Prior to the enunciation of the Bush Doctrine and the 2003 Iraq War, scholars commonly argued that democracies do not fight "preventive wars" against rising adversaries.¹ Scholars now debate whether the George W. Bush administration's doctrine of "preemption," which is actually based on the logic of prevention, constitutes a new departure in American foreign policy, or whether it has deeper historical roots.² Either argument, but especially the latter, contradicts the earlier conventional wisdom that democracies do not fight preventive wars.³ These debates raise a number of questions. What is preventive war? How does it differ from preemption? How influential was preventive or preemptive logic in the American initiation of the 2003 Iraq War? Does preventive logic have deep roots in American foreign policy? Is it true, more generally, that democracies never, or perhaps only rarely, fight preventive wars? If so, how can we explain that pattern? Under what conditions is preventive war morally justifiable?

My aim here is to answer some but not all of these questions. Given the amount of conceptual confusion that still persists about the meaning of preventive war and how it differs from preemption, among scholars as well as policy makers, I begin by clarifying the meaning of these concepts. I then turn to the question of the role of prevention and preemption in American foreign policy, and engage the debate about whether the Bush Doctrine represents a significant new development in American foreign policy or whether earlier American leaders resorted to preventive military action. In doing so, I am interested as much in the terms of the debate as in any substantive conclusion.

Given the amount of attention to the role of prevention in the 2003 American war in Iraq, in this volume and elsewhere, I devote only limited attention to that case. I also leave aside important questions about the conditions, if any, under which preventive war might be morally justifiable. That is a different question and one that has increasingly attracted the attention of philosophers as well as political scientists.⁴


The Concept of "Preventive War"

The conceptual question is fundamental, because until we define what a preventive war is we cannot begin to answer the questions of whether the Bush Doctrine is based on preemption or prevention, whether that policy is new or old, whether preventive war is a common tool of statecraft, for states in general and for democracies in particular, and whether preventive military action is morally defensible under certain conditions. Despite the importance of the conceptual question, scholars continue to confuse preemption and prevention and to define prevention in ways that limit the concept's utility for theoretical and empirical analysis.

Preventive war is commonly defined as a war fought to forestall an adverse shift in the balance of power between two states. The focus is on military capabilities, and the strategic logic is "better now than later." When confronted with a rising adversary, the argument goes, under some conditions it might be better to fight now rather than risk war under less favorable circumstances later. The concept is familiar. As Paul W. Schroeder argues, "preventive wars, even risky preventive wars, are not extreme anomalies in politics... They are a normal, even common, tool of statecraft." Wars commonly attributed to preventive logic include, among others, Prussia in the Seven Years War (1756–63), Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), Germany in World War I (1914–18), Japan in the Pacific War (1941–45), and Israel in the Sinai War (1956). The paradigmatic example of a preventive strike is the Israeli attack on the Iraq nuclear reactor in 1981.

The historical frequency of preventive war—or the preventive use of force short of war—depends on exactly how the concept is operationally defined. Definitions vary, and a given definition can be interpreted in different ways. Some scholars define preventive war so broadly as to encompass nearly all wars. A. J. P. Taylor, for example, claims that "[e]very war between Great Powers [in the 1848–1918 period] started as a preventive war, not a war of conquest." Dale Copeland argues that decline and prevention account for most of the major wars during the past two centuries of history, and Michael Howard argues even more broadly that wars originate in "perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own." These are strong claims, and they need to be tested, as do assertions that the Bush Doctrine's emphasis on "preemption" does or does not represent a significant departure in over two centuries of American foreign policy. Hypotheses like these can be validated only if the theoretical concepts used to structure empirical inquiry are defined precisely and used consistently. Otherwise, there is a danger that arguments regarding the history of prevention are shaped more by definition than by history. If prevention is defined broadly, then we will find numerous examples of prevention in the history of American foreign policy, or in diplomacy more generally. If prevention is defined narrowly, then we will find few such examples. These dangers are particularly worrisome given the political passions surrounding evaluations of the Bush Doctrine, even if many analysts are unaware of the impact of their definitions on their conclusions.

Perhaps the major source of a broad conception of prevention is the tendency to confound prevention with other sources of better-now-than-later logic. It is particularly common to see prevention confounded with preemption, despite the fact that scholars have emphasized the analytic distinction for at least two decades. Whereas prevention involves fighting now in order to avoid the risk of war under less favorable circumstances later, preemption involves the initiation of military action because decision makers believe that an adversary's attack is imminent and that there are advantages in striking first, or at least in preventing the adversary from doing so. Preemption is a response to the threat of an imminent attack. Prevention is a response to the more distant threat deriving from a negative shift in relative military capabilities.

It is important to emphasize, since this point is often neglected in the literature, that the threat leading to prevention goes beyond the risk of a future war, and an increasingly costly war, with an ever-stronger adversary. A negative shift in power leads to a decline in a state's bargaining leverage and influence on a wide range of issues. As a result, the declining state will be forced to make greater and greater concessions in order to satisfy its adversary and avoid a possible war. Thus the anticipated threat includes a state's loss of political influence as well as risk of war.

These considerations make it clear that the Bush administration's emphasis on "preemption," in its National Security Strategy of 2002 and again in 2006, and in the intervening Iraq War, is based more on prevention than on preemption. The administration did not anticipate, and its rhetoric did not emphasize, an imminent threat from Iraq, but instead the consequences—for the United States, for its allies, and for the stability of the region—of a sudden increase in Iraqi relative power that would follow from the its development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), particularly nuclear weapons.

The 2006 National Security Strategy, for example, states that the fight in the "War on Terror...involves using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of support." Several pages later it argues that "[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense." The emphasis is on denying perceived adversaries the military capabilities to inflict damage on the United States. The military elements of the American strategy designed to accomplish this objective fit the category of prevention. The National Security Strategy document goes on to say, however, that "In the long run, winning
the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas.” Winning the battle of ideas aims primarily to influence the intentions of potential adversaries, not their military capabilities, and that goal requires a different set of influence strategies, not prevention.

