"War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

In this seminar we undertake a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on interstate war, focusing primarily on the causes of war and the conditions of peace but giving some attention to the conduct and termination of war. We emphasize research in political science but include some coverage of work in other disciplines. We examine the leading theories, their key causal variables, the paths or mechanisms through which those variables lead to war or to peace, and the degree of empirical support for various theories. We look at a variety of methodological approaches: qualitative, quantitative, experimental, formal, and experimental. Our primary focus, however, is on the logical coherence and analytic limitations of the theories and the kinds of research designs that might be useful in testing them.

The seminar is designed primarily for graduate students who want to understand – and ultimately contribute to – the theoretical and empirical literature in political science on war, peace, and security. Students with different interests and students from other disciplines can also benefit from the seminar and contribute to it, and are welcome. Ideally, members of the seminar will have some familiarity with basic issues in international relations theory, philosophy of science, research design, and statistical methods. I recognize, however, that students will bring rather diverse backgrounds to the seminar, and I have tried to organize the course in a way that will be useful for students with different types of preparation and different career objectives, including students who have International Relations as a minor field of study. I have tried to combine breadth of coverage of the “mainstream” scholarship in the field with flexibility for students to advance their own programs of study. To this end I have coupled a common set of readings for all participants in the seminar with considerable freedom for individual students to select specific topics for their paper for the class. The required readings are rather extensive, though no more extensive than the typical graduate seminar.

The question of war and peace is a broad one, as one might expect for a topic that has engaged scholars from many disciplines since the times of Sun Tzu and Thucydides. Some narrowing of focus is necessary for any one-semester course, and I want to be explicit about which topics and approaches we will and will not emphasize. Our main task, following most of the social science
literature on war and peace, is to explain variations in war and peace over time and space. Are wars more likely to occur under some conditions than other conditions, at some times rather than other times, between some states rather than other states, under the direction of some types of leaders rather than other types of leaders? Under what conditions are wars likely to escalate or expand, and when are they likely to end? As the late Stuart Bremer asked, “Who Fights Whom, Where, When, and Why?”

We will focus primarily on interstate war, for many reasons. Although the most common forms of war in the international system have shifted in recent decades away from interstate war and towards civil war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, hybrid war, and various forms of communal violence, there is little reason to believe that the era of interstate war has ended. There are enough “hot spots” in the world today to create a non-trivial risk of interstate war, and U.S. political leaders have recently emphasized a return to an era of great power competition. The potential consequences of some of these wars – for human security, for the economy, and for the evolution of the international system – alone make them worthy of study. In addition, many important theoretical debates in the IR field are closely linked the origins and escalation of interstate war, so that a familiarity with this literature is quite valuable for those wishing to engage the IR field as a whole. Finally, there is a practical consideration: the Department at Columbia has several scholars who have considerable expertise in terrorism, civil war, and other forms of intrastate conflict, so a division of labor based on comparative advantage is beneficial. Similarly, the Columbia faculty’s expertise on nuclear weapons and strategy lead me to minimize coverage of that important area.

In our treatment of interstate war, we will not give much attention to the strategy or conduct of war, except to the extent that these considerations influence the outbreak, escalation, or termination of war. Following most of the mainstream literature, we also focus more on the causes of war than on the termination or consequences of war, though in recent years scholars have devoted more attention to war termination and to the impact of war on the political, economic, and social structures of state and society. Finally, we spend relatively little time on the normative and policy implications of our theories. This is not to say that these other subjects are any less important than those covered in this seminar. In a one-semester course, however, it is necessary to make some choices for the sake of coherence. Plus, the prevailing norms of the International Relations field (and hence incentives for Ph.D. students planning to go on the U.S. academic job market) give priority to the construction and testing of theoretical propositions over policy prescription and analysis. I understand, of course, that some students may have different career objectives.

This syllabus includes a far more extensive list of topics and sources than we will actually cover in the class. It serves as an analytically-organized bibliography of the field, though admittedly an incomplete and perhaps somewhat idiosyncratic one. It has evolved over many years, and I spend a lot of time updating and revising it for each new course. I hope it is useful. If you find any typos or duplications, or have suggestions for additions or deletions or shifting particular works from one category to another, I would be happy to hear from you.
READING:

The required reading for the class includes one book and a substantial number of articles and chapters. The book,

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010),

is available for purchase at Book Culture (536 W. 112 St; 212/865-1588) and also on the internet, probably at better prices. I have asked Columbia Library to place the required book on reserve.

I will put pdf’s of all required article–length pieces (but not the Levy-Thompson book, except for chapter 1 for our first day) on the Courseworks website for the class (https://courseworks.columbia.edu/), organized by week. In case any new student is unfamiliar with Courseworks, I will email you pdf’s of the readings for the first week of class.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS:

We will organize our weekly meetings as follows. I will usually begin with my own introductory comments on a particular body of literature, with the aim of putting the current literature in the context of earlier work and other bodies of literature. We will then move to an open discussion of the material. Most weeks we will cover several distinct topics. We will focus primarily in the logical coherence of the theoretical argument, the appropriateness of the research designs and particular methods for testing the theoretical argument, and implications for other conflict theories. We will identify the strengths as well as the weaknesses of a research program or of a particular article, and to identify useful directions for future research. We want to ask not only what is wrong with particular theories and efforts to test them, but also what is good about them and what we can do better. We can discuss historical examples bearing on various theories, but our aim is to use these examples as vehicles for illustrating theories and their limitations, not to engage in extensive debate the best explanations of particular historical events.

