RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE
Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism

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Religion against the State
A Political Economy of Religious Radicalism in Egypt and Israel

ERIC DAVIS

Introduction

The recent rise of militant religio-political movements in the Middle East was unpredicted by Western social scientists. In the view of the dominant paradigm, orthodox development theory, secularism was assumed to be ascendant in the so-called developing countries. The rise of radical religio-political or religious nationalistic movements in the Middle East during the past decade and a half has proved this prediction false. The West was shocked and perplexed by the fall of the secular, pro-Western government of the shah of Iran, and its replacement by a radical Islamic Republic committed not only to completely restructurining Iranian society but also to overthrowing neighboring "infidel" regimes. The perception of an Islamic revival sweeping the Arab world was enhanced by the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1980 and the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat by Islamic militants in 1981. In Lebanon, attacks upon American and Israeli troops and the taking of American hostages by a shadowy group known as al-Jihad (Islamic Holy War) was seen as yet another indication of an Islamic revival.

Israel has also witnessed the emergence of a powerful religio-political movement. In the realm of foreign affairs, groups in this movement have argued that the whole of Jerusalem as well as the occupied territories belong to Israel by divine right; in domestic politics, they have increasingly tried to enforce public policy defined in religious terms. In its most extreme variants, Jewish radicalism has called for curtailing the rights of the non-Jewish citizenry of Israel, the Arabs, and even expelling them along with the Arabs of the occupied territories if they do not agree to an Israeli state defined in strictly Jewish terms.

No scholars have raised the question of whether or not the factors that have led to the rise of Islamic radicalism are also responsible for the rise of Jewish radicalism. Through an examination of the most powerful Islamic move-
ment in the Middle East, the Society of Muslim Brothers (or Muslim Brother- 
hood) in Egypt, and the most powerful religious-political movement in Israel, 
the Gush Emunim, as well as their more radical splinter groups. This study 
offers such a comparative analysis. Five sets of questions are posed. First, what 
is the ideological perspective of each of these groups? What is its funda- 
mental critique of society, and what are the social and political changes they 
seek to bring about? Second, what factors have stimulated the growth of these 
movements? Does their growth reflect a rise in religiousness in Egypt and Israel, 
or must additional explanatory factors be drawn upon to understand their 
expanded influence? Third, what are the social bases of the respective move- 
ments? What social groups support these movements, and why did they come 
to support them at a particular point in time? Fourth, what types of predic- 
tions can be made about the future political influence of these movements? 
What are their prospects for implementing their ideological objectives and 
perhaps even seizing political power and gaining control of the state? Fifth 
and finally, to what extent are the causal factors giving rise to these two move- 
ments similar, and to what extent are they different? Which social science 
models best explain these movements? 

Models of Religious Radicalism

The dominant explanation of the genesis of and political support for re- 
ligious radical movements has been centered around the concept of political 
culture. The rise of radical religio-political movements is seen as a response 
to changes in the core values of the dominant political culture of the two 
countries in question. These changes are in turn seen as reactions to two cri- 
cital events—the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 and that of October 1973— 
which led to major shifts in public opinion and political attitudes.

The historicism of models based upon political culture leads to several 
thoretical shortcomings. In avoiding historical analysis, these models treat 
religious radicalism as largely isolated from the dominant societal ideology, 
the state, and the socioeconomic environment. According to an alternative 
perspective, an explanation of the rise to prominence of radical religio-political 
movements in Egypt and Israel requires a historical and structural analysis 
involving three basic elements. First, these movements need to be seen 
as one of a number of possible logical responses to the breakdown of the cor- 
paratus inherent in Arab nationalism and Zionism, both of which have tra- 
ditionally aimed at integrating secular and religious symbols. Second, these 
movements should be viewed as responses to changes in the world market, 
the endogenous class structure, and the state apparatus—al of which have 
undermined the traditional corporate unity of Arab nationalism and Zion- 
ism. Finally, it is necessary to incorporate the impact of specific catalysts, such 
as the June 1967 and October 1973 wars, since such catalysts tend to ac- 
celerate the crystallization of new and emerging countervailing political coal- 
tions and new symbol structures resulting from transformations in the class 
bases of Arab nationalism and Zionism as political movements. In this way, 
models, informed by the political economy tradition, the rise of radical religio- 
political movements can be seen as the unraveling of Arab nationalism and Zionism as movements. This unraveling has been the result of demographic 
changes, changes in the world market, and the behavior of dominant politi- 

cal elites and bourgeoisie in both Egypt and Israel. Because of such factors, 
Arab nationalism and Zionism no longer speak to basic social needs or reflect 
the changing class, political, and cultural base of Egyptian and Israeli socie- 
ties, respectively.

The rise of religious radicalism must be understood as much as a failure 
of leftist and secular ideologies as a resurgence of interest in religion. Tradi- 
tionally, dominant elites are unable to sustain ideological fervor in the face 
of such external pressures as the world market and such internal pressures 
as changes in the dynamic social structure and the dominant ideology. Reli- 
gious radicalism—or whatever some have referred to as religious nationalism—is 
not supported by all strata of society, but largely by members of the middle 
and lower middle classes, particularly those who are upwardly mobile (or as- 
spire to upward mobility). Historically, these groups have largely been excluded 
from political participation. They reject the dominant social ideology. In for- 
mulating a religiously based ideology, these groups seek to restructure the 
state and civil society according to their own hegemonic vision. 

I ideological Perspectives: The Two Movements Compared

The religious radical or religious nationalist movements in Egypt and Is- 
rael share many similarities. First, each seeks to restructure society along more 
overseas religious lines. Second, both agree that the laws enshrined in the Torah 
and the Quran, respectively, are absolute and indivisible, and therefore cannot 
be subject to human debate. An authoritarian tendency is implicit in 
each movement's worldview: both movements claim to possess the "true" un- 
derstanding of God's desires, and so know how they should be interpreted 
and applied. As a result, there is little room for compromise and bargaining 
between these movements and the secular state. Third, both believe that su-
ciety cannot hope to maintain a sense of mission and purpose if organized on a purely secular basis. Both movements therefore resort to an anamnestic and mystical interpretation of religious affairs as they relate to social organization and political legitimacy. Since the reasoning behind divine prescriptions can only be known to God and not to mortal men, Islam and Judaism are ultimately comprehended in a mystical or intuitive manner.

Both Islamic and Jewish religious radical organizations seek to promote the use of religious texts as the basic elements in the determination of public policy. Legal codes and personal conduct or morality in Israel should conform to the dictates of the Torah, while in Egypt they should follow the dictates of the Quran. Adherence to both movements feel that the distinctive character of Egyptian and of Israeli society is to be found in their respective religions. Islam and Judaism are conceived as more than narrow doctrines of faith reserved for the Friday prayer, the Sabbath, or religious holidays; rather, Islam and Judaism are comprehensive belief systems that provide the individual believer with everything needed to pursue a moral and religiously correct life.

Religious radicalism holds the opposite attitude toward alien values—particularly, those values emanating from the West and from the socialist countries. The worst characteristic of these countries is thought to be their promotion of secularism. Secularism in the West is associated with materialism and an individualistic perspective on life. These values are seen as the cause of the erosion of social solidarity in Western society. The moral decay, the breakdown of the family, and the isolation of individuals observed in Western industrialized societies are beginning to corrupt Egyptian and Israeli society as well. At the political level, the corrosive effect of imported and alien values are reflected in excessive corruption in public life. Socialism is even more violently condemned, since it explicitly rejects religion and seeks to substitute materialism for spiritualism. As a result, no basis for societal morality exists.

One of the more obvious characteristics of radical religio-political ideology is the linking of the personal and the public spheres. Great emphasis is placed upon strengthening the family, particularly upon strengthening the position of the male while confining the female to such traditional roles as the socialization of children. Given a social environment seen as hostile to core religious values, the family becomes the central institution for protecting and promoting such values. In the process of strengthening the family, both Muslim and Jewish women find restrictions on their ability to control their futures.

These ideological orientations of the two movements are paralleled by a distaste for party politics. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gush Emunim have refused to constitute themselves as political parties, reflecting their aversion to what they see as the corrupt nature of secular political life. In order to hold themselves above the rest of society, these two groups do not want to stoop to the level of their adversaries. Putting their policies to a vote by the public would imply that the dictates of God can be judged by the populace at large. This is an unacceptable notion: absolutes are eternal and cannot be judged by mankind.

Structural Determinants of Religious Radicalism in Egypt and Israel

In addition to sharing similar ideologies, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gush Emunim are the outgrowths of similar, long-term structural changes in Egyptian and Israeli society. The war of 1967 and 1973 are only catalysts that accelerated ongoing processes of social change. The development of nationalism among the Arabs and the Jews underwent two historical phases: liberalism and corporatism. For the Arabs, liberal nationalism was largely centered in individual Arab countries like Egypt and Iraq, where it sought to achieve political independence from colonial rule but eschewed any attempts to restructure the social and economic bases of society. Zionism also began with a liberal phase under the leadership of Theodor Herzl. Primarily concerned with the "problem of the Jews"—namely, the establishment of a nation-state to provide a haven from antisemitism—Herzl and the political Zionists offered little in the way of a socioeconomic program for the new Jewish state.

Historically, both Arab nationalism and Zionism have had very specific class bases. Although both nationalist movements did derive some support, especially in their early phases, from sectors of the upper class, the initial social base of the two ideologies drew largely upon the middle and lower middle classes. As with many forms of nationalism, Arabism and Zionism represent political ideologies that attempted to synthesize religious and national symbols.

Zionism and Arab Nationalism in Their Historical Context

Between 1880 and the early 1930s, Zionist settlers were largely drawn from the lower middle class—particularly, the small traders, artisans, and petty merchants. The Zionists wished to escape their socioeconomic status in Eastern Europe and Russia; they were determined to become landowners, and thereby
join the "natural." As opposed to the makes-economy. In most respects, their development was Unogke social. This was the case. When the majority of the people live in the community, they are more likely to form political institutions, particularly of a more permanent nature. The tendency of the people within the community is to vote and vote for their political institutions, which is more likely to lead to the formation of political institutions, particularly of a more permanent nature.

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The Decline of Labor Zionism and Corporatist Arab Nationalism: Hegemony

The dominance of Labor Zionism ideology following the creation of the state of Israel was a natural result of its dominance of the socioeconomic and political life of the Jewish community, or yishuv. Labor Zionism demystified the class nature of Jewish society. In a certain degree such an ideological position was understandable, since the Jews of the ghettos and the villages of Poland and Russia where Zionist first took root were not highly socially stratified. This situation continued throughout the early period of Zionist settlement in Palestine, from the first migration in 1882 until the early 1920s. Once mass work had been paralleled by mass movements throughout Europe, Jewish emigration from Europe—particularly from Germany—began to take a dramatic upturn. Often of relatively well-to-do background and very individualistic, the German Jews possessed little desire to participate in a collective society centered around the kibbutz. A small but significant portion of Eastern European Jewish immigrants to Palestine were turning to a new, millenarian variant of Zionism, namely Revisionism. Revisionism, as articulated by Vladimir Jabotinsky and his followers (including Menachem Begin), held little sympathy for socialism. With Zionism on the rise in Europe, and the conflicts between Arabs and Zionists intensifying in Palestine, Revisionism thinking emphasized political power and the military might needed to acquire such power.

Following World War II (but especially after 1948), the newly created state of Israel witnessed the influx of a large number of Arab Jews from surrounding Arab countries and from North Africa. The influx of German settlers, East European Revisionists, and ultimately large numbers of Arab Jews created a political stratum that did not wield political power in proportion to their numbers. This was due to the breakdown of early Zionists, settlers in institutionalizing their position by developing such institutions as the Histadrut, or Jewish labor federation, which also came to own and operate a wide variety of economic enterprises. German settlers, the Revisionists, and the Arab Jews possessed little of this collective tradition. Thus they were disadvantaged in two respects. This diverse group possessed neither the institutional network of the Labor Zionists nor an organizational tradition for mobilizing to challenge it. The heterogeneity of their social and cultural backgrounds was perhaps the greatest barrier of all to effective collective political action.

With the advent of independence, Labor Zionists in the Israeli parliament (Knesset) were able to further consolidate their power through transforming the economic institutions of the yishuv into state enterprises. This process institutionalized the labor party both as a political and economic elite. The Labor party was further strengthened by the significant influx of foreign
capital during the post-1948 period, including American foreign aid contributions from Western Jewry (particularly from the United States), and reparations payments from West Germany. Wielded sales of Israeli bonds alone accounted for $4.5 billion in funds between 1971 and 1978.10 Further economic benefits resulted from the large amounts of cheap labor in the form of Arab Jews, especially those of Moroccan origin and the Palestinian Arabs who now found themselves living in the Israeli state. With the tremendous boost in construction occasioned by the need for housing and infrastructural development, the Israeli economy experienced an annual growth rate of roughly ten percent between 1950 and 1967. Only Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan achieved a comparable growth during the same period of time.11 The development of state enterprises institutionalized the social welfare policies of the Jewish community. The state became the employer of a large sector of the labor force in a country of the responsibility fulfilled by Zionist organizations in providing for Jewish settlers prior to the formation of the state. As in Egypt, the result of this policy was the creation of a large number of protected but ineffectual state enterprises. Following the 1973 war, only 25% of the Israeli labor force was employed in industry, while over half was employed in state enterprises or in the service sector.12 Perhaps most critical for the economy was the institutionalization of the system of wage-price indexation, whereby a worker's wages rose as fast as the rate of inflation. This policy was an outcome of the corporatist character of Labor Zionism ideology. While enhancing social solidarity and labor peace, it placed severe constraints on the Israeli economy once it entered a period of severe inflation. This represented the contradiction of an ideology that tried to achieve class harmony through both denigrating class differences and strengthening to give all classes a significant portion of the national economic pie. Hyperinflation made clear the class nature of Israeli society, since the bourgeoisie found itself tied to policies that prevailed in the framework of economic change opera the working class. As one official stated, "Nobody suffers much from inflation, so it is hard for us to argue the need for restraint."13 The notion of indexing, which had become part of the hegemonic ideology promoted for over half a century by Labor Zionism, could not be readily undone without strong pressure from the working class as well as from white-collar workers employed by the state.

Politically, the Labor party concluded a tacit agreement with the religious parties. In return for their acquiescence to Labor party hegemony in economic, defense, and foreign policy, the religious parties were given control of the religious affairs and education ministries. Although professing socialist values, the Labor party was giving significant power over the socialization of the next generation of Israelis to sociopolitical forces that amortized an ideology opposed to secular values. This decision should be seen not only as a necessary response but also as a decline in commitment to socialist ideology among Labor party members themselves. The fact that only now constituted the dominant political and economic elite led to a rethinking of this commitment. During the 1970s and 1980s, the type of consensus that was later to be expected began to develop as some Labor party members used their positions within the state public sector to advance their own economic interests.14 Although many Israelis were benefiting from economic policies fostered by the state, the sense of struggle and communal solidarity that had characterized the yishuv was on the wane. The sense of social solidarity that had existed prior to 1948 was less in evidence as economic prosperity accentuated an individualistic and materialistic ethic. The ethnic homogeneity of Israeli society based upon Eastern European Ashkenazi dominance changed with the influx of Arab, and to a lesser extent American and Russian, Jews. At the same time, due to rates of population growth, the Arab Jewish population—the so-called Oritz—was increasing in number. Likewise, a second generation of leaders from the religious parties and the Revisionist movement—groups that were not committed to the collective ethic of Labor Zionism—was coming of age. In many instances, these individuals were either upwardly mobile or aspirants to upward mobility who realized the domination of the socioeconomic system by the Labor party elite. For them, as for many Israelis, the concept of socialism became increasingly meaningless in ideological terms. Indeed the term assumed a pejorative connotation as it came to be associated with the domination of the political and economic system by an Eastern European Jewish elite that still drew its ideological legitimacy from the yishuv.

Iideological Vacuum and Growth of the Right We can now point to the conditions leading to the rise of religious radicalism in Israel. First, the emergence of the Gush Emunim resulted not so much from religious resurgence as from a much more complex conjunction of structural changes and events. The rightward drift of Israeli politics since 1967 came as much from a failure of the left as from a strengthening of the right. After years in power, the Labor party began to lose control of the state it granted, allowing the development of a power vacuum within which other political parties could then operate. Second, the Labor party was not sufficiently attuned to the changing demographics of Israeli society. The growing Oritz community was largely ignored and viewed in a patronizing and condon ing manner. A third factor concerns changing economic conditions. By the
Given the already tense situation in the region resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict, the developments in the Middle East in 1973-74 were seen as a turning point in the history of the region. The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74, initiated by OPEC and supported by many Arab countries, led to a significant increase in oil prices and had profound economic and political consequences. The Arab Oil Embargo demonstrated the power of oil-producing countries and underscored the vulnerability of consuming countries to oil disruptions.

The two Arab-Israeli wars of 1973 and 1974 further exacerbated the tensions in the region. The October War of 1973, also known as the Yom Kippur War, marked a significant shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. The war resulted in a near-victory for Egypt, but with significant losses for both sides. The war also demonstrated the limitations of military power, as well as the strategic importance of opposing industrialized countries.

The economic consequences of the Arab Oil Embargo were far-reaching. The sharp increase in oil prices had a significant impact on the global economy, leading to inflation and economic slowdown in many countries. The embargo also highlighted the interdependence of oil-producing and oil-consuming countries, and the vulnerability of the world economy to disruptions in oil supplies.

The Arab Oil Embargo and the two Arab-Israeli wars of 1973 and 1974 marked a significant turning point in the history of the Middle East. They demonstrated the power of oil producing countries and the vulnerability of consuming countries to oil disruptions, and had profound economic and political consequences.
The major impact of the October 1973 war was to increase the power of the religious right in both Egypt and Israel. However, in the Egyptian case, the religious right was already well established, and the war only solidified its position. In Israel, the religious right was not as well established, and the war provided an opportunity for it to gain influence. The war also led to the ascension of a new political figure, Golda Meir, who was not as ideologically committed to the religious right as her predecessor, Levi Eshkol. However, the war did provide an opportunity for the religious right to gain influence, and it did so by putting pressure on the government to adopt a more hardline stance towards Egypt and to support the construction of a new capital city, Gush Einaim, in order to gain more influence within the state. However, the period following the October 1973 war was also a time of change, as the religious right continued to struggle against the secular left, and the Israeli government began to shift towards a more moderate stance. The war also led to a growth in the economy, as the government began to invest in new industries and infrastructure, which helped to boost the economy and create jobs. However, the war also had a negative impact on the economy, as the country was left with a large debt and the cost of reconstruction was enormous. Overall, the war had a complex and multifaceted impact on the political and economic landscape of the Middle East, and its effects are still felt today.
Anatomy of the Coptic Egyptian and the Modern Brotherhood

The spread of Islam in the Egyptian and Jewish religious movements is often

light upon the nature of the relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Coptic Egyptian Brotherhood. An analysis of the membership of the two groups and the spread of their respective ideologies to both the dominant power structure and the dominant ideology. Additionally, the rise of the Arab nationalism movement and the Egyptian Brotherhood under Mubarak have both helped to shape the Coptic Brotherhood in terms of its role in the Egyptian society. Indeed, the Coptic Brotherhood, like many other religious movements, has been effective in promoting a specific version of Islam and religious values. In recent years, the Coptic Brotherhood has been a key player in the political arena, with its members participating in various elections and political parties. The Brotherhood has also played a significant role in the social and economic development of the region, with its members engaging in various charitable and educational activities. Overall, the spread of Islam in the Egyptian and Jewish religious movements is a complex phenomenon that is shaped by a multitude of factors, including historical, cultural, and political factors. The ongoing struggle between the Coptic Brotherhood and the Egyptian government is a testament to the ongoing challenges faced by religious movements in the region. However, it is clear that the spread of Islam in the Egyptian and Jewish religious movements is a powerful force that continues to shape the political and social landscape of the region.
ounced in Egypt, which has a much more fragile economy than Israel. Nevertheless, we can also expect the appeal to grow in Israel, where economic expectations are higher and where the government has only been able to bring down a highly destructive inflation rate through elimination of employment in the state bureaucracy and in the state-controlled public sector, and through eroding the traditional system of indexing wages to inflation—a policy part of the corporatist consensus originally raised by the Labor Zionist ideology.  

Conclusion: Religion against the State 

This essay has sought to provide a comparative analysis of religious radicalism in Egypt and Israel. It has attempted to move the discourse on religious radicalism, with its attendant focus upon revival, resurgence, and fundamentalism, away from a narrow cultural to a broader socioeconomic analysis. The significance of culture is not eschewed; quite the opposite, the reconstruction of Islam and Judaism by religious radicals in a more explicitly and modern political manner demonstrates the centrality of culture.

The phenomenon of religious radicalism has been analyzed in a dynamic fashion that allows us both to understand its genesis and evolution and to make some predictions about its future course of developments. The type of cultural approach that has dominated the analysis of religious radicalism to date is too static. It fails to explain why religious radicalism has become so salient for Egyptians and Israelis at this particular point in time as well as for so many other citizens in developing as well as in Western countries.

The discourse on Islamic and Jewish radicalism needs to be broadened temporally to encompass a historical focus. Such an approach is intended as an antidote to the tendency to reduce religion—to see the strength of religious radicalism largely in terms of religion itself. Rather, any theory of the rise to prominence of such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Gush Emunim, and their more radical offshoots must situate their strength in the weakness of the forces with which they are struggling as much as in the inherent strength of religion cast as a political ideology. The ideological weakness of corporatist Arab nationalism (Nasserism, for example) and Labor Zionism lies in their inability to provide either an effective model of societal organization or a symbolic nexus to meaningfully interpret social reality for large segments of the population. As a result, a political space was opened for religious groups to offer itself as a competing ideology.

These ideologies have not appealed in any significant way to either the upper or lower classes. They have addressed themselves primarily to the con-

cents of the upwardly mobile lower middle classes in both Egypt and Israel. As economic conditions in both societies have deteriorated (due to the inability of political elites to protect these classes from the negative impact of world-market forces), religious nationalism has begun to appeal to elements of the lower classes that feel increasingly dependent about their ability to achieve upward mobility. In Egypt, these lower-class recruits are in actuality often downwardly mobile lower middle-class youth who have dropped out of the university and gone up hope of achieving a meaningful career. In Israel, the movement has taken a more violent and violent tone among sectors of the working class that feel threatened by Arab labor. Religious nationalism appears to have broadened its appeal to the lower classes, and in the process become more radical. In Egypt, however, the "lower classes" seem in fact to be downwardly mobile lower middle-class youth, while in Israel the workers who support the Kach movement come from the "autochtony of labor"—namely, those Oriental Jews who seek to retain their material and psychological advantage over the even poorer strata of Arab workers. Those who avoid a class analysis of religious radicalism fail to explain why the movement appeals only to certain strata of society and not to others.

Despite the cooperation between the state and the religious radical movements at various periods, such as during the early years of the Sadat and Begin regimes, these movements ultimately seek to impose their own vision on society in opposition to the state. While the Muslim Brotherhood is but a shell of itself when compared to the large business, educational, and health infrastructure that it possessed prior to being disbanded in 1954, the attempts to create a society within a society has fallen to more radical groups of youth, such as the Society of Muslims and al-Jihad. The establishment of urban and desert communes as well as the use of the mosque in lower middle-class quarters of Cairo and other urban areas represent the start of what Gramsci referred to as the "war of position." Reinterpretations of Islam by such thinkers as Suleymen Faraj and Shakhri Khilf and the extensive use of the writings of Sayyid Qutb form the core of a counter-ideology to the symbolically dislocated state ideology synthesizing in an unimaginable way remnants of Nasserism, Western liberalism, and reformism (i.e., modernized Islam).  

In Israel, the efforts to create a new, alternative society have gone even further. In the West Bank in particular, the Gush Emunim has fashioned a minisate complete with municipal administration, educational system, and paramilitary organization, and a religious intelligentsia that provides an alternative ideology to both Labor Zionism and the orthodox religion of the chief rabbinate. As the efforts to remove the Sinai settlement of Yami demonstrated, any attempt by the state to dismantle Gush Emunim settlements in the West Bank will face fierce opposition. Indeed, it would lead to civil war, many Gush
Emnun members have asserted. Despite the distress of many members of the movement for violence, Gush Emunim efforts to blow up the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem and the uncovering of a terrorist underground linked to the movement indicate that it is an important component of the Gush's strategy to ultimately control the state.57

Unless the left in both Egypt and Israel is able to develop more organizational strength (which is very difficult given their inability to date to generate viable public policies to confront development problems), the religious nationalist movement will continue to expand its influence. A central question is whether or not an "Arabian" strategy is a possibility. Given their relatively narrow class base and their lack of control of the armed forces, the coming to power of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Gush Emunim or any of their splinter groups in the near future seems highly unlikely. Rather, the growth of these movements symbolizes the expansion of increasingly chauvinist, xenophobic, parochial, and obscurantist politics in both Egypt and Israel. In the short term, such policies will benefit the Egyptian and Israeli bourgeoisie, who will be able to exploit this trend to threaten efforts at social and economic reforms by progressive groups. Perhaps more sobering, the growth of religious radicalism bodes ill for any meaningful solution to the Palestinian problem in the near future as well as for the continuation of peace between Egypt and Israel. Continued increase in tension between the state and the religious radical movements can be predicted as each seeks to manipulate the other in order to expand its influence within society at large.

Notes


5. This emphasis is clear in the writings of the foremost Labor Zionists thinker, A. D. Gordon: "Not that we write ourselves to the world proletarian, the international, whose actions and whose methods are basically opposed to us. . . . I believe that we should not even combine with Jewish workers in the Diaspora specifically as workers, much as we regret labor; they should be our allies as Jews, just like other Jews in the Diaspora who share our aspirations, no more and no less. We must draw our inspiration from our land, from the life on our own soil, from the labor we are engaged in, and must be on guard against allowing too many influences from outside to affect us." Gordon, "Our Task Ahead," in Arthur Hertzberg, ed., The Zionist Idea (New York: Athenia Press, 1963), p. 182.


9. Political (or Liberal) Zionism, in the thought of such thinkers as Theodor Herzl, Max Nordau, and Leon Pinsker, dominated the Zionist movement for only a relatively short period of time. It was a movement that reflected the concerns of the more assimilated middle and upper-middle-class Jews of Germany and Western Europe. As is well known, in its primary cause was the "problem of the Jews"—specifically, their safety from the pogroms and persecution in Eastern Europe. Unable to speak to the more socioeconomic and spiritual trends of lower middle and lower-class Jews, it was soon swept away by Labor Zionism.


11. Idem, idem, idem.

12. Idem, idem, idem.

13. Idem, idem.


17. Ibid., p. 577.


22. Ibid.

23. Actually, the founding of the Gush Emunim can be seen as the outgrowth of an earlier prototype: the Land of Canaan Israeli Movement. This movement, founded after the June 1967 war, was highly significant in that it represented the first time that fundamental ideological cleavages in Israeli society were manifested. Thus the movement attached Ankbeinu who sought
to evacuate the Zionism ethos of pioneering, as well as religious nationalism who considered set-

ttlement in the occupied territories their divinely ordained "city." On the Land of Greater Israel


45-72.

24. On the social bases of the Gush Emunim, see the references cited in n. 16, above. On the

more radical split of the Gush Emunim, the Kach organizations, see Yair Petrol and Gior-

di Shafii, "Thorns in Your Eye," The Social-Economic Basis of the Kach Party, mimeographed

(b.p., n.d.), Yehud Spernak, "Kach and Meir Kahane: The Emergence of Jewish Quasi-Fascism,"

Patterns of Prejudice 15, nos. 3, 4 (1981), reprinted by the American Jewish Committee; and

Liran Weinstein, "The Demise of the Jews," New Republic no. 3,059 (1 November 1983): 15-

25. On violent activities, particularly against the Arab population of the occupied territories by

both the Gush Emunim and the Kach organizations, see Robert J. Friedman, "In the Realm


bases of the modem Brotherhood and more radical Islamic organizations, see Eric Davis, "Ideol-

ogy, Social Cuts and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt," in S. Arjomand, ed., From National-


25. A comment by an American emigrant to Israel is indicative of the attitude toward a global

masculine culture expressed often by Israelis and Egyptians who provide the recruitment base

for Islamic and Jewish radicals: "In the States the constant fighting for the back...it's bad

for the kids and it's bad for their parents...they are suffering, in a way so too, somewhere

on the Golani, will never suffer. Those kids are shooting on America's efficiency. They have no


Benovitz, The Wise Band Data Project (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Insti-


(Fall 1980): 30-40.

29. See Avraham, "American Immigrants," Newman, "Role of Gush Emunim," and Woman,

"Political and Social Attitudes,"

30. Keppel, Prophet and the Pharaoh, esp. pp. 70-7.10, 191-218, and Israel Alattina, "Is-


32. Meron Benvenisti, "Israel's Economic Crisis," MIDEQP Research, no. 161 (July-Octo-


33. That rise of religious radicalism and religious nationalism has not limited to the Mid-

dle East but has a broad base at the advanced capitalistic countries of the West should be obvious.

In the West, the failure of a "left" alternative such as New Deal liberalism to provide economic

and social security is very apparent. On religious radicalism in the United States, see Robert C.


Company, 1983).


16-22.

37. See Friedman, "In the Brain," for a discussion of religious activities of some Gush

Emunim members.