

WHY WAR?

(Interdisciplinary Perspectives)

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Rutgers University

SAS Interdisciplinary Honors Seminar
01:090:293:H1

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Time: Monday 08:30 AM - 11:30 AM

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Introduction to the Course

War has been a recurrent theme in the relationships between clans, tribes, city-states, empires, and states throughout history. It is one of the most destructive forms of human behavior, in both human and economic terms. Although some types of war have declined in frequency and/or magnitude, other forms of warfare have become more common, leading some to conclude that “only the dead have seen the end of war.” This latter perspective has been reinforced by recent events like the Ukraine War and the Gaza War, and the real and imminent possibility that the later might expand into a regional war with American involvement. Most of us would like to see an end to war, or, if that is not possible, at least a reduction in the frequency and destructiveness of war. Any serious attempt to reduce the frequency of war or to minimize its severity requires that we first understand why war occurs in the first place, and under what economic, political, technological, and cultural conditions.

Despite the enormous intellectual energy that scholars in a variety of disciplines have devoted to this question, a consensus has yet to emerge on the question of what causes

war. The only consensus is that war is complex and has many causes, though some question even this argument. The absence of a full understanding of war is compounded by the fact that most scholars tend to work within their own disciplinary boundaries, with little communication with those in other disciplines, and with little attempt to build on the insights of other disciplines.

With these considerations in mind, this seminar focuses on war and its causes. We adopt an interdisciplinary perspective and draw on insights from biology, evolutionary theory, primatology, anthropology, archaeology, sociology, psychology, political science, economics, military science, history, philosophy, theology, feminist theory, international legal theory, and just war theory. Among the questions we ask are. What is war? What are the different kinds of warfare? When in human history did war begin? Is war “natural,” perhaps biologically determined, or is it learned behavior shaped by politics and culture? How has war evolved over time? Is the increasing destructiveness of warfare primarily due to changes in military technology, or have economic, political, and sociological changes also contributed? Why do civil wars occur? Is it possible to generalize about something as complex and varied as war, or is each war unique? What kinds of war, if any, are just?

We begin, the first day of class, with the question of definition. What is war? We base our discussion (ideally, more discussion than lecture) on readings from an anthropologist, an historian, a military theorist, a political leader, and political scientists. No discussion of the nature of war is complete without a consideration of the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century military theorist whose book *On War* is one of the three most famous books on war ever written. (We will also be reading a selection from one of the others.) Clausewitz famously argued that war is a “continuation of politics.” That leads to a broader discussion of what that statement means and of the different ways in which political leaders have used military force to advance their goals.

After opening our second session with a brief discussion of historical trends in war, we turn to the “levels-of- analysis” framework, which is a typology or system for the classification of different causes of war (and of the sources of foreign policy behavior more generally). We will use this framework to organize our exploration of theories of the causes of war throughout much of the course. We gain a better understanding of this framework by illustrating it with reference to a number of hopefully familiar cases, including a more detailed analysis of the 2003 Iraq War. To say that one thing causes another can mean different things, so we explore different ways to think about causation.

In the third week of the term we turn to perspectives on war from several different academic disciplines, beginning with philosophy. We read Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who had conflicting views about the human condition in the “state of nature,” before the advent of more organized human civilization. We explore debates among archaeologists and anthropologists as to when, where, and how wars got started

early in human civilization, or perhaps before. We read a piece by a primatologist on primate wars and their relevance (if any) for the study of human aggression. We then survey a variety of theories of human nature and war.

In subsequent weeks we proceed to examine many of the leading theories of war, beginning with international system-level theories, including “realist” theories based on power and interest, and in particular balance of power theory and power transition theory. We read and discuss an influential recent application of power transition theory that considers the implications of the theory for the rise of China and the potential risks of a Sino-American war.

The next week we examine the Prisoner’s Dilemma model, which originated in Economics and then was widely adopted in Political Science and in other disciplines. We then turn to some “dyadic” (bilateral) models of strategic interaction between states. One is the debate between the “deterrence model” and the “spiral model,” which offer different answers to the question of whether threats of force induce adversary compliance or lead to escalation. We also look at the “bargaining model of war” (from Economics and now quite influential in Political Science), at different ways in which bargaining can break down, and at leaders’ strategies for managing crises in a way that maintains their interests while minimizing the risks of a costly war.