Our class discussions will be most useful, collectively and individually, if each student completes all of the required reading prior to each class meeting, comes to class prepared to discuss the reading, and actively participates in the discussion. I will try to make a few comments at the end of each class about things to think about in the reading for the following week, and which topics or readings to prioritize for discussion. In addition, I will ask each student to select, from a list provided below, three topics to which they will give special attention and come to class particularly well-prepared to discuss. This may involve reading one or two articles beyond the required reading on that topic.

The above-mentioned requirement is somewhat informal but important. The more formal requirement is to write a paper on a subject of your choice relating to war. I understand that many of you plan to focus your graduate work on topics relating to civil war, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and other aspects of intrastate war, and for that reason I have no objection to papers on those topics as long as they related to war and peace broadly defined. Those papers should be
informed by our readings for the class where they are relevant. I now turn to each of these requirements in more detail.

**Requirement #1: Topics for Special Attention**

Each student will select three of the following topics, read the two or (usually) three articles listed for each, and come to class especially well prepared to discuss these topics. Students will not give a formal presentation on their topic nor submit anything in writing, but I will expect you to be particularly active and well-informed in class discussion that day. If you topic comes up indirectly during a different week, I encourage you to speak out. We can have up to two students on a particular topic, so please inform me of your preferred topic as soon as possible. My Rutgers email is the best way to contact me.

Many of these readings are required for the entire class, but for several topics I include one or sometimes two additional items. I have posted pdf’s of all readings not required of the entire class in the “Readings - special topics” folder on Courseworks, organized by week within the folder. Note that you do not have to read all of the items listed for a particular week in the “special topics” folder, only those listed with your topic in the following list. Let me know immediately if your readings are missing from Courseworks.

The list below includes the week of the term and topic number in the syllabus. I identify the readings by the author’s name and date of publication. If a reading comes from a different topic, I will list the topic number. In some cases I give you a choice of readings. Let me know if anything is unclear.

**Evolutionary approaches (2a)**
- Wrangham (2006)
- Mead (1968)

**Security dilemma and the spiral model (3b)**
- Jervis (1976)
- Jervis (1978, 3c)
- Glaser (1997)

**Offensive/defensive balance (3e)**
- Jervis (1978)

**Offensive realism (3g)**
- Mearsheimer (2001, required reading for 3g)
- Mearsheimer (2001, chap. 5)
- Walt (2002, from 3a)
Defensive realism (3h)
   Walt (1985)
   Kydd (1997)
   Betts (1999)

Balance of power theory (4b)
   Gulick (1955)
   Levy and Thompson (2010, from 4f)
   Levy and Thompson (2005, from 4f)

Alliances and war (4e)
   Crawford (2011)
   Morrow (2000)
   Johnson & Leeds (2011)

Territory and the Steps-to-War Model (4o)
   Sensee & Vasquez (2008), chap. 1 & 2
   Toft (2014, from 4n)

Power transition theory (5a)
   Tammen (2000)
   DiCicco and Levy (1999)
   Gilpin (1988, 5b)

Preventive war (5d)
   Levy (2008)
   Vasquez (2014: “Was the First World War a preventive War?” (focus on criteria, not WW1)
   Schroeder (2011)

Strategic rivalry (5k)
   Thompson (2001)
   Goertz and Diehl (in Midlarsky, 2000)

Bargaining model of war (6b-e) [requires some familiarity with game theory]
   Fearon (1995)
   Powell (2006, 6c)
   Streich and Levy (2016, 6i)

Democratic peace: Schultz Signaling Model (7e)
   Schultz (2001), chap. 1-3
   Levy and Mabe (2004, from 9f)
Democratic peace: Selectorate Model (7f)
   Russett and Starr (2000, 7b)
   Owen (1994, 7b)
   Bueno de Mesquita et al (1999, 7f)

Economic Interdependence and the Capitalist Peace (8c,d,h)
   Mansfield and Pollins (2001, 8c)
   Copeland (2015)

Financing War (8h)
   McDonald (2007) OR Flores-Macías & Kreps

Sectoral Interests and Coalitional Politics (8i)
   Lobell (2004)
   Snyder (1991)

Diversionary theory of war (9a)
   Levy (1989)
   Haynes (2017)
   Chiozza & Goemans (2011, from 9b)

Norms and War (9f)
   Zacher (2001)
   Tannenwald (2005)
   Fazal (2012)

Do Leaders Matter? (10b)
   Jervis (2013)
   Levy (2015)

Psychology of threat perception/misperception and war (10e,f)
   Jervis (1988)
   Levy (1983)
   Yarhi-Milo (2013)
   Stein (2013, 10g)

Analogical Reasoning and Learning from History (10g)
   Jervis (1976)
   Levy (1994)
   Khong (1992, chap.2)
Prospect theory and war (11a)
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
Levy (1997)
Taliaferro (in Political Psychology 2004)

Strategic Culture (11h)
Johnston (1995)

Intelligence failure (11j)
Bar-Joseph & Levy (2009)

Audience costs (12c)
Fearon (1994)
Snyder and Borghard (2011)