The blurring of the distinction between prevention and preemption is not unique to the Bush administration. Numerous scholars have either unknowingly conflated the concepts or deliberately used them interchangeably, as if the differences were negligible. But the differences are in fact quite substantial. While prevention is relatively common, preemption is relatively rare.13 The circumstances that lead states to consider undertaking preventive action are quite different from those that lead them to consider preemption. The primary driver of prevention is the changing dyadic balance of power (more accurately, the perception of an adverse power shift), whereas preemption can occur quite independently of changing power differentials between states.

Preemption usually emerges from international crises, when one state comes to believe, correctly or incorrectly, that an adversary is about to attack. Prevention can occur during a crisis, as political leaders seize the opportunity provided by the crisis to deal with deteriorating structural conditions, or perhaps as a result of leaders deliberately creating a crisis for the purposes of rationalizing preventive action they want for other reasons.14 Prevention can also occur outside of a crisis period, in part because political leaders hope to forestall the shift in power that might give the adversary the bargaining leverage to make demands that might lead to a crisis in the first place.

A related difference between prevention and preemption concerns the initiation of war. With preemption, a state has incentives to initiate war and secure first-mover advantages; with prevention, a state wants war, but may not necessarily want to initiate it. Under some conditions, a state may prefer that its adversary initiate war. Its aim is to shift the blame for the war and reap the diplomatic and domestic political advantages of being seen as the victim, or at least to avoid the costs of being perceived as the aggressor.15 This assumes that the stronger state is the one doing the preventing, which is true most of the time. It is conceivable, however, that a weaker actor that perceives that its position will worsen even more over time might conclude that a risky military action might be a reasonable gamble.16 The difference between prevention and preemption is also important for policy. As Richard K. Betts argues, “Countermobilization is the best way to deter an enemy contemplating preventive attack and the worst way to deter one considering preemption.”17

The difference between prevention and preemption is also important on normative and legal grounds. Preemption has traditionally been regarded as easier to justify than is prevention, in both just war theory and in international law.18 Michael Walzer, for example, argues for “the moral necessity of rejecting any attack that is merely preventive in character, that does not wait upon and respond to the willful acts of an adversary.” Walzer goes on to argue
some analysts broaden it to include state strategies aimed to avoid any development that might leave the state worse off in the future.

Some scholars are quite explicit about this. Jonathan Renshon, while recognizing the dangers of an excessively broad definition, rejects the standard practice of restricting the concept of preventive war to efforts to avoid a change in the balance of power as too narrow. For Renshon, "a preventive action is one fought to forestall a grave national security threat." This more expansive definition can include fears of the loss of status or prestige as well as a decline in relative military power. This view is the basis for Renshon's argument that the Suez War of 1956 was a preventive war for Britain, not because British leaders feared a decline in relative power, but rather because they feared the loss of Britain's great power status. I do not challenge Renshon's interpretation of British motives in the crisis, only his decision to label them as preventive.22

John Gaddis also uses a broad conception of the term when he argues that "preemption" is an "old tradition" in American foreign policy, with roots in the policies of John Quincy Adams and those of several subsequent presidents. Adams, as Secretary of State in the administration of James Monroe, defended a military response to cross-border incursions from Spanish Florida on grounds that if Spain could not control the armed infiltration, the United States had the right to do so. Adams argued that "the marauding parties...ought to be broken up immediately." Gaddis argues that Adams' reasoning was based on "preemptive" logic, as was Andrew Jackson's policy of using military force on the vulnerable western frontier before specific threats materialized.23

The Polk administration also used preemptive logic, Gaddis argues, to justify its annexation of Texas in 1845, which precipitated (some would say deliberately provoked) the war with Mexico. Similar logic led to the view that the incorporation of California required the extension of American sovereignty over all the territory between California and Texas. The argument in each case was that the territory was vulnerable to threats from and incorporation by other great powers, and that the United States needed to act to forestall those possible threats from materializing. Decades later, fears that political instability in Central and South America led Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson to use similar arguments to justify what Gaddis calls a "succession of preemptive interventions" in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Gaddis concludes that "[t]he doctrine of preemption also came, in time, to justify expansion at the expense of states that might fail," that "even the prospect of power vacuums invited preemption," and that "concerns about 'failed' or 'derelict' states, then, are nothing new in the history of United States foreign relations, nor are strategies of preemption in dealing with them."24

Gaddis makes a strong argument that territorial annexations and military actions motivated by existing or potential security threats from weak or unstable states or territories that are vulnerable to influence or penetration by other great powers have been a common theme in American foreign policy for nearly two centuries. This argument is reminiscent of John S. Galtby's "turbulent frontier" explanation of nineteenth-century British colonial expansion—the idea that each new territory needed to be defended, generating further expansion, which in turn created new threats and additional motivations for expansion, in an unending process.25 Both Gaddis and Galtby emphasize a defensively motivated expansion driven by the security dilemma and a worst-case analysis of potential threats.26 This argument serves as a useful counter to interpretations that emphasize a more offensively oriented expansionism, one driven by the goal of overturning the existing status quo. My question here is whether it is useful to describe such actions as preventive, or whether the concept of prevention should be limited to military action motivated primarily by the anticipation of a decline in relative military power and potential and by fear of the consequences of that decline.27

The analytical problem with such a broad conception of prevention or preemption—and even more so with Renshon's definition of prevention as an attempt to forestall a grave national security threat—is that it incorporates too many different things under a single category. It is important to understand—for theory, for history, for policy, and for questions of just war—whether a military action is motivated by fear of imminent attack, fear of a rising and hostile adversary that might leave one vulnerable to direct military attack in a few years, fear that a region external to a state's territory is either politically unstable or otherwise vulnerable to exploitation or possible annexation by a rival state, or fear of a loss of prestige or status in the international system.