We then turn to societal-level theories of war, beginning with the in-group/out-group theory from Sociology. This underpins the “diversionary theory of war,” which we illustrate in more detail with a historical example. We next explore what has recently become the most influential societal-level theory, “democratic peace theory,” based on the observation that democratic states rarely if ever go war with each other. We ask whether that pattern is true and how to explain it.

Week 8 focuses on economic theories of war, beginning with the long-standing but still influential (in some circles) Marxist-Leninist theories of imperialism. We give more attention to liberal theories of economic interdependence and peace, including the argument that the reason democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other is not because they are democratic but instead because they are capitalist.

The following week we turn to decision-making theories of war. We look at theories of individual decision-making from Social Psychology, comparing those with “rational choice theory” from Economics. We take a look at the argument that people are more interested in avoiding losses than in making gains, and consider its application to questions of war and peace. The next week we move from the individual level to examine theories decision-making at the organizational and small group levels, looking at scholarship from Sociology, Political Science, and Management Science, and Social Psychology. We consider the implications of theories of individual and organizational decision-making to crisis decision-making and to the phenomenon of intelligence failure.

Having surveyed many of the leading theories of the causes of war from different levels of analysis, in week 11 we use all of those theories to help us understand one particularly acute international crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world the closest it has ever been to a nuclear war.

Although wars between states have been a central feature of the last five centuries of the global political system, and have played a central role in the evolution of that system, they are not the most common form of warfare. In important respects, war has been transformed. Non-state actors play an increasingly important role, and civil wars, insurgencies, and terrorism are much more common and increasingly central to the national security interests of states. We spend a week on theories of civil wars.

In week 12 we turn from interstate war to civil war, which are in fact the more common form of warfare. We will find that although some of the causes of civil wars are similar to those of interstate wars, many causes are different. Having focused most of our attention in the course on causal questions relating to why wars occur, we then turn in week 13 to normative questions, and more specifically to the longstanding debate about just war. What kinds of wars (if any) are just, and under what conditions? We read and discuss works by philosophers, theologians, historians, and international lawyers. We end the term in week 14 with theoretical reflections on the question of “why war.”

To wrap up this introduction, our survey will highlight a number of themes to consider when thinking about the outbreak of a particular war. What is the relative importance of strategic, ideological, economic, and domestic political motivations in political leaders' decisions for war? Do states go to war primarily to increase their power and security, to increase the wealth of their societies or perhaps certain groups within their societies, to promote certain principles of justice or other ideological or religious objectives, to consolidate the domestic positions of key elites, or to respond to pressures from private corporations or ethnic groups? Are states driven more by ambition or by fear? How important are conflicts of interests over tangible issues as opposed to concerns over power, reputation, and internal politics? To what extent are decisions for war made through careful cost-benefit calculations based on interests and on international and domestic constraints, and to what extent are they driven by flawed information processing and other departures from a rational decision-making calculus? Does the political structure of the regime, the economic structure of society, or the country's political culture make any difference? Do the world views and personalities of individual political leaders make a difference? Why do some wars escalate or expand, while others do not? Are the causes of great power wars any different than the causes of wars between weaker states? These are all important questions, even if they do not have clear answers.

Course Learning Objectives

A primary goal of this honors seminar is to develop student skills in critical thinking and writing, along with new conceptual tools for thinking about war and about international relations more generally. Through reading, class discussions, and papers, students will gain experience in constructing logically coherent causal arguments, engaging alternative interpretations, and understanding the kinds of evidence needed to discriminate among competing arguments. Students will also gain experience in writing with revision based on critical feedback on a preliminary paper leading up to a final research paper. Our emphasis on perspectives from multiple disciplines, alternative interpretations within disciplines, causal argumentation, critical thinking, and empirical evidence is particularly important at a time of political polarization and “information silos,” where both technology and social pressures make it easier for people to focus on information that confirms their preexisting beliefs.

This seminar also aims to provide an understanding of the leading theories of causes of war, especially between nation-states but also between other organized political groups, past and present, Western and non-Western. This causal knowledge of theories of war will be supplemented by greater factual knowledge about particular wars, based on the historical examples arising in the readings and in class. If students do a research project on a particular war, they will gain great familiarity with that war. In studying why states go to war they will gain a better appreciation of why states make other kinds of foreign policy decisions. In the process, students will develop the analytic skills for analyzing contemporary and future international issues, including civil wars.

