of power, favoring the focal state to the right of 1 or the target to the left, is represented at equal intervals from 1.

11. Others assess the balance of power using the focal state’s share of the sum of its capabilities and the capabilities of the target. Substituting this measure for the logarithm of the capability ratio has very little effect on the results; initiation is most likely when power is evenly distributed between the members of the dyad.

CHAPTER 5

DEMOCRACY AND THE RENEWAL OF CIVIL WAR

Roy Licklider

The international relations research on democratic peace has focused on the outbreak of interstate wars. There has also been some similar work in comparative politics on the outbreak of internal wars. A third comparative politics literature deals with the question of whether it is possible to establish a democratic government after an internal war. However, there has been less work on whether, after an internal war, a postwar democratic government makes renewed civil war less likely. In fact, this is the issue that has the most policy relevance; it is precisely in postwar situations that outsiders have a chance to actually influence the type of government that emerges. The consensus seems to be that democratic governments will make renewed civil war less likely. This in turn is one of the major justifications for the current costly and risky strategy of trying to establish democracies in states that lack any of the conventional preconditions for democracy and where it would obviously be easier to simply select an authoritarian leader.

However, in fact there is less consensus than meets the eye. People on the ground are often highly dubious both about the prospects for establishing democracies and the likely effects of doing so; we are looking exclusively at the latter question in this chapter. There is some feeling that the pro-democracy policy is being driven by Wilsonian ideology rather than reality. We need to establish whether the democratic peace theory applies to the renewal of civil wars. If it is not, democratization may not be a worthwhile goal in such cases.
The obvious initial response to this sort of question would be a large-N study. Two such studies have been carried out. Although they use somewhat different methods and the analysis is not yet complete, they both tentatively find a negative correlation between postwar democracy and civil war renewal in the post-1945 period (Dubey 2002; Mukherjee 2004). The two studies used similar variables and databases. Their cases came from the dataset of Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) of civil wars from 1945 to 2000. Their causal variables included democracy and presidential, mixed or parliamentary system, which were taken from the ACLP database (Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003); proportional representation/ majoritarian measures taken from other sources (Kurian 1998; Derbyshire and Derbyshire 2000); executive constraints taken from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers); several powersharing variables from Barbara Walter's Civil War Resolution Data Set (Walter 2002); and data on international interventions from Doyle and Sambanis. Control variables included intensity of human cost, type of war, peace treaty/informal truce, powersharing agreement (political, military, territorial), size of government forces, ethnic heterogeneity, natural resource dependency, and development. Their dependent variable was the length of time between a settlement and a renewed civil war, if any (a considerable advance over earlier work, including my own, which had dichotomized this variable into success and failure, usually at the five-year mark).

Dubey used a Cox proportional hazards model to reduce the effects of two problems: the dependent variable may not be normally distributed, and "right-censoring," the fact that we do not know the end of a peace process that has not yet broken down but may do so in the future. Mukherjee used a parametric Weibull duration model, which he suggests has certain statistical advantages over Cox and is a better fit to the data. He also employed some sophisticated techniques to check for collinearity and endogeneity. Both analyses concluded that democracy was related to longer peace. At a fairly basic level, Dubey noted that only 14 percent of the democracies had reverted to civil wars as opposed to 48 percent of the nondemocracies. In more sophisticated analysis, he found that democracy reduced the likelihood of failure of peace by 74 percent; Mukherjee's comparable figure was 34 percent, and both were highly significant. They also found that proportional representation regimes increased the length of time of peace more than presidential and majoritarian parliamentary regimes. Dubey also found that democracies with constrained executives are linked to longer periods of peace than democracies that are not. It is interesting to note that they both also found that powersharing without democracy did not extend the period of peace and that third-party intervention had no significant impact.

Nonetheless, like most large-N studies, they do not establish the mechanisms that connect the independent and dependent variables, and without such linkages we have difficulty explaining the findings in a way that is persuasive to skeptics or sorting out conditions under which the effects are more or less likely to be observed. They also cannot refute the argument that some prior variable accounts for the relationship, making it spurious.

This analysis focuses on the intervening variables to try to sort out whether these results were due to democracy or not and, if so, which of the several different theoretical explanations of this linkage is more persuasive.

The strategy is to (1) specify several different possible explanations why postsettlement democracy might make renewed civil war less likely, (2) specify for each different explanation a set of hypotheses about how it would predict the way people and institutions will behave in democratic and nondemocratic postsettlement states, (3) select several cases of postsettlement democracy from the data used by Dubey and Mukherjee, and (4) use process tracing to determine which, if any, of the theorized processes were actually present in these cases and whether they actually had the expected effects. The strategy does not assume that a single dominant process will appear in all cases; indeed one of the objects is to see whether there are different paths to similar outcomes and, if so, when each is more likely to occur. It thus links international relations and comparative politics by looking at the impact of democracy on renewed civil wars and uses qualitative methods to refine and develop the results of quantitative analyses.

