THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE

POLSGR8832, Columbia University, Fall 2021

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Fridays, 10:10am – 12:00 noon
Office Hours:
after class & by appointment

"War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

In this seminar we undertake a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on interstate war, focusing primarily on the causes of war and the conditions of peace but giving some attention to the spread, conduct, and termination of war. We emphasize research in political science but include some coverage of work in other disciplines. We examine the leading theories, their key causal variables, the paths or mechanisms through which those variables lead to war or to peace, and the degree of empirical support for various theories. We look at a variety of methodological approaches: qualitative, quantitative, formal, and experimental. Our primary focus, however, is on the logical coherence and analytic limitations of theories and the kinds of research designs that might be useful in testing them.

The seminar is designed primarily for Ph.D. students (or aspiring Ph.D. students) who want to understand – and ultimately contribute to – the theoretical and empirical literature in political science on war, peace, and security. Students with different interests and students from other disciplines can also benefit from the seminar and contribute to it, and are welcome. Ideally, members of the seminar will have some familiarity with basic issues in international relations theory, philosophy of science, research design, and statistical methods. I recognize, however, that students will bring rather diverse backgrounds to the seminar, and I have tried to organize the course in a way that will be useful for students with varying preparation and career objectives, including students who have International Relations as a minor field of study. I have tried to combine breadth of coverage of the “mainstream” scholarship in the field with flexibility for students to advance their own programs of study. To this end I have coupled a common set of readings for all participants in the seminar with considerable freedom for individual students to select specific topics for their paper for the class. The required readings are rather extensive, though no more extensive than for a typical Ph.D. seminar.

The question of war and peace is a broad one, as one might expect for a topic that has engaged scholars from many disciplines since the times of Sun Tzu and Thucydides. Some narrowing of focus is necessary for any one-semester course, and I want to be explicit about which topics and approaches we will and will not emphasize. Our approach is primarily causal rather than normative. Our main task, following most of the social science literature on war and peace, is to
explain variations in war and peace over time and space. Are wars more likely to occur under some conditions than other conditions, at some times rather than other times, between some states rather than other states, under the direction of some types of leaders rather than other types of leaders? Under what conditions are wars likely to escalate or expand, and when are they likely to end? As the late Stuart Bremer asked, “Who Fights Whom, Where, When, and Why?”

We will focus primarily on interstate war, for many reasons. Although the most common forms of international conflict have shifted in recent decades away from interstate war and towards civil war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, hybrid war, and various forms of communal violence, there is little reason to believe that the era of interstate war has ended. There are enough “hot spots” in the world today to create a non-trivial risk of interstate war, and the return of great power competition heightens the risk. The potential consequences of some of these wars – for human security, for the economy, and for the evolution of the international system – alone make them worthy of study. In addition, many important theoretical debates in the IR field are closely linked the origins and escalation of interstate war, so that a familiarity with this literature is quite valuable for those wishing to engage the IR field as a whole. Finally, there is a practical consideration: Columbia has several scholars who have considerable expertise in terrorism, civil war, and other forms of intrastate conflict (Professors Fortna, Daly, and Mitts, for example), so a division of labor based on comparative advantage is beneficial. Similarly, the Columbia faculty’s expertise on nuclear weapons and strategy (Professors Betts, Biddle, Jervis, and Snyder, among others) lead me to minimize coverage of that important topic.

In our treatment of interstate war, we will not give much attention to military strategy or the conduct of war, except to the extent that these considerations influence the outbreak, escalation, or termination of war. Following most of the mainstream literature, we also focus more on the causes of war than on the termination or consequences of war, though in recent years scholars have devoted more attention to war termination and to the impact of war on the political, economic, and social structures of state and society. Finally, we spend relatively little time on the normative and policy implications of our theories. This is not to say that these other subjects are any less important than those covered in this seminar. In a one-semester course, however, it is necessary to make some choices for the sake of coherence. Finally, the prevailing norms of the International Relations field (and hence incentives for Ph.D. students planning to go on the U.S. academic job market) give priority to the construction and testing of theoretical propositions over policy prescription and analysis. I understand, of course, that some students may have different career objectives.

This syllabus includes a far more extensive list of topics and sources than we will actually cover in the class. It serves as an analytically-organized bibliography of the field, though admittedly an incomplete and perhaps somewhat idiosyncratic one. It has evolved over many years, and I spend a lot of time updating and revising it for each new course. I hope it is useful, both now in the course and perhaps later on. If you find any typos or duplications, or have suggestions for additions, deletions, or reorganization, I would be happy to hear from you.
READING:

The required reading for the class includes one book and a substantial number of articles and chapters. The book,


is available for purchase at Book Culture (536 W. 112 St; 212/865-1588) and also on the internet, probably at better prices. I have asked Columbia Library to place the required book on reserve.

I will put pdf’s of all required article–length pieces (but not the Levy-Thompson book, except for chapter 1 for our first day) on the Courseworks website for the class (https://courseworks.columbia.edu/), organized by week.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS:

We will organize our weekly meetings as follows. I will usually begin with my own introductory comments on the readings, with the aim of putting it in the context of existing literature. We will then move to an open discussion of the material. Most weeks we will cover several distinct topics. We will focus primarily in the logical coherence of the theoretical argument, the appropriateness of the research designs and particular methods for testing the theoretical argument, and implications for other conflict theories. We will identify the strengths as well as the weaknesses of a research program or of a particular article, and to identify useful directions for future research. We want to ask not only what is wrong with particular theories and efforts to test them, but also what is good about them and what we can do better. We can discuss historical examples bearing on various theories, but our aim is to use these examples as vehicles for illustrating theories and their limitations, not to engage in extensive debate about the best explanations of particular historical events. I will try to make a few comments at the end of each class about things to think about in the reading for the following week, and which topics or readings to prioritize for discussion.