These are all potentially serious threats, of course; actions to avoid them are all motivated by better-now-than-later logic; and it is useful to differentiate this behavior from actions driven by current issues and interests. We gain additional analytic leverage, however, by preserving the ability to differentiate among these threats. If prevention, whether by war or the more limited use of military force, is defined in terms of avoiding any future threat, even those perceived as grave, then we would end up identifying a significant number of wars as preventive. Such a broad definition of prevention leads to the classification of military action driven by the fear of the loss of credibility or of instability on the "turbulent frontier," or by the security dilemma more generally, into the same category as behavior driven by an adverse shift in the balance of power. More specifically, we would classify American interventions in Central America and elsewhere in the same category as the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, or as the contemplated U.S. strike against North Korean nuclear facilities in 1994. This expansive conception of the preventive motivation for war is not very useful. It is much preferable to define preventive war as a military response to the anticipation of a negative shift in the dyadic balance of military power, the fear of its consequences, and the hope of blocking or delaying that shift.
This is not to say that a decline in relative military power is necessarily more important than other kinds of future threats or generates different policy responses, only that it is analytically distinct. It is important to know whether one kind of threat is more serious than another, whether it occurs more often, or whether it is more likely to lead to a military response; but this is possible only if we first analytically distinguish among these threats and then investigate them empirically. To incorporate various types of future threats under the same conceptual umbrella is a classic form of "conceptual stretching," and only distracts from rigorous theoretical and historical analysis.

To summarize, my definition of prevention focuses on a particular state strategy in response to a particular kind of future threat—a military response to the perception of an adverse power shift and the fear of its consequences. Those consequences include not only the risk of war under less favorable conditions in the future, but also the continued deterioration of the status quo and the erosion of one's bargaining leverage and influence over a variety of issues. Prevention differs from preemption, which is a military response to the anticipation of an imminent attack. Prevention also differs from other sources of better-now-than-later logic driven by other kinds of future threats. Thus, motivations for war based on the fear of a decline in reputation, political instability, change in the adversary's regime or ideology, and similar factors would not be included in the category of prevention. I say this without passing judgment on the causal importance of these other factors relative to prevention.

It is also useful to separate the motives for a policy and the means used to implement it. One might identify several alternative strategies for the goal of blocking or retarding the rise of the adversary's military power, ranging from bribery to diplomacy to containment to a military attack. I restrict the concept of preventive war, or the logic of prevention, to the use of military force. Thus I exclude policies of deterrence and containment. I also exclude Gaddis' category of peaceful territorial annexations. Similarly, preventive war should not be confused with "preventive diplomacy," which generally refers to strategies of conflict prevention adopted by the United Nations and other international organizations.

So far I have adopted the standard usage and referred to the concept of "a preventive war." This is in fact quite problematic, because it implies that preventive war is a type of war. Such an approach essentially defines a war in terms of its cause, which confounds cause and effect in a single concept. This practice raises the question of how to classify wars in which the preventive motivation is just one of several contributing causes. This is a critical problem, since most wars have multiple causes, and so-called preventive wars are no exception.

Although preventive war is defined in terms of a military response to the anticipation of an adverse power shift, not all power shifts lead to war, as illustrated by the power transition involving Britain and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. In addition, not all power shifts that lead to war necessarily involve the preventive motivation. It is conceivable that the rising state might initiate the war. Power transition theorists, for example, have long emphasized the central importance of power transitions in the processes leading to war, but they have consistently dismissed the argument that the preventive motivation plays a significant role. They argue that it is the rising (and dissatisfied) challenger who initiates the war in order to speed up the transition of power, gain a dominant position, and use its power to create a new set of international political, economic, and legal arrangements that will bring the benefits it derives from the system into line with its newly acquired military power.

Rather than focus on "preventive war" as a type of war, it is analytically preferable to focus on the preventive motivation for war, or preventive logic, as a causal variable. It is an intervening variable, one possible causal mechanism linking power shifts and war. This approach allows us to assess the causal weight of the preventive motivation relative to that of other variables in the processes leading to war.

Although preventive (not preemptive) logic played a role in the processes leading to the 2003 Iraq War, I do not find it useful to characterize that war as a preventive war. Some key actors in the Bush administration may have been driven primarily by the preventive motivation of destroying Iraq's nuclear weapons program, whatever its stage of development and however much they may have exaggerated it. Other key actors may have been driven more by the goals of overthrowing a brutal dictator, bringing democracy to Iraq and perhaps the Middle East as a whole, securing access to oil, demonstrating the effectiveness of U.S. power projection capabilities and sending a signal to other potential adversaries, or by other motives. The decision-making process was conducted within a domestic political context shaped by the September 11 attacks. It is important to assess the relative causal impact of these different policy preferences and domestic constraints and opportunities, and this task is not advanced by using the label of "preventive war" to describe the entire enterprise.

Having said that, I recognize that "preventive war" is a widely used linguistic shorthand, and I occasionally use it to refer to a war driven primarily by the goal of forestalling an adverse power shift. The meaning of the term, however, should be clear from the preceding discussion.

The preventive motivation for war is driven by the anticipation of an adverse shift in the dyadic balance of power and by perceived incentives to use military force to block or retard the adversary's further growth while the opportunity is still available. I have distinguished this factor from other sources of better-now-than-later logic, but it would still be useful to highlight certain aspects of this definition. Let me preface this discussion by reminding the reader that the perceived threat is not only the risk of war against a stronger adversary in the future, but also the erosion of the declining state's bargaining power,
resulting in an increase in the concessions made by the potential preventer to its rising adversary.