Status and War (12f)
Dafoe et al (2014)
Renshon (2016)
Jervis AND Betts in 2012 SS Symposium, OR Wolf (2014)

The Expansion (Spread) of War and the Case of the First World War (13d, e)
Vasquez (2018)
Levy (1990-91)

Requirement #2: paper

Given that students in the class will have different backgrounds and goals and may be at different stages in the graduate program, the paper requirement is somewhat flexible. I recognize that some of you may be primarily interested in forms of conflict other than interstate war, and consequently I will allow papers on any topic relating to international conflict broadly defined (civil war, insurgency, terrorism, etc.), not just interstate war. Note, however, that if some of the material covered in class relates to parts of your paper on intrastate conflict, you should include it. In terms of the type of paper, it can be a literature review, research design, or research paper. If you are a first year student, or perhaps someone outside of the IR field, a literature review paper might be appropriate. If you are further along and have an idea for a research paper but are just getting started on it, maybe a research design would be best. If you are a more advanced student and have started to do research on a particular topic, then a research paper makes more sense. The type of paper is up to you, but whatever you do must go significantly beyond what you have done before on a similar paper in other classes.

You should inform me, verbally or by email, of the topic you wish to pursue. I will probably ask for a longer written statement of your question and how you plan to go about analyzing it. For
literature reviews, this might involve a preliminary outline and provisional bibliography at some point. For research papers, this might involve a 3-5 page research design. Basically, I will ask for a few intermediate products along the way to your final paper, to make sure we are on the same page and to provide hopefully feedback along the way.

**Style:** All papers should be single space with a space between paragraphs, with footnotes rather than endnotes, and submitted to me by email attachment. Any citation style is acceptable, as long as you are consistent. However, even if you use a traditional footnote style – as detailed in *Chicago Manual of Style* and adopted by *International Security*, *Security Studies*, and some other journals – please include a separate bibliography at the end of the paper (even though that style does not formally require a cumulative bibliography. The due date is Friday, December 13, a week after our last class.

**Literature reviews** should be 11-15 pages. This should be a critical review of the literature on a well-defined theoretical question or set of interrelated questions relating to war, peace, and security. It can overlap with one or your three topics for requirement #1. Good paper topics often coincides with a section or subsection of the course, but sometimes span several topics. For example, a broader topic might be balance of power theory or power transition theory, while narrower topics might be alliances and war, preventive war, or territory and war. In order to avoid misunderstandings, please secure my approval for your paper topic in advance.

I have included extensive bibliographies in the hope that they serve as useful guides, or at least points of departure, for many possible paper topics. I encourage you to utilize additional sources. This will be absolutely necessary on topics where my lists of sources is rather limited. Please do not assume that by reading all of the items in a particular section of the syllabus you have adequately covered a particular topic for your review. On topics where the list of sources is much longer, you may need to narrow the list considerably, while hopefully adding a few additional sources. In either case, please consult me for suggestions as to possible additions to the list and/or priorities among them (if the number of items is quite large). The order of items on the syllabus is rarely an indicator of their relative importance.

In your literature review you should summarize the literature on your topic and at the same time organize it in some coherent way – preferably around a useful typology or theoretical theme, not around a succession of books and articles. You should note the theoretical questions that this literature attempts to answer, identify the key concepts and causal arguments, note some of the empirical research that bears on these theoretical propositions, and relate it to the broader literature on war and peace. You should identify the logical inconsistencies, broader analytical limitations, and unanswered questions of the leading scholarship in this area. You should also suggest fruitful areas for subsequent research. If you have any thoughts on how particular hypotheses could be tested, please elaborate on that.

Early in the term I will post copies of a few sample literature reviews from previous courses, to give you a few models of what good papers look like. Those papers will also give you a sense of
many sources are appropriate, though that will vary by topic. How you organize your review and what you say about the sources is more important than the length of your bibliography.

Research designs should identify the question you are trying to answer, ground it in the theoretical literature, specify your key hypotheses, offer a theoretical explanation for those hypotheses, and provide a detailed statement as to how you would carry out the research. This includes the specification of the dependent and independent variables and the form of the relationship between them, the operationalization of the variables, the identification (and theoretical justification) of the empirical domain of the study (i.e., case selection), the identification of alternative explanations for the phenomenon in question, and an acknowledgment of what kinds of evidence would confirm your hypotheses and what kinds of evidence would disconfirm or falsify your hypotheses. Try to do this in 12-15 pages (single space). Please consult with me along the way, starting with a one page statement early in the term. I am hoping for research designs that are roughly equivalent to rough drafts of dissertation proposals or grant proposals (which, admittedly, vary in length).

Research papers include research designs and basically implement them. For the purposes of this class, the research need not necessarily be complete. For example, if your design calls for four comparative case studies, and you complete only one or two for this class, that is fine. There is no set length for the paper. However, if you are aiming at an article-length paper that will ultimately be submitted to a journal, note that most journals have word limits ranging from 12-15,000 words, including footnotes and references but not including any technical appendices. (I think that works out to 23-27 pages, single space, though journals always require double space.) The paper for this class need not be that long.

Grading

Grades for the course will be based on the following weighting:

Contributions to class discussion, including on your three topics for special attention 20%

Paper 80%

Academic Integrity

The intellectual venture in which we are all engaged requires of faculty and students alike the highest level of personal and academic integrity. As members of an academic community, each one of us bears the responsibility to participate in scholarly discourse and research in a manner characterized by intellectual honesty and scholarly integrity.