READINGS

The required reading for the course includes one paperback book and a number of articles and book chapters. The book is

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War*. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. ISBN-13: 978-1405175593

I have asked Rutgers Barnes & Noble Bookstore (100 Somerset Street, 732 246 8448) to order this book, but other outlets might be more convenient. Used (and some “like new”) copies are available, often at reduced prices, or in a Kindle edition, from internet booksellers. Try Amazon, AbeBooks, BookFinder, or Alibris. Alexander Library has put a print copy the book on reserve (2 hour time limit). Note that the first chapter of the book (but only the first chapter), which we will read for the first two class periods, will be available as a pdf on Canvas. We get to other chapters in this book beginning September 23.

The required reading for the course also includes a fair number of articles, book chapters, and shorter pieces. I list them in the Course Outline and provide full bibliographic information at the end of the syllabus. Many of these readings are fairly short excerpts, so please do not be deterred by the long list. All of these articles and chapters (but not the required book) are available on the Canvas site for the class. I assume that most of you are familiar with Canvas. If not, go to <https://canvas.rutgers.edu/>, log in, go to Why War?, to Files in the left column, and then to the relevant folder. You can find the articles and chapters for the class under “Resources” in the menu to the left. Folders 01-13 include all the reading for the class (except for the required book) for each week of the term.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Most of our class meetings will emphasize a combination of lecture and discussion, with the lecture aimed to highlight points for discussion. It is imperative, therefore, that you do all of the required reading in advance, and to come to class prepared to discuss the reading and to use it to engage in the wide-ranging discussions in class. Your active participation in class discussions is important. It is a central part of the learning experience; it is a skill that will serve you well in the future; it makes the class a lot more fun; and it counts for a non-trivial fraction of your grade. This means, in terms of attendance, that I expect you to be present for all sessions. If you miss, or expect to miss a session – because of illness or family-related issues, please email me with a very brief explanation.

Given the fact that members of the seminar come from multiple disciplines and have multiple interests, and given that I hope to make the paper assignments an enjoyable as well as useful experience, I have constructed two “tracks” of assignments, giving you a choice as to which you prefer to follow. Each consists of a preliminary paper, an outline and bibliography, and a final research paper. I first summarize the two tracks, then describe them in more detail below.

Track A. Select a war, preferably an interstate war, and analyze its causes. Paper #1 in this track will involve a 2-3 page paper on alternative interpretations of that war. (All page lengths are for single-space pages, with an extra space between paragraphs). The next assignment is a preliminary outline of your final paper (paper #2), along with a bibliography. The final paper will be a more detailed 9-12 page analysis of the causes of the war in which you present your own interpretation. I prefer that you select an interstate war, because most of our theoretical readings have focused on interstate wars, but I am willing to consider intrastate/civil wars. I provide much more detail below.

Track B: Some of you may have less interest in history; or be particularly interested in one of the other topics covered in the class – for example, the origins of war in human civilization, or theories of just war, or the termination of war, or intelligence failure; or be interested in a particular cause of war – for example, economic causes of war. I'll give more examples in class. A choice of this topic will involve preliminary discussions with me after class (or before) and/or by email. Once I give you the go-ahead, your first paper will be a 2-3 page paper with a clear statement of the purpose of the paper, the question you are asking, why it is important, and a preliminary survey of how others have attempted to answer your question. Your next assignment, like for Track A, will be a short outline and bibliography for your final paper. Paper #3 will be a 9-12 page paper.

The multiple variations of a Track B project makes it too difficult to summarize further, but I will say more in class and to students individually. One type of paper I do NOT want, however, is one dealing with current policy issues. For example, I will not accept a paper on what national security strategy the US should follow in the Middle East or with respect to Ukraine or China,

I recommend Track A. Many previous students have written this kind of paper in my previous classes, it works well, they have generally enjoyed it, and they have done well. The majority of the readings and class discussions help prepare you for such a paper. In addition, I can provide a lot of help on the papers in terms of preliminary bibliographies, sample papers from past classes, and general guidance. I recognize, however, that students in the seminar have a wide variety of different backgrounds and interests. If another kind of paper is significantly more appealing, I am happy to discuss it.

Track (A): Causes of an Interstate War

Pick an interstate war, any war, and analyze its causes. (If you much prefer to do a civil war, I would be willing to discuss it.) This project involves the combination of theory and history, as the theoretical concepts developed earlier in the course should guide and inform your historical analysis. Below I include a description of my expectations for both the paper #1 (what I call the “alternative interpretations” paper) and the final research paper, with the former designed as the foundation for the latter. I also include suggestions on how to go about selecting your war. Note that the focus of each paper is the causal one of explaining the outbreak of the war, not the historical one of tracing the series of events that led to the war, or the normative one of arguing whether or not it was a “just” war for one or both states.. If you prefer to focus on questions of whether certain types of wars are just or legal, that would be track B.