It is important to note, first of all, that my definition does not limit the preventive motivation for war to situations involving power transitions. Even a limited increase in the adversary’s relative military capabilities, one that falls short of a complete power transition, can generate incentives for war by eroding the leading state’s bargaining power, reducing the probability of victory in any war that might occur, and increasing the costs associated with that war, even if victory were still the most likely outcome. Complete power transitions are presumably more likely to lead to war than are more limited power shifts, but the latter can still be perceived as threatening.

Limited power shifts can be particularly threatening if they involve step-level changes in relative military power. Most of the theoretical literature on preventive war, at least prior to the Bush Doctrine, assumed a gradual rise in one state’s military power relative to another, and most systematic empirical investigations of power shifts have focused on aggregate levels of military capabilities and economic foundations of military potential. One can find little if any theoretical discussion of step-level power shifts resulting from technological breakthroughs, arms imports, or other processes. Historically, however, some of the most famous cases described as preventive wars involved step-level changes in power, or at least the anticipation of such. Germany’s fear of the completion of the Russian railroad system and army reforms by 1917 was a major incentive for war in 1914. Israel’s fear that the 1955 Czech/Russian arms sales would give Egypt a quantitative and qualitative military advantage over Israel was a major factor in, and perhaps a necessary condition for, Israel’s Sinai campaign against Egypt in 1956.

Step-level changes in military power short of power transitions are particularly threatening if they are expected to cross a critical threshold of military power. The nuclear threshold is the obvious example here. Israeli fear that Iraq was about to acquire nuclear weapons was necessary and nearly sufficient for the Israeli strike against the Osirak reactor, and the threat of “rogue states” and terrorist organizations acquiring nuclear weapons was the primary force behind the emphasis on “preemption” by the second Bush administration.

The preventive motivation for war applies to limited military strikes as well as to all-out wars, as illustrated by the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and by U.S. deliberations about a possible preventive strike against North Korea in 1994. It is important to note, however, that whether a strike stays limited or escalates to a full-scale war depends not only on the actions of the preventer, but also on the actions of the target. Moreover, the preventer’s anticipation of the target’s response can be an important consideration in the preventer’s decision calculus. We speak of Israel’s preventive strike, rather than a preventive war, in 1981 because Iraq did not retaliate, and Israel’s anticipation of that nonresponse influenced its decision to strike in the first place. By contrast, the United States anticipated that a limited strike against North Korean nuclear facilities in 1994 would probably lead to a North Korean invasion of South Korea and consequently an all-out war on the Korean peninsula, and those perceptions were critical in deterring an American strike.

Although most discussions of preventive war focus on the dyadic power relationship between two states, third parties can also play important roles. The rising challenger may be a greater threat if it has allies and a lesser threat if the declining leader has allies. Germany’s fear in 1914 was not that it would be unable to defeat Russia in bilateral war in 1917, but rather that it would not be able to defeat a Franco-Russian alliance. In addition, allies may be an important source of armaments and economic aid, which can compensate for an adverse dyadic power shift. Russian arms sales to Egypt through Czechoslovakia in 1955 generated Israel’s preventive motivation for war, and Israel’s failure to secure armaments from France or the United States eliminated an alternative to a military solution for Israel and made a decision for war much more likely.

Having defined the preventive motivation for war and distinguished it from preemption and from other sources of better-now-than-later logic, let us now turn to its role in American foreign policy. I focus on the period after World War II, where a dominant United States was confronted with the rising power first of the Soviet Union and then of China, and then with the possibility that North Korea, Iraq, and now Iran might acquire nuclear weapons and pose a potential threat to the United States, its allies, and its interests.

Preventive Logic in American Foreign Policy since 1945

In the early years of the Cold War, American political leaders recognized that the U.S. atomic monopoly would be temporary and that the Soviet Union would soon develop the atomic bomb. They feared an adverse shift in the balance of power, believed that the Soviets were an implacably hostile and immoral adversary that was bent on world domination, and expected that the Soviets would probably go to war once they had the capability to do so. There was some talk about the strategy of prevention among U.S. decision makers and their advisors in the late 1940s, but uncertainty about whether the United States could actually win a war against the Soviet Union, combined with the belief that a preventive attack was inconsistent with American values and politically impractical, quickly silenced such talk. Instead of preventive war, the U.S. preferred a policy of massive rearmament, incorporated such a policy into NSC-68 (National Security Council, 1950), and adopted it once the Korean War created the political conditions that made it feasible to formally adopt that policy.

American leaders gave more serious thought to the feasibility and desirability of a strategy of prevention in the 1950s, but they came nowhere close
to adopting one.\textsuperscript{42} President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a note to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, asked whether “our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment,” and raised the issue several times at meetings of the National Security Council in the 1952–54 period.\textsuperscript{43}

In emphasizing that preventive logic was one of several factors leading the United States to take a tough line against the Soviet Union, Marc Trachtenberg suggests that a primary American motivation was to test the Soviet Union, to assess what its intentions really were, and to determine whether a war was inevitable. If the Soviet Union responded with a hard line even while they were weak, it would be reasonable to infer that they would be likely to take an even stronger line once the balance of power had shifted and the Soviets were in a stronger position. If that were the case, the U.S. could think more seriously about a strategy of prevention.\textsuperscript{44}

This is an interesting argument, one that implicitly adopts a signaling model framework, but it is several steps removed from a strategy of prevention. The validation of that argument would require a lot more evidence that U.S. decision makers were thinking along these lines, that they would have been willing to seriously consider military action in the case that the Soviets had adopted a harder line, and at what point they would have done so. It is easier to speculate about how you might hypothetically act in such a situation than to actually make such consequential and irreversible decisions once you get there.\textsuperscript{45}

Discussions about the viability of a strategy of prevention were more prominent in the Kennedy administration. During the Cuban missile crisis, American decision makers seriously considered the possibility of an air strike (surgical or more massive) against Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Although President John F. Kennedy chose the naval blockade strategy over the surgical air strike or alternative strategies during the Cuban missile crisis, his administration conveyed (on October 27) a clear threat of an air strike to Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and there is substantial evidence that Kennedy was planning to authorize an air strike by October 30 if Khrushchev did not remove the missiles.\textsuperscript{46}

This raises several questions. One is the counterfactual one of whether Kennedy would have actually authorized air strikes if the Soviets had not complied with American coercive threats. A second question is the interpretive historical one of why Kennedy and other American decision makers were considering an air attack or some other hardline strategy. A third question, closely tied to the second and central for our purposes, is whether it is useful to describe Kennedy’s thinking as involving preventive logic, and whether we would describe a hypothetical air strike as preventive.