Clearly the method hinges on process tracing, a term that has been used in many ways. Ideally it would mean first developing a set of theories that would specify the processes and mechanisms that would connect the independent to the dependent variables and the sequence in which they would occur, that is what kind of behavior by what sorts of people would vary at what particular times. So far this looks like a mathematical model, and indeed there is no reason, other than my own inadequacies, why it should not be. However, unlike the claims of many modelers, this method assumes that the linkages specified are real and that, if they are not, the theory is weakened. (For a good discussion of this issue, see Ray 1995, 131-157.)

However, I cannot specify the sequences of variables in many cases. Instead of a causal chain, we have causal clusters, which are groups of things that the theory predicts will be happen in order to cause the result. I have attempted to divide them into sequences of clusters to suggest some causal activity. The "testing" of the different theories involves seeing if some or
all of these predicted changes happened in the kinds of cases which that particular theory predicts and whether they are plausibly connected to the outcome. Note that the hypotheses are probabilistic rather than absolute so we are more concerned with patterns across cases than any individual example.

Theory: Why Might Postsettlement Democracy Reduce the Likelihood of Renewed Civil War?

What particular qualities of democracy are expected to influence what sort of people to behave in what sorts of ways? The definition of democracy is contested on at least three dimensions: what societal issue areas are subject to some sort of popular control (often framed as economic vs. political questions), what sort of individual and collective rights must be widespread aside from some sort of election, and how long does the system have to be in place before having the hypothesized impact on behavior (the democracy/democratization debate). The role of democracy in reducing the likelihood of interstate war (the “democratic peace” issue) has been the subject of considerable analysis, including contributions in this volume. There appears to be a fairly solid correlation between the variables, but there is no single widely accepted theoretical explanation for this relationship on which we can draw. Similarly, when looking at the relationship between postsettlement democracy and renewed civil war, we do not have a single theoretical argument for a relationship; instead there are fragments of several different and possibly contradictory arguments. Thus, rather than looking for a single set of variables linked by good theory, it makes more sense to specify several different ones. The research thus has two objectives—to see whether any set of processes and mechanisms linked to theories of democracy explain the absence of renewed civil war and, if so, to see which theory or combination does the best job.

One advantage of this technique is that, while we try to sort out the utility of separate explanations, it is not necessary to think of them as necessarily opposed to one another (Most and Starr 1989; Russett and Oneal 2001, 53–54). We may be able to isolate particular elements of different explanations that seem to work and how elements from different theories work together in particular cases. Nonetheless, I attempted to develop hypotheses that were different for each of the explanations; ideally they would be certain and unique (Van Evera 1997, 30–35).

1. One argument is that democracy gives leaders of competing factions incentives to organize themselves differently from how they did during the civil war. In war, relatively small groups with deep levels of commitment and access to weapons can succeed in gaining considerable influence for their leaders; indeed in two of our cases the actual numbers of people engaged in violent activities is fairly small. Democracy, however, rewards leaders who can assemble large coalitions that need not be intensely cohesive and may shift over time on different issues. “Effective governance in a democracy requires leaders to attend to a wide range of societal interests” (Russett and Oneal 2001, 70). We can call this the elite incentive theory according to which democracies will make civil war less likely by giving formerly competing participants incentives to cooperate with one another and, if successful, be successful in influencing the government, either now or in the future. This in turn is expected to make the factions less willing to break the settlement terms when the government inevitably does something that they dislike. This process focuses on elites within the society.

If this is true, the following things should be observed in democratic postsettlement governments:

1a: Elites and populations will increasingly believe guarantees of political freedom and access. Therefore the following:

1b1: Factions are more likely to believe that they can influence government decisions.

1b2: Old coalitions, organized for the war, break up; the new ones are larger and include members from different sides of the previous civil war.

1b3: Competition becomes less intense since even losers believe they may be more successful in the future. Political becomes less of a zero-sum game.

1b4: Groups working outside the system increasingly get less public support. Thus:

1c: New challengers are brought into the political system and given a stake because of shifting coalitions.

This argument is distinctive to civil wars. Another obvious source of explanations is the democratic peace literature in international relations. In fact, however, the fit is not very good. The strongest finding of this literature is that democratic states seldom go to war with one another. It’s not entirely clear how to translate this finding into renewal of civil wars; presumably the argument would be that if both the government and the potential opponent were democratic, renewed civil war would be less likely than if one or both were nondemocratic. This would require identifying every faction in every country that might provoke a civil war and then classifying each as to its degree of democracy, a task well beyond this study. Thus any application of democratic peace theories is likely to be
somewhat indirect. Moreover, as a recent major study cactus points out, “there is as yet no consensus on why liberal democracies have not gone to war with one another” (Bennett and Stam 2003, 208).

Nonetheless, the two major theoretical approaches to the democratic peace, cultures/norms and structures/institutions, each offer some ideas that can be adapted for civil war renewal. At one level, of course, the division is artificial; presumably institutions flow from and influence societal norms and culture (Russett and Oneal 2001, 53–59). This is particularly true in established democracies. In post–civil war societies, on the other hand, the two are less likely to go hand in hand. In many of these cases the prewar government was not democratic, and in any case the war had probably significantly reduced agreement on democratic norms for resolving political disputes. Indeed one of the central questions of state-building is precisely how much weight institutions can have in creating democracy in societies where democratic norms are less than universal.