Scholarship, by its very nature, is an iterative process, with ideas and insights building one upon the other. Collaborative scholarship requires the study of other scholars' work, the free discussion of such work, and the explicit acknowledgement of those ideas in any work that inform our own.
This exchange of ideas relies upon a mutual trust that sources, opinions, facts, and insights will be properly noted and carefully credited.

In practical terms, this means that, as students, you must be responsible for the full citations of others' ideas in all of your research papers and projects; you must be scrupulously honest when taking your examinations; you must always submit your own work and not that of another student, scholar, or internet agent.

Any breach of this intellectual responsibility is a breach of faith with the rest of our academic community. It undermines our shared intellectual culture, and it cannot be tolerated. Students failing to meet these responsibilities should anticipate being asked to leave Columbia.

**Disability Accommodations**

In order to ensure their rights to reasonable accommodations, it is the responsibility of students to report any learning-related disabilities, to do so in a timely fashion, and to do so through the Office of Disability Services. Students who have documented conditions and are determined by DS to need individualized services will be provided a DS-certified ‘Accommodation Letter.’ It is students’ responsibility to provide this letter to all their instructors and in so doing request the stated accommodations.

If you are a student with a disability and have a DS-certified ‘Accommodation Letter,’ please come to my office hours to confirm your accommodation needs. If you believe that you might have a disability that requires accommodation, you should contact Disability Services at 212-854-2388 and disability@columbia.edu. For more information, please visit http://www.college.columbia.edu/rightsandresponsibilities.
TOPICAL OUTLINE

1. COURSE INTRODUCTION (Sept. 6)
   CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, I
   What is War?
   The Clausewitzian Paradigm
   Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?
   Trends in War
   The Levels-of-Analysis Framework

2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, II (Sept. 13)
   Evolutionary Approaches: What Do They Explain?
   Typologies of War
   The Concept of Total War
   The Use of Force: Contemporary Clausewitzians
   Concepts of Causation

3. REALIST THEORIES OF WAR, I (Sept. 20)
   Varieties of Realist Theories
   The Security Dilemma and the Spiral Model
   The Prisoner’s Dilemma Model, I – single-play
   The Prisoner’s Dilemma Model, II – repeated-play
   The Offensive/Defensive Balance
   Neorealist Theories of War
   Offensive Realism
   Defensive Realism
   Definition and Measurement of Military Power
   Military Effectiveness

4. REALIST THEORIES OF WAR, II (Sept. 27)
   Neoclassical Realism
   Classical Balance of Power Theories
   Conceptual Ambiguities
   Historians’ Perspectives
   Debates about Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and War
   Quantitative Studies of Polarity and of Systemic Capability Concentration
   The Dyadic Power Parity Hypothesis
   Alliances and War
   Debates over Balancing vs. Bandwagoning
   Do Alliances Deter Provoke War? Quantitative Studies
   Formal Models of Alliances
   Alliance Data
   Alliance Cohesion in Wartime
   Domestic Sources of Alliances
Whom Do States Balance Against? Land Powers and Sea Powers
What Do States Balance Against? Disaggregating Power
Balancing (or not) in Non-Western Systems
“Soft Balancing”
Lateral Pressure Theory
Asymmetric Conflicts

ISSUES, TERRITORY, AND THE STEPS TO WAR MODEL
Issues: What Do States Fight About?
Issues Correlates of War Project (ICOW)
Territory and War
   - Borders and Walls
The Steps-to-War Model

5. HEGEMONIC THEORIES (Oct. 4)
   Power Transition Theory – The Organski et al Research Program
   Gilpin's Hegemonic Transition Theory
      - Historical Perspectives
   Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China
   Preventive War
      - Historical Applications
      - Preventive Logic in the Nuclear Age
   Rising and Declining Powers
   Long Cycle Theory (Thompson, Rasler, Modelski)
   Hegemonic War
   Other Theories of Hierarchy, Transition and War
   Theories of Unipolar Politics
   David Kang’s Research Program on Hierarchy in Asia

RIVALRIES AND ARMS RACES
International Rivalries
   - Overview
   - The Diehl & Goertz Research Program
   - The Thompson/Rasler/Colaresi Research Program
   Rivalry Termination
   Other Approaches to Rivalry
Arms Races and War
   - Historical Studies
   - Quantitative and Formal Approaches
6. THE BARGAINING MODEL OF WAR (Oct. 11)
   Rational Choice Theories: Introduction
   The Bargaining Model of War
   The Commitment Problem
   Informational Problems
   Issue Indivisibility
   Complications of Multilateral Bargaining
   Other Formal Models of Bargaining
      Spatial Models
   The Non-Formal Literature on Misperceptions and their Consequences
   Behavioral Perspectives on the Bargaining Model of War

7. THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (October 18)
   Societal-Level Theories of War: Overviews
   The Democratic Peace
   Quantitative Empirical Studies
      Monadic Level
      System Level
   Critiques
   Domestic Oppositions and Signaling (Schultz)
   Alternative Models of Political Oppositions and Signaling
   Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al)
   War and the Survival of Political Leaders: Empirical Studies
   The Territorial Peace
   Why Do Democracies Win Wars?
   Other Implications of the Democratic Peace
      Covert Action
      A Democratic Civil Peace?
   More on Democratic Accountability
   Democratization and War
   Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies
   Autocracies, War, and Peace

8. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE (Oct. 25)
   General Treatments
   Marxist-Leninist Theories
      Alternative Theories of Imperialism
   Resources and War
   Does Trade Promote Peace?
   Quantitative-Empirical Studies
   The Globalization of Production
   The Capitalist Peace
   The Contractual Peace
   The Impact of War on Trade
   The Militarization of Commercial Rivalries
World War I and Economic Liberalism
Financing War
   Historical Perspectives
   The First World War
Sectoral Interests and Coalitional Politics
The Costs of Conflict

9.  SOCIETAL-LEVEL THEORIES (continued) (Nov. 1)
The Diversionary Theory of War
   Social Identity Theory
   Debates over Mechanisms
   Quantitative-Empirical Studies
   Formal Theoretical Approaches
   Case Studies
   Leaders, Institutions, Political Survival, and War
   Diversionary Theory, Political Oppositions, and Signaling (back to Schultz)
   Public Opinion and War
   Other Domestic Frameworks and Studies
   Revolution and War

IDEATIONAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES
Ideas, Ideology, and War
   Culture and War
   Race and War
Religion and War
   A Data Set
   Historical Perspectives
   The “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington)
   Attitudes toward War
   Norms and War
   Experimental Studies
   The Law of War and Its Impact
   Paul W. Schroeder’s Research Program on Ideas and Norms

10.  DECISION-MAKING: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, I (Nov. 8)
Overviews
Do Leaders Matter?
Backgrounds and Characteristics of Leaders
Beliefs and Images
   Images of the Enemy
Msperception and the Causes of War
Psychology of Threat Perception
Emotions, Political Interests, Motivated Reasoning, and War
   Neurobiological Approaches
Analogical Reasoning and Learning from History
11. DECISION-MAKING – THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, II (Nov. 15)
   Prospect Theory Goes to War
   Time Horizons
   Other Psychological Models of Conflict
   Psychoanalytic Approaches

   DECISION-MAKING – THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL
   Decision-Making in Groups
   Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Processes
   - Applications to the Causes of War
   Crisis Decision-making: The Impact of Stress
   - Definitions of Crisis
   Strategic Culture
   Civil-Military Relations
   - Militarism
   Decision-Making in Advisory Systems and Small Groups
   Intelligence Failure
   - Historical Cases
   Military Doctrine and Military Innovation
   Command and Control

   THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND WAR

12. SIGNALING, REPUTATION, RESOLVE, AND STATUS (Nov. 22)
   Signaling
   Reputation and Signaling: Formal Models
   Reputation: Empirical and Experimental Studies
   Reputation and Resolve
   - Audience Costs
   Status and War

13. THE ESCALATION AND EXPANSION OF CRISES AND WAR (Dec. 6)
   General Studies of Crisis Escalation
   Models of Entrapment
   Loss of Control and Inadvertent War
   - Crisis (Mis)management
   The Expansion (Spread) of War
   The Case if the First World War
   Duration of War
   - Implications of the Bargaining Model
   Psychological Perspectives and Debates

SOME ANALYTIC ISSUES
Methodological Issues: Quantitative
Methodological Issues: Qualitative
Future Directions in the Study of Interstate War
APPENDICIES

A-1 DATA SETS ON INTERSTATE WAR
   Since 1815
   Since 1945
   Since 1500 or Before

A-2 IS WAR DECLINING?

A-3 THE EVOLUTION OF WAR
   Biological, Primatological, and Evolutionary Perspectives
   Anthropological studies of the origins of war
   Archaeological Perspectives
   Historians’ Treatments
   The “Military Revolution” and the Rise of the State

A-4 THE NUCLEAR ERA
   Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Theory
   Nuclear Weapons and the Long Peace
   Empirical Studies of the Impact of Nuclear Weapons, I: Qualitative
   Empirical Studies of the Impact of Nuclear Weapons, II: Quantitative
   Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Bargaining
   Nuclear Proliferation

A-5 THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR

A-6 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE AND BARGAINING
   Classical Deterrence: Models and Critiques
   The Huth-Russett Research Program on Deterrence
   The Lebow/Stein Research Program on Deterrence
   Further Debates over Rational Deterrence Theory
   Deterrence and Selection Effects
   Alexander George’s Research Program on Force and Statecraft
   The Behavioral Correlates of War Research Program on Crisis Bargaining
   Other Studies of Deterrence and Bargaining

A-7 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY REGIMES
   Institutions and Peace
   Collective Security and Security Regimes
   Regional Security Systems

A-8 CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A-9 WAR TERMINATION

A-10 PEACEKEEPING

A-11 THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR
   Winners and Losers
   Economic Costs of War
   Human Costs of War

A-12 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, MIGRATION, & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
   Environmental Change, Scarcity, and Conflict
   Climate Change and War
   Water and War
   Demography, Security, and Conflict
   Refugees and Conflict

A-13 SECURITY ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

A-14 THEORIES OF JUST WAR
   Theological Perspectives
   Just War in the Nuclear Age
   Anticipatory Self-Defense

A-15 GENDER AND WAR
   Quantitative Empirical Studies
   Biological Perspectives

A-16 THE STUDY OF PEACE

ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES
Reviews of the International Relations Literature on the Causes of Interstate War
   Encyclopedias
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on War and Peace
   General
   Philosophy
   Anthropology
   Sociology
   Geography
   Economics
   Theories of Strategy
COURSE OUTLINE AND READING LIST

main number refers to week of the term;
letter indicates multiple topics each week;
* indicates required reading; the other reading is included for those doing papers on the
topic and for future reference;
for each week I recommend that you read in the order the items are listed here, not in the
alphabetical order on Courseworks.