Track A (Interstate War), Paper #1: “Alternative Interpretations”

2-3 pages single space; includes preliminary bibliography of at least five sources, due Wednesday, October 30, on Canvas.

Scholarly explanations for why a particular war (or other event) occurs aim to demonstrate not only that the hypothesized explanation fits the historical evidence, but also that it provides a closer fit with the evidence than do competing or alternative explanations. Although it is highly unlikely that any of you will turn out to be a professional historian, thinking in terms of alternative interpretations is an important mindset to develop for anyone hoping to develop a better understanding of the world around them.

This “alternative interpretations” paper should include a bibliography of at least five sources. If you read five or more articles or book chapters on “your” war, it should be pretty easy to identify alternative interpretations. Sometimes historians are explicit about those interpretations. If not, your theoretical readings from the course, or the levels of analysis framework we adopt, should provide some categories that facilitate the identification of alternative interpretations of your war. I will circulate a short handout on this.

If you pick a war that I know something about, I will make your task easier by sending you a list of recommended sources for the war you have selected. Although students learn through the research process of constructing their own bibliographies, they also learn from starting with good sources, which I am in a better position to identify, for many but admittedly not for all wars. I expect that you will incorporate some additional sources into your Outline and Bibliography (second assignment) and your final research paper #2. If several of your sources keep mentioning a particular source, it would be worth pursuing, especially if it is available online.

My primary aim in assigning this preliminary paper is to help you write a better research paper. You should feel free to (and are encouraged to) incorporate parts of paper #1, or preferably a revised version of it after getting my comments, into your final research paper (#2) for the course.

Track A, Interstate War, Outline/bibliography
2-3 pages, single space, due Monday, November 25.

This mainly serves as a check to make sure you are on the right track, and for me to suggest changes, or maybe an important missing source, in time for you to make changes in your paper. Your bibliography should include at least ten article-length sources, fewer if your sources include a book or two focusing on the causes of the war. (Many books on a particular war have just a single chapter or two on its causes.)

Track A, Interstate War, Paper #2 (Research paper)

9-12 pages, single space (space between paragraphs), due Monday, December 16.

The final paper for the class should focus on the causes of the particular crisis or war that you select for investigation. I will circulate additional guidelines about the paper later, and we will talk more about it on and off throughout the course. If a lot of students select the track A option, we might set aside time in class to talk about a sample paper from a previous class. Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the sample paper will help you write a better final paper. Here I provide a preliminary summary of my expectations for the paper.

The paper must be more than a historical chronology of the events leading to the war. You need to analyze the causes of the war, and causes involve more than identifying a sequence of events. The paper must be analytically focused and guided by some of the theoretical concepts that we develop in the class. That is, you should use some of the theoretical concepts from the first part of the course (for example, balance of power, or diversionary theory) to help explain the outbreak of your war. The paper must include an evaluation of the relative importance of different causal factors at different levels of analysis in the processes leading to the outbreak of the war. I do not want a laundry list of ten or twenty causes of the war. You need to prioritize among the many causes, and identify primary and secondary causes of the war.

I want to emphasize that although your main aim is to provide a causal interpretation of the outbreak of your war, it is not just an interpretive essay. It is a piece of historical research that must be well grounded in and supported by the available historical evidence. This requires extensive research and extensive footnoting. In your alternative interpretations paper you should include a list of sources that you have consulted. If something critical is missing I will let you know. If I recommend additional sources that you have omitted, you would be wise to follow up on my suggestions.

Selecting a war for your two papers:

This is a major project involving two papers (and an outline) that will consume a fair amount of your time and constitute a significant proportion of your grade for the course. It is important that you pick a historical case that is of interest to you. Some of you may already have a pretty good sense of one or two wars that would be of interest, or maybe a time period or region or country that interests you – because of your previous school work or reading, a film, or your ethnic or national background.

For those (I suspect most of you) who have no prior preferences, in file 01 on Canvas I have posted a list of about 35 interstate wars from which you might choose, from ancient Greece to the present. You are not confined to this list. I would be happy to consider additional wars that you might suggest. I would be happy to talk more about a war that might be of interest to you.