2. The *culture and norms* argument is that democracies have “norms of bounded political competition and peaceful resolution of disputes” (Levy 2002, 359). This argument should be particularly strong in civil wars in which all of the factions have presumably shared a common culture before the war at least to some extent. If this is true, the following things are more likely to occur in democratic than nondemocratic postsettlement governments; the stress here is on beliefs and behavior widely shared within the populations.

2a1: Elites and publics should oppose the use of violence to resolve political disputes.
2a2: Society should encourage and support individuals and groups with connections across competing factions. Therefore, the following:
2b1: Media will support individuals and groups advocating negotiation and compromise.
2b2: Societal discourse should stress unity rather than historic divisions.
2b3: Violence during the previous civil war should not be glorified. Therefore the following:
2c1: Successful political strategies should stress conciliation rather than coercion.
2c2: Costly compromises should be accepted by publics and elites.
2c3: There should be considerable support for measures of transitional justice applied equitably to both sides, especially as regards individuals.
2c4: Leaders responsive to the public will be less likely to support war than those who are not.

3. The *institutional constraints* argument is that divided power and open societies, including a free press, make it difficult for governments to resort to war. The argument has been further developed by game theoretic methods “Leaders of democracies typically experience high political costs from fighting wars—always from losing them, and often despite winning them” (Russett and Oneal 2001, 54). The plausibility of this approach is heightened by the fact that Dubey (2002, 23–24) found that democracies whose executives were constrained had longer periods of postwar peace than those whose executives were unconstrained.

I have included at least two interesting ideas stemming from this approach. The first is the game theoretic work that is based on the assumption that democracies require large winning coalitions that can only be held together by successful public policies, as opposed to nondemocracies that require smaller coalitions that can be obtained by private goods. Thus democratic leaders who engage in war run higher personal risks than nondemocratic leaders and are less likely to do so (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003). The second is Kenneth Schultz’s argument (1998) that democracies are more transparent, because of a free press and especially competing parties, reducing the role of misperception that some analysts see as a major contributor to war (see also Starr, chapter 6, this volume).

As a result they are less likely to enter a war because of poor information, and their opponents should have a more realistic idea of what the government’s response is likely to be. Moreover, since democratic leaders realize that they cannot really bluff successfully, they are more likely to settle conflicts that they feel they cannot win than their nondemocratic counterparts.

If this is true, leaders in democratic postsettlement governments are likely to behave in the following ways:

3a1: Decision making will be more transparent to the media and the public.
3a2: The media and the public are more likely to oppose a resort to civil war.
3a3: Leaders on both sides will have a more realistic understanding of the probable consequences of civil war.
3a4: Leaders on both sides are less likely to misjudge intentions of their opponents. Therefore the following:
3b1: Leaders with warlike constituencies are more likely to be less warlike than their followers.
3b2: Top government leaders who desire renewed civil war will be constrained by other individuals and institutions within government.
3b3: Leaders believe that if they go to renewed civil war they will suffer politically if they lose.
Leaders are likely to support negotiation and compromises, even those that are politically costly. Therefore the following:

3c: Leaders in democracies whose executives are relatively constrained will be less likely to renew civil war than those in democracies with relatively unconstrained executives.

3d: However, leaders whose public policies have failed are more likely to resort to civil war in order to redeem themselves (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 803–804).

This gives us about 30 hypotheses to test on our cases. We are actually looking for two quite different things when using these ideas—we want to know (1) whether this did happen in the particular case and, (2) if so, is it plausible to attribute much causal weight to this process in avoiding renewed civil war? Obviously the latter judgment is much more difficult to defend.

**Case Selection**

What cases should we use? At one level the choice is simple—states whose civil wars have ended, that have a democratic government, and whose wars have not resumed. In fact the issue is a little more complicated. Since this is a theory-building exercise, I decided to look at cases in which democracy was in effect immediately after the civil wars; the processes associated with democracy should be easiest to observe and have the most impact here. Dubey’s data uses two different measures of democracy, Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers) and ACLP (Przeworski et al. 2000). He lists only four cases in which governments which were both (1) 9 or 10 on the polity scale (which runs from +10 for most democratic to -10 for least democratic) and (2) “democratic” on the dichotomous variable in the ACLP data had civil wars that had not been renewed until his cutoff date of 2000: South Africa 1994, Cyprus 1974, Northern Ireland 1994, and Israel–Palestine 1993. To these I added India–partition (coded democratic for 25 years afterward, which should have been long enough to observe its effects) and India–Sikh (coded as 8 from 1994–1995, 9 thereafter by Polity IV but democratic for both periods by ACLP), which is very close to the cutoff point. Of these six I then deleted Israel–Palestine 1993 because we know that it broke down after Dubey’s 2000 data cutoff. I also deleted India–partition and Cyprus because they were two of the very few cases in which civil war resulted in separation; “renewal of the civil war” thus would mean either the foreign policy issue of violence with another state (albeit unrecognized in Cyprus) or relations with the very small number of Turks remaining in Greek Cyprus and the larger number of Moslems in India who were so few in number that they were unable to resort to civil war had they desired to do so. This left me with three cases: India–Sikh, South Africa, and Northern Ireland.