1. COURSE INTRODUCTION (September 6)
Organizational meeting and theoretical introduction.
required reading (*) in sections 1 a, b, d

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, I

1a. What is War?

1b. The Clausewitzian Paradigm


“Clausewitz Special Section,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, 6-7 (2014).

1c. **Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?**


1d. **Trends in War**


1e. **The Levels-of-Analysis Framework**


2. **CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, II** (September 13)

Required reading in sections 2a, b, d, e

2a. **Evolutionary Approaches: What Do They Explain?**


+++ See more extended bibliography in Appendix A-3.
2b. **Typologies of War**


2c. **The Concept of Total War**


2d. **The Use of Force: Contemporary Clausewitzians**


2e. **Concepts of Causation**

3. **REALIST THEORIES OF WAR, I** (September 20)

Required readings in sections 3a-h

3a. **Varieties of Realist Theories**


3b. **The Security Dilemma and the Spiral Model**


3c. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Model, I – Single-Play

3d. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Model, I – Repeated-Play

3e. The Offensive/Defensive Balance

3f. Neorealist Theories of War

3g. Offensive Realism

3h. Defensive Realism


### 3i. Definition and Measurement of Military Power


3j. Military Effectiveness


4. **REALIST THEORIES, II** (September 27)

Required readings in sections 4a, b, e, f, g, o

4a. **Neoclassical Realism**


Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism.” *Security Studies* 17, 2 (2008), 294-321.


4b. **Classical Balance of Power Theories**


**Conceptual Ambiguities**


**Historians’ Perspectives**


**4c. Debates about Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and War**


**Quantitative Studies of Polarity and of Systemic Capability Concentration**


4d. **The Dyadic Power Parity Hypothesis**


See also week 5 on power transition theory.

4e. **Alliances and War**


**Debates over Balancing vs. Bandwagoning**


**Do Alliances Deter or Provoke War? Quantitative Studies**


**Formal Models of Alliances**


Alliance Data


Alliance Cohesion in Wartime


Domestic Sources of Alliances


4g. **What Do States Balance Against? Disaggregating Power**


See also defensive realism in week 3.

4h. **Balancing (or Not) in Non-Western Systems**


4i. **“Soft Balancing”**


4j. **Lateral Pressure Theory**


4k. **Asymmetric Conflicts**


ISSUES, TERRITORY, AND THE STEPS-TO-WAR MODEL

4l. Issues: What Do States Fight About?

4m. Issues Correlates of War Project (ICOW, Paul Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell)
http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html

4n. Territory and War


### Borders and Walls


### 4o. The Steps-to-War Model


5. **HEGEMONIC THEORIES** (October 4)
   Required readings in sections a-d, k, l, o

5a. **Power Transition Theory – The Organski et al Research Program**
5b. **Gilpin's Hegemonic Transition Theory**


**Historical Perspectives**


5c. **Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China**


5d. **Preventive War**

(Fits equally well under balance of power theory.)


**Formal Models of Preventive War**

See week 6 on the commitment problem
Historical Applications

Preventive Logic in the Nuclear Age

5e. Rising and Declining Powers
5f. **Long Cycle Theory (Thompson, Rasler, Models)**


5g. **Hegemonic War**


5h. **Other Theories of Hierarchy, Transition and War**


**Theories of Unipolar Politics**
“International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity.” Special issue, *World Politics*, 57, 2 (January 2009). Articles by Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth; Wohlforth; Finnemore; Walt; Masanduno; Snyder, Shapiro, Bloch-Elkon; Jervis.
Daniel J. Sargent, “Paz Americana: Sketches for an Undiplomatic History.” *Diplomatic History* 42, 3 (June 2018): 357-76.
5j. **David Kang’s Research Program on Hierarchy in Asia**


### RIVALRIES AND ARMS RACES

5k. **International Rivalries**

**Overview**


**The Diehl & Goertz Research Program**


The Thompson/Rasler/Colaresi Research Program
* William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics.”

Rivalry Termination

Other Approaches to Rivalry


+++ See also week 8 on “The Militarization of Commercial Rivalries”

5L. Arms Races and War


Historical Studies


Quantitative and Formal Approaches

6. **THE BARGAINING MODEL OF WAR** (October 11)
   Required reading in sections 6 a, b, c, h

6a. **Rational Choice Theories: Introduction**


6b. **The Bargaining Model of War**


6c. The Commitment Problem


6d. **Informational Problems**


+++ On the sources of misperception see week 10 on the Misperception and the Causes of War and on the Psychology of Threat Perception.

6e. **Issue indivisibility**


Ron E. Hassner, “To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility.” *Security Studies* 12, no. 4 (Summer 2003): 1–33.