You might spend a little time (but not too much) reading background information on a few wars to help you make a decision. Internet sources like Wikipedia might be useful in providing enough basic historical information to help you decide whether or not this would be an interesting case for a paper, even if such sources have limited utility for your papers for the class (because they are historically rather than causally focused, because they are unreliable for documentation, and for other reasons). Thus reading about a few wars on Wikipedia or other internet sites would be one useful place to start. One thing to keep in mind for any of these wars is that this class focuses on the causes of the war, not how the war is fought (though I would allow someone to write a paper on the termination of war – on how warring parties came to an agreement to end their military conflict). I suggest – for the purposes of a paper on the causes of war, at least – that you stop reading when they start shooting.

You are free to pick just about any interstate war – recent or ancient, Western or non-Western. I have had students write on everything from the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431-404BCE) to the 2003 Iraq war and a lot of wars in between. If you pick a particularly “big” and complex war – such as World War I, World War II in either Europe or the Pacific – you have the option of focusing primarily on one state and its path to war. For example, you could choose for your paper topic “Germany and the Causes of World War I (or WW2),” or Japan and World War II. For most other wars, however, I would want you to explain the war as a whole.

If you follow this standard track, the statement of your research topic can be one or two sentences in an email to me. If you mention your topic in class, I still need an email.

Citation/reference style. My only rule is to be consistent. Students in this class come from different disciplines with different norms as to style. I respect that. I will mention a few different reference styles in class, but this is not something you should worry about. Just be consistent.

Comment on writing style. I have found that students often use too many direct quotations. That may be proper and necessary in a literature or poetry class, where you quote a passage and interpret it. Things are different history and the social sciences. It is generally preferable to save quotations for (1) statements of actors whose behavior you are trying to explain (for example, political leaders, influential military or business leaders, or citizens who are representative of public attitudes); or (2) secondary sources who really nail it, who perfectly and succinctly capture an argument you are trying to make (or criticize). For everything else it is better to put it in your own words, with appropriate citation.

Formal Requirements and Grading Criteria

I will calculate your final grade for the course as follows:

		<u>due date</u>
contributions to class discussions	20%	(any time this day)
Paper #1 (alternative interpretations)	20%	October 30
Outline & bibliography	10%	November 25
Paper #2 (research paper/final paper)	50%	December 16

You should submit each of the above papers through the Assignments tab on Canvas. Although the Outline/bibliography is due November 25, if you want to submit it earlier, to provide more time for you to incorporate any recommendations into your final paper, I would do my best to provide that feedback right away.

Canvas automatically runs papers through the “Turnitin” program. That program identifies passages in a paper that match passages in the “Turnitin” data base, which includes internet sources and previous papers submitted to Turnitin worldwide. To the best of my knowledge Turnitin has no restrictions regarding file type.

COURSE OUTLINE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS

Note: number indicates the week of the term; letters represent multiple topics each week. For each week, I recommend that you read the different items in the order in which they appear here, not in the alphabetical order in which they appear on Canvas.

- 1a. **Course Introduction** (September 9)
focus, aims, organization, requirements, expectations
- 1b. **Personal Introductions**
- 1c. **Defining War: Interdisciplinary Perspectives**
Raymond Kelly, *Warless Societies and the Origin of War*, "Introduction"
Jeremy Black, *Why Wars Happen*, "Introduction" (pp. 13-22 only)
Levy & Thompson, *Causes of War*, pp. 1-14.
- 1d. **War and Politics**
Carl von Clausewitz, "What Is War?"
Mao Tse-tung, "Military Principles"
- 2a. **Historical Trends in War** (September 16)
Steven Pinker, "A History of Violence" (excerpt);
or, watch the video at
<http://edge.org/conversation/mc2011-history-violence-pinker>
watch the first minute introduction, move to minute 15:00 and the section on
"The Long Peace," continue to the beginning of the discussion of genocide
(minute 27:15)
- 2b. **Classifying the Causes of War: The Levels of Analysis Framework**
Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, "Introduction"
Levy & Thompson, *Causes of War*, pp. 14-27
- 2c. **Application: The 2003 Iraq War**
Steve A. Yetiv, "The Iraq War of 2003" (for detailed discussion in class)
- 2d. **Conceptions of Causation**