The cases are certainly varied. The outcome of India–Sikh is usually classified as a government military victory; South Africa and Northern Ireland are both negotiated settlements. The magnitude of the violence is very different; estimates of total numbers of civilian and military deaths are 100,000 for South Africa, 25,000 for India–Sikh, and 3,200 for Northern Ireland (indeed Northern Ireland does not qualify as a civil war in many datasets, including my older one). All would probably be classified as ethnic rather than political-economic conflicts. The goals of the rebels are secession for India–Sikh, revolution in South Africa, and I guess irredentist in Northern Ireland, which is certainly unusual. They are definitely not representative of the post-1945 civil wars, although that is immaterial for our present purpose of theory-building about a particular subset of those wars.

**Cases**

**India–Sikhs**

The Sikhs are a religious group that believes in a common ancestry, although the distinction between Hindu and Sikh has traditionally been quite vague (Madan 1998, 977); roughly half of them live in the Punjab area of India. The example of the Moslem state of Pakistan, along with a sense of discrimination by the Indian government, encouraged separatism; this is an example of a wealthy area seeking secession. (A good summary of different explanations is Singh 1987; cf. Brass 1988; Nandi 1996; and Chima 2002.) In the 1980s militants escalated to organized terrorism, using the Sikh Golden Temple complex at Amritsar as a sanctuary from the Indian authorities. In 1984, the Indian Army attacked the temple, after getting permission from moderate Sikh politicians (Chima 2002, 29). The fierce fighting outraged Sikhs everywhere. The then Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards. The violence increased to its high point in 1991–1992; by 1993 it had virtually ended with the defeat of the major militant Sikh groups and the deaths of many of their prominent leaders, with an overall death count of almost 25,000 (Singh 1996, 41).

1. **Elite incentive model:** In 1992, at the height of war, elections for the provincial government were held. Many Sikhs boycotted these elections, and, with the help of “massive rigging” (Grewal 1998, 237), a minority of
the voters elected a provincial government that waged a brutal and successful struggle against the Sikh militants (Singh 1987, 414). However, within a year after the violence subsided, “the Sikhs generally expressed a clear preference for electoral politics through local body elections, and normally began to be restored after a decade of unrest” (Madan 1998, 981; cf. Grewal 1998, 238). By 1997, the mainstream Akali Dal Party, in an “odd couple” alliance with the nationalist Hindu BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), swept the provincial elections. Bringing Sikh politicians back into the Indian political system so quickly probably strengthened moderates. It also may have contributed to their high level of fractionalism; by 2001 there were five separate Akali parties, all competing for moderate votes; “no overtly radical or communal Akali leader can do well in electoral politics in Punjab” (Chima 2002, 32).

Nor was this merely nominal participation. By the end of the Sikh civil war, the Congress Party and the BJP competed for influence in India. Coalition governments with regional political parties became normal, giving the regions much more autonomy. Thus Sikh politicians could ally with BJP, despite its Hindu nationalism, on the understanding that it would not impose its ideals on Punjab (Chima 2002, 29–30). This made renewed civil war less likely, confirming the elite incentives model. However, this was not an inevitable result of democracy but the unexpected result of national power shifts. Indeed Chima (2002, 30) suggests that if either Congress Party or the BJP became strong enough to rule by themselves, overtly radical or communal Akali leader can do well in electoral politics in Punjab” (Chima 2002, 32).

2. The cultural model: This model, on the other hand, doesn’t seem to have applied. The government repression is remembered with bitterness by many Sikhs, while the general Indian public approved the use of force during the war, although most of the details were kept secret (Nandi 1996, 186). Concessions to the Sikhs were mostly those that did not cost much money, and a number of issues that had been raised as early as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 remained unsettled (Nandi 1996, 188). Nothing has been done to reveal covert government operations, much less punish anyone for violations of human rights. One possible argument in favor of the cultural model is the quick collapse of Sikh rebellion after the death of a relatively small number of prominent leaders in 1992–1993, suggesting that there was never much of a mass basis for secession in the first place, that many people really wanted some sort of recognition, regional autonomy, and cultural protection (Gupta 1996, 86–89). This might be seen as a product of a culture encouraged by political democracy before the war, but it has no obvious links to postsettlement government.

3. The institutional model: This model has a mixed record. The major decisions about using violence during the war were made by Indian politicians who had been selected by democratic processes, not the military or other specialists in violence (Madan 1998, 980), reflecting the very high degree of civilian control of the Indian armed forces. However, after the war Indian leaders and Sikh political moderates tried to restrain their constituents and avoid a resumption of violence. (Pureswal 2000, 165).

In the India-Sikh case the elite incentives model seems to have been at work; that is, appropriate things seem to have happened. It may also be an explanation for why the Sikh revolt ended so quickly. It thus seems to have had some real impact on the outcome.

South Africa

In South Africa the African National Congress (ANC) eventually led the challenge to apartheid, in alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the South African Community Party, and South African National Civic Organization. The struggle escalated to violence and ended with a negotiated transition to majoritarian political democracy. Both the ANC and the white government and army saw that they were at stalemate, that neither side could win and that continued violence would undermine South Africa as a whole. Violence continued during the negotiations (Marx 1998, 211; Höglund 2004, 121–152). The result was an elite pact to create a powersharing government for five years; elections would be held in 1994, and any party that got more than 5 percent would be represented in government. In the resulting Government of National Unity, the ANC shared power with the National Party (former governing party) and the Inuka Freedom Party. The National Party eventually withdrew from the coalition to fight the 1999 election, which resulted in another major victory for the ANC.