6f. **Complications of Multilateral Bargaining**


6g. **Other Formal Models of Bargaining**


**Spatial Models**


**Behavioral Perspectives on the Bargaining Model of War**


7. **THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE** (October 18)
   Required reading in sections 7 a, b, e, f, g, m, o

7a. **Societal-Level Theories of War: Overviews**
   *

7b. **The Democratic Peace**
   *


### 7c. Quantitative Empirical Studies


**Monadic Level**


**System Level**


**7d. Critiques**


Forum, *American Political Science Review*, 99, 3 (August 2005), including


7e. **Domestic Oppositions and Signaling (Schultz)**


7f. **Alternative Models of Political Oppositions and Signaling**


7g. **Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al)**


7h. **War and the Survival of Political Leaders: Empirical Studies**


**The Capitalist Peace**

See week 8
7i. **The Territorial Peace**

7j. **Why Do Democracies Win Wars?**


7k. Other Implications of the Democratic Peace


Covert Action


A Democratic Civil Peace?

7l. **More on Democratic Accountability**

7m. **Democratization and War**
see also week 9 on the diversionary theory of war

7n. **Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies**


70. **Autocracies, War, and Peace**


Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144. (classification of authoritarian regimes)


8. **ECONOMIC THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE** (October 25)
Required reading in sections 8a, d, h, l, m

8a. **General Treatments**
8b. **Marxist-Leninist Theories**


**Alternative Theories of Imperialism**


8c. **Resources and War**


Jeffrey D. Colgan, “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War.” *International Security* 38, 2 (Fall 2013), pp. 147–180

8d. **Does Trade Promote Peace?**


8e. **Quantitative-Empirical Studies**


### 8f. The Globalization of Production


8g. **The Capitalist Peace**


8h. **The Contractual Peace**


8i. **The Impact of War on Trade**


8j. **The Militarization of Commercial Rivalries**


8k. **World War I and Economic Liberalism**

8l. **Financing War**


**Historical Perspectives**


**The First World War**


8m. Sectoral Interests and Coalitional Politics


8n. The Costs of Conflict

9. **SOCIETAL-LEVEL THEORIES**, continued (November 1)

Required reading in sections 9a, b, c, d, g, j, l

9a. **The Diversionary Theory of War**


**Social Identity Theory**


**Debates over Mechanisms**


Quantitative-Empirical Studies
Ross A. Miller, "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43, 3 (June 1999), 388-402.


Sung Chul Jung, “Foreign Targets and Diversionary Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, 3 (September 2014): 566-78.


**Formal Theoretical Approaches**


**Case Studies**


9b. **Leaders, Institutions, Political Survival, and War**

   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   Cathy Xuanxuan Wu and Scott Wolford, “Leaders, States, and Reputations,” 2087-2117.
   

+++ See also week 7 on the selectorate model.

9c. **Public Opinion and War**


Matthew A. Baum and Tim Groeling, “Reality asserts itself: Public opinion on Iraq and the elasticity of reality.” *International Organization* 64 (Summer 2010), 443–479.


9d. **Other Domestic Frameworks and Studies**


9e. **Revolution and War**


Jeff Colgan and Jessica Weeks, “Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International
IDEATIONAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES
(societal or system level)

9f. Ideas, Ideology, and War

9g. Culture and War


Mary L. Dudziak, “‘You didn’t see him lying…beside the gravel road in France’: Death, Distance, and American War Politics.” *Diplomatic History* 42, 1 (January 2018): 1-16.


+++ See week 11 on strategic culture.

9h. **Race and War**


9i. **Religion and War**


A Data Set

Historical Perspectives
The "Clash of Civilizations" (Huntington)


Attitudes toward War


### 91. Norms and War


Nina Tannenwald, “How Strong is the Nuclear Taboo Today?” *Washington Quarterly* 41:3 (November 2018).


**Experimental Studies**


9m. **The Law of War and Its Impact**


9n. **Paul W. Schroeder's Research Program on Ideas and Norms**


See also articles by H.M. Scott, Charles Ingrao, T.C.W. Blanning, and Paul W. Schroeder in this special issue of the journal on "Paul W. Schroeder's International System."
10. DECISION-MAKING: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, I (November 8)
Required reading in sections 10 a, b, e-g

10a. Overviews

10b. Do Leaders Matter?

10c. Backgrounds and Characteristics of Leaders
10d. **Beliefs and Images**

**Images of the Enemy**

10e. **Misperception and the Causes of War**
* Jack S. Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War." *World Politics* 36, 1 (October 1983): 76-99. (pp.76-93 only)


10f. **Psychology of Threat Perception**


Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable 7-19 (2015) on Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations.*

http://issforum.org/roundtables/7-19-knowing-the-adversary/


10g. **Emotions, Political Interests, Motivated Reasoning, and War**


Neurobiological Approaches


10h. Analogical Reasoning and Learning from History


11. DECISION-MAKING: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL, II (November 15)
Required reading in sections 11 a, e-j

11a. Prospect Theory Goes to War
* Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations."
Political Psychology, special issue, 25, 2 (April 2004), articles by McDermott, Jervis, Taliaferro, Kanner, Elms, Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott.
11b. **Time Horizons**

11c. **Other Psychological Models of Conflict**

11d. **Psychoanalytic Approaches**
11e. **Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Processes**


**Applications to the Causes of War**


11f. **Crisis Decision-making: The Impact of Stress**

(includes individual, group, and governmental levels)


Definitions of Crisis


11g. Strategic Culture


**11h. Civil-Military Relations**


Militarism


11i. Decision-Making in Advisory Systems and Small Groups


11j. **Intelligence Failure**


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**Historical Cases**


DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1551569

11k. Military Doctrine and Military Innovation

11l. Command and Control
THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND WAR

12. SIGNALING, REPUTATION, RESOLVE, & STATUS (November 29)
required reading in sections 12 a, b, e, f
+++ recall Schultz from week 7

12a. Signaling


12b. **Reputation and Signaling: Formal Models**


12c. **Reputation: Empirical and Experimental Studies**

12d. **Reputation and Resolve**
12e. **Audience Costs**


  - Kenneth A. Schultz, “Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now,” 369-75.