In terms of the definition offered here, the thinking was clearly not preemptive, because no one anticipated an imminent Soviet attack against the United States. Whether the logic is best described as preventive raises some difficult issues. My definition of prevention emphasizes perceptions and motivations—perceptions of an adverse shift in power and the motivation of blocking or retarding that power shift. If Kennedy and his advisors perceived that the introduction of the Soviet missiles in Cuba constituted a significant increase in Soviet military power against the United States, if they feared the consequences of that adverse shift in power, and if they sought an air strike and possibly an invasion primarily in order to forestall that shift in the dyadic balance of power, then I would describe the thinking and any subsequent air strike as preventive.\textsuperscript{47}

If, on the other hand, Kennedy’s contemplation of a possible air strike was driven primarily by domestic political considerations, or even by a loss of credibility that might affect others’ perceptions of U.S. intentions in future crises, I would not describe his thinking as preventive.\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, if it were true, as many argue, that Kennedy and most of his advisors did not see the new Soviet missiles as constituting a significant increase in Soviet military power vis-à-vis the United States, and that Kennedy’s policy of demanding their removal—by persuasion if possible and by force if necessary—was driven more by domestic politics or concerns about alliance cohesion or credibility than by a perception of a shift in the strategic balance, then I would dissent from Trachtenberg’s argument that Kennedy was driven by preventive thinking in the missile crisis.\textsuperscript{49} This discussion makes clear that the labeling of state strategies as preventive can be a highly data-intensive task, one that requires detailed information about decision makers’ perceptions and intentions.

The Kennedy administration also worried about China’s nuclear weapons program. They believed that a nuclear-armed China would be “intolerable” and hoped that diplomatic efforts associated with the planned nuclear test ban treaty would convince Chinese leaders to abandon their program. At the same time, they considered the possibility of either an American or a Soviet preventive strike if diplomatic efforts failed.\textsuperscript{50} Kennedy approached the Soviets in July 1963, in the context of negotiations over the Test Ban Treaty, about their willingness to participate, but the Soviets declined.\textsuperscript{51} Trachtenberg raises the question of what Kennedy would have done if he had not been assassinated, or if the Soviet reaction had been more positive. Whether the Kennedy administration’s discussions and approach to the Soviets were idle talk, as some have argued, or whether they were much closer to a preventive strike, is something that requires more evidence to resolve.

It is interesting to note that later in the decade, as the Nixon administration was attempting to bring China into the balance against the Soviet Union, the U.S. was not at all receptive to the possibility of a preventive strike against China. During the Sino-Soviet crisis and border skirmishes in 1969, President Richard Nixon warned the Soviet Union that the United States “would not remain indifferent” if the Soviets attacked China. Four years later, when the
Soviets appeared to approach the United States about a possible Soviet preventive attack against China, the United States did not respond.52

Another situation in which preventive logic played a role is the 1990/91 Persian Gulf War. One factor contributing to the first Bush administration's decision to intervene in the war was its fear that the completion of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program would catapult Iraq beyond a critical threshold of military capabilities, upset the balance of power in the Middle East, threaten U.S. regional interests and allies (Israel in particular), and undermine the deterrent threat of American intervention. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided the opportunity to destroy Iraqi nuclear facilities while driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, and in close power some the preventive motivation was one of several factors leading to the American decision for war in January 1991.

The relative causal weight of preventive logic compared to that of other factors is difficult to assess, though it was probably not the primary consideration. We can say, however, that fears of an Iraqi nuclear program turned out to be the primary means by which the first Bush administration was able to mobilize public support for Operation Desert Storm. After eliciting relatively little public response to arguments that war might be necessary to protect oil supplies, to reverse an immoral action by an immoral regime, to protect the American way of life, and to protect American jobs, the administration shifted (in late November 1990) its emphasis to the risks posed by the Iraqi nuclear program, which finally struck a chord with the public.53 Thus preventive logic contributed to the American decision for war in January 1991 in two ways. It was one of several factors that directly influenced President George H. W. Bush and his advisors. Perhaps more significantly, it was the critical factor in the mobilization of public support for the war, which was itself an important causal path leading to war.

The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis provides a much clearer case in which American anticipation of a step-level shift in an adversary's military capabilities and the fear of its consequences led to the serious consideration of a preventive attack to forestall an adverse shift in military power, namely North Korea's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.54 American intelligence had suspicions about the North Korean nuclear program since the early 1980s. The International Atomic Energy Administration initiated inspections of the North Korean nuclear complex at Yongbyon in January 1992 and demanded more intrusive inspections. North Korea rebuffed these demands and in March 1993 withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. By fall 1993, the Clinton administration believed that North Korea might already have enriched plutonium to make two nuclear bombs, enough fuel rods to make five or six more, the capability of making ten to twelve nuclear bombs a year once its reactor moved into full-scale operation, and the ability to multiply that several times once its larger reactors were completed. The risks were seen to be "intolerable."55

After a series of diplomatic efforts failed, and it was clear that North Korea was intent on proceeding with its nuclear program, the Clinton administration developed plans both for a preventive strike against the North Korean military facility at Yongbyon, and for a defense against a North Korean invasion of the South. With support from Japan and South Korea, it publicly demanded that North Korea either stop its nuclear program or face economic sanctions. North Korea responded by threatening "to turn Seoul into a sea of flames" and warning that sanctions would constitute an "act of war."56