1. Elite incentives model: The guarantees of political freedom seem to have been widely enforced and used by individuals and groups on all sides of the conflict. Certainly different groups were given access to government with the creation of a “new class” of blacks in official and, to a lesser extent, business positions. Black elites seem to believe that they can influence government decisions, although this is much less true of black masses. Fewer people do seem to feel excluded from the political system. New coalitions have been formed on all sorts of issues, although the basic party
breakdown is still largely along racial lines. While the degree of political competition does seem to have become less intense, this doesn’t seem to be because losers believe they can be winners, since there is no effective check on the power of the ANC. It is a little early to see whether new challengers can be brought into the system, but the Inkatha example suggests that it is possible. In general the elite incentives model seems to be operative.

2. The cultural model: This model is presumably operating under a handicap here; multiracial democracy is so recent that it seems unlikely to have had much effect on culture. I look at two aspects of culture: mass attitudes toward tolerance and elite political behavior and discourse. Tolerance seems rather low, as might be expected in a transitional state, which makes the remarkably consensual South African political culture all the more surprising.

James Gibson and Amanda Gouws (2002) argue that popular tolerance is particularly important in South Africa, given its appalling history, the role of mass mobilization in bringing about change, and the weakness of contemporary institutions. In 1996, relatively early in the transition process, they found that South Africans in general were less tolerant than people in the United States and Great Britain and established democracies, but more tolerant than Russia, another country in political transition (Gibson and Gouws 2002, 12-38, 56-67). The level of intolerance did not change significantly from 1996 to 2001 (Gibson 2004, 234-235). A contradictory study showed that the level of tolerance among South Africans for one another increased significantly from 1994 to 1998. The increase was particularly strong among blacks, possibly reflecting their new dominance of the political system, but it was also visible among whites. On the other hand, trust in governmental institutions declined somewhat over the same period because of declining trust in their ability to guarantee human rights (Garcia-Riovero et al. 2002).

Regardless of mass attitudes, there has been remarkably little violence between the races after the settlement. Moreover, the concept of liberal democracy quickly dominated political discourse, greatly reducing divisive arguments about redistribution of wealth and control of production and creating a remarkably calm political culture. This is particularly interesting since much more radical ideas had been voiced within the ANC during the long struggle against apartheid. This apparent consensus has greatly reduced possible conflicts, at least among national elites, although it obscures a lack of change in both local townships (Zuern 2001) and rural areas (Gibson 2001, 69-70). There has been considerable debate as to the source of this agreement.

One line of thought is that it is the result of largely external factors, in particular the extensive support by Western governments, corporations, and NGOs to advocates of liberal democracy during the transition period, using the instruments of civic society to preach the need for tolerance and, by implication, avoiding large-scale economic and social change. Estimates of foreign support for these efforts range from $500 million to $700 million from 1986 to 1994 (Davis 1997; Hearn 1999, 7, 2000, 817, 820; Taylor 2002, 41). It was a great deal of money, creating and supporting what Taylor calls a “change industry” and a “transitarians.” Much of the discussion focused on “scenarios,” often on the likely impact of different political futures on South Africa’s role in the global marketplace. People with very different views of this effort suggest that it had a major impact on political discourse by delegitimizing discussion of major change (Hearn 2000; Taylor 2002, Galer 2004).

An alternate second explanation is that the low level of postwar violence involves shared interests of domestic elites.

[We] must avoid the reductionist tendency to see this process simply as a manufactured conspiracy. The process is more accurately depicted as a complex convergence of interests between the established political elites, domestic and transnational capital, and crucially, aspiring elites espousing, initially perhaps, an alternate vision for the country. (Taylor 2002, 36)

A broader view is that the transition is ongoing and creates a situation in which long-range change becomes more possible, although not guaranteed (Judson 2001, 75). David Dickinson argues that in the long run government policies are less important than the fact that people of different backgrounds are now “rubbing together” in different ways. As a result of changes in the system, a substantial, although still quite small, number of nonwhites have moved to higher economic positions, which in turn mean that they find themselves mediating between the different sides of a very polarized society. He notes two “changing agents of change” in particular: nonwhite workers who have been promoted to supervisory capacities and his nonwhite MBA students (Dickinson 2002, 19). This argument is strengthened by James Gibson’s finding that increased contact outside of work with people of different races substantially increases racial reconciliation, although such contact remains quite rare among blacks (Gibson 2004, 135-142).

South Africa has been a leader in transitional justice with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Indeed, it became a model of this new institution, which has become more popular as civil wars are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than victory for one side. Any negotiated settlement is likely to require amnesty for the signatories; otherwise they are unlikely to sign. But many people are dissatisfied with having
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with violence (Gibson and Gouws 2002, 25). However, it's not clear that pleaded for their followers to be tolerant and not to respond to violence. There is certainly evidence that many leaders, particularly Mandela, have racial attitudes.

the electorate voted for the ANC; in 1999, 66 percent did so. It is hard to see how this will change much. The ANC continues to wear the mantle of liberation party for many Africans, and polls do not suggest substantial opposition, even given major problems in unemployment and the economy.