Brandon J Kinne and Nikolay Marinov, “Electoral Authoritarianism and Credible Signaling in International Crises.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57, 3 (June 2013): 359-86.


**12f. Status and War**


13. CRISIS ESCALATION AND THE EXPANSION OF WAR
(December 6)
Required readings in sections 13 c, d, e

13a. General Studies of Crisis Escalation

13b. Models of Entrapment
+++ see also week 11 on prospect theory

13c. Loss of Control and Inadvertent War
Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen." International Security 20, 2 (Fall 1995): 5-34
13d. The Expansion (Spread) of War

13e. The Case of the First World War
13f. Duration of war

Implications of the Bargaining Model

Psychological Perspectives and Debates
Dan Reiter, “Unifying the Study of the Causes and Duration of Wars, 168–77.
Alex Weisiger, “Rationality and the Limits of Psychology in Explaining Interstate War Duration,” 215–24
Alex Weisiger, “Conclusion to the Symposium on War Duration”
SOME ANALYTIC ISSUES

13g. Methodological Issues: Quantitative
Philip A Schrodt, “Seven deadly sins of contemporary quantitative political analysis.”
“Dyadic Research Designs in International Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 60, 2 (June 2016), including

13h. Methodological Issues: Qualitative
13i. **Future Directions in the Study of Interstate War**


ADDITIONAL TOPICS

Many of the following are viable topics for papers. Check with me.

A-1 DATA SETS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICT/WAR

Since 1945


Since 1815
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs


Since 1500 or before


### A-2 IS WAR DECLINING?


**A-3 THE EVOLUTION OF WAR**

**Biological, Primatological, and Evolutionary Perspectives**


**Anthropological studies of the origins of war**


Archaeological Perspectives

Historians’ Treatments

**The “Military Revolution” and the Rise of the State**


A-4 THE NUCLEAR ERA

Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Theory

Nuclear Weapons and the "Long Peace"

Empirical Studies of the Impact of Nuclear Weapons, I: Qualitative
Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 10 (Summer 1985):
Empirical Studies of Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence, II: Quantitative
Jesse C Johnson and Stephen Joiner, “Power changes, alliance credibility, and extended deterrence.” Conflict Management and Peace Science online 3/7/19, doi.org/10.1177/0738894218824735

Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Bargaining


**Nuclear Proliferation**


Nina Tannenwald, “Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” *Ethics and International Affairs* (Fall 2013).


A-5  THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE (needs updating)
Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Calvary to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions."
*The National Interest* (Fall 1994): 30-42.

A-6  THEORIES OF DETERRENCE AND BARGAINING

**Classical Deterrence: Models and Critiques**


### The Huth-Russett Research Program on Deterrence


### The Lebow/Stein Research Program on Deterrence


**Debates over Rational Deterrence Theory**
  Includes
  - Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," 143-69.
  - Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," 170-82.

**Deterrence and Selection Effects**

**Alexander George's Research Program on Force and Statecraft**


**The Behavioral Correlates of War Research Program (BCOW) on Crisis Bargaining**


**Other Studies of Deterrence and Bargaining**


A-7  INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY REGIMES

Institutions and Peace

Collective Security and Security Regimes

Regional Security Systems


**A-8. CONFLICT RESOLUTION**


A-9 WAR TERMINATION
See also week 6 on the bargaining model and war termination

A-10 PEACEKEEPING (includes civil wars)

A-11 THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

**Winners and Losers**

**Economic Costs of War**

**Human Costs of War**
A-12 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, MIGRATION, & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Environmental Change, Scarcity, and Conflict
on scarcity see also week 4 on lateral pressure theory

Climate Change and War
Water and War

Demography, Security, and Conflict

Refugees and Conflict


A-13 SECURITY ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD


A-14. THEORIES OF JUST WAR


**Theological Perspectives**


Just War in the Nuclear Age

Anticipatory Self-Defense

A-15 GENDER AND WAR


**Quantitative Empirical Studies**


**Biological Perspectives**

Rose McDermott, “Sex and Death: Gender Differences in Aggressions and Motivations for Violence.” *International Organization* 69, 3 (Summer 2015), 753-775.

+++ see the syllabus collection at the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights: [http://genderandsecurity.org/projects-resources/syllabus-collection](http://genderandsecurity.org/projects-resources/syllabus-collection)
A-16 THE STUDY OF PEACE
ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Reviews of the International Relations literature on the causes of interstate war:

Encyclopedias:
The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. by Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett, at http://www.isanet.org/Publications
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON WAR

General

Philosophy
+++ See also earlier section on just war.


### Anthropology

+++ See also the earlier section on “Anthropological studies of the origins of war.”


### Sociology


### Geography


Economics

THEORIES OF STRATEGY