Secretary of Defense William Perry later said that the Clinton administration was faced with the choice between an "unpalatable" option and a "disastrous" one. They believed that a nuclear North Korea would be a "nightmare," but that a preventive strike was "very likely to incite" North Korea to attack the South, and even building up American military forces in the South to defend against a possible North Korean attack risked a preemptive attack by North Korea.57 Domestically, Republicans in Congress and conservative commentators were demanding a hard line against North Korea, and opinion polls showed substantial support for military action to keep North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, even at the risk of a broader war.58

As Trachtenberg notes, "the smell of war was in the air." Perry later said that he was aware at the time that "we were poised on the brink of a war that might involve weapons of mass destruction." Don Oberdorfer reports that the top U.S. Air Force general in Korea said that "although neither he nor other commanders said so out loud, not even in private conversations with one another, 'inside we all thought we were going to war.'"59

In the end, however, the Clinton administration settled for a compromise with North Korea, one that the U.S. had rejected earlier in the crisis. The primary factors working against military action were the perceived likelihood and costs of a major war,60 the absence of diplomatic support from China and Japan,61 and the unwanted and unexpected mission of former President Jimmy Carter to North Korea in the middle of the crisis. President Bill Clinton was "within minutes" of adopting one of three options to increase U.S. troop deployments in South Korea, which he recognized would have increased the risk of a general war on the peninsula and possibly lead to a preemptive attack by North Korea, when word of a provisional agreement negotiated by Carter arrived. Thus the U.S. came very close to war with North Korea in 1994, and the process was driven primarily by the anticipation of a step-level increase in North Korean military capabilities and by the U.S. willingness to run a high-risk war to forestall that development.62

Just as we can be confident that preventive war logic was more important as a rationale for the American war against Iraq in 1991 than as a leading cause of that war, we can also be fairly confident that preventive logic was more important as a means of gaining domestic support for the 2003 Iraq War than as a leading cause of that war.63 There is little doubt that the fear that Iraq was
close to developing a nuclear capability, along with (secondarily) the virtual certainty that Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons and that he had used them, was the primary means by which the George W. Bush administration mobilized public support for its war in Iraq, at least in its early stages.  

The actual decision for war was more complicated.  Although many have argued each side of the issue with great confidence, this is in fact a difficult conceptual and methodological question.  Conceptually, the decision for war, like many decisions for war, was quite complex.  The President and his advisors had multiple and sometimes conflicting motivations: they could agree on war but not on why it was desirable or necessary; the mix of factors may have varied for different individuals at different stages of the decision-making process; and the September 11 terrorist attacks created a permissive domestic political context for war.  How to aggregate all these factors, and to assess the relative weight of preventive logic, is a difficult question.  This analytic problem is compounded by the methodological problem of lack of access to all of the data necessary to resolve the factual question, and by the fact that actors have incentives to conceal not only their primary motivations but also what information they had and when they had it.  Given that the causes were complex and that the evidence is incomplete, I believe that too many observers have expressed too much confidence in emphasizing the dominant role of one particular factor in the outbreak of the war, whether it be preventive logic, a Wilsonian liberal agenda, the domestic political agenda of the Bush administration, or the religious views or personal agenda of the President.  Thus, in my view, a definitive assessment of the causal role of the preventive motivation in the processes leading to war would be premature at this time.

Conclusion

I have defined prevention, distinguished it from preemption and from other sources of better-now-than-later logic, and briefly examined the role of preventive logic in American foreign policy since the end of World War II.  This survey suggests that there are a number of interesting historical and theoretical questions that have yet to be fully answered and that require a great deal more research.  These questions include the extent of official thinking about a possible preventive strike against the Soviet Union and then China; how to explain the Clinton administration’s decision to pull back from a preventive strike against North Korea in 1994; the causal role of preventive logic in the U.S. decision to go to war against Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003; and the conditions, if any, under which the United States would be most likely to initiate, alone or in conjunction with other states, preventive strikes against North Korea, Iran, or other potential adversaries in the future.

My survey of the historical influence of preventive logic has generated one finding that might be surprising to some but that draws considerable support from the historical record.  That is the finding that the American public appears to be quite open to preventive logic as a justification for military action.  This, combined with evidence from the Israeli public’s reaction to the preventively motivated Sinai campaign against Egypt in 1956 and attack against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, runs contrary to the argument, quite common before the 2003 Iraq War, that democracies do not fight preventive wars.  An important causal mechanism underlying this hypothesis is the notion that democratic publics will not tolerate preventive wars on moral grounds.  Hans J. Morgenthau argued that preventive war is “abhorrent to democratic public opinion” because of the moral condemnation of war in the West, and Bernard Brodie argued that “there now exists a powerful and rigid barrier, largely on moral grounds, to American planning of preventive war.”

The two U.S.-Iraqi cases are particularly clear.  The fear of the development of an Iraqi nuclear capability under Saddam Hussein was the primary means by which each of the Bush administrations mobilized public support for a war against Iraq, first in January 1991 and then in March 2003.  In the latter case, the Iraqi nuclear program was one of the factors explicitly cited in the October 2002 Congressional Resolution authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq.  After it became clear that the war would be much more costly and less successful than the Bush administration had predicted, many Democratic political leaders stated that they never would have supported the war had they known at the time that Iraq did not pose a nuclear threat.  Their statements, combined with their support of the Congressional Resolution authorizing war, suggest that they believed that a strategy of military prevention was justified, or at least good policy.