The South African TRC was unusual in several respects. Its mandate was elaborate and sophisticated, its powers of search were considerable, its budget was large, it was designed to run for several years, it featured public testimony by victims, and it was led by Bishop Desmond Tutu, a prominent African religious and political leader. The TRC's actions were widely publicized. Stories appeared in papers all over the country every day, four hours of hearings were broadcast daily over radio, and a television program on Sunday was the most-watched news program in the country. About 21,000 victims and witnesses were interviewed, 2,000 of them in public. It investigated acts by both the government and the rebels (Hayner 2001, 42; Villa-Vicencio 2003, 240–244).

In a major study of the impact of the TRC on opinion and racial reconciliation, James Gibson concluded that a substantial number of whites changed their opinion of what had happened and became more sympathetic toward Africans. Interestingly, African attitudes toward whites were not affected by whether they believed the “truth” of the TRC (Gibson 2004). On balance, then, it seems to have had some positive impact on racial attitudes.

3. The institutional model: This model has some purchase but not much. There is certainly evidence that many leaders, particularly Mandela, have pleaded for their followers to be tolerant and not to respond to violence with violence (Gibson and Gouws 2002, 25). However, it’s not clear that this is driven by institutional pressure; indeed such pressure seems to be minimal and decreasing.

The central fact of the South African national political scene is that the ANC is totally dominant and is likely to remain so. In 1994, 62 percent of the electorate voted for the ANC; in 1999, 66 percent did so. It is hard to see how this will change much. The ANC continues to wear the mantle of liberation party for many Africans, and polls do not suggest substantial opposition, even given major problems in unemployment and the economy.

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Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland is the result of the partition of Ireland after World War I. The Protestant majority has effectively dominated the minority Catholic population, using the Westminster political system in the same way that the ANC seems to be doing in South Africa. Violence flared in 1969 and continued intermittently for decades, although with relatively few casualties.
In 1972 Britain re instituted direct rule over the province. The 1973 Sunningdale Agreement established a short-lived local powersharing government. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 established that Britain had primary responsibility for security in Northern Ireland but that the Republic of Ireland would have a consultative role, putting both governments in conflict with their supposed supporters (Morrow 1999, 123–124). In 1994, the PIRA and the loyalist paramilitaries called cease-fires, and negotiations began.

In 1998, the Good Friday agreements, sometimes called “Sunningdale for slow learners” (Tonge 2000, 39), set up a powersharing, consociational government structure with complex checks and balances. Essentially it called on paramilitaries on both sides to disarm (“decommission”) on a schedule linked to British reforms of the justice system and policing as well as implementing new human rights provisions. The agreement was ratified by a referendum in 1999. In 2002, Unionist party members withdrew from the Assembly because they felt disarmament was not being carried out, forcing its suspension for the fourth time in as many years. In elections in 2003, Sinn Fein, the party linked to the PIRA, overtook the Social Democratic Labor Party, formerly the largest nationalist party, which some believe was the consequence of “significant decommissioning by the IRA” (McGarry and O’Leary 2004, 215). The sectarian parties on both sides got 80–90 percent of the vote, and the two largest parties were the two extreme unionist and nationalist ones, making it the most polarized election in recent history (Hazleton 2004, 229) and making it impossible for the Assembly to operate. Despite this gridlock, large-scale violence has not yet broken out again, and the process continues.

The Loyalist parties that signed the agreement have been seriously weakened politically. The paramilitaries have no chance of getting ministerial positions, so they have no real incentive to disarm. Trimble signed the agreement, but his party is deeply divided, and he often has refused to implement it. “(O)n balance, both policing and justice reforms look primed to fulfill the promise of the Agreement” (McGarry and O’Leary 2004, 217), but it’s unclear that political leaders in Britain and Northern Ireland are prepared to institute them.

1. Elite incentives model: Certainly the prestige of the PIRA has increased. From terrorists its leaders have become routine participants in high-level negotiations, often with international figures like Senator George Mitchell or President Clinton. Formed in 1970 to oppose the parent organization’s decision to participate in elections, it now sends members to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The powersharing arrangements promise to give Catholics more access to power, but they have not yet been put into effect, mostly because the Unionists demand that the PIRA disarm first. (Decommissioning is something of a phony issue; it can’t be verified, since no one knows how many weapons the PIRA has, and even if it could it wouldn’t prevent rearmament (Wolff 2002, 113).) Perhaps because of the uncertainty, the extremist parties (DUP for the Unionists and Sinn Fein for the Republicans) did very well in the last election. There is little evidence of coalitions reaching across old divisions, and new challengers have not yet been brought into the system. It’s not clear that the Republicans actually have any more impact on policy than they did before because the governing institutions haven’t worked. On balance the elite incentives model doesn’t seem to work well here.

