasizes that the loss of legitimacy is not sufficient for regime transformation but must be combined with the perception of a viable alternative to the regime in power.
- 25 The military may also be divided over issues of the mission of the military regime, the length of its term in power, presidential succession, the extent of public participation, and economic policy (Fontana 1986: 11).
- 26 This behavior parallels a common pattern of bureaucratic politics in democratic regimes, where the ability to secure political support outside of the executive branch of government is an important source of political influence in the bureaucratic process (Halperin 1974).
- 27 The attempts of accommodating elites to engage in domestic reform may also backfire in democratic states and actually increase levels of domestic violence

- under certain conditions, as Rasler (1986) demonstrates for several American cases.
- 28 We recognize that a compelling explanation of a particular case requires both consistency with the evidence and demonstrated superiority to alternative explanations. Given space constraints, we are content for now to demonstrate that our domestic/bureaucratic politics explanation of Argentine behavior is consistent with the evidence, and make no attempt to control for other variables or to demonstrate conclusively that this interpretation is necessarily superior to others. We will save a more thorough treatment of the strategic and diplomatic dimension of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, and its interaction with domestic and bureaucratic factors, for a subsequent study.
 - 29 Diplomatically, the decade of negotiations following Argentina's presentation of a grievance to the United Nations in 1965 had been characterized by stagnation and Argentine frustration, particularly over the British insistence that no transfer of sovereignty could be considered "against the wishes of the Islanders," the British subjects living on the Falklands. Progress begun in 1971 was reversed by the 1975 Shackleton report, which led to a hostile response from Argentina and a break in negotiations. The new military regime adopted a more assertive stance, occupying the island of Southern Thule and establishing a "scientific station." The British issued a formal protest, but did little to interfere with the Argentine presence on Southern Thule from 1976 until the outbreak of the war in 1982. The Argentine military had developed a contingency plan for an invasion of the Falklands, but shelved the plan in February 1977 because of lack of Third World and or Communist Bloc support (Franks 1983: 15). The British became aware of this plan in January 1977 but resumed negotiations within a month.
 - 30 For a discussion of structural deficiencies in the Argentine military institution, including its feudal character, lack of inter-force communication or training, and extreme politicization, see Gamba (1987: 178-81).
 - 31 The military's expansionist geopolitical doctrines and staunch anti-communism led them to see the recovery of the islands as a means of gaining an important role for Argentina in the Western strategic system in the southern hemisphere. Recovery of the islands was essential if Argentina were to control the South Atlantic and access to Antarctica (and preclude the possibility that the British might play such a role, possibly with the support of Chile, after fortifying the islands). They would enhance their influence further through the establishment of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization through agreement with the Republic of South Africa and South American nations, and they hoped to anchor the anti-communist struggle in South America and play an important role in Central America. Through this they would secure modern weapons, which would improve their position in the regional balance of power and against potential regional antagonists. All this was necessary if Argentina was to fulfill their self-defined role as an emerging intermediate power (Moneta, 1984: 314-16; *LAIWR*, May 7 1982: 3).
 - 32 Galtieri may have needed Anaya's backing not simply to assume the presidency but also to maintain his position as commander-in-chief.
 - 33 The likelihood that Argentina would act by that date was anticipated in a 30 June 1981 meeting of senior officials in the British Foreign Office (Eddy and Linklater, 1982: 53).
 - 34 Moneta's (1984: 318, 324) evidence is based on interviews with "high officials of the (Argentine) armed forces." The British decision to withdraw the *Endurance* was announced 30 June 1981 (Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 43).
 - 35 There had been numerous reports in the press in January and February predicting hardening of Argentine negotiating stance and the possibility of invasion (Makin 1983b; 399-400; Franks 1983: 37-9).
 - 36 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1990: 46) argue that there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that the Argentine Navy played an important role in the Davidoff affair.
 - 37 The evidence is quite clear on this point (Gamba 1982: 21-2; *Bimestre* 12/1982: 123-9; Franks 1983: 66-7; Cardoso et al. 1983: 280-1; Hastings and Jenkins 1983: 43-9; Moneta 1984: 319; Lebow 1985: 111; Gordon 1988: 214; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990: 68, 142-3). Galtieri, Anaya, Costa Mendez all testified before the Rattenbach Commission that the political objective of occupying Malvinas was to force Britain to adhere to the original negotiating position set forth in UN Resolution 2065 (Gamba 1987: 133; Moro 1985; *Gente* December 8 1983).
 - 38 It is particularly interesting from the perspective of the theoretical concerns of this study (and in terms of the fundamental attribution error in social psychology) that many of these misperceptions derived from each state's failure to appreciate the importance of domestic pressures on the adversary's regime (Jervis 1976: Ch. 8), in spite of the fact that each was largely responding to its own domestic pressures.
 - 39 For a superb analysis of the mediation efforts and the failure of British-Argentine negotiations, see Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1990).
 - 40 We need to distinguish, however, between the aims of increasing the domestic political support of the government in power, and strengthening the institutions of the state against society.
 - 41 The authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal shared the exclusionary characteristics of BA regimes but not their modernizing orientation and their linkages to the international economy. It might be interesting to compare the foreign policies of Spain and Portugal with those of BA regimes with these differences in mind.
 - 42 One such case in which the scapegoat hypothesis is quite plausible concerns both El Salvador and Honduras in their Soccer War of 1969. In the context of severe economic crises in both systems, the forced eviction of Salvadoran immigrants from Honduras in June 1969, and the defeat of the Honduran national soccer team by El Salvador in the World Cup semi-finals in San Salvador, both regimes "saw some incentive to increase nationalist propaganda and engage in chauvinist brinkmanship in order to reduce domestic political pressure" (Dunkerley 1988: 358; Cockcroft 1989). Some of the widely-noted cases mentioned in note 5 would also be candidates for inclusion. Of course, a fully controlled comparative study would have to incorporate cases of domestic crisis that were not accompanied by external scapegoating.

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