The North Korean crisis provides supportive but not conclusive evidence on behalf of the hypothesis that the American public is willing to support preventively motivated military action.  Approximately half of the American public reported that they would support military action to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, despite the risks of a wider war.  True, the Clinton administration’s decision against a preventive strike was motivated in part by the anticipation of the enormous casualties that they expected would follow from the likely result of a general war on the peninsula, but to the extent that domestic considerations were important, Clinton was probably more concerned about charges that he was too soft in reaction to a serious foreign threat.  Thus we must reject any unconditional statements that public opposition and moral considerations prevent the United States from initiating preventive military action.  An interesting question to explore, however, is what impact the Iraq War will have on public attitudes toward possible preventive strikes against future adversaries.  Will preventive logic continue to appeal to the American public?  Or will frustration over the Iraq War and the grounds on which it was initiated lead to skepticism both about a future government’s
claims about an adversary's nuclear weapons capabilities and about the utility of a military solution to the threats said to be confronting the United States?

Notes

I thank the editors of this volume for their comments and suggestions.

Endnotes

1. Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics* 44 (January 1992): 235-269. This argument is distinct from the widely supported finding that democracies rarely if ever go to war against each other.


3. This contradiction is reminiscent of the contrast between the argument during the Cold War that the bipolar U.S.-Soviet rivalry was likely to persist for many years, and arguments in the 1990s and after that the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War were overdetermined.


6. Huntington, for example, defines preventive war as "[a] military action initiated by one state against another for the purpose of forestalling a subsequent change in the balance of power between the two states which would seriously reduce the military security of the first state." Walzer says that "[a] preventive war is a war fought to maintain the balance, to stop what is thought to be an even distribution of power from shifting into a relation of dominance and inferiority." Betts argues that "[p]reventive war is waged in anticipation of eventual vulnerability, not against immediate threats, and is designed to engage an enemy before he has improved his capabilities." Samuel P. Huntington, "To Choose Peace or War: Is There a Place for Preventive War in American Policy?" *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 83 (April 1957): 360, cited in Jonathan B. Reenish, *Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), chap. 1; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 76; Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1982), 145.


9. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 153. I suspect that Wolfers' statement that "there seems to be no case in history in which a country started a preventive war on the grounds of security" derives from his narrow (but unstated) definition.


12. 2006 NSS, 9, 18.
long distinguished capabilities from intentions or reputation. This distinction is reinforced by evidence suggesting that leaders’ expectations regarding the likely impact of their state’s reputation on its future influence may be misplaced. Adversaries’ perceptions of a state’s resolve in a crisis are influenced far more by their assessments of their opponent’s military power and interests at stake than by their assessments of its reputation deriving from past behavior. Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). This may or may not be correct, but we cannot assess their relative weight empirically unless we first distinguish them analytically.


24. Ibid., 18-21.


26. The argument assumes that the expansionist behavior is driven more by fear than by ambition, more by a concern to avoid losses than to maximize gains. The “loss aversion” hypothesis draws support, on the individual level, from prospect theory. For a summary and applications to international relations, see Jack S. Levy, “The Implications of Framing and Loss Aversion for International Conflict,” in Handbook of War Studies II, ed. Manz I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221.

27. None of the instances described above, with the possible exception of the incursions from Spanish Florida leading to an American military response, involved an imminent threat of external attack, so that none of these qualifies as preemption.

28. Perhaps an example will illustrate the issues involved. Renshon (Why Leaders Choose War, chap. 2) makes a strong argument that the primary factor leading British political leaders to intervene with military force in the 1956 Suez crisis was their concerns about Britain’s declining status and prestige in the global system. Given his definition of preemption, he classifies British behavior as preventive. I agree with Renshon’s analysis of British motivations but prefer not to use the concept of preventive war to describe it. It would be useful to compare British perceptions and motivations with those of Israel in the same war. Britain anticipated a continuing decline in its status, but no future threat of a military attack by any particular adversary. Israel anticipated that the Czech/Russian arms sales to Egypt and the incorporation of the new weapons into the Egyptian arsenal would lead to a shift in the qualitative and quantitative dyadic balance of power in Egypt’s favor, and that in the context of ongoing hostilities and Egypt President Nasser’s bellicose rhetoric there was a high probability that Egypt would initiate a war within two or three years. Levy and Gochal, “Democracy and Preventive War.” The expectations and motivations underlying British and Israeli behavior are sufficiently different that we should use different concepts to describe them. The question is not which view is correct or incorrect, but rather which is most useful for various theoretical purposes.

30. While Copeland (Origins of Major War, chap. 6) includes the "preventive containment" of the Soviet Union by the United States in the early Cold War period as a case of prevention in response to anticipated decline, I do not include that in a category of the preventive use of force.

31. In his An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between the parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." Cited in Fen Osler Hampson, Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations and Beyond, in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System, eds. Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 139-157.

32. For similar reasons, we have to be careful in referring to a state strategy of preventive war, because a state strategy may be the product of a collective decision by actors who support the strategy for different reasons. The U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003, rationalized under the rubric of "preemption," may be an example.

33. The probability that a power shift leads to war depends on the magnitude and the speed of the shift, images of the adversary's current hostility and future intentions, the expected costs of an immediate war, the availability of alternative strategies (including alliances) for dealing with the threat, and a state's risk orientation and time horizons. See Copeland, Origins of Major War; Van Evera, Causes of War; Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s," Security Studies, forthcoming.


35. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War." The one situation in which the concept of preventive war is not analytically problematic is one in which the preventive motivation is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for war, but I can think of no clear historical example. The Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 comes close, but if Peres rather than Begin had been prime minister—a reasonable counterfactual to invoke since for a time Peres was ahead in the polls at the time—the war would probably not have occurred. Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochal, "When Do Democracies Fight Preventive Wars?" Renshon, Why Leaders Choose War, chap. 3.


37. Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War; Levy and Gochal, "Democracy and Preventive War.


40. Trachtenberg ("Preventive War") interprets American entry into World War II as preventive, motivated by the fear of Germany's growing power in Europe, the recognition that American public opinion would not support American intervention, and by the belief that the only way to bring the United States into the war against Germany was to provoke a war against Japan. This is based on a very broad conception of prevention.