2. Cultural model: There are at least two different cultures to be considered, that of Northern Ireland and that of Great Britain itself. Certainly British political culture has shaped the dispute in many ways, mostly by taking certain options off the table. For the past 30 years British governments have insisted that the old system of Unionist dominance must change and be replaced with some form of powersharing; a simple majoritarian system is simply unacceptable. Second, the use of military force, although always controversial, has been significantly limited, as a quick comparison with Chechnya or Iraq will suggest. Most interestingly, the British were able to strike a deal with the Irish government, bringing it into the process; indeed Britain has historically said that it would leave Northern Ireland if a majority of its residents requested it (Tonge 2000, 40–42).

Within Northern Ireland itself, political violence increased after 2001. However, it seemed to be becoming less legitimate; the murder of a Catholic postal worker was widely condemned and resulted in rallies against violence attended by thousands of people, and the violence around the Holy Cross Girls School in Belfast did not spread, as it often had before. This suggests a potentially important change in the political culture (Wolff 2002, 104; cf. Cox 1999, 66). The British have released a significant number of prisoners, but there has been no move toward transitional justice (Lundy and McGovern 2001, 29–33).

3. Institutional model: As noted above, a new set of institutions has been instituted in Northern Ireland to make renewed violence less likely. However, so far they have not gone into operation. In the meantime, the paramilitary groups are outside of government, and they seem largely unaffected by institutions. To the extent that the British government is an active combatant (a highly debated point), the institutions of British intelligence are not at all transparent. More moderate political Loyalist leaders like John Trimble who have to face reelection periodically have recently suffered electoral setbacks, in part because they are connected to the
settlement, and Ian Paisley's party and Sinn Fein have done better. Membership in civil organizations is fairly high, but civil society is divided between the two communities (Wolff 2002, 107-108). The institutional model doesn't seem very helpful in this case.

Rather to my surprise, the cultural model seems to work best here. It may also explain the interesting fact that, despite the deep divisions in the society and the violent history that has been mythologized, casualties and mass mobilization are relatively low; one can plausibly argue that this is a case of terrorists or gangs with popular support rather than a war. This may have something to do with the fact that it is part of one of the older democracies in the world. My sense is that the model does in fact explain some of the relative moderation of violence, although obviously it is hard to persuade victims that the struggle is moderate. However, the democratic culture at work here seems to have been prewar rather than postsettlement; it seems unlikely that the culture of the postsettlement democracy explains much of what was going on.

Conclusion

We need to answer two types of questions: (1) Did the behavior predicted by the theories appear in the cases and (2) if so, how plausible is it that these behaviors account for the lack of resumption of civil war?

Table 5.1 summarizes my judgments about behaviors. The elite incentives model seems to do well in India-Sikh and South Africa; the fact that new challengers have not been brought into the political system reflects the fact that there haven't been many such challengers yet. The model does not do well in Northern Ireland, where elites remain deeply divided along the civil war lines. The cultural model, contrary to my expectations, also does well in India-Sikh and South Africa and less well in Northern Ireland. The institutional model starts off well, but it gets much weaker toward the end, in large part because there seems to be no real institutional constraint on decisions by the executive concerning renewed civil violence in any of the three countries.

I suspected, when I began this research, that the elite incentives model would do fairly well and that the cultural and institutional models would not. It seemed plausible that culture and institutions would take a long time to work, so neither explanation seemed well suited to civil war termination (and, of course, they were not developed for that purpose). Thus the surprise is the apparent success of the cultural model, at least in terms of behavior.

Table 5.1 Summary of Cases and Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>N. Ireland</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Elites and populations will increasingly believe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guarantees of political freedom and access</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Factions are more likely to believe that they can influence government decisions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Old coalitions, organized for the war, break up; the new ones are larger and include members from different sides of the previous civil war</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Competition becomes less intense since even losers believe they may be more successful in the future; political becomes less of a zero-sum game</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (no check on ANC)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Groups working outside the system increasingly get less public support.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. New challengers are brought into the political system and given a stake because of shifting coalitions.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cultural Model

2a1: Elites and publics should generally be opposed to large-scale use of violence to resolve political disputes.
2a2: Society should encourage and support individuals and groups with connections across competing factions.
2b1: Media will support individuals and groups advocating negotiation and compromise.
2b2: Societal discourse should stress unity rather than historic divisions.
2b3: Violence during the previous civil war should not be glorified.
2c1: Successful political strategies should stress conciliation rather than coercion.
2c2: Costly compromises should be accepted by publics and elites.
2c3: There should be considerable support for measures of transitional justice applied equitably to both sides, especially as regards individuals.
2c4: Leaders responsive to the public will be less likely to support war than those who are not.
3a1: Decision making will be more transparent to the public.
3a2: The media and the public are more likely to oppose a resort to civil war.