Our class discussions will be most useful, collectively and individually, if each student completes all of the required reading prior to each class meeting, comes to class prepared to discuss the reading, and actively participates in the discussion. Such discussions will also make the course more enjoyable. Contributions to class discussion are an important component of a student’s grade for the course. The primary component of the grade, however, is a paper on a subject of your choice relating to war or peace or to international conflict more generally.
The Paper

The paper requirement is somewhat flexible, as I understand that some students may be primarily interested in forms of international conflict other than interstate war. Consequently I will allow papers on any topic relating to international conflict broadly defined (civil war, insurgency, terrorism, etc.), not just interstate war. All papers, however, should be informed by our readings for the class where they are relevant. I also recognize that students are at different stages of their graduate programs, so anything from a literature review to a research design or a research paper is acceptable. If you are a first year Ph.D. student, or perhaps someone outside of the IR field, a literature review paper might be appropriate. If you are further along and have an idea for a research paper but are just getting started on it, maybe a research design would be best, outlining your question and how you plan to answer it. If you are a more advanced student and have started to do research on a particular topic, then a research paper makes more sense. The type of paper is up to you, but whatever you do must go significantly beyond what you have done before on a similar paper in other classes.

You should inform me by email, of the topic you wish to pursue. I will probably ask for a longer written statement of your question and how you plan to go about analyzing it. For literature reviews, this might involve a preliminary outline and provisional bibliography at some point. For research papers, this might involve a 3-5 page research design. Basically, I will ask for a few intermediate products along the way to your final paper, to make sure we are on the same page and to provide hopefully feedback along the way. I will not formally grade these products, but doing them well will ultimately affect the quality of your final paper.

Style: All papers should be single space with a space between paragraphs, with footnotes rather than endnotes, and submitted to me by email attachment. Any citation style is acceptable, as long as you are consistent. However, even if you use a traditional footnote style – as detailed in Chicago Manual of Style and adopted by International Security, Security Studies, and some other journals – please include a separate bibliography at the end of the paper (even though that style does not formally require a cumulative bibliography. The due date is Wednesday, December 15 (midnight), five days after our last scheduled class.

Literature reviews should be 11-15 pages. This should be a critical review of the literature on a well-defined theoretical question or set of interrelated questions relating to war, peace, and security. Good paper topics often coincide with a section or subsection of the course, but sometimes span several topics. For example, a broader topic might be balance of power theory or power transition theory, while narrower topics might be preventive war, territory and war, or norms and war. In order to avoid misunderstandings, please secure my approval for your paper topic in advance.

The syllabus includes extensive bibliographies in the hope that they serve as useful guides, or at least points of departure, for many possible paper topics. I encourage you to utilize additional sources. This will be absolutely necessary on topics where my lists of sources is rather limited. Please do not assume that by reading all of the items in a particular section of the syllabus you
have adequately covered a particular topic for your review. On topics where the list of sources is much longer, you may need to narrow the list considerably, while hopefully adding a few additional sources. In either case, please consult me for suggestions as to possible additions to the list and/or priorities among them (if the number of items is quite large). The order of items on the syllabus is rarely an indicator of their relative importance.

In your literature review you should summarize the literature on your topic and at the same time organize it in some coherent way – preferably around a useful typology or theoretical theme, not around a succession of books and articles. You should note the theoretical questions that this literature attempts to answer, identify the key concepts and causal arguments, note some of the empirical research that bears on these theoretical propositions, and relate it to the broader literature on war and peace. You should identify the logical inconsistencies, broader analytical limitations, and unanswered questions of the leading scholarship in this area. You should also suggest fruitful areas for subsequent research. If you have any thoughts on how particular hypotheses could be tested, please elaborate on that.

Early in the term I will post copies of a few sample literature reviews from previous courses, to give you a few models of what good papers look like. Those papers will also give you a sense of how many sources are appropriate. That varies, depending on whether your sources are primarily books or articles, but the equivalent of fifteen articles is often a good guide for a lower limit. How you organize your review and the substance of your arguments are more important than the length of your bibliography.

Research designs should identify the question you are trying to answer, ground it in the relevant theoretical literature, specify your key hypotheses, offer a theoretical explanation for those hypotheses, and provide a detailed statement as to how you would carry out the research. This includes the specification of the dependent and independent variables and the form of the relationship between them, the operationalization of the variables, the identification (and theoretical justification) of the empirical domain of the study (i.e., case selection), the identification of alternative explanations for the phenomenon in question, and an acknowledgment of what kinds of evidence would confirm your hypotheses and what kinds of evidence would disconfirm or falsify your hypotheses. Try to do this in 12-15 pages (single space). Please consult with me along the way, starting with a one page statement early in the term. I am hoping for research designs that are roughly equivalent to rough drafts of dissertation proposals or grant proposals (which, admittedly, vary in length).