- 3a. **Philosophical Perspectives: Hobbes, and Rousseau** (Sept. 23)
 Thomas Hobbes, excerpts from *De Cive* and from *Leviathan*
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, excerpts from *The State of War* (pp. 480-489 only)
- 3b. **The Origins of War: Perspectives from Archaeology and Anthropology**
 Lawrence Keeley, *War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage*, chap. 1
 Barry Cunliffe, "The Roots of Warfare"
 Margaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only an Invention – Not a Biological Necessity"
- 3c. **A Primatological Perspective**
 Robert Wrangham, "Why Apes and Humans Kill"
- 3d. **The Individual Level: Human Nature and War**
 Greg Cashman, "The Individual Level of Analysis, Part I"
4. **System Level Explanations** (September 30)
 Levy & Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 2
- 4a. **Realist Theory**
 Stephen Walt, "Realism and Security"
 John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power"
- 4b. **Balance of Power Theory**
 Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?"
- 4c. **Power Transition Theory**
 Ronald L. Tammen, et al. *Power Transitions*, chap. 1.
- 4d. **Application: The "Thucydides Trap" and Sino-American Relations**
 Thucydides, excerpts from *The Peloponnesian War*
 Graham Allison, "The Thucydides Trap."
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/>
5. **Discussion of Research Projects** (October 7)

- 6. **The Dyadic Level** (October 14)
 - 6a. **The Prisoner's Dilemma Model**
Bruce Russett, *The Prisoners of Insecurity*, chap. 5-6.
 - 6b. **The Deterrence Model and the Spiral Model**
Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary"
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, pp. 55-63
 - 6c. **The Bargaining Model of War**
Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power"
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, pp. 63-70
 - 6d. **Crisis Management**
Alexander L. George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management"

- 7. **Societal-Level Theories of War** (October 21)
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 4.
 - 7a. **Sociological Perspectives**
Lewis Coser, "Conflict with Out-Groups and Group Structure" pp. 87-95 only.
 - 7b. **The Diversionary Theory of War**
Jack S. Levy and Lily I. Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes:
Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case." (ignore theoretical discussion of
BA regimes on pp. 125-27)
 - 7c. **The Democratic Peace**
Immanuel Kant, excerpts, *Perpetual Peace* and from *The Metaphysics of Morals*
John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace"

- 8. **Economic Theories of War** (October 28)
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, pp. 70-77, 85-93.
 - 8a. **Marxist-Leninist Theories of Imperialism and War**
 - 8b. **The Capitalist Peace**
 - 8c. **Review, Levels of Analysis**
Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 8

+++ Wednesday, October 30: paper #1 due (Canvas)

9. **Decision-Making Theories: The Individual Level** (November 4)
 - 9a. **The Psychology of Decision-Making**
 Joe Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systematic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory”
 Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 5 & pp. 180-182
 Janice Gross Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat”
 Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, “Hawkish biases”
 - 9b. **Prospect Theory: The Psychology of Gains and Losses**
 Kahneman and Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames”
10. **Decision-Making Theories: The Organizational and Group Levels** (November 11)
 - 10a. **Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Processes**
 Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 6
 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications”
 - 10b. **Social Psychology of Group Decision-Making**
 Irving L. Janis, “Groupthink”
 - 10c. **Crisis Decision-making**
 Holsti, “Crisis Decision-Making”
 - 10d. **Intelligence Failure**
 Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable”
11. **Cuban Missile Crisis** (November 18)
 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.*, chap. 2
 Alexander L. George, “The Cuban Missile Crisis”
 Robert Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: What can we know, why did it start, and how did it end?”

12. **Theories of Civil War** (November 25)
 Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict”
 Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”
 T. David Mason, “The Evolution of Theory on Civil War and Revolution”
 Mary Caprioli, “Primed for violence: The role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict” (pp161-67, 173-74 only)
 Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, chap. 6

+++ November 25: outline & bibliography for paper #2 due (Canvas)

13. **Theories of Just War** (December 2)
 Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, chap. 2 (“The Crime of War”) & chap. 5 (“Anticipations”)
 Augustine, from *The City of God* and other writings, in Reichberg et al, “Augustine (354-430): Just War in the Service of Peace”
 Machiavelli, from *The Prince* and from *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy*, in Reichberg, et al., “Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527): War is Just to Whom it is Necessary”
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, from *The German Ideology*, *The Communist Manifesto*, and other writings, in Reichberg, et al., “Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: War as an Instrument of Emancipation”

14. **Theoretical Reflections on War, Peace, and Interdisciplinarity** (December 9)

Summary of due dates (end of day, on Canvas)

Wednesday, October 30	paper #1
November 25	outline & bibliography for paper #2
Monday, December 16	paper #2

List of Articles and Book Chapters

I list these complete bibliographic references in alphabetical order. They are all available on the Canvas site for the course, under Resources, organized by week of the term.

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