Institutional Model

No No No

Continued
Table 5.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>N. Ireland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3a: Leaders on both sides will have a more realistic understanding of the probable consequences of civil war.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b: Leaders on both sides are less likely to misjudge the intentions of their opponents.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c: Leaders with warlike constituencies are more likely to be less warlike than their followers.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d: Top government leaders who desire renewed civil war will be constrained by other individuals and institutions within government.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3e: Leaders believe that if they go to renewed civil war they will suffer politically if they lose.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3f: Leaders are likely to support negotiation and compromises, even those that are politically costly.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3g: Leaders in democracies whose executives are relatively constrained will be less likely to renew civil war than those in democracies with relatively unconstrained executives.</td>
<td>(low constraint)</td>
<td>(low constraint)</td>
<td>(low constraint)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3h: However, leaders whose public policies have failed are more likely to resort to civil war in order to redeem themselves</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

Yes means that the behavior predicted by the theory seems to have occurred.
No means that the behavior predicted by the theory does not seem to have occurred.
DK means don't know.
NA means not applicable.

Obviously the impact of these behaviors on the probability of civil war resumption is harder to establish. It necessarily reflects my own judgment, and I am far from being expert on any one of these three cases; at some point it may be appropriate to organize some sort of Delphi process to have real country experts analyze this issue more carefully. For what it's worth, my sense is that the elite incentive model does seem to have substantially reduced the likelihood of renewed civil war in India and South Africa, something that was not a foregone conclusion in either case. This process does not seem to have had a chance to work yet in Northern Ireland, and it may not be a coincidence that this is also the case where the renewal of violence seems the most probable.

I also think that the cultural behaviors have been important, not only in India and South Africa, but also in Northern Ireland. While I certainly cannot track this in my data, such as it is, I think that the low level of violence in Northern Ireland can best be explained by cultural norms against large-scale violence; there is evidence that, when one side escalates the violence, popular dissatisfaction with it seems to increase. On the other hand, I do not believe that the new institutions constitute a real check on the power of the executive in any of the three countries.

But this in turn raises a third question: Are the behaviors of the elite incentive and cultural models really caused by postsettlement democracy? I have become increasingly skeptical of this link in the argument. The most obvious problem is culture—how can a new democracy transmit cultural norms to a population in a short time? Is there another explanation for the existence of such norms?

One of the striking things about these three cases is the role of democracy before their civil wars. India and Northern Ireland had well-established democratic political systems long before the violence, and even South Africa had a set of democratic institutions in place, although obviously marred by the total exclusion of a majority of the population from them. In fact this background probably explains why democracy was so quickly established (or reestablished) in these cases. This also suggests that, if the cultural theory of democracy helps explain the nonresumption of violence in India and South Africa and the limited violence in Northern Ireland, it stems from prewar rather than postwar democracy, since it seems quite unlikely that postsettlement democracy could establish cultural norms in a few years. Prewar democracy may, then, be a preexisting variable that helps explain both postsettlement democracy and peace.

Elite incentives seems a more straightforward case, however. In earlier work I had linked this to powersharing, which was not necessarily linked to democracy (Licklider 1999). However, the large-N studies isolated powersharing and found that it had no independent impact on civil war resumption—in democracies and otherwise. The elite incentives model, then, is a logical product of postsettlement democracy and predicts some behavior that seems to make renewed civil war less likely. It thus may be one justification for attempting to establish democracy in such countries. However, we obviously need to see if these relationships hold for other countries, particularly those without prewar democracy, before we can have much confidence in their validity. We also need more quantitative analysis geared to intervening variables to uncover the conditions under which different causal processes are likely to appear. This in turn may suggest methods of reaching agreement on the theoretical foundations of the democratic peace findings in international relations.
Notes

This chapter is part of a larger project on the resumption of civil war, I acknowledge with gratitude major financial support on earlier aspects of the project by the United States Institute of Peace (grant 077-94F) and the Rutgers Center for Conflict Resolution and International Peace Studies, Manus Midlarsky, director, and research and collaboration by Pierre Atlas and Ayse Ozkan. For this particular chapter Jack Levy guided me through the thicket of the democratic peace literature, Amitabh Dubey generously provided me with his data, and Dubey, Bumba Mukherjee, and Beth Leech were enormously helpful in working through the intricacies of the data itself and the STATA statistical package. As always, however, the most important contributions were the thoughtful and incisive comments on this and earlier papers by my colleagues in Charles Tilly's Workshop on Contentious Politics at Columbia University. Unfortunately I cannot blame these kind people for the use I have made of their invaluable assistance.

1. This is an edited version of a longer set developed in conjunction with Pierre Atlas and Ayse Ozkan.

CHAPTER 6
DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND INTEGRATION: SYNERGIES ACROSS LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Harvey Starr

Introduction

There is no need to belabor an obvious observation regarding the current study of international relations—that the form of the governments of states, especially democratic forms—has played an increasingly important role in the theories and findings of a broad range of research programs. Over the past two decades, the "democratic peace" in all of its various forms, implications, and ramifications has been a (perhaps the) major focus of international relations (IR) scholars, producing a steadily cumulative research project investigating conflict, cooperation, and the relationship between internal and external politics (see Russett and Starr 2000; and especially Chernoff 2004).

As noted in Russett and Starr, among other overviews, a variety of theoretical explanations have been developed to explain why democratic states to date have avoided engaging in war with one another, and why the existence of democratic governments (especially stable and generally economically developed ones) produces a variety of related positive/cooperative behaviors, both dyadically and monadically. Such theories, which cross the boundaries between internal and external politics, include the initial models based on norms or values, structural constraints, and combined strategic models of democratic policy making based in rational choice.1
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