Research papers include research designs and basically implement them. For the purposes of this class, the research need not necessarily be complete. For example, if your design calls for four comparative case studies, and you complete only one or two for this class, that is fine. There is no set length for the paper. However, if you are aiming at an article-length paper that will ultimately be submitted to a journal, note that most journals have word limits ranging from 12-15,000 words (with most at the lower end), including footnotes and references but not including any technical appendices. (I think that works out to 23-27 pages, single space, though journals always require double space.) The paper for this class need not be that long.
Grading

Grades for the course will be based on the following weighting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Weight</th>
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<tr>
<td>Contributions to class discussion</td>
<td>20%</td>
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| Paper                      | 80%    | (due Wednesday, December 15)

Academic Integrity

The intellectual venture in which we are all engaged requires of faculty and students alike the highest level of personal and academic integrity. As members of an academic community, each one of us bears the responsibility to participate in scholarly discourse and research in a manner characterized by intellectual honesty and scholarly integrity.

Scholarship, by its very nature, is an iterative process, with ideas and insights building one upon the other. Collaborative scholarship requires the study of other scholars' work, the free discussion of such work, and the explicit acknowledgement of those ideas in any work that inform our own.

This exchange of ideas relies upon a mutual trust that sources, opinions, facts, and insights will be properly noted and carefully credited.

In practical terms, this means that, as students, you must be responsible for the full citations of others' ideas in all of your research papers and projects; you must be scrupulously honest when taking your examinations; you must always submit your own work and not that of another student, scholar, or internet agent.

Any breach of this intellectual responsibility is a breach of faith with the rest of our academic community. It undermines our shared intellectual culture, and it cannot be tolerated. Students failing to meet these responsibilities should anticipate being asked to leave Columbia.

Disability Accommodations

In order to ensure their rights to reasonable accommodations, it is the responsibility of students to report any learning-related disabilities, to do so in a timely fashion, and to do so through the Office of Disability Services. Students who have documented conditions and are determined by DS to need individualized services will be provided a DS-certified ‘Accommodation Letter.’ It is students’ responsibility to provide this letter to all their instructors and in so doing request the stated accommodations.

If you are a student with a disability and have a DS-certified ‘Accommodation Letter,’ please come to my office hours to confirm your accommodation needs. If you believe that you might have a disability that requires accommodation, you should contact Disability Services at 212-854-2388 and disability@columbia.edu. For more information, please visit http://www.college.columbia.edu/rightsandresponsibilities.
TOPICAL OUTLINE

1. COURSE INTRODUCTION
   CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, I
   What is War?
   Typologies of War
   The Concept of Total War
   The Clausewitzian Paradigm
   Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?
   Trends in War

2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, II
   The Use of Force: Conceptual Distinctions
   The Levels-of-Analysis Framework
   Evolutionary and Primatological Approaches
   Concepts of Causation

3. REALIST THEORIES OF WAR, I
   Varieties of Realist Theories
   Geopolitics
   The Security Dilemma and the Spiral Model
   The Single-Play Prisoner’s Dilemma Model
   Neorealist Theories of War
   Offensive Realism
   Defensive Realism
   The Offensive/Defensive Balance
   Neoclassical Realism
   Definition and Measurement of Military Power
   Military Effectiveness

4. REALIST THEORIES OF WAR, II
   Classical Balance of Power Theories
   Conceptual Ambiguities
   Historians’ Perspectives
   Polarity and War
   Quantitative Studies of Polarity/Systemic Capability Concentration and War
   The Dyadic Power Parity Hypothesis
   Alliances
   Alliance Data
   Domestic Sources of Alliances
   Do Alliances Deter War or Provoke War?
   Formal Models of Alliances
   Wartime Military Coalitions
Balancing
  Balancing vs. Bandwagoning
  Whom Do States Balance Against? Land Powers and Sea Powers
  What Do States Balance Against? Disaggregating Power
  Balancing (or not) in Non-Western Systems
  “Soft Balancing”
Lateral Pressure Theory
Issues: What Do States Fight About?
  Issues Correlates of War Project (ICOW)
Territory and War
  Borders and Walls
The Steps-to-War Model
Asymmetric Conflicts
Realist Theory and Great Power Cooperation
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

5. HEGEMONIC THEORIES
Power Transition Theory – The Organski et al Research Program
Gilpin's Hegemonic Transition Theory
  Historical Perspectives
Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China
Preventive War
  Historical Applications
  Preventive Logic in the Nuclear Age
The Status Quo/Revisionist Distinction
Rising and Declining Powers
Systemic Leadership and Long Cycle Theory (Thompson, Rasler, Modelski)
Hegemonic War (General/Systemic/World War)
Other Theories of Hierarchy, Transition and War
Theories of Unipolar Politics
David Kang’s Research Program on Hierarchy in Asia

RIVALRIES AND ARMS RACES
International Rivalries
  Overview
  The Diehl & Goertz Research Program
  The Thompson/Rasler/Colaresi Research Program
  Rivalry Termination
  Other Approaches to Rivalry
Arms Races and War
  Historical Studies
  Quantitative and Formal Approaches
  Arms Control
6. THE BARGAINING MODEL OF WAR
   Rational Choice Theories: Introduction
   The Bargaining Model of War
   The Commitment Problem
   Informational Problems
   Issue Indivisibility
   Complications of Multilateral Bargaining
   Other Formal Models of Bargaining
      Spatial Models
   Behavioral Perspectives on the Bargaining Model of War

7. THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE
   Societal-Level Theories of War: Overviews
   The Democratic Peace
      Kant
      Measurement and Datasets
   Quantitative Empirical Studies
      Monadic Level
      System level
   Critiques
   Domestic Oppositions and Signaling (Schultz)
   Alternative Models of Political Oppositions and Signaling
   Selectorate Theory (Burno de Mesquita et al)
   The Territorial Peace
   Why Do Democracies Win Wars?
   Other Implications of the Democratic Peace
      Covert Action
      A Democratic Civil Peace?
   Democratization and War
   Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies
   Autocracies, War, and Peace
      Datasets

8. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE
   General Treatments
   Marxist-Leninist Theories
      Alternative Theories of Imperialism
   Resources and War
   Does Trade Promote Peace?
   Quantitative-Empirical Studies
   The Globalization of Production
   The Capitalist Peace
   The Contractual Peace
   The Impact of War on Trade; Trading with the Enemy
The Militarization of Commercial Rivalries
World War I: An Anomaly in Economic Liberalism?
Finance and War
   Historical Perspectives
   The First World War
Sectoral Interests and Coalitional Politics
The Costs of Conflict

9. SOCIETAL-LEVEL THEORIES (continued)
The Diversionary Theory of War
   Social Identity Theory
   Debates over Mechanisms
   Quantitative-Empirical Studies
   Formal Theoretical Approaches
   Historical Case Studies
Leaders, Institutions, Political Survival, and War
Diversionary Theory, Political Oppositions, and Signaling (back to Schultz)
Public Opinion and War
The Media
Gendered Attitudes towards War
Other Domestic Frameworks and Studies
Revolution and War

IDEATIONAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES
Constructivist Approaches (Background)
Ideas, Ideology, and War
Culture and War
Race and War
Religion and War
   A Data Set
   Historical Perspectives
The “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington)
Attitudes toward War
Norms and War
   General
   The Nuclear Taboo
   Other Weapons
   The Territorial Integrity Norm
   Other Issues
   Experimental Studies
Rhetoric, Justification, and Legitimacy
The Law of War and Its Impact
Paul W. Schroeder’s Research Program
10. DECISION-MAKING: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, I:  
BELIEFS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING  
  Overviews  
  Do Leaders Matter?  
  Backgrounds and Characteristics of Leaders  
Beliefs and Images  
    Images of the Enemy  
Misperception and the Causes of War  
Psychology of Threat Perception  
Emotions, Interests, Motivated Reasoning, and War  
    Interpersonal Relationships and Face-to-Face Diplomacy  
Neurobiological Approaches  
Analogical Reasoning and Learning from History  
Gender Differences in Decision-Making

11. DECISION-MAKING – THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, II  
Prospect Theory Goes to War  
    Other Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty  
Time Horizons  
Other Psychological Models of Conflict  
Psychoanalytic Approaches

DECISION-MAKING – THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL  
Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Processes  
    Applications to the Causes of War  
The Small Group Level  
Advisory Systems  
Crisis Decision-making  
    Definitions of Crisis  
    The Impact of Stress  
Strategic Culture  
Civil-Military Relations  
    Militarism  
Intelligence Failure  
    Historical Cases  
Military Doctrine and Military Innovation  
Command and Control  
The President and Congress: War Powers
12. SIGNALING, REPUTATION, RESOLVE, AND STATUS
   Signaling
   Reputation and Signaling: Formal Models
   Reputation: Empirical, Experimental, and Conceptual Studies
   Reputation and Resolve
   Audience Costs
   Status and War
   Humiliation, Disrespect, and Revenge

13. THE ESCALATION AND EXPANSION OF CRISES AND WAR
   General Studies of Crisis Escalation
   Models of Entrapment
   Loss of Control and Inadvertent War
   Crisis (Mis)management
   The Expansion (Spread) of War
   The First World War
   Duration of War
   Implications of the Bargaining Model
   Psychological Perspectives and Debates

SOME ANALYTIC ISSUES
   Methodological Issues: Quantitative
   Methodological Issues: Experimental
   Methodological Issues: Qualitative
   Future Directions in the Study of Interstate War

APPENDICES

A-1 DATA SETS ON INTERSTATE WAR
   Since 1945
   Since 1815
   Since 1500 or Before

A-2 IS WAR DECLINING?
   Forecasting War

A-3 THE EVOLUTION OF WAR
   Biological, Primatological, and Evolutionary Perspectives
   Anthropological studies of the origins of war
   Archaeological Perspectives
   The History of Warfare
A-4 THE NUCLEAR ERA
Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Theory
Nuclear Weapons and the Long Peace
Empirical Studies of the Impact of Nuclear Weapons, I: Qualitative
Empirical Studies of the Impact of Nuclear Weapons, II: Quantitative
Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Bargaining
Nuclear Strategies (US and Others’)
Nuclear Proliferation

A-5 THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE

A-6 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE AND BARGAINING
Classical Deterrence: Models and Critiques
The Huth-Russsett Research Program on Deterrence
The Lebow/Stein Research Program on Deterrence
Further Debates over Rational Deterrence Theory
Deterrence and Selection Effects
Alexander George's Research Program on Force and Statecraft
The Behavioral Correlates of War Research Program on Crisis Bargaining
Other Studies of Coercion and Bargaining