42. Trachtenberg argues that the evidence, while not conclusive, suggests that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had a policy of preemption against the Soviet Union (until Kennedy rejected it in 1963), in the sense that NATO planned to respond to a Soviet conventional invasion of Europe, or even to evidence that war was unavoidable, with a massive nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. That, of course, is distinct from a policy of prevention in response to a negative shift in the balance of power. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 158-164, 182-183.


44. Trachtenberg, "Preventive War.

45. Any supporting evidence would have to reflect a systematic pattern of thinking and be tested against alternative explanations. The fact that a political leader mentioned a particular policy option once or twice is far from evidence that he or she supported it. They might have suggested an option, thus leaving it in the historical record, only to quickly abandon it if they became convinced that it was intellectually flawed or politically impossible. They might also have deliberately played the devil's advocate role in raising certain possibilities.
46. In an October 29 cabinet meeting, President Kennedy stated, "We had decided Saturday night to begin this air strike on Tuesday [October 30]." Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University/Belknap Press, 1997), 656. The air strike might very well have been massive and followed by an invasion. See Sheldon M. Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). I thank Lori Gronich for her suggestions regarding recent research on the missile crisis.

47. Trachtenberg ("Preventive War") argues that the Kennedy administration's relatively hard line in Cuba was driven by the fear of what the Soviets might do in the near future in Berlin, and concludes that the underlying logic was basically "preemptive."

48. To illustrate a point I emphasized earlier, whether the contemplated U.S. air strike option was driven more by the goal of forestalling an adverse shift in the strategic balance of power or by the goal of forestalling a decline in U.S. image and credibility is an important question. Describing both as preventive would not facilitate an assessment of their relative causal impact.

49. President Kennedy repeatedly said in meetings with the ExComm that the Soviet missiles in Cuba did not substantially increase the Soviet nuclear threat to the U.S. The president's brother, Robert Kennedy, was particularly sensitive to the possible domestic implications of the crisis. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in arguing for an all-out air and land attack on Cuba (after initially rejecting such options), stated that "it's not a military problem that we are facing; it's a political problem; it's a problem of holding the alliance together; it's a problem of...conditioning Khrushchev for our future moves." It was a "problem of dealing with our domestic public," rather than a change in the military balance of power that he said justified an invasion of Cuba (emphasis in original). In Stern, Averting 'The Final Failure', 98-100, 127. While some members of the ExComm, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that the missiles constituted a military problem, no one dissented from the view that it was a major political problem. As Roger Hilsman (a Kennedy advisor, but not a member of the ExComm) said, "The United States might not be in mortal danger, but...the administration most certainly was." Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 197. The stakes were all the higher because Kennedy had publicly warned Khrushchev that he would not tolerate Soviet missiles in Cuba, and thus staked his reputation on the issue. Lebow and others conclude that the continuing presence if Soviet missiles in Cuba would have crippled Kennedy's presidency and possibly led to a Republican control of Congress in November. Richard Ned Lebow, "The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated: Why Was Cuba a Crisis?" in The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, ed. James A. Nathan (New York: St. Martins, 1992), 173. See also, Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problem of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, ed. Nathan, 68-69.

50. A Soviet strike would be accompanied by American efforts to ensure that West Germany would not acquire nuclear weapons, which was a major Soviet concern.


54. The key sources include Don Oberdofer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997); Sigal, Disarming Strangers; Wit, Proneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical.


56. Ibid., 129.

57. Ibid., 128-131; Oberdofer, The Two Koreas, 323.

58. A June 1994 poll revealed that nearly half of the public were willing to risk war to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. Oberdofer, The Two, 323; Sigal, Disarming Strangers, 302-303.


60. There was a wide range of estimates regarding the costs of a general war if it did occur, but all involved casualty rates substantially higher than the 1950-1952 Korean conflict. Perry, Head of JCS General John Shalikashvili, and General Luck told Clinton on May 19 that a war to repulse a North Korean attack before it reached Seoul, followed by a counterattack into North Koran, would result in 52,000 U.S. troops killed or wounded, 490,000 Republic of Korean military casualties, "enormous" number of North Korean and civilian deaths, and a $61 billion cost, mostly to be paid by the U.S. Oberdofer, The Two, 315; Sigal, Disarming Strangers, 211-212.

61. Sigal, Disarming Strangers, 9, 118.

62. As we now know, the negotiated settlement did not achieve its objectives.


65. Also unclear, at least at this point (spring 2006), is exactly which decision makers had what degree of confidence in how close Saddam was to acquiring nuclear weapons, and how those estimates changed over time in response to new information. Intelligence estimates may have been influenced by a variety of psychological mechanisms or political considerations. Policy preferences for war may have led some officials, through a process of “motivated biases” (wishful thinking) to a genuine belief that Saddam was getting close to acquiring nuclear weapons. Others may have realized that an Iraqi nuclear capability was a more distant prospect, but consciously and deliberately distorted intelligence in an attempt to influence others’ policy preferences and advance their own policy agendas. Such distortions may have included the restructuring of the intelligence collection apparatus itself to produce the desired intelligence, as illustrated by the creation of the Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon. Finally, some actors may have been driven by unmotivated (purely cognitive) biases, independent of their policy preferences, to the conclusion that the Iraqi nuclear capability was far along. After all, this conclusion appeared to make sense in light of Saddam’s refusal to allow inspections and reports that the Iraqi military believed that Iraq had nuclear weapons. Plus, U.S. intelligence had underestimated the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in 1990, and they did not want to make the same mistake again. On the influence of cognitive biases on perceptions of an Iraqi nuclear capability, see Robert Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 29,1 (February 2006), 3-52.


67. Schweller (“Domestic Structure and Preventive War”) qualified this hypothesis by saying that democracies might fight low-cost preventive wars against much weaker opponents, but other scholars subsequently stated the hypothesis in more unconditional terms.


69. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas; Sigal, Disarming Strangers; Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical.