

# **UNDERSTANDING WAR: WILL THE SECOND HORSEMAN RIDE FOREVER?**

**Professor Jack S. Levy**

FAS Interdisciplinary Honors Seminar (01:556:499:H1), Rutgers University, Fall 2004  
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The image of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse -- War, Famine, Pestilence, and Death -- is a powerful cultural symbol. It goes back to chapter six of the Book of Revelation in the Bible, in which the Second Horseman was given a "great sword" and "the power ... to take peace from the earth." Indeed, since the beginning of human civilization war has been a persistent theme in the relationships between tribes, societies, empires, and states, and a primary source of human suffering. This has led many to ask "Will there always be war?" Will the Second Horseman ride forever? This question serves as the point of departure for our seminar.

Only a decade or so ago many academics and public intellectuals were arguing that after an extremely violent 20th century we were beginning to witness a significant decline in the frequency and magnitude of war and even the possibility of the obsolescence of major war. The decline of war, it was argued, could be traced to a combination of the deterrent effects of the nuclear revolution, the end of the Cold War, the spread of global capitalism and democracy, and the "end of history," conceived as the end of ideological conflict as the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the victory of liberal democracy, and the absence of alternative political/economic/ideological systems. Instead, we have observed an increase in extremely violent ethnonational conflicts, an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a major crisis between two nuclear powers in South Asia, an explosion of terrorism on a global scale, growing hostility to the United States as a result of its occupation of Iraq, evidence that North Korea has developed a nuclear capability and that Iran is only a few years away, and increasing fears of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. These developments do not bode well for the obsolescence-of-war hypothesis. Perhaps a better set of questions is not whether war will always be with us, but who is likely to use what kinds and levels of violence against whom and for what purposes as we move into the future.

Any serious attempt to forecast the future of war, or perhaps to attempt to reduce its frequency or mitigate its severity, requires that we first understand what causes war. Despite the enormous intellectual energy that has been devoted to this question by philosophers, historians, political scientists, and other social scientists, a clear answer has

yet to emerge. The only consensus, with some notable dissenters, is that war is complex and multi-causal. The absence of a full understanding of war is compounded by the fact that most scholars tend to work within their own disciplinary boundaries, with little communication with those in other disciplines.

With these considerations in mind, this seminar focuses on war and its causes. We adopt an interdisciplinary perspective and try to draw on some of the best scholarship from a variety of disciplines, including philosophy, biology, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, economics, and history. While we give some attention to tribal warfare, civil war, and to contemporary terrorism, we focus most of our attention on interstate wars. This is the form of war that has dominated the last five centuries, that has shaped the evolution of the modern world system, and that has generated the most well-developed theory (at least in political science) on the causes of war. Many of these theories can be applied to other forms of warfare, but that is a question that must be deferred to another time.

We begin the seminar by considering various definitions of war offered by anthropologists and political scientists, with the aim of thinking about a definition broad enough to encompass the many different forms war has taken over the millennia. We examine the view offered by the military theorist Clausewitz that war is a "continuation of politics," and we look at different ways military force has been utilized to advance political ends. We will analyze the history of warfare with a distinguished military and diplomatic historian, Jeremy Black, who will be a guest speaker on September 21. I have also arranged a visit with one of the leading figures in the anthropology of war, Brian Ferguson, who will talk about the study of war in his discipline. (Since his classes meet the same time as ours, that meeting will take place on another day, which we will try to schedule at an optimally convenient time.)

We then turn to questions of the causes of war. Our objective is not so much to answer the philosophical question of the "essence" or meaning of war in some abstract sense, or to explain why war has always been with us, but instead to deal with the more social scientific question of explaining variations in war and peace over time and space. Why do wars occur at some times and not other times, under some conditions rather than other conditions, between some states rather than other states, under some kinds of leaders rather than other leaders?

We begin our analysis of the causes of war with an examination of the "level-of-analysis" framework, which is a useful way of classifying various causal factors. We look at debates among philosophers, biologists, anthropologists, and others as to whether war is biologically determined or whether it is the product of evolution of human cultures and institutions. We then turn to survey of the leading theories of the causes of war. We

examine (not necessarily in this order) political science theories of anarchy and hierarchy, balance of power, preventive war, deterrence, conflict spirals, bargaining, and the "democratic peace"; sociological and anthropological theories of identity conflicts; Marxist-Leninist theories of economic imperialism; and theories of organizational, group, and individual decision-making. We also look briefly at civil wars and terrorism, and at theories constructed to explain them. We supplement our theoretical analyses with a wide range of illustrative historical examples – ancient and modern, pre-industrial and industrial, Western and non-Western.

Among the various theoretical questions we will attempt to answer in our cases are the following: What is the relative importance of strategic, ideological, economic, and domestic political motivations in political leaders' decisions for war? Do states go to war primarily to increase their power and security, to promote certain principles of justice or forms of socio-political organization, to increase their wealth, or to consolidate the domestic positions of key elites? How important are conflicts of interests over tangible issues as opposed to concerns over power, reputation, and internal politics? To what extent are decisions for war made through careful cost-benefit calculations based on interests and on international and domestic constraints, and to what extent are they driven by flawed information processing and other departures from a rational decision-making calculus? Does the political structure of the regime, the economic structure of society, or political culture make any difference? Why do some wars escalate or expand, while others do not? Are the causes of great power wars any different than the causes of wars between weaker states?

In the course of our investigations we will ask whether the causes of war have changed over time, whether our theoretical and historical analyses of the wars of the past can help us understand the likely patterns of war in the future, and whether it is even possible to generalize about something as complex as the causes of war. Although we will not deal directly with the question of the future of war, our study of the causes of war will have important implications for that question.

One of the best ways to understand abstract theories is to apply them to concrete historical cases, and the second section of the course will be centered around individual student projects. Each student will undertake a major research project on the causes of a particular war and present the analysis to the class for discussion. These research projects will help illustrate how various theories really work, which variables are most important, how these variables interact with each other, and whether there are any patterns that repeatedly occur over time. They will also serve to demonstrate the benefits of the interplay of theory and history in the analysis of war or political and social phenomena more generally. We will see how theory can usefully guide our historical analyses and how history can help us test and refine our theories.

With a class enrollment that might approach twenty students, we do not have time for presentations on as many different wars as there are students in the class. Instead, I have grouped student research projects around several sets of cases: the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.), World War I (Europe), the Arab-Israeli wars (1956, 1967, 1973), and the Persian Gulf wars involving the United States and Iraq (1990-91 and 2003). This format has several advantages. It will facilitate debate about alternative interpretations of each war. Students working on the same war will invariably reach different interpretations as to its causes, and the class readings provide enough historical background on each of the wars to help other students ask informed questions about the war. In addition, it will take pressure off of individual students, because there will often be two or three students, rather than just one, who can provide answers to the various questions that are raised. I say more about the paper on pp. 8-10 of the syllabus.

## READINGS

Note: Most of the required reading falls during the first seven weeks of the term.

### Required Books

Michael Howard, *War in European History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

### Required Articles

The required reading for the course also includes about thirty articles. A reading packet of these items is available for purchase (\$52) at Pequod Copy (214-8787; 119 Somerset Street). I strongly recommend that you purchase the packet. I have asked Alexander library to put a copy of each of the articles on electronic reserve, but at this point I have no information about the status of that request nor the reliability of electronic reserves, since I have not worked with them before. The articles in the reading packet are as follows:

Raymond C. Kelly, *Warless Societies and the Origin of War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Pp. 1-10.

John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. 14-50.

Peter Paret, "Clausewitz." In Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pp. 186-213.

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. 1-34.

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Pp. 1-15.

- Jack S. Levy, "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach." In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. Pp. 3-27.
- Lawrence H. Keeley, *War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. 3-24.
- Margaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only an Invention--Not a Biological Necessity." In Leon Bramson and George W. Goethals, eds. *War*, rev. ed. New York: Basic Books, 1968. Pp. 269-74.
- R. Brian Ferguson, "A Paradigm for the Study of War and Society." In Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein, eds., *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. Pp. 389-437.
- Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. Pp. 1-30, 153-56.
- Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Pp. 41-92.
- John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power." In Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., *International Politics*. 7<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005. Pp. 50-60.
- Edward Vose Gulick, "The Aims of Europe's Classical Balance of Power." In Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *International Conflict and Conflict Management*, 2nd ed. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988. Pp. 390-97.
- Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning." In Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., *International Politics*, 4th ed. New York: HarperCollins, 1996. Pp. 108-15.
- Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power." In Blainey, *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press, 1988. Pp. 108-124.
- Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary." In Ralph K. White, *Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War*. New York: New York University Press, 1986. Pp. 107-30.
- Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat." In Neil J. Kressel, *Political Psychology*. New York: Paragon House, 1993. Pp. 367-92.
- Irving L. Janis, "Groupthink." In Neil J. Kressel, *Political Psychology*. New York: Paragon House, 1993. Pp. 360-66.
- Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988): 653-673.
- Jacob Viner, "Peace as an Economic Problem." In Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, ed., *International Politics*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Boston: Little Brown, 1985. Pp. 291-302.
- Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework." In Halperin and Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective*. Boston: Little Brown, 1973. Pp. 1-42.

- James C. Thomson, "How Vietnam Happened? An Autopsy." In Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, ed., *Readings in American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Little Brown, 1973. Pp. 98-110.
- Michael E. Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict." In Michael E. Brown, et al., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996-97. Pp. 3-25.
- Martha Crenshaw, "The Strategic Logic of Terrorism." In Richard K. Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., updated. New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005. Pp. 491-504.
- James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: Longman, 1992. Pp. 1-41.
- Janice Gross Stein, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War Through Miscalculated Escalation." In Alexander L. George, ed., *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*. Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1991. Pp. 126-59.
- Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won." *International Security*, 16, 2 (Fall 1991), 5-41.
- Kathleen Crocco, "An Analysis of the Causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71." Seminar paper, PS419, Professor Levy, Rutgers University, Fall 1993.
- Jonathan Kobrinski, "The Causes of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War of 1898." Seminar paper, PS324H, Professor Levy, Rutgers University, Spring 2003.

### **Optional Background Reading**

Students sometimes ask for recommendations for additional background readings, particularly those covering many of the historical examples used to illustrate the theoretical arguments discussed in the course. While I do not believe that additional background reading is necessary for this course, and while in most cases I would rather that you spend any additional time on your research projects, let me suggest a few things.

For a nice combination of background on international relations theories and brief histories of international conflicts, see

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (any edition).

For a very detailed treatment of European diplomacy during the last two centuries, perhaps better to have as a reference than to read, see

Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna*.

For a shorter version in a quasi-outline format, see

Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *Europe after 1815*.

For a more readable (i.e., shorter) history of diplomacy that covers the last 130 years, see

C.J. Bartlett, *The Global Conflict 1880-1970: The International Rivalry of the Great Powers*.

For an even briefer treatment of the last hundred years, see James Lee Ray, *Global Politics* (5th edition or later), chapters 1-2.

For a more global perspective on the evolution of war, see Jeremy Black, *Why Wars Happen*.

For a perspective spanning over seven millennia, and a book with a title that inspired the title of this course, see Robert O'Connell, *The Ride of the Second Horseman*.

## COURSE REQUIREMENTS

There are three formal requirements for the course, in addition to completing all of the required readings prior to class meetings and coming to class prepared to discuss the readings:

- (1) a take-home exam. The question(s) will be handed out in class October 26, and the paper will be due the following week in class, November 2.
- (2) an oral presentation to the class on the topic of your research paper on the causes of a particular war (along with a one-page single-spaced summary of your argument); and
- (3) a research paper.

There will be no final examination.

For the purposes of determining a final grade for the class, your work will be weighted as follows:

class discussion	15%
take-home exam	25%
presentation	15%
paper	45%

In addition, I expect you to attend every meeting of the seminar.

Please turn off your cell phones before entering the classroom.

**The Take-Home Exam** (handed out October 26; due November 2 or before; 6-8 pages double space; open book)

This will be a cross between an exam and a short paper. The questions will be more like exam questions, and you will probably have a choice of one out of two, but it

will be take-home and you will have a week to complete your typed response. I will hand out the questions in class on October 26, and your paper is due in class the following week (November 2). It will be based on material from both the readings and the class discussions. It will be more theoretical than historical in orientation, although you will be expected to use historical material from the course to illustrate your theoretical arguments. It will be a "thought" paper rather than a research paper. You are free to consult your readings for the course, but extensive documentation will not be necessary. I expect that you should be able to complete the paper in satisfactory fashion in 5-6 hours. Please adhere to the 6-8 page guidelines. I will not reward long exams. You are free to consult with others in the class about the exam, but the paper you write must be your own.

In order to help you prepare for the take-home exam I will circulate a **study guide** on October 19, and we will have an in-class **review session** on October 26, the day I hand out questions.

### **The Research Paper**

The paper (18-22 double-spaced pages, due December 20) will focus on the causes of the particular war that you select for investigation. I will circulate additional guidelines about the paper later, and we will talk more about it on and off throughout the course. I have also set aside a special session (November 2) for more extended discussions. Let me briefly describe the paper here, however, because it is a major project and you should take this seminar only if the paper is something that you would enjoy doing.

Your basic task in the paper is to select an interstate war and to analyze its causes. The sooner you select a case the better, so that I can recommend some sources, so that you can acquire your research materials, and so that I can organize the presentations for the class. The final deadline for selection of topics is September 28. In most cases you will do a comprehensive analysis of the overall causes of the war. In cases of particularly large and complex wars, however, you have the option of focusing instead on the role of a particular state in the processes leading to war (Athens in the Peloponnesian War or Germany in World War I, for example). You should understand that if you focus more narrowly you must go much deeper into the sources and provide a more detailed explanation.

The paper must be more than a historical chronology of the origins of your war. It must be analytically focused and guided by some of the theoretical concepts that we develop in the class. The paper must include an evaluation of the relative importance of different causal factors at different levels of analysis in the processes leading to the outbreak and escalation of the war, and identify primary and secondary causes of the war.

It must also include extensive documentation (including footnotes). You should also include a bibliography of all the sources that you cite.

In order to allow me to give you timely feedback on the adequacy of the sources you use for your paper, you should turn in a preliminary bibliography for your paper by October 26. I will then give you feedback on your list. If I recommend additional sources, you would be wise to follow up on most of my suggestions. At the time of your oral presentation, you must also submit a one-page (single space) summary of your provisional interpretation of the causes of your war. If you think that a map would help students to follow your presentation, please find one from one of your sources, copy it, and make enough copies for everyone in the class.

The **oral presentations** will be about ten minutes each, with 30-45 minutes for questions and answers. You can provide a brief historical overview of the processes leading up to the war, but keep in mind that in most cases everyone in the class will have read some background material on the causes of the war. It is essential, however, that you make an argument as to the primary and secondary causes of the war.

One word of warning: I guarantee that nearly all of you will find that the time goes by much more quickly than you anticipate during your talk. Make sure that you pace yourself and leave time for some concise theoretically-oriented conclusions at the end. Some people (professors as well as students) like to do a trial-run of their talk in front of a mirror (or whatever), but I leave that up to you.

In the question and answer session, people will raise questions of interpretation, the theoretical coherence of your argument, the strength and validity of your supporting evidence, and other topics. It would be useful to think about these issues when you write your final paper. In other words, you should think of the presentation as a rough draft of your paper and as a means of getting feedback to help you improve the paper. Note that you will not have the opportunity to take extensive notes at the same time that you are responding to questions, and I strongly recommend that after your presentation you take the time to write down all the useful ideas and any responses that come to mind while things are still fresh.

It should be clear that I do not want your written paper at the time of your presentation, and in fact I will refuse to accept any paper at that time. You must take the opportunity to revise your paper based on the comments and questions from others in the class and from myself. For the presentation to be useful to all concerned, however, you must have completed a substantial amount of your research prior to your presentation, and you should have a pretty good outline of your argument and supporting evidence. You will be responding to a wide range of questions. The more thoroughly you know

your material, the better you will do, the more enjoyable the experience will be, and the more you will be able to profit from feedback and incorporate it into your final paper.

**Sources.** Once students have selected their topics, I will provide a bibliography of some of the better sources on the causes of that war. Most of these should be available from the library. Some might not be available, however, and I urge you to check out books early and if necessary request books on interlibrary loan. In addition, given that several of you will be working on each case, and given the fact that the library is unlikely to have duplicate copies of most books of interest, I strongly recommend that each of you purchase one of the following books, depending on your paper topic. I did not ask any of the Rutgers bookstores to order the following. I recommend that you order them either on the internet or from your local bookstore. Used book sites are generally the least expensive, and I would recommend the following: <http://www.abebooks.com>, <http://www.bibliofind.com>, <http://www.bookfinder.com>. Any edition of any of the following books will suffice.

#### Peloponnesian War

Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War*. New York: The Free Press, 1996.

recommended:

Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War*. New York: Viking/Penguin, 2003.

#### World War I:

James Joll, *Origins of the First World War*. New York: Longman, 1992.

#### 1967 Arab-Israeli War

Michael Oren, *Six Days of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

#### 1990/91 Persian Gulf War

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990/91*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

#### 2003 U.S.-Iraqi War

Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

## COURSE OUTLINE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS

Note: number indicates the week of the term (beginning Sept. 6); letters represent multiple topics each week;

- 1a. **Course Introduction** (September 7)  
focus, aims, organization, requirements  
preliminary discussion of research project  
value of an interdisciplinary approach
  
2. **Theoretical Introduction** (September 14)
  - 2a. **What Is War?**  
Raymond Kelly, *Warless Societies and the Origin of War*, "Introduction"  
John Vasquez, "Conceptualizing War"
  
  - 2b. **Perspective from Military Theory: Clausewitz and the Politics of Force**  
Peter Paret, "Clausewitz"  
Thomas Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence"
  
  - 2c. **Classification of the Causes of War: The Levels of Analysis Framework**  
Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, "Introduction"
  
  - 2d. **Perspectives from Political Science**  
Jack Levy, "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach"
  
  - 2e. **Perspectives from Biology**
  
  - 2f. **Perspectives from Anthropology: The Origins of War**  
speaker: Brian Ferguson (Department of Anthropology, Rutgers - Newark);  
day and time to be announced  
Lawrence Keeley, "The Pacified Past: The Anthropology of War"  
Margaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only an Invention--Not a Biological Necessity"  
Brian Ferguson, "A Paradigm for the Study of War and Society"
  
3. **The History of War** (September 21)  
Speaker: Jeremy Black (Exeter University, UK)  
Michael Howard, *War in European History*  
Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, chap. 1-2

4a. **Perspectives from Philosophy: Hobbes and Rousseau** (September 28)

4b. **Realist Theories of War: Anarchy and the Balance of Power**

Michael Doyle, "The Range of Realism"

Michael Doyle, "Complex Realism: Thucydides"

John Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power"

Edward Gulick, "The Aims of Europe's Classical Balance of Power"

Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning"

\*\*\*\* deadline: topic selection for presentation/research paper (Sept. 28)

5. **Bargaining and Strategic Interaction** (October 5)

5a. **The Bargaining Model of War**

Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power"

5b. **Deterrence and the Spiral Model**

Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary"

6. **Decision-Making Theories** (October 12)

6a. **The Psychology of Decision-making**

Janice Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat"

Irving Janis, "Groupthink"

6b. **Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Processes**

Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective"

James Thomson, "How Vietnam Happened? An Autopsy"

7a. **Domestic Sources of War** (October 19)

Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War"

7b. **Economic Theories of War**

Jacob Viner, "Peace as an Economic Problem"

7c. **Sociological Perspectives: Social Identity and War**

7d. **Civil Wars**

Michael Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict"

7e. **Terrorism**

Martha Crenshaw, "The Strategic Logic of Terrorism"

8a. **Theoretical Review** (October 26)

8b. **Additional Historical Perspectives**

James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, chap. 1-2

Janice Stein, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967"

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won"

\*\*\* **Preliminary Bibliographies for Research Papers Due** (October 26)

\*\*\* **Hand out question(s) for short paper topics. Due Tuesday November 2.**

9. Take-home exams due (November 2)

### **Discussion of Research Projects and Sample Papers**

Kathleen Crocco, "An Analysis of the Causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71"

Jonathan Kobrinski, "The Causes of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War of 1898"

10. (November 9) - no class; individual consultations

## **PRESENTATIONS**

<u>week</u>	<u>day</u>	<u>topic and options</u>
11.	November 16	<b>Peloponnesian War</b>
12.	November 23	<b>World War I</b>
13.	November 30	<b>Arab-Israeli Wars: 1956, 1967, 1973</b>
14.	December 7	<b>U.S. - Iraq Wars: 1990/91 Persian Gulf War 2003 U.S. - Iraq War</b>

### **List of Deadlines:**

September 28	deadline for topic selection for research papers
October 26	preliminary bibliographies for research papers
October 26	questions given for take-home exam
November 2	take-home exam due

day of presentation:  
December 20, noon

one page (single space) summary of your argument  
research papers due (Levy mailbox, Hickman 513)