A-7 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY REGIMES
Institutions and Peace
Collective Security and Security Regimes
Regional Security Systems

A-8 CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A-9 WAR TERMINATION

A-10 PEACEKEEPING

A-11 THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR
Winners and Losers
Economic and Social Costs of War
Human Costs of War

A-12 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, MIGRATION, & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
Environmental Change, Scarcity, and Conflict
Climate Change and War
Water and War
Demography, Security, and Conflict
Refugees and Conflict
A-13 SECURITY ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

A-14 THEORIES OF JUST WAR
   Theological Perspectives
   Just War in the Nuclear and Information Age
   Anticipatory Self-Defense

A-15 FEMINIST THEORIES OF WAR

A-16 THE STUDY OF PEACE

A-17 WAR AND STATE-MAKING
   The “Military Revolution” and the Rise of the State

ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES
Reviews (of the causes of interstate war)
   Encyclopedias
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on War and Peace
   General
   Philosophy
   Anthropology
   Sociology
   Geography
   Economics
   Theories of Strategy
COURSE OUTLINE AND READING LIST

main number refers to week of the term;
letter indicates multiple topics each week;
* indicates required reading; the other reading is included for those doing papers on the
topic and for future reference;
for each week I recommend that you read in the order the items are listed here, not in the
alphabetical order on Courseworks.

1. COURSE INTRODUCTION (September 10)
Organizational meeting and theoretical introduction.
required reading (*) in sections 1 a, b, c, e

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, I

1a. What is War?

1b. Typologies of War
The Concept of Total War

1c. The Clausewitzian Paradigm
“Clausewitz Special Section,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, 6-7 (2014).

1d. Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?

1e. **Trends in War**


Either read excerpt on Courseworks or watch video (watch the first minute introduction, move to minute 15:00 and the section on "The Long Peace," continue to the beginning of the discussion of genocide at minute 27:15)


+++ see Appendix A-2, Is War Declining?

2. **CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, II** (September 17)

Required reading in sections 2a, b, c, d

2a. **The Use of Force: Conceptual Distinctions**


2b. **The Levels-of-Analysis Framework**

no need to re-read the next two if you are familiar with them.


2c. **Evolutionary and Primatological Approaches**


+++ See more extended bibliography in Appendix A-3.
2d. **Concepts of Causation**


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3. **REALIST THEORIES OF WAR, I** (September 24)

Required readings in sections 3 a-d, f

3a. **Varieties of Realist Theories**


3b. The Security Dilemma and the Spiral Model


The Single-Play Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

3c. Neorealist Theories of War


3d. Offensive Realism


3e. Defensive Realism


3f. **The Offensive/Defensive Balance**


3g. **Neoclassical Realism**
Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism.” *Security Studies* 17, 2 (2008), 294-321.

3h. **Definition and Measurement of Military Power**


+++ see also next section and sections on defensive realism and on disaggregating power

### 3i. Military Effectiveness


4. REALIST THEORIES, II (October 1)

Required readings in sections 4 a, d, e, h, i,

4a. Classical Balance of Power Theories


Conceptual Ambiguities


Historians’ Perspectives


4b. **Polarity and War**

**Quantitative Studies of Polarity/Systemic Capability Concentration and War**

4c. **The Dyadic Power Parity Hypothesis**
See also week 5 on power transition theory.
4d. **Alliances**


* John A. Vasquez, "What Do We Know about War?" In John A. Vasquez, ed., *What Do We Know about War?* 3rd ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021. Pp. 319-42. (on alliances, territorial disputes, rivalries, and other topics covered this week)


Alliance Data
ATOP alliance data: http://atop.rice.edu/data

Domestic Sources of Alliances
Jessica Edry, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds, “Threats at Home and Abroad: Interstate War, Civil War, and Alliance Formation.” *International Organization*, 75, 3 (Summer 2021), 837-57

Do Alliances Deter War or Provoke War?


**Formal Models of Alliances**


DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/0007123416000247


**Wartime Military Coalitions**


4e. **Balancing**

**Balancing vs. Bandwagoning**


**Whom Do States Balance Against? Land Powers and Sea Powers**


**What Do States Balance Against? Disaggregating Power**


See also defensive realism in week 3.

**Balancing (or Not) in Non-Western Systems**


**“Soft Balancing”**


**4f. Lateral Pressure Theory**


4g. Issues: What Do States Fight About?

**The Issues Correlates of War Project (ICOW)**
ICOW website: http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html

4h. Territory and War


**Borders and Walls**


4i. The Steps-to-War Model


4j. Asymmetric Conflicts


4k. Realist Theory and Great Power Cooperation
   James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International
   Benjamin Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in
   Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management." *World
   +++ see also Appendix A-7 on Collective Security and Security Regimes

4l. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
   Robert Axelrod, “The emergence of cooperation among egoists.” *American Political
   Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation." *World Politics* 40 (April
   Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and
   Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation:
   Analysis with an Amended Prisoners' Dilemma Model." *Journal of Politics* 50
   Philip Streich and Jack S. Levy, “Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal
5. **HEGEMONIC THEORIES** (October 8)

Required readings in sections a-d, g, l, m

### 5a. Power Transition Theory – The Organski et al Research Program


### 5b. Gilpin's Hegemonic Transition Theory


Historical Perspectives

5c. Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China
  https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/
  H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable 12-2 (9 Nov 2020) on Chan, Thucydid’s Trap?
  https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-Thucydid


5d. **Preventive War**

(Fits equally well under balance of power theory.)


Steven E. Lobell, “Preventive military strike or preventive war? The fungibility of power resources.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, online first 2021 [https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2021.1879731](https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2021.1879731)


**Formal Models of Preventive War**

See week 6 on the commitment problem

**Historical Applications**


Preventive Logic in the Nuclear Age


5e. The Status Quo/Revisionist Distinction


**5f. Rising and Declining Powers**


5g. **Systemic Leadership and Long Cycle Theory (Thompson, Rasler, Modelski)**


5h. **Hegemonic War (General/Systemic/World War)**


5i. **Other Theories of Hierarchy, Transition and War**


5j. **Theories of Unipolar Politics and Hegemony**


“International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity.” Special issue, *World Politics*, 57, 2 (January 2009). Articles by Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth; Wohlforth; Finnemore; Walt; Masanduno; Snyder, Shapiro, Bloch-Elkon; Jervis.


Daniel J. Sargent, “Paz Americana: Sketches for an Undiplomatic History.” *Diplomatic History* 42, 3 (June 2018): 357-76.

5k. **David Kang’s Research Program on Hierarchy in Asia**

**RIVALRIES AND ARMS RACES**

51. **International Rivalries**

**Overview**
The Diehl & Goertz Research Program

The Thompson/Rasler/Colaresi Research Program on Rivalries
Rivalry Termination

Other Approaches to Rivalry
+++ See also week 8 on “The Militarization of Commercial Rivalries”
5m. **Arms Races and War**


**Historical Studies**


**Quantitative and Formal Approaches**


**Arms Control**


6. **THE BARGAINING MODEL OF WAR** (October 15)

Required reading in sections 6 a, b, c, h

6a. **Rational Choice Theories: Introduction**


6b. **The Bargaining Model of War**


6c. **The Commitment Problem**


6d. **Informational Problems**

Alexandre Debs, “Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis.” *American Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12569 (focus on theory; we’ll discuss WW1 later)


+++ On the sources of misperception see week 10 on the Misperception and the Causes of War, and on the Psychology of Threat Perception.

6e. **Issue indivisibility**


Stacie Goddard, Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010;


Ron E. Hassner, “To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility.” Security Studies 12, no. 4 (Summer 2003): 1–33.


6f. **Complications of Multilateral Bargaining**


6g. **Other Formal Models of Bargaining**


Mark Fey and Branton Kenkel,” Is an Ultimatum the Last Word on Crisis Bargaining?” *Journal of Politics* 83, 1 (January 2021), 87-102.

**Spatial Models**


6h. **Behavioral Perspectives on the Bargaining Model of War**


+++ see section 10 on the psychology of misperceptions and war
7. **THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE** (October 22)

Required reading in sections 7 a, b, e, f, g, k

7a. **Societal-Level Theories of War: Overviews**


7b. **The Democratic Peace**


Kant


Measurement and Datasets


V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) dataset: https://www.v-dem.net/en/
7c. **Quantitative Empirical Studies**


**Monadic Level**


**System Level**


**7d. Critiques**


Forum, *American Political Science Review*, 99, 3 (August 2005), including


The Capitalist Peace

See week 8

7e. **Domestic Oppositions and Signaling (Schultz)**


7f. **Alternative Models of Political Oppositions and Signaling**


7g. **Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al)**


7h. **The Territorial Peace**


**71. Why Do Democracies Win Wars?**


7j. **Other Implications of the Democratic Peace**

**Covert Action**

**A Democratic Civil Peace?**

7k. **Democratization and War**


see also week 9 on the diversionary theory of war

### 71. **Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies**


8. **ECONOMIC THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE** (October 29)

Required reading in sections 8 a, d, g, l, m

8a. **General Treatments**


8b. **Marxist-Leninist Theories**


**Critiques and Alternative Theories of Imperialism**


8c. Resources and War
Jeffrey D. Colgan, “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War.” International Security 38, 2 (Fall 2013), pp. 147–180
+++ see A-12 on water and war

8d. Does Trade Promote Peace?


8e. **Quantitative-Empirical Studies**


8f. **The Globalization of Production**


The Capitalist Peace
*


The Contractual Peace


8i. **The Impact of War on Trade; Trading with the Enemy**

8j. **The Militarization of Commercial Rivalries**
8k. **World War I: An Anomaly in Economic Liberalism?**

8l. **Finance and War**


Historical Perspectives

The First World War
8m. **Sectoral Interests and Coalitional Politics**


8n. **The Costs of Conflict**


9. **SOCIETAL-LEVEL THEORIES**, continued (November 5)

Required reading in sections 9 a, b, c, j, n, p, q

9a. **The Diversionary Theory of War**


**Social Identity Theory**


**Debates over Mechanisms**


Quantitative-Empirical Studies
Ross A. Miller, "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43, 3 (June 1999), 388-402.


Sung Chul Jung, “Foreign Targets and Diversionary Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, 3 (September 2014): 566-78.


**Formal Theoretical Approaches**

Diana Richards, et al., "Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force."
*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (September 1993): 504-35.


**Historical Case Studies**


9b. Leaders, Institutions, Political Survival, and War


* Scott Wolford, Leaders and War.” In Mitchell and Vasquez, What Do We Know about War? Chap. 14, pp. 244-259.


Alexandre Debs and Hein E. Goemans, “Regime type, the fate of leaders, and war.” American Political Science Review, 104, 3 (August 2010), 430-45.


Alexandre Debs and H. E. Goemans, “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War.”
Cathy Xuanxuan Wu and Scott Wolford, “Leaders, States, and Reputations,” 2087-2117.
9c. **Autocracies, War, and Peace**


H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable (2016): [https://issfforum.org/roundtables/8-7-dictators](https://issfforum.org/roundtables/8-7-dictators)


Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144. (classification of authoritarian regimes)


Datasets


9d. Public Opinion and War


Matthew A. Baum and Tim Groeling, “Reality asserts itself: Public opinion on Iraq and the elasticity of reality.” *International Organization* 64 (Summer 2010), 443–479.


9e. The Media
Piers Robinson, “The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy.” 
Review of International Studies 25, 2 (April 1999), 301-309.

9f. Gendered Attitudes toward War
Joslyn Barnhart, Robert Trager, Elizabeth Saunders, and Allan Dafoe, “Women’s Suffrage and the Democratic Peace: Female Voters Slow the March to War.” Foreign Affairs (August 2020)


Mary Caprioli, “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict.” International Studies Quarterly, 49, 2 (June 2005), 161-78.


9g. Other Domestic Frameworks and Studies


h. Revolution and War

IDEATIONAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES
(societal or system level)

9i. Constructivist Approaches (Background)
9j. **Ideas, Ideology, and War**


9k. **Culture, Identity, and War**


Mary L. Dudziak, “’You didn’t see him lying…beside the gravel road in France’: Death, Distance, and American War Politics.” *Diplomatic History* 42, 1 (January 2018): 1-16.


+++ See week 11 on strategic culture.

**9l. Race and War**


**9m. Religion and War**


**Data Sets**

**Historical Perspectives**
9n. The "Clash of Civilizations" (Huntington)

9o. Attitudes toward War


James Lee Ray, "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War."


9p.

**Norms and War**

**General**


**The Nuclear Taboo**


Other Weapons

The Territorial Integrity Norm

Other Issues
Experimental Studies

9q. Rhetoric, Justification, and Legitimacy


9r. **The Law of War and Its Impact**


9s. **Paul W. Schroeder's Research Program**
Contributions by Jervis, Trachtenberg, de Graaf, Otte, Levy, and Vasquez,
10. **DECISION-MAKING: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, I: BELIEFS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING** (November 12)
   Required reading in sections 10 a, b, e, f, g, h

10a. **Overviews**
   *

10b. **Do Leaders Matter?**
   *

10c. **Backgrounds and Characteristics of Leaders**
   Michael C. Horowitz, Philip Potter, Todd S. Sechser and Allan Stam, “Sizing Up the Adversary: Leader Attributes and Coercion in International Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, 10 (2018), 2180-2204


10d. **Beliefs and Images**


**Images of the Enemy**


10e. Misperception and the Causes of War


* Jack S. Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War." *World Politics* 36, 1 (October 1983): 76-99. (pp.76-93 only)


10f. Psychology of Threat Perception


Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.


10g. **Emotions, Interests, Motivated Reasoning, and War**


Interpersonal Relationships and Face-to-Face Diplomacy


Neurobiological Approaches

10h. **Analogical Reasoning and Learning from History**


10i. **Gender Differences in Decision-Making**


11. DECISION-MAKING: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, II (November 19)
Required reading in sections 11 a, e, g, h, i, j, k

11a. Prospect Theory Goes to War
* Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations."
  *Political Psychology*, special issue, 25, 2 (April 2004), articles by McDermott, Jervis, Taliaferro, Kanner, Elms, Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott.
Other Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty

11b. Time Horizons

11c. Other Psychological Models of Conflict
Jonathan W Keller, Keith A Grant, and Dennis M Foster, “Presidential Risk Propensity and Intervention in Interstate Conflicts.” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 16, 3 (July 2020): 272–291,
11d. **Psychoanalytic Approaches**

**DECISION-MAKING – THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL** (Mar 31, cont.)

11e. **Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Processes**

**Applications to the Causes of War**
11f. The Small Group Level

11g. Advisory Systems

11h. Crisis Decision-making

**Definitions of Crisis**

**The Impact of Stress**
(includes individual, group, and governmental levels)


### 11i. Strategic Culture


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11j. **Civil-Military Relations**


**Militarism**


11k. **Intelligence Failure**


**Historical Cases**


Military Doctrine and Military Innovation

Command and Control
Richard K. Betts and Matthew C. Waxman, “The President and the Bomb.” *Foreign Affairs* 97, 2 (March-April 2018),

The President and Congress: War Powers


12. **SIGNALING, REPUTATION, RESOLVE, & STATUS** (December 3)

required reading in sections 12 a, b, d, e, f

12a. **Signaling**


12b. **Reputation and Signaling: Formal Models**


12c. **Reputation: Empirical, Experimental, and Conceptual Studies**


### 12d. Reputation and Resolve


**12e. Audience Costs**


Kenneth A. Schultz, “Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now,” 369-75.


Brandon J Kinne and Nikolay Marinov, “Electoral Authoritarianism and Credible Signaling in International Crises.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57, 3 (June 2013): 359-86.


12f. **Status and War**


H-Diplo/ISFS Roundtable 10-23 on Renshon, [http://issforum.org/roundtables/10-23-status](http://issforum.org/roundtables/10-23-status)


**Humiliation, Disrespect, and Revenge**


13. **CRISIS ESCALATION AND THE EXPANSION OF WAR** (December 10)

Required readings in sections 13 b, d, e, i

13a. **General Studies of Crisis Escalation**


Austin Carson, *Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2018).


13b. **Models of Entrapment**


13c. Loss of Control and Inadvertent War

Crisis (Mis)Management

13d. The Expansion (Spread) of War
H-Diplo/ISSR Review of John A. Vasquez, Contagion and War: Lessons from the First World War (forthcoming)


13e. **The First World War**


13f. **Duration of war**

**Implications of the Bargaining Model**


**Psychological Perspectives and Debates**


Alex Weisiger, “Rationality and the Limits of Psychology in Explaining Interstate War Duration,” 215–24


Alex Weisiger, “Conclusion to the Symposium on War Duration”

**SOME ANALYTIC ISSUES**

13g. **Methodological Issues: Quantitative**


13h. **Methodological Issues: Experimental**

13i. **Methodological Issues: Qualitative**

13j. **Future Directions in the Study of Interstate War**
APPENDICES

Many of the following are viable topics for papers. Check with me.

A-1  DATA SETS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICT/WAR

Since 1945

Since 1815
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/CZGAO2


https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718824635


**Since 1500 or before**


Lawrence Freedman, “Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War.” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2020). (review)

A-2 IS WAR DECLINING?


Steven Pinker, “A History of Violence.”

http://edge.org/conversation/mc2011-history-violence-pinker


Steven Pinker, Fooled by belligerence: Comments on Nassim Taleb’s “The Long Peace is a Statistical Illusion” (2012); https://stevenpinker.com/files/comments_on_taleb_by_s_pinker.pdf.


**Forecasting War**


**A-3 THE EVOLUTION OF WAR**

**Biological, Primatological, and Evolutionary Perspectives**


**Anthropological studies of the origins of war**


**Archaeological Perspectives**


**The History of Warfare**


A-4 THE NUCLEAR ERA

Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Theory


Nuclear Weapons and the "Long Peace"

Empirical Studies of the Impact of Nuclear Weapons, I: Qualitative
Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 10 (Summer 1985):
Empirical Studies of Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence, II: Quantitative

Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Bargaining


**Nuclear Strategies (US and Others’)**


**Nuclear Proliferation**


Nina Tannenwald, “Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” *Ethics and International Affairs* (Fall 2013).


**THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE** (needs updating)

Stephen Biddle, “The determinants of nonstate military methods,” *The Pacific Review,* 31, 6 (2018), 714-739. or, intro or conclusion of book. see 4/12/21 email


### A-6 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE AND BARGAINING

**Classical Deterrence: Models and Critiques**


**The Huth-Russett Research Program on Deterrence**


**The Lebow/Stein Research Program on Deterrence**


**Further Debates over Rational Deterrence Theory**
Includes
Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," 143-69.
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," 170-82.

**Deterrence and Selection Effects**

**Alexander George's Research Program on Force and Statecraft**


**The Behavioral Correlates of War Research Program (BCOW) on Crisis Bargaining**


**Other Studies of Coercion and Bargaining**


Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare, “Flexibility and Firmness in Crisis Bargaining.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, 6 (July 2021), 1039-1066.

A-7 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY REGIMES

Institutions and Peace

Collective Security and Security Regimes


**Regional Security Systems**


A-8. CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A-9 WAR TERMINATION

Eric Min, Talking While Fighting: Understanding the Role of Wartime Negotiation.” International Organization 74, 3 (Summer 2020), 610-32.
+++ See also week 6 on the bargaining model and war termination
A-10 PEACEKEEPING (includes civil wars)

A-11 THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

Winners and Losers

Economic and Social Costs of War
David Mayhew, “War and American Politics.” *Perspectives on Politics* 3, 3 (September 2005), 473-93.

**Human Costs of War**

**A-12 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, MIGRATION, & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT**

**Environmental Change, Scarcity, and Conflict**

on scarcity see also week 4 on lateral pressure theory
Climate Change and War

Water and War

Demography, Security, and Conflict


**Refugees and Conflict**


**A-13 SECURITY ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD**


A-14. THEORIES OF JUST WAR


Magnus Reitberger, “License to kill: is legitimate authority a requirement for just war?” International Theory 5, 1 (March 2013): 64-93.


**Theological Perspectives**


**Just War in the Nuclear and Information Age**


**Anticipatory Self-Defense**


A-15 FEMINIST THEORIES OF WAR
+++ see the syllabus collection at the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights: http://genderandsecurity.org/projects-resources/syllabus-collection

A-16  **THE STUDY OF PEACE**

A-17  **WAR AND STATE-MAKING**
The “Military Revolution” and the Rise of the State
J. C. Sharman, “Myths of military revolution: European expansion and Eurocentrism.”
ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES

For bibliographies for the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis, see my syllabus at https://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/syllabi/foreignpolicyanalysis.pdf

Reviews (of the causes of interstate war)


Encyclopedias:


INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON WAR

General

Philosophy
+++ See also earlier section on just war.


**Anthropology**

+++ See also the earlier section on “Anthropological studies of the origins of war.”


**Sociology**


**Geography**


Economics


STRATEGY AND GRAND STRATEGY


